Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
9 California opinions name it 2 courts 2015–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
The People v. Super. Ct.green2 sentences2016This court has previously rejected the contention that section 1170.126 creates a presumption in favor of resentencing. ( Esparza, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th 726, 793 ; accord, Kaulick, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1301-1302 .) Again defendant offers no compelling reason to depart from that holding. 2016This court has previously rejected the contention that section 1170.126 creates a presumption in favor of resentencing. ( Esparza, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th 726, 793 ; accord, Kaulick, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1301-1302 .) Again defendant offers no compelling reason to depart from that holding. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Guinnred2 sentences2016Defendant challenges that analysis and claims that People v. Guinn (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1130 , 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 791 ( Guinn ) establishes that section 1170.126 creates a presumption. 2016Defendant challenges that analysis and claims that People v. Guinn (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1130 , 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 791 ( Guinn ) establishes that section 1170.126 creates a presumption. | 1 | 5 |
People v. Gutierrezgreen2 sentences2016The Guinn court held, based on a statutory construction analysis, that section 190.5 established a presumption of life without parole as the sentence for a 16- or 17-year-old minor convicted of a special circumstance murder. *236 ( Guinn, at pp. 1141-1142, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 791 .) Section 190.5 provides that the penalty "shall be confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole or, at the discretion of the court, 25 years to life." (§ 190.5, subd. (b).) In People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354 , 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 421 , 324 P.3d 245 ( Gutierrez ), the California Suprem 2015The text of section 190.5[, subdivision] (b) does not clearly indicate whether the statute was intended to make life without parole the presumptive sentence.” (People v. Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1371 .) Given our Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 190.5, we do not believe the language of section 1170.126 creates a presumption in favor of resentencing. | 1 | 3 |
Apprendi v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences2016In Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 ( Apprendi ), the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires that, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." ( Apprendi, at p. 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348 , italics *773 added.) The Second District found that there was no presumption under section 1170.126 that an eligible petitioner was entitled to resentencing. 2016In Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 ( Apprendi ), the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires that, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." ( Apprendi, at p. 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348 , italics *773 added.) The Second District found that there was no presumption under section 1170.126 that an eligible petitioner was entitled to resentencing. | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Esparza
green
2 sentences2016This court has previously rejected the contention that section 1170.126 creates a presumption in favor of resentencing. ( Esparza, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th 726, 793 ; accord, Kaulick, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1301-1302 .) Again defendant offers no compelling reason to depart from that holding. 2016This court has previously rejected the contention that section 1170.126 creates a presumption in favor of resentencing. ( Esparza, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th 726, 793 ; accord, Kaulick, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1301-1302 .) Again defendant offers no compelling reason to depart from that holding. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Conley
green
2 sentences2021(People v. Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 656-659.) “Section 1170.126 creates a special mechanism that entitles all persons ‘presently serving’ indeterminate life terms imposed under the prior law to seek resentencing under the new law. 2021(People v. Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 656 .) However, section 1170.126 rebuts that presumption. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Superior Court (Romero)
green
2 sentences2016Appellant also argues that Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497 is relevant in interpreting section 1170.126. 2016Appellant also argues that Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497 is relevant in interpreting section 1170.126. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2016(Martinez, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 988-989.) After an inmate has satisfied these criteria, he or she “shall be resentenced [as a second strike offender] unless the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the [inmate] would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (f), italics added.) Relying on People v. Guinn (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1130 (Guinn), defendant contends that the use of “shall”/“unless” language of section 1170.126 creates a presumption that the court shall reduce a life-term to a second-strike sentence. 15 Guinn held that section | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Ybarra
red
1 sentence2015First, defendant points to the language of section 1170.126, subdivision (f), which states that “the petitioner shall be resentenced pursuant to [a second-strike term] unless the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (Italics added.) He argues that the “shall/unless” language establishes a presumption in favor of resentencing a petitioner that can only be overcome if the court finds the petitioner would present an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. 13 To support this proposition, defendant r | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Murray
red
1 sentence2015First, defendant points to the language of section 1170.126, subdivision (f), which states that “the petitioner shall be resentenced pursuant to [a second-strike term] unless the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (Italics added.) He argues that the “shall/unless” language establishes a presumption in favor of resentencing a petitioner that can only be overcome if the court finds the petitioner would present an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. 13 To support this proposition, defendant r | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.