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9 California opinions name it 2 courts 1930–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Burgess v. Cahillgreen2 sentences1972Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 142 , 153 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 373 P.2d 640 ], the court stated the entire automobile financial responsibility law must be liberally construed to foster its main objective of giving “ ‘monetary protection to that ever changing and tragically large group of persons, who while lawfully using the highways themselves suffer grave injury through the negligent use of those highways by others.’ ” And at page 154 the court stated; “The pattern is clearly discernible: a desire on the part of the judiciary and the Legislature to not only prevent the astronomical accident toll in thi 1972Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 142 , 153 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 373 P.2d 640 ], the court stated the entire automobile financial responsibility law must be liberally construed to foster its main objective of giving “ ‘monetary protection to that ever changing and tragically large group of persons, who while lawfully using the highways themselves suffer grave injury through the negligent use of those highways by others.’ ” And at page 154 the court stated; “The pattern is clearly discernible: a desire on the part of the judiciary and the Legislature to not only prevent the astronomical accident toll in thi | 2 | 2 |
Brown v. Chevrolet Motor Co.green2 sentences1933(Brown v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 39 Cal. App. 738 [ 179 Pac. 697 ]; Barton v. McDermott, 108 Cal. App. 372 [ 291 Pac. 591 ].) The above-mentioned statute, however, imposes upon the owner of a motor vehicle, merely by virtue of ownership, a new liability analogous to the liability which arises from the doctrine of respondeat superior. 1933(Brown v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 39 Cal. App. 738 [ 179 Pac. 697 ]; Barton v. McDermott, 108 Cal. App. 372 [ 291 Pac. 591 ].) The above-mentioned statute, however, imposes upon the owner of a motor vehicle, merely by virtue of ownership, a new liability analogous to the liability which arises from the doctrine of respondeat superior. | 1 | 2 |
Tunkl v. Regents of University of Californiagreen2 sentences2025(See maj. opn., ante, at p. 20, fn. 2; see also Tunkl, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 96, fn. 3 [approvingly quoting commentator’s skepticism that § 1668 was meant to invalidate all contractual releases for liability for negligence “ ‘where the negligence consists of violation of one of the many hundreds of statutory provisions setting forth standards of care’ ”].) And at the same time that the Legislature enacted section 1668, the Legislature also enacted Civil Code section 3513, which provides: “Any one may waive the advantage of a law intended solely for their benefit. 2025(See maj. opn., ante, at p. 20, fn. 2; see also Tunkl, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 96, fn. 3 [approvingly quoting commentator’s skepticism that § 1668 was meant to invalidate all contractual releases for liability for negligence “ ‘where the negligence consists of violation of one of the many hundreds of statutory provisions setting forth standards of care’ ”].) And at the same time that the Legislature enacted section 1668, the Legislature also enacted Civil Code section 3513, which provides: “Any one may waive the advantage of a law intended solely for their benefit. | 1 | 1 |
Mason v. Russellgreen2 sentences1972Co. v. Consolidated Freightways (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 774, 781 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 789 ]; Mason v. Russell (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 391, 393 [ 322 P.2d 486 ]; Webster v. Zevin (1947) 77 Cal.App.2d 855, 859 [ 176 P.2d 960 ].) We, therefore, hold that the legislative intent in the enactment of the statutes (Veh. 1972Co. v. Consolidated Freightways (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 774, 781 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 789 ]; Mason v. Russell (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 391, 393 [ 322 P.2d 486 ]; Webster v. Zevin (1947) 77 Cal.App.2d 855, 859 [ 176 P.2d 960 ].) We, therefore, hold that the legislative intent in the enactment of the statutes (Veh. | 1 | 1 |
Webster v. Zevingreen2 sentences1972Co. v. Consolidated Freightways (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 774, 781 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 789 ]; Mason v. Russell (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 391, 393 [ 322 P.2d 486 ]; Webster v. Zevin (1947) 77 Cal.App.2d 855, 859 [ 176 P.2d 960 ].) We, therefore, hold that the legislative intent in the enactment of the statutes (Veh. 1972Co. v. Consolidated Freightways (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 774, 781 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 789 ]; Mason v. Russell (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 391, 393 [ 322 P.2d 486 ]; Webster v. Zevin (1947) 77 Cal.App.2d 855, 859 [ 176 P.2d 960 ].) We, therefore, hold that the legislative intent in the enactment of the statutes (Veh. | 1 | 1 |
Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Freightwaysgreen2 sentences1972Co. v. Consolidated Freightways (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 774, 781 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 789 ]; Mason v. Russell (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 391, 393 [ 322 P.2d 486 ]; Webster v. Zevin (1947) 77 Cal.App.2d 855, 859 [ 176 P.2d 960 ].) We, therefore, hold that the legislative intent in the enactment of the statutes (Veh. 1972Co. v. Consolidated Freightways (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 774, 781 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 789 ]; Mason v. Russell (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 391, 393 [ 322 P.2d 486 ]; Webster v. Zevin (1947) 77 Cal.App.2d 855, 859 [ 176 P.2d 960 ].) We, therefore, hold that the legislative intent in the enactment of the statutes (Veh. | 1 | 1 |
Grantham v. Ordwaygreen2 sentences1930(Aubel v. Sosso, 72 Cal. App. 57, 62 [ 236 Pac. 319 ]; Fahey v. Madden, 56 Cal. App. 593 [ 206 Pac. 128 ]; Hall v. Puente Oil Co., 47 Cal. App. 611 [ 191 Pac. 39 ]; Brown v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 39 Cal. App. 738, 741 [ 179 Pac. 697 ].) However, when the relation of master and servant is established, and it also appears that the car driven by the servant belongs to the master, there arises a prima facie inference, sometimes even characterized as amounting to a presumption, that the servant in driving it was acting within the scope of his employment *379 (Grantham v. Ordway, 40 Cal. App. 758, 76 1930(Aubel v. Sosso, 72 Cal. App. 57, 62 [ 236 Pac. 319 ]; Fahey v. Madden, 56 Cal. App. 593 [ 206 Pac. 128 ]; Hall v. Puente Oil Co., 47 Cal. App. 611 [ 191 Pac. 39 ]; Brown v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 39 Cal. App. 738, 741 [ 179 Pac. 697 ].) However, when the relation of master and servant is established, and it also appears that the car driven by the servant belongs to the master, there arises a prima facie inference, sometimes even characterized as amounting to a presumption, that the servant in driving it was acting within the scope of his employment *379 (Grantham v. Ordway, 40 Cal. App. 758, 76 | 1 | 1 |
Aubel v. Sossogreen2 sentences1930(Aubel v. Sosso, 72 Cal. App. 57, 62 [ 236 Pac. 319 ]; Fahey v. Madden, 56 Cal. App. 593 [ 206 Pac. 128 ]; Hall v. Puente Oil Co., 47 Cal. App. 611 [ 191 Pac. 39 ]; Brown v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 39 Cal. App. 738, 741 [ 179 Pac. 697 ].) However, when the relation of master and servant is established, and it also appears that the car driven by the servant belongs to the master, there arises a prima facie inference, sometimes even characterized as amounting to a presumption, that the servant in driving it was acting within the scope of his employment *379 (Grantham v. Ordway, 40 Cal. App. 758, 76 1930(Aubel v. Sosso, 72 Cal. App. 57, 62 [ 236 Pac. 319 ]; Fahey v. Madden, 56 Cal. App. 593 [ 206 Pac. 128 ]; Hall v. Puente Oil Co., 47 Cal. App. 611 [ 191 Pac. 39 ]; Brown v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 39 Cal. App. 738, 741 [ 179 Pac. 697 ].) However, when the relation of master and servant is established, and it also appears that the car driven by the servant belongs to the master, there arises a prima facie inference, sometimes even characterized as amounting to a presumption, that the servant in driving it was acting within the scope of his employment *379 (Grantham v. Ordway, 40 Cal. App. 758, 76 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Buelke v. Levenstadt
green
2 sentences1952(Buelke v. Levenstadt, 190 Cal. 684 [ 214 P. 42 ].) “A reading of the language of the statute and a review of the decisions in this state reveal that the legislative purpose in the enactment of section 1714% of the Civil Code (now section 402 of the Vehicle Code), was to protect innocent third parties from the careless use of automobiles and that this protection should be paramount to the rights of an owner who has permitted the use of his car by others even though he, personally, was not guilty of negligence. 1952(Buelke v. Levenstadt, 190 Cal. 684 [ 214 P. 42 ].) “A reading of the language of the statute and a review of the decisions in this state reveal that the legislative purpose in the enactment of section 1714% of the Civil Code (now section 402 of the Vehicle Code), was to protect innocent third parties from the careless use of automobiles and that this protection should be paramount to the rights of an owner who has permitted the use of his car by others even though he, personally, was not guilty of negligence. | 2 | 1945–1952 |
Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club v. Ohio Casualty Insurance
green
2 sentences1972Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 142 , 153 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 373 P.2d 640 ], the court stated the entire automobile financial responsibility law must be liberally construed to foster its main objective of giving “ ‘monetary protection to that ever changing and tragically large group of persons, who while lawfully using the highways themselves suffer grave injury through the negligent use of those highways by others.’ ” And at page 154 the court stated; “The pattern is clearly discernible: a desire on the part of the judiciary and the Legislature to not only prevent the astronomical accident toll in thi 1972Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 142 , 153 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 373 P.2d 640 ], the court stated the entire automobile financial responsibility law must be liberally construed to foster its main objective of giving “ ‘monetary protection to that ever changing and tragically large group of persons, who while lawfully using the highways themselves suffer grave injury through the negligent use of those highways by others.’ ” And at page 154 the court stated; “The pattern is clearly discernible: a desire on the part of the judiciary and the Legislature to not only prevent the astronomical accident toll in thi | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Ledgerwood v. Ledgerwood
green
2 sentences1958In the ease of Ledgerwood v. Ledgerwood, 114 Cal.App. 538 [ 300 P. 144 ], a mother riding in a car which was the community property of herself and her husband and was then being driven by an adult son, sought damages for injuries as the result of his negligent operation of the car. 1958In the ease of Ledgerwood v. Ledgerwood, 114 Cal.App. 538 [ 300 P. 144 ], a mother riding in a car which was the community property of herself and her husband and was then being driven by an adult son, sought damages for injuries as the result of his negligent operation of the car. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Bunch v. Kin
green
1 sentence1936As pointed out in Bunch v. Kin, 2 Cal. App. (2d) 81 [ 37 Pac. (2d) 744 ], said section 45%, which was enacted in 1931, two years subsequent to the enactment of section 1714%, provides two methods whereby the owner of an automobile, upon the unconditional sale or transfer thereof, may relieve himself of such liability, namely, by giving the required notice of the sale- or transfer to the state motor vehicle department, and by the indorsement and delivery of the certificate of ownership to the purchaser or transferee. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Harding v. City of Hawthorne
neutral
2 sentences1936(Keller v. City of Los Angeles, 179 Cal. 605 [ 178 Pac. 505 ]; Harding v. City of Hawthorne, 114 Cal. App. 580 [ 300 Pac. 42 ].) Prior to the enactment of section 1714½ of the Civil Code in 1929 the city was not liable for the negligent acts of its officers, agents and employees in operating motor vehicles in the discharge of duties incident to the governmental functions of the city. 1936(Keller v. City of Los Angeles, 179 Cal. 605 [ 178 Pac. 505 ]; Harding v. City of Hawthorne, 114 Cal. App. 580 [ 300 Pac. 42 ].) Prior to the enactment of section 1714½ of the Civil Code in 1929 the city was not liable for the negligent acts of its officers, agents and employees in operating motor vehicles in the discharge of duties incident to the governmental functions of the city. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Kellar v. City of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences1936(Keller v. City of Los Angeles, 179 Cal. 605 [ 178 Pac. 505 ]; Harding v. City of Hawthorne, 114 Cal. App. 580 [ 300 Pac. 42 ].) Prior to the enactment of section 1714½ of the Civil Code in 1929 the city was not liable for the negligent acts of its officers, agents and employees in operating motor vehicles in the discharge of duties incident to the governmental functions of the city. 1936(Keller v. City of Los Angeles, 179 Cal. 605 [ 178 Pac. 505 ]; Harding v. City of Hawthorne, 114 Cal. App. 580 [ 300 Pac. 42 ].) Prior to the enactment of section 1714½ of the Civil Code in 1929 the city was not liable for the negligent acts of its officers, agents and employees in operating motor vehicles in the discharge of duties incident to the governmental functions of the city. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Barton v. McDermott
green
2 sentences1933(Brown v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 39 Cal. App. 738 [ 179 Pac. 697 ]; Barton v. McDermott, 108 Cal. App. 372 [ 291 Pac. 591 ].) The above-mentioned statute, however, imposes upon the owner of a motor vehicle, merely by virtue of ownership, a new liability analogous to the liability which arises from the doctrine of respondeat superior. 1933(Brown v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 39 Cal. App. 738 [ 179 Pac. 697 ]; Barton v. McDermott, 108 Cal. App. 372 [ 291 Pac. 591 ].) The above-mentioned statute, however, imposes upon the owner of a motor vehicle, merely by virtue of ownership, a new liability analogous to the liability which arises from the doctrine of respondeat superior. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Crain v. Sumida
green
2 sentences1930(Aubel v. Sosso, 72 Cal. App. 57, 62 [ 236 Pac. 319 ]; Fahey v. Madden, 56 Cal. App. 593 [ 206 Pac. 128 ]; Hall v. Puente Oil Co., 47 Cal. App. 611 [ 191 Pac. 39 ]; Brown v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 39 Cal. App. 738, 741 [ 179 Pac. 697 ].) However, when the relation of master and servant is established, and it also appears that the car driven by the servant belongs to the master, there arises a prima facie inference, sometimes even characterized as amounting to a presumption, that the servant in driving it was acting within the scope of his employment *379 (Grantham v. Ordway, 40 Cal. App. 758, 76 1930(Aubel v. Sosso, 72 Cal. App. 57, 62 [ 236 Pac. 319 ]; Fahey v. Madden, 56 Cal. App. 593 [ 206 Pac. 128 ]; Hall v. Puente Oil Co., 47 Cal. App. 611 [ 191 Pac. 39 ]; Brown v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 39 Cal. App. 738, 741 [ 179 Pac. 697 ].) However, when the relation of master and servant is established, and it also appears that the car driven by the servant belongs to the master, there arises a prima facie inference, sometimes even characterized as amounting to a presumption, that the servant in driving it was acting within the scope of his employment *379 (Grantham v. Ordway, 40 Cal. App. 758, 76 | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Hall v. Puente Oil Co.
green
2 sentences1930(Aubel v. Sosso, 72 Cal. App. 57, 62 [ 236 Pac. 319 ]; Fahey v. Madden, 56 Cal. App. 593 [ 206 Pac. 128 ]; Hall v. Puente Oil Co., 47 Cal. App. 611 [ 191 Pac. 39 ]; Brown v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 39 Cal. App. 738, 741 [ 179 Pac. 697 ].) However, when the relation of master and servant is established, and it also appears that the car driven by the servant belongs to the master, there arises a prima facie inference, sometimes even characterized as amounting to a presumption, that the servant in driving it was acting within the scope of his employment *379 (Grantham v. Ordway, 40 Cal. App. 758, 76 1930(Aubel v. Sosso, 72 Cal. App. 57, 62 [ 236 Pac. 319 ]; Fahey v. Madden, 56 Cal. App. 593 [ 206 Pac. 128 ]; Hall v. Puente Oil Co., 47 Cal. App. 611 [ 191 Pac. 39 ]; Brown v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 39 Cal. App. 738, 741 [ 179 Pac. 697 ].) However, when the relation of master and servant is established, and it also appears that the car driven by the servant belongs to the master, there arises a prima facie inference, sometimes even characterized as amounting to a presumption, that the servant in driving it was acting within the scope of his employment *379 (Grantham v. Ordway, 40 Cal. App. 758, 76 | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Fahey v. Madden
green
2 sentences1930(Aubel v. Sosso, 72 Cal. App. 57, 62 [ 236 Pac. 319 ]; Fahey v. Madden, 56 Cal. App. 593 [ 206 Pac. 128 ]; Hall v. Puente Oil Co., 47 Cal. App. 611 [ 191 Pac. 39 ]; Brown v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 39 Cal. App. 738, 741 [ 179 Pac. 697 ].) However, when the relation of master and servant is established, and it also appears that the car driven by the servant belongs to the master, there arises a prima facie inference, sometimes even characterized as amounting to a presumption, that the servant in driving it was acting within the scope of his employment *379 (Grantham v. Ordway, 40 Cal. App. 758, 76 1930(Aubel v. Sosso, 72 Cal. App. 57, 62 [ 236 Pac. 319 ]; Fahey v. Madden, 56 Cal. App. 593 [ 206 Pac. 128 ]; Hall v. Puente Oil Co., 47 Cal. App. 611 [ 191 Pac. 39 ]; Brown v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 39 Cal. App. 738, 741 [ 179 Pac. 697 ].) However, when the relation of master and servant is established, and it also appears that the car driven by the servant belongs to the master, there arises a prima facie inference, sometimes even characterized as amounting to a presumption, that the servant in driving it was acting within the scope of his employment *379 (Grantham v. Ordway, 40 Cal. App. 758, 76 | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.