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9 California opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Chapmangreen2 sentences2024(Cf. People v. Chapman (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 597, 603 [“Since section 261.5 includes an element not present in section 261 — namely, that the victim be ‘under the 11 age of 18 years’ — unlawful sexual intercourse under section 261.5 is not, as a matter of statutory definition, an offense necessarily included within the offense of rape proscribed by section 261”].) Rios argues that factually, he satisfies the conditions for violating section 289, subdivision (i) because he was over 21 years of age and Doe was under 16 years of age and that substantial evidence supports a conviction on the lesser 2015(See CALCRIM No. 1000.) *479 Woods concedes that “ ‘unlawful sexual intercourse under section 261.5 is not, as a matter of statutory definition, an offense necessarily included within the offense of rape proscribed by section 261.’ ” (People v. Chapman (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 597, 603 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 315 ].) He asserts, however, that unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor is a lesser included offense of forcible rape under the accusatory pleading test in this case because the information “specifically alleged within each of the forcible oral copulation charges that the victim was younger than 1 | 2 | 3 |
People v. Hofsheierred2 sentences2015(Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1199 .) Hofsheier answered this question in the affirmative, stating “[t]he only difference” between nonforcible oral copulation under section 288a(b)(1), which mandates registration, and unlawful sexual intercourse under section 261.5, which does not, is “the nature of the sexual act.” (Hofsheier, at p. 1200.) Hofsheier next examined whether a “rational basis” supports the statutory classification mandating lifetime sex offender registration by a person convicted of nonforcible oral copulation with a 16-year-old minor (§ 288a(b)(l)), but not by a person con 2015The court shall state on the record the reasons for its findings and the reasons for requiring registration.” Unlike a person charged with a sex offense enumerated in section 290, a person charged with an offense subject to discretionary registration “may be able to stipulate in a plea bargain that the trial judge will not order registration.” (Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1198 .) 6 mandates registration, and unlawful sexual intercourse under section 261.5, which does not, is “the nature of the sexual act.” (Hofsheier, at p. 1200.) Hofsheier next examined whether a “rational basis” suppo | 2 | 2 |
People v. Pearsonred2 sentences2009(See People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 876 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 757 ]; cf. People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 356 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 509 , 721 P.2d 595 ] [conduct violating § 288 not lesser included offense of sodomy under § 286, because the former crime has specific intent requirement].) The higher mental state required for a conviction under section 288 is a distinction that is meaningful in deciding whether a person convicted under that statute is similarly situated with one convicted under section 261.5. 2009(See People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 876 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 757 ]; cf. People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 356 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 509 , 721 P.2d 595 ] [conduct violating § 288 not lesser included offense of sodomy under § 286, because the former crime has specific intent requirement].) The higher mental state required for a conviction under section 288 is a distinction that is meaningful in deciding whether a person convicted under that statute is similarly situated with one convicted under section 261.5. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Derrick B.green2 sentences2009(In re Derrick B. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 535, 537 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 13 , 139 P.3d 485 ] (Derrick B.) [juvenile offenders may not be required to register for offense not enumerated in statute].) Having been adjudicated of committing nonforcible oral copulation under section 288a, subdivision (b)(1) with victims who were in fact under 14, appellant is similarly situated to an offender adjudicated of having committed unlawful sexual intercourse under section 261.5 with a minor who was in fact under 14. 2009(In re Derrick B. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 535, 537 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 13 , 139 P.3d 485 ] (Derrick B.) [juvenile offenders may not be required to register for offense not enumerated in statute].) Having been adjudicated of committing nonforcible oral copulation under section 288a, subdivision (b)(1) with victims who were in fact under 14, appellant is similarly situated to an offender adjudicated of having committed unlawful sexual intercourse under section 261.5 with a minor who was in fact under 14. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pittsred2 sentences2009(See People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 876 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 757 ]; cf. People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 356 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 509 , 721 P.2d 595 ] [conduct violating § 288 not lesser included offense of sodomy under § 286, because the former crime has specific intent requirement].) The higher mental state required for a conviction under section 288 is a distinction that is meaningful in deciding whether a person convicted under that statute is similarly situated with one convicted under section 261.5. 2009(See People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 876 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 757 ]; cf. People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 356 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 509 , 721 P.2d 595 ] [conduct violating § 288 not lesser included offense of sodomy under § 286, because the former crime has specific intent requirement].) The higher mental state required for a conviction under section 288 is a distinction that is meaningful in deciding whether a person convicted under that statute is similarly situated with one convicted under section 261.5. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Madridgreen2 sentences1975(Compare, People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1143 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225 , 43 A.L.R.3d 677 ]; In re McCartney (1966) 64 Cal.2d 830 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 894 , 415 P.2d 782 ]; In re Madrid (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 996, 1005-1006 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 354 ].) Since the new section 261.5 charge in the third amended information was filed more than three years after the alleged commission of that offense, the charge was barred by the statute of limitations. 1975(Compare, People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1143 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225 , 43 A.L.R.3d 677 ]; In re McCartney (1966) 64 Cal.2d 830 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 894 , 415 P.2d 782 ]; In re Madrid (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 996, 1005-1006 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 354 ].) Since the new section 261.5 charge in the third amended information was filed more than three years after the alleged commission of that offense, the charge was barred by the statute of limitations. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Escarcegagreen2 sentences1975“A necessarily included offense exists when the charged offense as defined by statute, or as stated in the accusatory pleading, cannot be committed without also committing a lesser and included offense.” (People v. Escarcega (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 391, 396 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 595 ].) (Italics in original.) Since section 261.5 includes an element not present in section 261—namely, that the victim be “under the age of 18 years”—unlawful sexual intercourse under section 261.5 is not, as a matter of statutory definition, an offense necessarily included within the offense of rape proscribed by section 26 1975“A necessarily included offense exists when the charged offense as defined by statute, or as stated in the accusatory pleading, cannot be committed without also committing a lesser and included offense.” (People v. Escarcega (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 391, 396 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 595 ].) (Italics in original.) Since section 261.5 includes an element not present in section 261—namely, that the victim be “under the age of 18 years”—unlawful sexual intercourse under section 261.5 is not, as a matter of statutory definition, an offense necessarily included within the offense of rape proscribed by section 26 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Danielsred2 sentences1975(Compare, People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1143 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225 , 43 A.L.R.3d 677 ]; In re McCartney (1966) 64 Cal.2d 830 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 894 , 415 P.2d 782 ]; In re Madrid (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 996, 1005-1006 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 354 ].) Since the new section 261.5 charge in the third amended information was filed more than three years after the alleged commission of that offense, the charge was barred by the statute of limitations. 1975(Compare, People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1143 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225 , 43 A.L.R.3d 677 ]; In re McCartney (1966) 64 Cal.2d 830 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 894 , 415 P.2d 782 ]; In re Madrid (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 996, 1005-1006 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 354 ].) Since the new section 261.5 charge in the third amended information was filed more than three years after the alleged commission of that offense, the charge was barred by the statute of limitations. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
The People v. Mai
red
1 sentence2025The abstract indicates the convictions for counts 1, 2, and 3 were under section 269 as originally charged and refers to count 1 as “Sexual Assault Child/Oral Cop” and count 2 as “Aggravated Sexual Assault/Minor.” In fact, Machmuller was convicted in count 1 of oral copulation on a child under age 14 under 287, subdivision (c)(1); in count 2 of simple battery under section 242; and in count 3 of unlawful sexual intercourse under section 261.5, subdivision (d). 11 When evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we “defer[] to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions, and there is a | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Castaneda
red
1 sentence2025The abstract indicates the convictions for counts 1, 2, and 3 were under section 269 as originally charged and refers to count 1 as “Sexual Assault Child/Oral Cop” and count 2 as “Aggravated Sexual Assault/Minor.” In fact, Machmuller was convicted in count 1 of oral copulation on a child under age 14 under 287, subdivision (c)(1); in count 2 of simple battery under section 242; and in count 3 of unlawful sexual intercourse under section 261.5, subdivision (d). 11 When evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we “defer[] to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions, and there is a | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Kasler v. Lockyer
green
1 sentence2015(Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1201, 1203-1204 .) Hofsheier found no "rational 10 The California Supreme Court has described the rational relationship test as follows: "'"[I]n areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. [Citations.] Where there are 'plausible reasons' for [the classification], 'our inquiry is at an end. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Puckett
green
1 sentence1975“A necessarily included offense exists when the charged offense as defined by statute, or as stated in the accusatory pleading, cannot be committed without also committing a lesser and included offense.” (People v. Escarcega (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 391, 396 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 595 ].) (Italics in original.) Since section 261.5 includes an element not present in section 261—namely, that the victim be “under the age of 18 years”—unlawful sexual intercourse under section 261.5 is not, as a matter of statutory definition, an offense necessarily included within the offense of rape proscribed by section 26 | 1 | 1975–1975 |
In re McCartney
green
2 sentences1975(Compare, People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1143 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225 , 43 A.L.R.3d 677 ]; In re McCartney (1966) 64 Cal.2d 830 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 894 , 415 P.2d 782 ]; In re Madrid (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 996, 1005-1006 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 354 ].) Since the new section 261.5 charge in the third amended information was filed more than three years after the alleged commission of that offense, the charge was barred by the statute of limitations. 1975(Compare, People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1143 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225 , 43 A.L.R.3d 677 ]; In re McCartney (1966) 64 Cal.2d 830 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 894 , 415 P.2d 782 ]; In re Madrid (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 996, 1005-1006 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 354 ].) Since the new section 261.5 charge in the third amended information was filed more than three years after the alleged commission of that offense, the charge was barred by the statute of limitations. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.