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9 California opinions name it 1 courts 2002–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ingels v. Westwood One Broadcasting Services, Inc.green2 sentences2014Hence, the Legislature expressly designed subdivision (b) of section 425.17 to prevent the use of the anti-SLAPP device against ‘specified public interest actions,’ among others. [Citation.]” (Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 903, 913 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 385 ] (Blanchard).) The court in Ingels v. Westwood One Broadcasting Services, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1066 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 933 ] (Ingels), summarized section 425.17, subdivision (b) and the Legislature’s intent in enacting that provision as follows: “On its face, subdivision (b) appears to exempt class actions and pri 2014Hence, the Legislature expressly designed subdivision (b) of section 425.17 to prevent the use of the anti-SLAPP device against ‘specified public interest actions,’ among others. [Citation.]” (Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 903, 913 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 385 ] (Blanchard).) The court in Ingels v. Westwood One Broadcasting Services, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1066 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 933 ] (Ingels), summarized section 425.17, subdivision (b) and the Legislature’s intent in enacting that provision as follows: “On its face, subdivision (b) appears to exempt class actions and pri | 2 | 2 |
Paul for Council v. Hanyeczred2 sentences2006(Paul for Council v. Hanyecz (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1365 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 864 ], disapproved on other grounds in by Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53 , 68, fn. 5 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 , 52 P.3d 685 ].) Here, appellant’s complaint alleges malicious prosecution which qualifies for treatment under section 425.16 as a matter of law. 2006(Paul for Council v. Hanyecz (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1365 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 864 ], disapproved on other grounds in by Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53 , 68, fn. 5 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 , 52 P.3d 685 ].) Here, appellant’s complaint alleges malicious prosecution which qualifies for treatment under section 425.16 as a matter of law. | 2 | 2 |
Barak v. the Quisenberry Law Firmgreen1 sentence2021(Barak, at p. 661; see ibid. [distinguishing summary judgment, which requires evidence by moving defendant to trigger response by plaintiff].) But Barak does not support joinder here. | 1 | 1 |
Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafifgreen1 sentence2015Rather, [we] accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff [citation] and evaluate the defendant’s evidence only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law.’ [Citation.]” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 269, fn. 3 .) a. | 1 | 1 |
Mattel, Inc. v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scrippsgreen2 sentences2015“When the moving party establishes that the action qualifies for treatment under section 425.16, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the ‘probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.’” (Mattel, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1188 , quoting § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) “If the plaintiff meets its burden the motion must be denied.” ( Mattel, supra, at p. 1189 .) “In order to establish a probability of prevailing on a cause of action in the context of an anti-SLAPP motion, a plaintiff must state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim.” (La Jolla Group II v. Bruce, supra, 2015“The moving party has the initial burden of establishing that the [cause of] action challenged qualifies for treatment under section 425.16” (Mattel, Inc. v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1188 (Mattel)), i.e., “[the] cause of action … aris[es] from any act of th[e] [defendant] in furtherance of the [defendant]’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1)). | 1 | 1 |
Blanchard v. DirecTV, Inc.green2 sentences2014Hence, the Legislature expressly designed subdivision (b) of section 425.17 to prevent the use of the anti-SLAPP device against ‘specified public interest actions,’ among others. [Citation.]” (Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 903, 913 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 385 ] (Blanchard).) The court in Ingels v. Westwood One Broadcasting Services, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1066 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 933 ] (Ingels), summarized section 425.17, subdivision (b) and the Legislature’s intent in enacting that provision as follows: “On its face, subdivision (b) appears to exempt class actions and pri 2014Hence, the Legislature expressly designed subdivision (b) of section 425.17 to prevent the use of the anti-SLAPP device against ‘specified public interest actions,’ among others. [Citation.]” (Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 903, 913 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 385 ] (Blanchard).) The court in Ingels v. Westwood One Broadcasting Services, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1066 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 933 ] (Ingels), summarized section 425.17, subdivision (b) and the Legislature’s intent in enacting that provision as follows: “On its face, subdivision (b) appears to exempt class actions and pri | 1 | 1 |
Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Federation of Americagreen2 sentences2007(Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 322, 339 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 197 ].) IV DEFENDANTS SATISFIED THEIR PRIMA FACIE BURDEN The trial court concluded the complained of statements constituted speech in connection with a public issue qualifying for anti-SLAPP treatment under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). 2007(Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 322, 339 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 197 ].) IV DEFENDANTS SATISFIED THEIR PRIMA FACIE BURDEN The trial court concluded the complained of statements constituted speech in connection with a public issue qualifying for anti-SLAPP treatment under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). | 1 | 1 |
Navellier v. Slettengreen2 sentences2006(Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530 , 52 P.3d 703 ].) A special motion to strike is particularly appropriate when the action sought to be stricken is one for malicious prosecution, as here. 2006(Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530 , 52 P.3d 703 ].) A special motion to strike is particularly appropriate when the action sought to be stricken is one for malicious prosecution, as here. | 1 | 1 |
Governor Gray Davis Committee v. American Taxpayers Alliancegreen2 sentences2003(Governor Gray Davis Com. v. American Taxpayers Alliance (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 449, 456 [ 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 534 ].) In doing so, we consider “ ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’ ” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2); Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67 .) We turn to the first question of whether Lieberman’s complaint qualifies for treatment under section 425.16. 2003(Governor Gray Davis Com. v. American Taxpayers Alliance (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 449, 456 [ 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 534 ].) In doing so, we consider “ ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’ ” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2); Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67 .) We turn to the first question of whether Lieberman’s complaint qualifies for treatment under section 425.16. | 1 | 1 |
Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunitygreen2 sentences2002(See Bradbury v. Superior Court (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1114-1117 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 207 ]; see also Mission Oaks Ranch, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 713 , 730 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 ], disapproved on other grounds in Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1123, fn. 10 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471 , 969 P.2d 564 ].) Although we do not categorically hold that all lawsuits against governmental agencies and officials automatically qualify for treatment under section 425.16, the particular facts of this case justify adhering to the parties’ theory that 2002(See Bradbury v. Superior Court (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1114-1117 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 207 ]; see also Mission Oaks Ranch, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 713 , 730 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 ], disapproved on other grounds in Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1123, fn. 10 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471 , 969 P.2d 564 ].) Although we do not categorically hold that all lawsuits against governmental agencies and officials automatically qualify for treatment under section 425.16, the particular facts of this case justify adhering to the parties’ theory that | 1 | 1 |
Mission Oaks Ranch, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbarared2 sentences2002(See Bradbury v. Superior Court (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1114-1117 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 207 ]; see also Mission Oaks Ranch, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 713 , 730 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 ], disapproved on other grounds in Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1123, fn. 10 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471 , 969 P.2d 564 ].) Although we do not categorically hold that all lawsuits against governmental agencies and officials automatically qualify for treatment under section 425.16, the particular facts of this case justify adhering to the parties’ theory that 2002(See Bradbury v. Superior Court (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1114-1117 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 207 ]; see also Mission Oaks Ranch, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 713 , 730 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 ], disapproved on other grounds in Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1123, fn. 10 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471 , 969 P.2d 564 ].) Although we do not categorically hold that all lawsuits against governmental agencies and officials automatically qualify for treatment under section 425.16, the particular facts of this case justify adhering to the parties’ theory that | 1 | 1 |
Bradbury v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2002(See Bradbury v. Superior Court (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1114-1117 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 207 ]; see also Mission Oaks Ranch, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 713 , 730 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 ], disapproved on other grounds in Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1123, fn. 10 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471 , 969 P.2d 564 ].) Although we do not categorically hold that all lawsuits against governmental agencies and officials automatically qualify for treatment under section 425.16, the particular facts of this case justify adhering to the parties’ theory that 2002(See Bradbury v. Superior Court (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1114-1117 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 207 ]; see also Mission Oaks Ranch, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 713 , 730 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 ], disapproved on other grounds in Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1123, fn. 10 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471 , 969 P.2d 564 ].) Although we do not categorically hold that all lawsuits against governmental agencies and officials automatically qualify for treatment under section 425.16, the particular facts of this case justify adhering to the parties’ theory that | 1 | 1 |
Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co.red2 sentences2002(Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 855, 862-863 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 46 ].) The moving party has the initial burden of establishing that the action challenged qualifies for treatment under section 425.16. 2002(Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 855, 862-863 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 46 ].) The moving party has the initial burden of establishing that the action challenged qualifies for treatment under section 425.16. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Equilon Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc.
green
2 sentences2006(Paul for Council v. Hanyecz (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1365 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 864 ], disapproved on other grounds in by Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53 , 68, fn. 5 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 , 52 P.3d 685 ].) Here, appellant’s complaint alleges malicious prosecution which qualifies for treatment under section 425.16 as a matter of law. 2006(Paul for Council v. Hanyecz (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1365 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 864 ], disapproved on other grounds in by Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53 , 68, fn. 5 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 , 52 P.3d 685 ].) Here, appellant’s complaint alleges malicious prosecution which qualifies for treatment under section 425.16 as a matter of law. | 2 | 2003–2006 |
Flatley v. Mauro
green
1 sentence2015“When the moving party establishes that the action qualifies for treatment under section 425.16, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the ‘probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.’” (Mattel, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1188 , quoting § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) “If the plaintiff meets its burden the motion must be denied.” ( Mattel, supra, at p. 1189 .) “In order to establish a probability of prevailing on a cause of action in the context of an anti-SLAPP motion, a plaintiff must state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim.” (La Jolla Group II v. Bruce, supra, | 1 | 2015–2015 |
La Jolla Group II v. Bruce
green
1 sentence2015“When the moving party establishes that the action qualifies for treatment under section 425.16, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the ‘probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.’” (Mattel, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1188 , quoting § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) “If the plaintiff meets its burden the motion must be denied.” ( Mattel, supra, at p. 1189 .) “In order to establish a probability of prevailing on a cause of action in the context of an anti-SLAPP motion, a plaintiff must state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim.” (La Jolla Group II v. Bruce, supra, | 1 | 2015–2015 |
City of Cotati v. Cashman
green
1 sentence2015A defendant satisfies this burden by demonstrating (1) “the plaintiff’s cause of action itself was based on [the defendant’s] act” (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78 ); and (2) “‘the act underlying the plaintiff’s cause fits one of the categories spelled out in section 425.16, subdivision (e)[7]’” (ibid.). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Rusheen v. Cohen
green
1 sentence2015“When the moving party establishes that the action qualifies for treatment under section 425.16, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the ‘probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.’” (Mattel, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1188 , quoting § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) “If the plaintiff meets its burden the motion must be denied.” ( Mattel, supra, at p. 1189 .) “In order to establish a probability of prevailing on a cause of action in the context of an anti-SLAPP motion, a plaintiff must state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim.” (La Jolla Group II v. Bruce, supra, | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Christian v. Mattel, Inc.
green
1 sentence2002Summary of Facts A summary of the tenor and background of this action is set out in the recent opinion from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressing an appeal by Hicks from an award of sanctions levied against him in the underlying action: Christian v. Mattel, Inc. (9th Cir. 2002) 286 F.3d 1118 : *1184 Hides should have discovered prior to commencing the civil action that Mattel’s dolls could not have infringed Christian’s copyright because, among other things, the Mattel dolls had been created well prior to the Claudene doll and the Mattel dolls had clearly visible copyright notices on t | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.