section 473 pleading requirement in California

2024The statute requires that such a proposed response accompany the request for relief: “Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, . . . .” (§ 473(b), italics added.) There are twin rationale for section 473(b)’s proposed pleading requirement: (1) “to screen out those applications for relief that do not assert a potentially meritorious defense” (County of Stanislaus v. Johnson (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 832, 837 (Johnson)); and (2) “to avoid further delays by compelling the de

2021(See County of Stanislaus v. Johnson (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 832, 837 [“The ‘accompanied by’ requirement . . . seeks to 9 We also note that despite her continuing uncertainty about the form of response required under section 473, Dubinina ultimately did provide a proposed response to the joinder pleading, which was filed on February 7, 2020, in support of her request to vacate the default judgment.

2025“The purpose of the proposed pleading requirement of section 473 is to compel the delinquent party to demonstrate his or her good faith and readiness to proceed on the merits” and because of this purpose “courts have held substantial compliance to be sufficient.” (Carmel, Ltd. v. Tavoussi, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 401, 402.) “A test for substantial compliance is whether the moving party has demonstrated a willingness and ability to comply with the procedural requirements that led to the militate against consideration of an issue raised initially in the reply brief of an appellant”].) Furt

2025Case law explains that with respect to the statute’s mandatory relief provision, “[t]he phrase ‘in proper form’ encompasses the mandate, expressly included in the discretionary relief provision . . . that the motion be ‘ “accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed . . . .” ’ ” (Jimenez, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 63, italics added.) “[S]ubstantial compliance with that requirement is sufficient.” (Dollase v. Wanu Water, Inc. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1315 , 1324 (Dollase) [citing Carmel, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 402-403 in which the defendants “prepared a propo

2025At the hearing on the motion to vacate, the court noted that Seiden’s earlier (April 2023) ex parte application for a continuance of the hearing date had been denied and “there was nothing [in the motion to vacate] to show that a renewed ex parte [application] should have been granted or would have been granted.” 14 Given this statement in the court’s order, we reject Seiden’s contention that the trial court did not base its decision on the lack of a proposed pleading. 27 dismissal.” (Rodriguez v. Brill, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 729 [“In the context of a terminating sanction for failing to

2024The statute requires that such a proposed response accompany the request for relief: “Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, . . . .” (§ 473(b), italics added.) There are twin rationale for section 473(b)’s proposed pleading requirement: (1) “to screen out those applications for relief that do not assert a potentially meritorious defense” (County of Stanislaus v. Johnson (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 832, 837 (Johnson)); and (2) “to avoid further delays by compelling the de

2025Case law explains that with respect to the statute’s mandatory relief provision, “[t]he phrase ‘in proper form’ encompasses the mandate, expressly included in the discretionary relief provision . . . that the motion be ‘ “accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed . . . .” ’ ” (Jimenez, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 63, italics added.) “[S]ubstantial compliance with that requirement is sufficient.” (Dollase v. Wanu Water, Inc. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1315 , 1324 (Dollase) [citing Carmel, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 402-403 in which the defendants “prepared a propo

2021(Rappleyea v. Campbell, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 980 ; see Grappo, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 1005 [“ ‘the trial court’s discretion [in cases of default] is not unlimited and must be “ ‘exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice’ ” ’ ”].) Accordingly, both the order denying Dubinina’s request to set aside the default and the ensuing default judgment must be reversed.

2021(Rappleyea v. Campbell, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 980 ; see Grappo, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 1005 [“ ‘the trial court’s discretion [in cases of default] is not unlimited and must be “ ‘exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice’ ” ’ ”].) Accordingly, both the order denying Dubinina’s request to set aside the default and the ensuing default judgment must be reversed.

2021(Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App. 4th 739, 759-761 .) “[S]ection 473, which gives the courts power to permit amendments in furtherance of justice, has received a very liberal interpretation by the courts of this state. [Citations.] In spite of this policy of liberality, a court may deny a good amendment in proper form where there is unwarranted delay in presenting it. [Citations.] On the other hand, where there is no prejudice to the adverse party, it may be an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend. [Citation]” (Thompson Pacific Construction, Inc. v. City of Sunnyvale (2007) 155

2021(Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App. 4th 739, 759-761 .) “[S]ection 473, which gives the courts power to permit amendments in furtherance of justice, has received a very liberal interpretation by the courts of this state. [Citations.] In spite of this policy of liberality, a court may deny a good amendment in proper form where there is unwarranted delay in presenting it. [Citations.] On the other hand, where there is no prejudice to the adverse party, it may be an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend. [Citation]” (Thompson Pacific Construction, Inc. v. City of Sunnyvale (2007) 155

2009(Job v. Farrington (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 338, 341 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 210 ].) The requirement helps ensure courts do not become “ ‘ “a sanctuary for chronic procrastination and irresponsibility on the part of either litigants or their attorneys,” ’ ” and supports “ ‘policies [which] favor getting cases to trial on time, avoiding unnecessary and prejudicial *402 delay, and preventing litigants from playing fast and loose with the pertinent legal rules and procedures.’ ” (Iott v. Franklin (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 521, 531 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 635 ].) These policies apply with even greater force when mandato

2009(Job v. Farrington (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 338, 341 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 210 ].) The requirement helps ensure courts do not become “ ‘ “a sanctuary for chronic procrastination and irresponsibility on the part of either litigants or their attorneys,” ’ ” and supports “ ‘policies [which] favor getting cases to trial on time, avoiding unnecessary and prejudicial *402 delay, and preventing litigants from playing fast and loose with the pertinent legal rules and procedures.’ ” (Iott v. Franklin (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 521, 531 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 635 ].) These policies apply with even greater force when mandato

2009(Job v. Farrington (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 338, 341 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 210 ].) The requirement helps ensure courts do not become “ ‘ “a sanctuary for chronic procrastination and irresponsibility on the part of either litigants or their attorneys,” ’ ” and supports “ ‘policies [which] favor getting cases to trial on time, avoiding unnecessary and prejudicial *402 delay, and preventing litigants from playing fast and loose with the pertinent legal rules and procedures.’ ” (Iott v. Franklin (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 521, 531 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 635 ].) These policies apply with even greater force when mandato

2009(Job v. Farrington (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 338, 341 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 210 ].) The requirement helps ensure courts do not become “ ‘ “a sanctuary for chronic procrastination and irresponsibility on the part of either litigants or their attorneys,” ’ ” and supports “ ‘policies [which] favor getting cases to trial on time, avoiding unnecessary and prejudicial *402 delay, and preventing litigants from playing fast and loose with the pertinent legal rules and procedures.’ ” (Iott v. Franklin (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 521, 531 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 635 ].) These policies apply with even greater force when mandato

2001A trial court’s determinations to deny leave to file a belated amended pleading under section 473, subdivision (a)(1) (Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 118, 135 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 59 ]), to strike a pleading under section 436 (Gitmed v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 824, 827 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ]), and to dismiss an action under section 581, subdivision (f)(2) (Harding v. Collazo (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1044, 1054 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 329 ]) are all reviewed for abuse of discretion.

2001A trial court’s determinations to deny leave to file a belated amended pleading under section 473, subdivision (a)(1) (Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 118, 135 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 59 ]), to strike a pleading under section 436 (Gitmed v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 824, 827 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ]), and to dismiss an action under section 581, subdivision (f)(2) (Harding v. Collazo (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1044, 1054 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 329 ]) are all reviewed for abuse of discretion.

2001A trial court’s determinations to deny leave to file a belated amended pleading under section 473, subdivision (a)(1) (Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 118, 135 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 59 ]), to strike a pleading under section 436 (Gitmed v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 824, 827 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ]), and to dismiss an action under section 581, subdivision (f)(2) (Harding v. Collazo (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1044, 1054 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 329 ]) are all reviewed for abuse of discretion.

2001A trial court’s determinations to deny leave to file a belated amended pleading under section 473, subdivision (a)(1) (Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 118, 135 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 59 ]), to strike a pleading under section 436 (Gitmed v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 824, 827 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ]), and to dismiss an action under section 581, subdivision (f)(2) (Harding v. Collazo (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1044, 1054 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 329 ]) are all reviewed for abuse of discretion.

2001A trial court’s determinations to deny leave to file a belated amended pleading under section 473, subdivision (a)(1) (Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 118, 135 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 59 ]), to strike a pleading under section 436 (Gitmed v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 824, 827 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ]), and to dismiss an action under section 581, subdivision (f)(2) (Harding v. Collazo (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1044, 1054 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 329 ]) are all reviewed for abuse of discretion.

2001A trial court’s determinations to deny leave to file a belated amended pleading under section 473, subdivision (a)(1) (Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 118, 135 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 59 ]), to strike a pleading under section 436 (Gitmed v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 824, 827 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ]), and to dismiss an action under section 581, subdivision (f)(2) (Harding v. Collazo (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1044, 1054 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 329 ]) are all reviewed for abuse of discretion.

1968Co. v. Superior Court, 250 Cal.App.2d 722, 727 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 870 ]).

1968Co. v. Superior Court, 250 Cal.App.2d 722, 727 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 870 ]).

1967(Feykert v. Hardy, 213 Cal. App.2d 67 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 510 ]; Gonzales v. Brennan, 238 Cal. App.2d 69, 74-75 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 501 ].) Any difference there may be between the meaning of the phrase, ‘ ‘ to prevent manifest injustice,” as used in rule 216, and the phrase, “in furtherance of justice,” as used in section 473, is a difference of no meaningful significance.

1967(Feykert v. Hardy, 213 Cal. App.2d 67 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 510 ]; Gonzales v. Brennan, 238 Cal. App.2d 69, 74-75 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 501 ].) Any difference there may be between the meaning of the phrase, ‘ ‘ to prevent manifest injustice,” as used in rule 216, and the phrase, “in furtherance of justice,” as used in section 473, is a difference of no meaningful significance.