attenuation doctrine in Idaho

2026Under the attenuation doctrine, “[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’ ” Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 238 (2016) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006)).

2026On this point, the district court added a footnote to its decision, stating: “The inevitable discovery doctrine also does not assist the State here since there is no indication that there was a parallel path by which the drug evidence would have been discovered, apart from [the trooper]’s encounter with [Campbell].” While acknowledging that these factors “favor[ed] suppression,” the district court determined that the evidence was still admissible under the attenuation doctrine, which permits evidence where the “connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or ha

2007Applying the above criteria to the facts established herein, I find that the subsequent incriminating evidence obtained in this case did not come about by exploitation of the illegal entry, but instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of any primary taint. 2 The test for determining whether the primary taint of a prior constitutional violation has been purged is commonly referred to as an attenuation analysis or attenuation test, and advances the exclusionary rules “twin aims of deterrence and judicial integrity.” Washington, 387 F.3d at 1072 -73 (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 59

2007Applying the above criteria to the facts established herein, I find that the subsequent incriminating evidence obtained in this case did not come about by exploitation of the illegal entry, but instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of any primary taint. 2 The test for determining whether the primary taint of a prior constitutional violation has been purged is commonly referred to as an attenuation analysis or attenuation test, and advances the exclusionary rules “twin aims of deterrence and judicial integrity.” Washington, 387 F.3d at 1072 -73 (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 59

2024Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); State v. Hoak, 107 Idaho 742, 749 , 692 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1984).

2024Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); State v. Hoak, 107 Idaho 742, 749 , 692 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1984).

1985The doctrine of attenuation, announced in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 , 60 S.Ct. 266 , 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939), has been explained and applied by the Supreme Court in United States v. Crews, supra .

1985The doctrine of attenuation, announced in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 , 60 S.Ct. 266 , 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939), has been explained and applied by the Supreme Court in United States v. Crews, supra .

2025Three factors guide the attenuation analysis: “(1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence, (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action.” State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846 , 103 P.3d 454, 459 (2004).

2025Three factors guide the attenuation analysis: “(1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence, (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action.” State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846 , 103 P.3d 454, 459 (2004).

2024In applying the attenuation doctrine, the test is “whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 .

2024In applying the attenuation doctrine, the test is “whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 .

2022There are three factors associated with the attenuation doctrine: “There are three factors for a court to consider when determining whether unlawful conduct has been adequately attenuated.” Those factors are: “(1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence, (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action.” Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 721–22, 404 P.3d at 663–64 (internal citations omitted).

2022There are three factors associated with the attenuation doctrine: “There are three factors for a court to consider when determining whether unlawful conduct has been adequately attenuated.” Those factors are: “(1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence, (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action.” Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 721–22, 404 P.3d at 663–64 (internal citations omitted).

2026Under the attenuation doctrine, “[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’ ” Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 238 (2016) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006)).

2017The attenuation doctrine allows evidence to be admitted “when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.”’ Utah v. Strieff, — U.S. —, —, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2061 , 195 L.Ed.2d 400, 407-08 (2016) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 , 126 S.Ct. 2159, 2163-64 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56, 64 (2006)).

2017A court must consider three factors in an attenuation analysis: “(1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence, (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action.” Page, 140 Idaho at 846 , 103 P.3d at 459 (citing United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 521 (7th Cir. 1997)).

2014The Court turned to a Seventh Circuit case, United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 1997), and found the attenuation analysis used by Green persuasive.

2017The attenuation doctrine allows evidence to be admitted “when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.”’ Utah v. Strieff, — U.S. —, —, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2061 , 195 L.Ed.2d 400, 407-08 (2016) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 , 126 S.Ct. 2159, 2163-64 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56, 64 (2006)).

2017See Strieff, — U.S. at —, 136 S.Ct. at 2062 , 195 L.Ed.2d at 408-09 (proceeding to the analysis of the attenuation factors without deciding whether the stop was illegal because the State conceded the point). 1.

2012Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963); State v. Bigham, 141 Idaho 732, 734 , 117 P.3d 146 , 148 (Ct. App. 2005).

2012Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963); State v. Bigham, 141 Idaho 732, 734 , 117 P.3d 146 , 148 (Ct. App. 2005).

2025State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 482 , 988 P.2d 700, 708 (Ct. App. 1999). 5 Nonetheless, in regard to whether Sergeant Hay’s request for and examination of Razo’s mouth (and nose) constituted a search, the State and Razo raise three issues: (1) the district court erred in finding that the existence of eye tremors (together with the other facts) gave Sergeant Hay probable cause to conduct the search of Razo’s mouth and nose; (2) the doctrine of attenuation applies; and (3) Razo consented to the search.

2025State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 482 , 988 P.2d 700, 708 (Ct. App. 1999). 5 Nonetheless, in regard to whether Sergeant Hay’s request for and examination of Razo’s mouth (and nose) constituted a search, the State and Razo raise three issues: (1) the district court erred in finding that the existence of eye tremors (together with the other facts) gave Sergeant Hay probable cause to conduct the search of Razo’s mouth and nose; (2) the doctrine of attenuation applies; and (3) Razo consented to the search.

2023Lindley was admittedly not executing an arrest of Doe pursuant to the warrants at the time of the search, the magistrate court concluded that the pat search was not incident to a lawful arrest. 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 438 (1966). 3 However, the magistrate court went on to conclude that the search was proper under the attenuation doctrine: Important to the attenuation analysis is the timing of when Corporal Lindley received confirmation of four outstanding arrest warrants for the juvenile he was investigating.

2023Lindley was admittedly not executing an arrest of Doe pursuant to the warrants at the time of the search, the magistrate court concluded that the pat search was not incident to a lawful arrest. 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 438 (1966). 3 However, the magistrate court went on to conclude that the search was proper under the attenuation doctrine: Important to the attenuation analysis is the timing of when Corporal Lindley received confirmation of four outstanding arrest warrants for the juvenile he was investigating.

2023To properly preserve an issue for appeal, “both the issue and the party’s position on the issue must be raised before the trial court[.]” State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 99 , 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019). 8 Here, the State never argued inevitable discovery below and although the State used the word “attenuated” in its briefing at one point before the magistrate court—on intermediate appeal, the State explicitly denied that it was “undertak[ing] an attenuation analysis[,]” and even argued that attenuation “should not be considered” by the district court.

2023To properly preserve an issue for appeal, “both the issue and the party’s position on the issue must be raised before the trial court[.]” State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 99 , 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019). 8 Here, the State never argued inevitable discovery below and although the State used the word “attenuated” in its briefing at one point before the magistrate court—on intermediate appeal, the State explicitly denied that it was “undertak[ing] an attenuation analysis[,]” and even argued that attenuation “should not be considered” by the district court.

2022“Issues not raised below will not be considered by this Court on appeal, and the parties will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court.” State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 221 , 443 P.3d 231, 235 (2019) (quoting State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275 , 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (alternation omitted).

2022“Issues not raised below will not be considered by this Court on appeal, and the parties will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court.” State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 221 , 443 P.3d 231, 235 (2019) (quoting State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275 , 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (alternation omitted).

2022“Issues not raised below will not be considered by this Court on appeal, and the parties will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court.” State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 221 , 443 P.3d 231, 235 (2019) (quoting State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275 , 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (alternation omitted).

2022“Issues not raised below will not be considered by this Court on appeal, and the parties will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court.” State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 221 , 443 P.3d 231, 235 (2019) (quoting State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275 , 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (alternation omitted).

2021State v. Fairchild, 164 Idaho 336 , 345, 429 P.3d 877, 886 (Ct. App. 2018).

2012State v. Hoak, 107 Idaho 742, 749 , 692 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1984); State v. Hudson, 147 Idaho 335, 338 , 209 P.3d 196, 199 (Ct. App. 2009).

2012State v. Hoak, 107 Idaho 742, 749 , 692 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1984); State v. Hudson, 147 Idaho 335, 338 , 209 P.3d 196, 199 (Ct. App. 2009).

2012However, Buhler has not cited the standard or test for voluntariness, see, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973), and while she concludes that her consent was involuntary, that conclusion is based on an analysis of the attenuation factors.

2000See, e.g., State v. Barnett, 133 Idaho 231, 235 , 985 P.2d 111, 115 (1999); State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 250-51 , 787 P.2d 231, 236-37 (1990).

2000See, e.g., State v. Barnett, 133 Idaho 231, 235 , 985 P.2d 111, 115 (1999); State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 250-51 , 787 P.2d 231, 236-37 (1990).

2000See, e.g., State v. Barnett, 133 Idaho 231, 235 , 985 P.2d 111, 115 (1999); State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 250-51 , 787 P.2d 231, 236-37 (1990).

2000See, e.g., State v. Barnett, 133 Idaho 231, 235 , 985 P.2d 111, 115 (1999); State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 250-51 , 787 P.2d 231, 236-37 (1990).