6 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1990–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2010We need not, however, determine in this appeal whether any of these events, alone or in some combination, terminate a traffic stop as a matter of law because there is no evidence that Morgan returned the license, rental papers and infraction ticket to the defendant; thus, the factual predicate of this appeal is an ongoing traffic stop, and the relevant legal inquiry is whether it was measurably or unreasonably extended. [30] Because we conclude that the defendant was not subjected to an illegal seizure, we need not consider whether the evidence taken from the consent search was the fruit of th 2010We need not, however, determine in this appeal whether any of these events, alone or in some combination, terminate a traffic stop as a matter of law because there is no evidence that Morgan returned the license, rental papers and infraction ticket to the defendant; thus, the factual predicate of this appeal is an ongoing traffic stop, and the relevant legal inquiry is whether it was measurably or unreasonably extended. [30] Because we conclude that the defendant was not subjected to an illegal seizure, we need not consider whether the evidence taken from the consent search was the fruit of th | 1 | 3 |
State v. Nowellgreen2 sentences2010See, e.g., State v. Nowell, 262 Conn. 686, 700 , 817 A.2d 76 (2003). 2010See, e.g., State v. Nowell, 262 Conn. 686, 700 , 817 A.2d 76 (2003). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ostroski
green
2 sentences2002In the past, we have stressed the importance of this factor as it “effectuates the deterrence policy of the exclusionary rule by providing an incentive for police to engage in lawful conduct.” State v. Ostroski, 201 Conn. 534, 549 , 518 A.2d 915 (1986). 2002In the past, we have stressed the importance of this factor as it “effectuates the deterrence policy of the exclusionary rule by providing an incentive for police to engage in lawful conduct.” State v. Ostroski, 201 Conn. 534, 549 , 518 A.2d 915 (1986). | 2 | 1990–2002 |
State v. Brunetti
green
2 sentences2017We also reject the state’s claim that an attenuation analysis can be inferred from the court’s findings. ‘‘The factors to be considered in determining whether the statement of an accused is sufficiently attenuated from the original illegality to cleanse it of its taint are (1) whether Miranda warnings had been issued, (2) the temporal proxim- ity of the illegal police action and the statement, (3) the presence of interven- ing circumstances, and (4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.’’ State v. Brunetti, 279 Conn. 39, 73 , 901 A.2d 1 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212 , 127 2017We also reject the state’s claim that an attenuation analysis can be inferred from the court’s findings. ‘‘The factors to be considered in determining whether the statement of an accused is sufficiently attenuated from the original illegality to cleanse it of its taint are (1) whether Miranda warnings had been issued, (2) the temporal proxim- ity of the illegal police action and the statement, (3) the presence of interven- ing circumstances, and (4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.’’ State v. Brunetti, 279 Conn. 39, 73 , 901 A.2d 1 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212 , 127 | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Brunetti v. Connecticut
green
2 sentences2017We also reject the state’s claim that an attenuation analysis can be inferred from the court’s findings. ‘‘The factors to be considered in determining whether the statement of an accused is sufficiently attenuated from the original illegality to cleanse it of its taint are (1) whether Miranda warnings had been issued, (2) the temporal proxim- ity of the illegal police action and the statement, (3) the presence of interven- ing circumstances, and (4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.’’ State v. Brunetti, 279 Conn. 39, 73 , 901 A.2d 1 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212 , 127 2017We also reject the state’s claim that an attenuation analysis can be inferred from the court’s findings. ‘‘The factors to be considered in determining whether the statement of an accused is sufficiently attenuated from the original illegality to cleanse it of its taint are (1) whether Miranda warnings had been issued, (2) the temporal proxim- ity of the illegal police action and the statement, (3) the presence of interven- ing circumstances, and (4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.’’ State v. Brunetti, 279 Conn. 39, 73 , 901 A.2d 1 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212 , 127 | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Geisler
green
2 sentences2002The court also determined that, under its interpretation of the controlling precedent; State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 , 610 A.2d 1225 (1992); either the passage of time or intervening circumstances could attenuate the taint of an unlawful arrest under the totality of the circumstances. 2002The court also determined that, under its interpretation of the controlling precedent; State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 , 610 A.2d 1225 (1992); either the passage of time or intervening circumstances could attenuate the taint of an unlawful arrest under the totality of the circumstances. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
New York v. Harris
green
2 sentences2002The court held that “where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the State’s use of a statement made by the defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is taken after [a warrantless] arrest made in the home . . . .” Id., 21 . 2002Id. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
United States v. Carl Bailey
green
1 sentence1998The Supreme Court has clearly directed that the attenuation analysis be informed by `considerations relating to the exclusionary rule and the constitutional principles it is designed to protect.' United States v. Ceccolini , 435 U.S. 268 , 279 , 98 S.Ct. 1054 , 1061 , 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978). . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Bailey , 691 F.2d 1009 , 1017 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 933 (1982). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
United States v. Ceccolini
green
2 sentences1998The Supreme Court has clearly directed that the attenuation analysis be informed by `considerations relating to the exclusionary rule and the constitutional principles it is designed to protect.' United States v. Ceccolini , 435 U.S. 268 , 279 , 98 S.Ct. 1054 , 1061 , 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978). . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Bailey , 691 F.2d 1009 , 1017 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 933 (1982). 1998The Supreme Court has clearly directed that the attenuation analysis be informed by `considerations relating to the exclusionary rule and the constitutional principles it is designed to protect.' United States v. Ceccolini , 435 U.S. 268 , 279 , 98 S.Ct. 1054 , 1061 , 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978). . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Bailey , 691 F.2d 1009 , 1017 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 933 (1982). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Gasque v. Unidentified, Wrecked, & Abandoned Sailing Vessel
green
1 sentence1998The Supreme Court has clearly directed that the attenuation analysis be informed by `considerations relating to the exclusionary rule and the constitutional principles it is designed to protect.' United States v. Ceccolini , 435 U.S. 268 , 279 , 98 S.Ct. 1054 , 1061 , 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978). . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Bailey , 691 F.2d 1009 , 1017 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 933 (1982). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Cates
green
2 sentences1997Ed. 2d 416 (1975); State v. Cates, 202 Conn. 615, 621 , 522 A.2d 788 (1987). 1997Ed. 2d 416 (1975); State v. Cates, 202 Conn. 615, 621 , 522 A.2d 788 (1987). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Shifflett
green
2 sentences1990Ed. 2d 416 (1975); State v. Ostroski, 201 Conn. 534, 547 , 518 A.2d 915 (1986).” State v. Schroff, supra, 197-98 , quoting State v. Shifflett, 199 Conn. 718, 741 , 508 A.2d 748 (1986). 1990Ed. 2d 416 (1975); State v. Ostroski, 201 Conn. 534, 547 , 518 A.2d 915 (1986).” State v. Schroff, supra, 197-98 , quoting State v. Shifflett, 199 Conn. 718, 741 , 508 A.2d 748 (1986). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Schroff
green
2 sentences1990The attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule is well settled. “ ‘Not every confession that follows an invalid admission of criminal involvement is a tainted product of the earlier statement.’ ” State v. Schroff, 206 Conn. 182, 197 , 536 A.2d 952 (1988). “ ‘[I]n assessing the causal connection between an involuntary statement and a subsequent confession, courts have considered the temporal proximity of the illegality and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the flagrancy of the official misconduct.’ See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-604 , 95 S. Ct. 2254 , 1990The attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule is well settled. “ ‘Not every confession that follows an invalid admission of criminal involvement is a tainted product of the earlier statement.’ ” State v. Schroff, 206 Conn. 182, 197 , 536 A.2d 952 (1988). “ ‘[I]n assessing the causal connection between an involuntary statement and a subsequent confession, courts have considered the temporal proximity of the illegality and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the flagrancy of the official misconduct.’ See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-604 , 95 S. Ct. 2254 , | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.