18 California opinions name it 3 courts 1984–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Brendlingreen2 sentences2023(Brown, at p. 604.) In Brendlin, supra, 45 Cal.4th 262 , this court considered how the attenuation doctrine applies when an officer unlawfully seizes an individual and then discovers that the individual has an outstanding arrest warrant. 2023(Brown, at p. 604.) In Brendlin, supra, 45 Cal.4th 262 , this court considered how the attenuation doctrine applies when an officer unlawfully seizes an individual and then discovers that the individual has an outstanding arrest warrant. | 5 | 9 |
Utah v. Strieffgreen2 sentences2023(People v. Johnson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 717, 723 (Johnson).) If, as here, the defendant was held to answer at the preliminary hearing, the defendant may renew his motion to 2 Under the attenuation doctrine, “[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’ ” (Utah v. Strieff (2016) 579 U.S. 232, 238 .) 10 suppress or “make the moti 2021The Officer’s Discovery of Defendant’s Parolee Status Sufficiently Attenuated the Connection Between the Unlawful Detention and the Evidence Seized Where a detention is unreasonable, the exclusionary rule may mandate suppression of the evidence obtained as a direct result of the unlawful detention and any “ ‘evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality.’ ” (Strieff, supra, 136 S.Ct. at p. 2061 .) However, “exclusion may not be premised on the mere fact that a constitutional violation was a ‘but-for’ cause of obtaining evidence.” (Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. 586, | 4 | 7 |
Brown v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2024(See, e.g., People v. Williams (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 949, 961 [deferring to trial court’s finding that the defendant’s consent was voluntary where officers “went out of their way to be courteous,” even where the defendant was in custody].) But this does not end our inquiry because where, as here, a defendant “claims a consent to search is tainted by a prior Fourth Amendment violation, mere voluntariness of the consent is not enough.” (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 450 .) Instead, pursuant to “the so-called attenuation doctrine” (McWilliams, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 437), we must exami 2023This reality is a proper consideration under the second factor of the attenuation doctrine set out in Brown v. Illinois (1975) 422 U.S. 590 , 603–604. | 4 | 6 |
Hudson v. Michigangreen2 sentences2023Balancing the benefits of the exclusionary remedy against its costs, the United States Supreme Court has fashioned various exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the so-called attenuation doctrine. ( Strieff, supra, 579 U.S. at pp. 237–238; see Davis, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 237 .) The attenuation doctrine holds that, notwithstanding the exclusionary rule, “[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee 2021The Officer’s Discovery of Defendant’s Parolee Status Sufficiently Attenuated the Connection Between the Unlawful Detention and the Evidence Seized Where a detention is unreasonable, the exclusionary rule may mandate suppression of the evidence obtained as a direct result of the unlawful detention and any “ ‘evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality.’ ” (Strieff, supra, 136 S.Ct. at p. 2061 .) However, “exclusion may not be premised on the mere fact that a constitutional violation was a ‘but-for’ cause of obtaining evidence.” (Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. 586, | 3 | 3 |
Davis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2023Balancing the benefits of the exclusionary remedy against its costs, the United States Supreme Court has fashioned various exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the so-called attenuation doctrine. ( Strieff, supra, 579 U.S. at pp. 237–238; see Davis, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 237 .) The attenuation doctrine holds that, notwithstanding the exclusionary rule, “[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee 2023Balancing the benefits of the exclusionary remedy against its costs, the United States Supreme Court has fashioned various exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the so-called attenuation doctrine. ( Strieff, supra, 579 U.S. at pp. 237–238; see Davis, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 237 .) The attenuation doctrine holds that, notwithstanding the exclusionary rule, “[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee | 3 | 3 |
People v. Batesgreen2 sentences2023(Compare People v. Durant (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 57, 66 [concluding that the “illegality in the initial traffic detention was attenuated by appellant’s probation search condition”] with People v. Bates (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 60, 71 (Bates) [declining to adopt Durant’s reasoning and reaching the opposite conclusion on the facts].) We granted review to consider the proper application of the attenuation doctrine to the officer’s discovery of the parole search condition in this case.1 II. 2021Although the Bates court expressed “discomfort” in the after-the-fact use of a probation search condition unknown at the time of the initial illegal detention “to justify an otherwise unlawful search” (Bates, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 70 ), we observe that any intervening circumstance analyzed under the attenuation doctrine necessarily arises after unlawful police conduct. | 3 | 3 |
Murray v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2019Rather, the more apt question in such a case is 'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' " ' " ( People v. Brendlin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 262 , 268, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 496 , 195 P.3d 1074 ( Brendlin ).) Accordingly, the Supreme Court has created exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the attenuation doctrine. ( Utah v. Strieff (2016) --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2056 , 2061, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 ] ( Ut 2019Rather, the more apt question in such a case is 'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' " ' " ( People v. Brendlin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 262 , 268, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 496 , 195 P.3d 1074 ( Brendlin ).) Accordingly, the Supreme Court has created exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the attenuation doctrine. ( Utah v. Strieff (2016) --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2056 , 2061, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 ] ( Ut | 3 | 3 |
Wong Sun v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2019Rather, the more apt question in such a case is 'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' " ' " ( People v. Brendlin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 262 , 268, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 496 , 195 P.3d 1074 ( Brendlin ).) Accordingly, the Supreme Court has created exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the attenuation doctrine. ( Utah v. Strieff (2016) --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2056 , 2061, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 ] ( Ut 2019Rather, the more apt question in such a case is 'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' " ' " ( People v. Brendlin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 262 , 268, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 496 , 195 P.3d 1074 ( Brendlin ).) Accordingly, the Supreme Court has created exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the attenuation doctrine. ( Utah v. Strieff (2016) --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2056 , 2061, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 ] ( Ut | 3 | 3 |
Fare v. Tony C.green2 sentences2021The Officer Lacked Reasonable Suspicion to Detain Defendant “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits seizures of persons, including brief investigative stops, when they are ‘unreasonable.’ (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 , 19 & fn. 16; [citation].)” (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 229 .) When a police contact rises to the level of an investigative stop or detention, the detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the officer has “reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is involved in criminal activity” or “advance knowledge that the individual is on se 2021The Officer Lacked Reasonable Suspicion to Detain Defendant “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits seizures of persons, including brief investigative stops, when they are ‘unreasonable.’ (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 , 19 & fn. 16; [citation].)” (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 229 .) When a police contact rises to the level of an investigative stop or detention, the detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the officer has “reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is involved in criminal activity” or “advance knowledge that the individual is on se | 2 | 2 |
People v. Lloydgreen2 sentences2021The Officer Lacked Reasonable Suspicion to Detain Defendant “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits seizures of persons, including brief investigative stops, when they are ‘unreasonable.’ (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 , 19 & fn. 16; [citation].)” (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 229 .) When a police contact rises to the level of an investigative stop or detention, the detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the officer has “reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is involved in criminal activity” or “advance knowledge that the individual is on se 2021The Officer Lacked Reasonable Suspicion to Detain Defendant “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits seizures of persons, including brief investigative stops, when they are ‘unreasonable.’ (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 , 19 & fn. 16; [citation].)” (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 229 .) When a police contact rises to the level of an investigative stop or detention, the detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the officer has “reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is involved in criminal activity” or “advance knowledge that the individual is on se | 2 | 2 |
People v. Souzagreen2 sentences2021We determine that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain defendant based on the absence of “specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide[d] some objective manifestation that [defendant] may [have] be[en] involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231 (Souza).) However, under the principles articulated in Utah v. Strieff (2016) 136 S.Ct. 2056 (Strieff) and People v. Brendlin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 262 (Brendlin), we conclude that the officer’s discovery of defendant’s “active and searchable CDC[R] parole” st 2021The Officer Lacked Reasonable Suspicion to Detain Defendant “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits seizures of persons, including brief investigative stops, when they are ‘unreasonable.’ (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 , 19 & fn. 16; [citation].)” (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 229 .) When a police contact rises to the level of an investigative stop or detention, the detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the officer has “reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is involved in criminal activity” or “advance knowledge that the individual is on se | 2 | 2 |
People v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2024(See, e.g., People v. Williams (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 949, 961 [deferring to trial court’s finding that the defendant’s consent was voluntary where officers “went out of their way to be courteous,” even where the defendant was in custody].) But this does not end our inquiry because where, as here, a defendant “claims a consent to search is tainted by a prior Fourth Amendment violation, mere voluntariness of the consent is not enough.” (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 450 .) Instead, pursuant to “the so-called attenuation doctrine” (McWilliams, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 437), we must exami | 1 | 1 |
Ornelas v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023(People v. Johnson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 717, 723 (Johnson).) If, as here, the defendant was held to answer at the preliminary hearing, the defendant may renew his motion to 2 Under the attenuation doctrine, “[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’ ” (Utah v. Strieff (2016) 579 U.S. 232, 238 .) 10 suppress or “make the moti | 1 | 1 |
People v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2023(People v. Johnson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 717, 723 (Johnson).) If, as here, the defendant was held to answer at the preliminary hearing, the defendant may renew his motion to 2 Under the attenuation doctrine, “[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’ ” (Utah v. Strieff (2016) 579 U.S. 232, 238 .) 10 suppress or “make the moti | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Durantgreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Troyergreen1 sentence2023Balancing the benefits of the exclusionary remedy against its costs, the United States Supreme Court has fashioned various exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the so-called attenuation doctrine. ( Strieff, supra, 579 U.S. at pp. 237–238; see Davis, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 237 .) The attenuation doctrine holds that, notwithstanding the exclusionary rule, “[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee | 1 | 1 |
People v. Macabeogreen1 sentence2023Balancing the benefits of the exclusionary remedy against its costs, the United States Supreme Court has fashioned various exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the so-called attenuation doctrine. ( Strieff, supra, 579 U.S. at pp. 237–238; see Davis, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 237 .) The attenuation doctrine holds that, notwithstanding the exclusionary rule, “[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Veringreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Bryan Lee Simpsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| McBath v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dunaway v. New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Oregon v. Elstadgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Ceccolinigreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Superior Court (Sosa)green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| People v. Mooregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Boyer
red
2 sentences2024(See, e.g., People v. Williams (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 949, 961 [deferring to trial court’s finding that the defendant’s consent was voluntary where officers “went out of their way to be courteous,” even where the defendant was in custody].) But this does not end our inquiry because where, as here, a defendant “claims a consent to search is tainted by a prior Fourth Amendment violation, mere voluntariness of the consent is not enough.” (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 450 .) Instead, pursuant to “the so-called attenuation doctrine” (McWilliams, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 437), we must exami 2024(See, e.g., People v. Williams (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 949, 961 [deferring to trial court’s finding that the defendant’s consent was voluntary where officers “went out of their way to be courteous,” even where the defendant was in custody].) But this does not end our inquiry because where, as here, a defendant “claims a consent to search is tainted by a prior Fourth Amendment violation, mere voluntariness of the consent is not enough.” (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 450 .) Instead, pursuant to “the so-called attenuation doctrine” (McWilliams, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 437), we must exami | 2 | 2015–2024 |
People v. Camacho
green
2 sentences2021Rather, defendant raised the attenuation doctrine in his opening brief, arguing that it does not apply here. 7 courts to order the exclusion of evidence at trial as a remedy for an unreasonable search and seizure unless that remedy is required by the federal Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 830 , fn. omitted.) B. 2021Rather, defendant raised the attenuation doctrine in his opening brief, arguing that it does not apply here. 7 courts to order the exclusion of evidence at trial as a remedy for an unreasonable search and seizure unless that remedy is required by the federal Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 830 , fn. omitted.) B. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Wells
green
2 sentences2021The Officer Lacked Reasonable Suspicion to Detain Defendant “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits seizures of persons, including brief investigative stops, when they are ‘unreasonable.’ (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 , 19 & fn. 16; [citation].)” (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 229 .) When a police contact rises to the level of an investigative stop or detention, the detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the officer has “reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is involved in criminal activity” or “advance knowledge that the individual is on se 2021The Officer Lacked Reasonable Suspicion to Detain Defendant “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits seizures of persons, including brief investigative stops, when they are ‘unreasonable.’ (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 , 19 & fn. 16; [citation].)” (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 229 .) When a police contact rises to the level of an investigative stop or detention, the detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the officer has “reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is involved in criminal activity” or “advance knowledge that the individual is on se | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Douglas
green
2 sentences2021The Officer Lacked Reasonable Suspicion to Detain Defendant “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits seizures of persons, including brief investigative stops, when they are ‘unreasonable.’ (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 , 19 & fn. 16; [citation].)” (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 229 .) When a police contact rises to the level of an investigative stop or detention, the detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the officer has “reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is involved in criminal activity” or “advance knowledge that the individual is on se 2021The Officer Lacked Reasonable Suspicion to Detain Defendant “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits seizures of persons, including brief investigative stops, when they are ‘unreasonable.’ (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 , 19 & fn. 16; [citation].)” (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 229 .) When a police contact rises to the level of an investigative stop or detention, the detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the officer has “reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is involved in criminal activity” or “advance knowledge that the individual is on se | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Elkins v. United States
green
2 sentences2021Its purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.” (Elkins v. United 4 States (1960) 364 U.S. 206, 217 ; see also Davis v. United States (2011) 564 U.S. 229 , 236–237.) In my judgment, the district attorney did not present sufficient evidence to support application of the attenuation doctrine here. 2021Its purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.” (Elkins v. United 4 States (1960) 364 U.S. 206, 217 ; see also Davis v. United States (2011) 564 U.S. 229 , 236–237.) In my judgment, the district attorney did not present sufficient evidence to support application of the attenuation doctrine here. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2021The Officer Lacked Reasonable Suspicion to Detain Defendant “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits seizures of persons, including brief investigative stops, when they are ‘unreasonable.’ (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 , 19 & fn. 16; [citation].)” (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 229 .) When a police contact rises to the level of an investigative stop or detention, the detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the officer has “reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is involved in criminal activity” or “advance knowledge that the individual is on se 2021The Officer Lacked Reasonable Suspicion to Detain Defendant “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits seizures of persons, including brief investigative stops, when they are ‘unreasonable.’ (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 , 19 & fn. 16; [citation].)” (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 229 .) When a police contact rises to the level of an investigative stop or detention, the detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the officer has “reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is involved in criminal activity” or “advance knowledge that the individual is on se | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Ramos
green
2 sentences2021The ruling on whether the applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to independent review. [Citation.]” (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 505 .) “[S]ince voter approval of Proposition 8 in June 1982, state and federal claims relating to exclusion of evidence on grounds of unreasonable search and seizure are measured by the same standard. [Citations.] ‘Our state Constitution thus forbids the 5 Although the prosecution argued in its written opposition that defendant’s parolee status authorized the search and introduced evidence at the suppressi 2021The ruling on whether the applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to independent review. [Citation.]” (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 505 .) “[S]ince voter approval of Proposition 8 in June 1982, state and federal claims relating to exclusion of evidence on grounds of unreasonable search and seizure are measured by the same standard. [Citations.] ‘Our state Constitution thus forbids the 5 Although the prosecution argued in its written opposition that defendant’s parolee status authorized the search and introduced evidence at the suppressi | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Richard G.
green
2 sentences2025“The attenuation doctrine holds that, notwithstanding the exclusionary rule, ‘[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that “the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.” ’ ” (People v. McWilliams, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 437-438.) While “evidence may be excluded as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ where its discovery ‘results from’ or is ‘caused’ by a Fourth Amendment viol 2025“The attenuation doctrine holds that, notwithstanding the exclusionary rule, ‘[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that “the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.” ’ ” (People v. McWilliams, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 437-438.) While “evidence may be excluded as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ where its discovery ‘results from’ or is ‘caused’ by a Fourth Amendment viol | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Parson
green
2 sentences2025(Strieff, at p. 238; People v. Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, 345 .) Because we conclude that the attenuation doctrine applies here, we need not address Fourzon’s argument that he did not voluntarily abandon the firearm. 2025(Strieff, at p. 238; People v. Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, 345 .) Because we conclude that the attenuation doctrine applies here, we need not address Fourzon’s argument that he did not voluntarily abandon the firearm. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Silveria and Travis
green
1 sentence2023(People v. Johnson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 717, 723 (Johnson).) If, as here, the defendant was held to answer at the preliminary hearing, the defendant may renew his motion to 2 Under the attenuation doctrine, “[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’ ” (Utah v. Strieff (2016) 579 U.S. 232, 238 .) 10 suppress or “make the moti | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Tacardon
green
1 sentence2023Our Supreme Court granted review and deferred consideration pending dispositions in People v. McWilliams (2023) 14 Cal.5th 429 (McWilliams) and People v. Tacardon (2022) 14 Cal.5th 235 (Tacardon). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Scott v. United States
green
1 sentence2023In any event, Officer Guevara’s characterization of his justification for the detention is not dispositive; the validity of the officer’s actions under the Fourth Amendment “turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time” (Scott v. United States (1978) 436 U.S. 128, 136 ), “not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken” (Maryland v. Macon (1985) 472 U.S. 463 , 470–471). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Maryland v. MacOn
green
1 sentence2023In any event, Officer Guevara’s characterization of his justification for the detention is not dispositive; the validity of the officer’s actions under the Fourth Amendment “turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time” (Scott v. United States (1978) 436 U.S. 128, 136 ), “not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken” (Maryland v. Macon (1985) 472 U.S. 463 , 470–471). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Hernandez
green
1 sentence2023During defense counsel’s cross-examination of Officer Guevara during the special hearing, the following colloquy occurred: “[Counsel:] You actually didn’t see anywhere, where this person was coming from a vehicle, or you saw a general area he was coming from, right? “[Officer Guevara:] That’s correct. 5 Because we conclude that the detention, searches, and seizures of defendant and the evidence defendant sought to suppress were lawful, we do not address the attenuation doctrine, on which the trial court relied. 19 “[Counsel:] Nothing to link anything that the tagger did to what Mr. Barclay was | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Utah v. Strieff green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Lorenzana v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| United States v. David Lee Green green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Hill green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Frierson green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.