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7 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 2003–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Riverared2 sentences2006This contextual misapprehension of the standard leads to the fallacy in the majority’s conclusion that “inasmuch as both HRS §§ 706-606 and 706-662 require the determination of whether the sentence imposed is needed to protect the public, the sole determining factor remaining that increases the penalty under Hawaii’s extended term sentencing in HRS § 706-662(1) is the fact of a prior conviction, ... expressly authorized ... in Apprendi and again in Blakely [ ] ... [and similarly t]he multiple offender determination, pursuant to HRS § 706-662(4)(a), mirrors the prior conviction exception in App 2006This contextual misapprehension of the standard leads to the fallacy in the majority’s conclusion that “inasmuch as both HRS §§ 706-606 and 706-662 require the determination of whether the sentence imposed is needed to protect the public, the sole determining factor remaining that increases the penalty under Hawaii’s extended term sentencing in HRS § 706-662(1) is the fact of a prior conviction, ... expressly authorized ... in Apprendi and again in Blakely [ ] ... [and similarly t]he multiple offender determination, pursuant to HRS § 706-662(4)(a), mirrors the prior conviction exception in App | 2 | 2 |
Apprendi v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences2022Masuoka presided over Peralto's 1998 trial and sentencing, and the 2004 resentencing. 3 In Flubacher, the supreme court held that, pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the fact-finder rather than the sentencing judge must determine whether an "extended term sentence was necessary for the protection of the public" for extended term sentencing under HRS § 706-662. 142 Hawaiʻi at 118, 414 P.3d at 170 . 2018In reaching that conclusion about the importance of facts being "elemental" rather than "extrinsic," this court appeared to rely on language in Apprendi that responded to the State of New Jersey's argument that a finding of racial bias under the hate crime statute involved nothing more than the "traditional 'sentencing factor' of motive." Id. ; see Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 492 -93 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 . | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Huelsman
green
2 sentences2006Specifically, the facts at issue in rendering an extended term sentencing determination under HRS §§ 706-662(1), (3), and (4) implicate considerations completely “extrinsic” to the elements of the offense with which the defendant was charged and of which he was convicted; accordingly, they should be found by the sentencing judge in accordance with [State v.] Huelsman [, 60 Haw. 71 , 588 P.2d 394 (1979),] and its progeny. 2006Specifically, the facts at issue in rendering an extended term sentencing determination under HRS §§ 706-662(1), (3), and (4) implicate considerations completely “extrinsic” to the elements of the offense with which the defendant was charged and of which he was convicted; accordingly, they should be found by the sentencing judge in accordance with [State v.] Huelsman [, 60 Haw. 71 , 588 P.2d 394 (1979),] and its progeny. | 4 | 2003–2006 |
Flubacher v. State.
green
1 sentence2022Masuoka presided over Peralto's 1998 trial and sentencing, and the 2004 resentencing. 3 In Flubacher, the supreme court held that, pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the fact-finder rather than the sentencing judge must determine whether an "extended term sentence was necessary for the protection of the public" for extended term sentencing under HRS § 706-662. 142 Hawaiʻi at 118, 414 P.3d at 170 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Kaua
green
2 sentences2018Accordingly, we asserted that the "facts at issue in rendering an extended term sentencing determination under HRS § 706-662(1), (3), and (4) implicate considerations completely 'extrinsic' to the elements of the offense with which the defendant was charged.... [and thus] fell outside the Apprendi rule." Id. at 12-13 , 72 P.3d at 484 -85 . 2018In reaching that conclusion about the importance of facts being "elemental" rather than "extrinsic," this court appeared to rely on language in Apprendi that responded to the State of New Jersey's argument that a finding of racial bias under the hate crime statute involved nothing more than the "traditional 'sentencing factor' of motive." Id. ; see Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 492 -93 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Cunningham v. California
green
1 sentence2008Under Cunningham v. California, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007), the circuit court erred in granting the State's motion for extended-term sentencing under HRS § 706-662(4), [2] because the circuit court's finding that the extended terms were necessary for the protection of the public was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury; 2. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Maugaotega
green
1 sentence2008State v. Maugaotega, 115 Hawai`i 432, 168 P.3d 562 (2007). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.