confirmation hearing in California

2009Thus, a party may qualify as an interested person entitled to participate for purposes of one proceeding but not for another.” (Estate of Davis (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 663, 668 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 384 ].) Examples of the flexibility given to the probate court in determining whether a party is an interested person include Estate of Davis, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d 663 , in which the court determined that a probate administrator’s surety may be an interested person, and Estate of Maniscalco (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 520 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 803 ], in which a prospective bidder on estate property who failed to atte

2009Thus, a party may qualify as an interested person entitled to participate for purposes of one proceeding but not for another.” (Estate of Davis (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 663, 668 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 384 ].) Examples of the flexibility given to the probate court in determining whether a party is an interested person include Estate of Davis, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d 663 , in which the court determined that a probate administrator’s surety may be an interested person, and Estate of Maniscalco (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 520 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 803 ], in which a prospective bidder on estate property who failed to atte

1992(See Estate of Herz, supra, 147 Cal. App.2d at p. 106 ; Estate of Moreland, supra, 49 Cal. App.2d at pp. 486-487.) Understandably so, Cenplex has not contended the probate court abused its discretion in concluding the City was entitled to relief, if it had standing, under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, since it had been misled as to the date of the confirmation hearing by the administrator's counsel resulting in its absence.

1992(See Estate of Herz, supra, 147 Cal.App.2d at p. 106 ; Estate of Moreland, supra, 49 Cal.App.2d at pp. 486-487.) Understandably so, Cenplex has not contended the probate court abused its discretion in concluding the City was entitled to relief, if it had standing, under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, since it had been misled as to the date of the confirmation hearing by the administrator’s counsel resulting in its absence.

1971(Leese v. Clark, 18 Cal. 535 .) While it stands, the claimant, or those deriving title through him, will not be permitted to aver that the claim comprised other or different lands from those mentioned in the patent. . . .

1873A patent, issued under the Act of 1851, is, as has often been held by this Court, the final act in proceedings instituted for the confirmation of the claim of the patentee to land which had been granted by the former Government, and for the segregation of such land from the public lands of the United States; and it is a record which binds both the Government and the claimant, and cannot be attacked by either party, except by direct proceedings instituted for that purpose (Leese v. Clark, 18 Cal. 535 ).

1992(See Estate of Herz, supra, 147 Cal. App.2d at p. 106 ; Estate of Moreland, supra, 49 Cal. App.2d at pp. 486-487.) Understandably so, Cenplex has not contended the probate court abused its discretion in concluding the City was entitled to relief, if it had standing, under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, since it had been misled as to the date of the confirmation hearing by the administrator's counsel resulting in its absence.

1992(See Estate of Herz, supra, 147 Cal.App.2d at p. 106 ; Estate of Moreland, supra, 49 Cal.App.2d at pp. 486-487.) Understandably so, Cenplex has not contended the probate court abused its discretion in concluding the City was entitled to relief, if it had standing, under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, since it had been misled as to the date of the confirmation hearing by the administrator’s counsel resulting in its absence.

1976Appellant's reliance on the cases of Estate of Scott, 172 Cal. 485 [ 157 P. 242 ] and Estate of Bazzuro, 161 Cal. 71 [ 118 P. 434 ] is clearly misplaced because those cases involved direct appeals from orders confirming sales of property, whereas appellant is appealing from denial of a motion to vacate an order under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.

1976Appellant’s reliance on the cases of Estate of Scott, 172 Cal. 485 [ 157 P. 242 ] and Estate of Bazzuro, 161 Cal. 71 [ 118 P. 434 ] is clearly misplaced because those cases involved direct appeals from orders confirming sales of property, whereas appellant is appealing from denial of a motion to vacate an order under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.

1976Appellant's reliance on the cases of Estate of Scott, 172 Cal. 485 [ 157 P. 242 ] and Estate of Bazzuro, 161 Cal. 71 [ 118 P. 434 ] is clearly misplaced because those cases involved direct appeals from orders confirming sales of property, whereas appellant is appealing from denial of a motion to vacate an order under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.

1976Appellant’s reliance on the cases of Estate of Scott, 172 Cal. 485 [ 157 P. 242 ] and Estate of Bazzuro, 161 Cal. 71 [ 118 P. 434 ] is clearly misplaced because those cases involved direct appeals from orders confirming sales of property, whereas appellant is appealing from denial of a motion to vacate an order under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.

1976Appellant’s reliance on the cases of Estate of Scott, 172 Cal. 485 [ 157 P. 242 ] and Estate of Bazzuro, 161 Cal. 71 [ 118 P. 434 ] is clearly misplaced because those cases involved direct appeals from orders confirming sales of property, whereas appellant is appealing from denial of a motion to vacate an order under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.

1976Appellant’s reliance on the cases of Estate of Scott, 172 Cal. 485 [ 157 P. 242 ] and Estate of Bazzuro, 161 Cal. 71 [ 118 P. 434 ] is clearly misplaced because those cases involved direct appeals from orders confirming sales of property, whereas appellant is appealing from denial of a motion to vacate an order under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.

1876(Estrada v. Murphy, 19 Cal. 272 ; Clark v. Lockwood, 21 Cal. 222 ; Emeric v. Penniman, 26 Cal. 119 ; O’Connell v. Dougherty, 32 Cal. 462 ; Schmitt v. Giovanari, 43 Cal. 617 .) In Emeric v. Penniman , the grantee of the Mexican government filed a petition for the confirmation of the claim, but after his death, his devisees were substituted as parties in his stead, and the land was confirmed to them; and the administrator of the deceased grantee having brought ejectment, it was held that he could not recover, because the legal title was in the confirmees.

1873(Estrada v. Murphy, 19 Cal. 272; Clark v. Lockwood, 21 Cal. 222 ; Emeric v. Penniman, 26 Cal. 119; O’Connell v. Dougherty, 32 Cal. 462 ; Schmitt v. Giovanari, 43 Cal. 617 .) In Emeric v. Penniman , the grantee of the Mexican Government filed the petition for the confirmation of the claim, but after his death his devisees were substituted as parties in his stead, and the land was confirmed to them; and the administrator of the deceased grantee having brought ejectment, it was held that he could not recover, because' the legal title was in the confirmees.

1876(Estrada v. Murphy, 19 Cal. 272 ; Clark v. Lockwood, 21 Cal. 222 ; Emeric v. Penniman, 26 Cal. 119 ; O’Connell v. Dougherty, 32 Cal. 462 ; Schmitt v. Giovanari, 43 Cal. 617 .) In Emeric v. Penniman , the grantee of the Mexican government filed a petition for the confirmation of the claim, but after his death, his devisees were substituted as parties in his stead, and the land was confirmed to them; and the administrator of the deceased grantee having brought ejectment, it was held that he could not recover, because the legal title was in the confirmees.

1873(Estrada v. Murphy, 19 Cal. 272; Clark v. Lockwood, 21 Cal. 222 ; Emeric v. Penniman, 26 Cal. 119; O’Connell v. Dougherty, 32 Cal. 462 ; Schmitt v. Giovanari, 43 Cal. 617 .) In Emeric v. Penniman , the grantee of the Mexican Government filed the petition for the confirmation of the claim, but after his death his devisees were substituted as parties in his stead, and the land was confirmed to them; and the administrator of the deceased grantee having brought ejectment, it was held that he could not recover, because' the legal title was in the confirmees.

2025And, considering the behavior at issue is nonverbal, there is nothing in the record that calls into question the trial court’s finding confirming that Z.P. acted in such manner.3 (See Ortiz, at p. 802, citing People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 926 .) 3 Defendant belatedly argues in his reply brief that the confirmation requirement was not met because the court did not observe Z.P. on her phone the day before the challenge.

2023“It is elementary that points raised for the first time in a reply brief are not considered by the court.” (Levin v. Ligon, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1486 .) Consequently, we will not address whether, 16. in the circumstances of this case, the trial court had a sua sponte9 obligation to hold a confirmation hearing to determine whether the receiver complied with section 567.

2023“It is elementary that points raised for the first time in a reply brief are not considered by the court.” (Levin v. Ligon, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1486 .) Consequently, we will not address whether, 16. in the circumstances of this case, the trial court had a sua sponte9 obligation to hold a confirmation hearing to determine whether the receiver complied with section 567.

2013(See In re Enewally, supra, 368 F.3d at pp. 1172—1173; In re Seidler (11th Cir. 1995) 44 F.3d 945, 948-949 ; In re Summerville, supra, 361 B.R. at p. 140 ; In re Brawders, supra, 325 B.R. at p. 411 .) As the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia has explained: “Generally, [section] 1327(a) does provide a res judicata effect to the terms of a confirmed plan. [Citation.] This effect, however, is premised on the notion that the bankruptcy court has addressed in the confirmed plan and order only those issues that are properly within the scope of the confirmation hearing

2013W.D.Va. 1992) 141 B.R. 890, 898 , affd. (4th Cir. 1993) 990 F.2d 160 , 163.) Thus, the federal courts have held in specified circumstances that a confirmed chapter 13 plan has limited preclusive effect.

2013W.D.Va. 1992) 141 B.R. 890, 898 , affd. (4th Cir. 1993) 990 F.2d 160 , 163.) Thus, the federal courts have held in specified circumstances that a confirmed chapter 13 plan has limited preclusive effect.

2013(See In re Enewally, supra, 368 F.3d at pp. 1172—1173; In re Seidler (11th Cir. 1995) 44 F.3d 945, 948-949 ; In re Summerville, supra, 361 B.R. at p. 140 ; In re Brawders, supra, 325 B.R. at p. 411 .) As the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia has explained: “Generally, [section] 1327(a) does provide a res judicata effect to the terms of a confirmed plan. [Citation.] This effect, however, is premised on the notion that the bankruptcy court has addressed in the confirmed plan and order only those issues that are properly within the scope of the confirmation hearing

2013(See In re Enewally, supra, 368 F.3d at pp. 1172—1173; In re Seidler (11th Cir. 1995) 44 F.3d 945, 948-949 ; In re Summerville, supra, 361 B.R. at p. 140 ; In re Brawders, supra, 325 B.R. at p. 411 .) As the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia has explained: “Generally, [section] 1327(a) does provide a res judicata effect to the terms of a confirmed plan. [Citation.] This effect, however, is premised on the notion that the bankruptcy court has addressed in the confirmed plan and order only those issues that are properly within the scope of the confirmation hearing

2012C.D.Cal. 2001) 268 B.R. 237, 241 .) A debt is defined as a liability on a claim. (§ 101(12); FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc., supra, 537 U.S. at p. 302 .) Section 101(5)(A) broadly defines the term “claim” thusly: “The term ‘claim’ means—[f] (A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured ....” (See United States v. Galletti (2004) 541 U.S. 114, 118 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 279 , 124 S.Ct. 1548 ].) Prior to the confirmation hearing, a debtor i

2012C.D.Cal. 2001) 268 B.R. 237, 241 .) A debt is defined as a liability on a claim. (§ 101(12); FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc., supra, 537 U.S. at p. 302 .) Section 101(5)(A) broadly defines the term “claim” thusly: “The term ‘claim’ means—[f] (A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured ....” (See United States v. Galletti (2004) 541 U.S. 114, 118 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 279 , 124 S.Ct. 1548 ].) Prior to the confirmation hearing, a debtor i

1995(See United States v. Washington (1977) 431 U.S. 181 , 187-188 [ 52 L.Ed.2d 238, 244-245 , 97 S.Ct. 1814 ].) As a last ditch argument, the Albertson appellants claim that the nature of the confirmation hearing on the modified plan denied them their First Amendment rights of speech and petition.

1995(See United States v. Washington (1977) 431 U.S. 181 , 187-188 [ 52 L.Ed.2d 238, 244-245 , 97 S.Ct. 1814 ].) As a last ditch argument, the Albertson appellants claim that the nature of the confirmation hearing on the modified plan denied them their First Amendment rights of speech and petition.