proceeding must disregard any error in Kentucky

2025CR 61.01 instructs that “[t]he court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” An error is harmless if “the result probably would have been the same absent the error[.]” T.R.W. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs., 599 S.W.3d 455 , 465 (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Begley, 313 S.W.3d 52, 69 (Ky. 2010)).

2024“When considering a claim of harmless error under CR 61.01, the court determines whether the result probably would have been the same absent the error or whether -10- the error was so prejudicial as to merit a new trial.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Begley, 313 S.W.3d 52, 69 (Ky. 2010) (citations and footnotes omitted).

2021Moreover, this Court has stated explicitly that a conviction is to be set aside because of a discovery violation only when “a ‘reasonable probability’ [exists] that had the evidence been disclosed the result 11 at trial would have been different.” Weaver v. Commonwealth, 955 S.W.2d 722, 726 (Ky. 1997) (quoting Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6 (1995)); see RCr 9.24 (setting forth harmless error rule and stating “court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties[]”); see also Baumia, 402 S.W.3d

2021Even when a discovery violation is discovered, reversal is only 5 appropriate when “a ‘reasonable probability’ [exists] that had the evidence been disclosed the result at trial would have been different.” Weaver v. Commonwealth, 955 S.W.2d 722, 726 (Ky. 1997) (quoting Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6 (1995)); see also RCr 9.24 (setting forth harmless error rule and stating that the “court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties[]”); Baumia v. Commonwealth, 402 S.W.3d 530, 545-46 (Ky. 2013

2021Moreover, this Court has stated explicitly that a conviction is to be set aside because of a discovery violation only when “a ‘reasonable probability’ [exists] that had the evidence been disclosed the result 11 at trial would have been different.” Weaver v. Commonwealth, 955 S.W.2d 722, 726 (Ky. 1997) (quoting Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6 (1995)); see RCr 9.24 (setting forth harmless error rule and stating “court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties[]”); see also Baumia, 402 S.W.3d

2021Even when a discovery violation is discovered, reversal is only 5 appropriate when “a ‘reasonable probability’ [exists] that had the evidence been disclosed the result at trial would have been different.” Weaver v. Commonwealth, 955 S.W.2d 722, 726 (Ky. 1997) (quoting Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6 (1995)); see also RCr 9.24 (setting forth harmless error rule and stating that the “court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties[]”); Baumia v. Commonwealth, 402 S.W.3d 530, 545-46 (Ky. 2013

2021Kentucky courts recognize “[a]n error is harmless where, considering the entire case, the substantial rights of the defendant are not affected or there appears to be no likely possibility that the result would have been different had the error not occurred.” Greene v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76, 84 (Ky. 2006).

2007As the Kentucky Supreme Court has recently noted, “An error is harmless where, considering the entire case, the substantial rights of the defendant are not affected or there appears to be no likely possibility that the result would have been different had the error not occurred.” Greene v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76, 84 (Ky.2006).

2021Moreover, this Court has stated explicitly that a conviction is to be set aside because of a discovery violation only when “a ‘reasonable probability’ [exists] that had the evidence been disclosed the result 11 at trial would have been different.” Weaver v. Commonwealth, 955 S.W.2d 722, 726 (Ky. 1997) (quoting Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6 (1995)); see RCr 9.24 (setting forth harmless error rule and stating “court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties[]”); see also Baumia, 402 S.W.3d

2021Even when a discovery violation is discovered, reversal is only 5 appropriate when “a ‘reasonable probability’ [exists] that had the evidence been disclosed the result at trial would have been different.” Weaver v. Commonwealth, 955 S.W.2d 722, 726 (Ky. 1997) (quoting Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6 (1995)); see also RCr 9.24 (setting forth harmless error rule and stating that the “court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties[]”); Baumia v. Commonwealth, 402 S.W.3d 530, 545-46 (Ky. 2013

2021Moreover, this Court has stated explicitly that a conviction is to be set aside because of a discovery violation only when “a ‘reasonable probability’ [exists] that had the evidence been disclosed the result 11 at trial would have been different.” Weaver v. Commonwealth, 955 S.W.2d 722, 726 (Ky. 1997) (quoting Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6 (1995)); see RCr 9.24 (setting forth harmless error rule and stating “court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties[]”); see also Baumia, 402 S.W.3d

2021Even when a discovery violation is discovered, reversal is only 5 appropriate when “a ‘reasonable probability’ [exists] that had the evidence been disclosed the result at trial would have been different.” Weaver v. Commonwealth, 955 S.W.2d 722, 726 (Ky. 1997) (quoting Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6 (1995)); see also RCr 9.24 (setting forth harmless error rule and stating that the “court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties[]”); Baumia v. Commonwealth, 402 S.W.3d 530, 545-46 (Ky. 2013

2015Criminal Rule 9.24 states that “[n]o error in either the admission or thé exclusion of evidence ... is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside á verdict ... unless it appears to the court that the denial of such relief would be inconsistent with substantial justicé.” The rule specifl-cally commands that “[t]he court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” We have interpreted this rule to mean that “[a] non-constitutional eviden-tiary error such as this one is harmless if the

2015Ordinarily, -an “evidentiary error ... is harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” Harris v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Ky.2012).

2009We have sometimes expressed different harmless error standards, variously holding that an error is harmless if "there is not a substantial possibility that the result would have been any different,” Mclntire v. Commonwealth, 192 S.W.3d 690, 698 (Ky.2006), or that an error is harmless "if there is no reasonable possibility that it contributed to the conviction.” Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 122 (K.y.2007).

2009We have sometimes expressed different harmless error standards, variously holding that an error is harmless if "there is not a substantial possibility that the result would have been any different," Mclntire v. Commonwealth, 192 S.W.3d 690, 698 (Ky.2006), or that an error is harmless "if there is no reasonable possibility that it contributed to the conviction." Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Ky.2007).

2005The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.") [58] Abernathy v. Com., 439 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Ky.1969), overruled on other grounds by Blake v. Com., 646 S.W.2d 718 (Ky.1983). [59] Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Ky.1994).

2001Id. [2] Abernathy v. Commonwealth, Ky., 439 S.W.2d 949, 952 (1969). [3] See Bruce v. Commonwealth, Ky., 441 S.W.2d 435, 438 (1969) ("[T]his evidence, even if erroneously admitted, could not have been prejudicial because it was cumulative in character and concerned incidental matters about which there was no dispute.

2019A person of means would not have been subjected to the initial denial of funds or being sent to an institution that declared it could not act as an independent defense expert and would not have been subjected to the side-switching. “[BJefore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678 , 689 n. 1 (2009) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); RCr 9.24 (“The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceed

2014Wallen v. Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 232 (Ky.1983); Baumia at 539 ; Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678 , 689 n. 1 (2009) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (“[BJefore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”)); RCr 9.24 (“The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”).

2019A person of means would not have been subjected to the initial denial of funds or being sent to an institution that declared it could not act as an independent defense expert and would not have been subjected to the side-switching. “[BJefore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678 , 689 n. 1 (2009) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); RCr 9.24 (“The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceed

2014Wallen v. Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 232 (Ky.1983); Baumia at 539 ; Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678 , 689 n. 1 (2009) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (“[BJefore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”)); RCr 9.24 (“The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”).

2026Consequently, “[a] nonconstitutional evidentiary error may be deemed harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” Mason v. Commonwealth, 559 S.W.3d 337, 339-40 (Ky. 2018) (citations omitted).

2022“The test for harmlessness is whether the error substantially swayed the verdict.” Allen v. Commonwealth, 395 S.W.3d 451, 467 (Ky. 2013).

2021KRS 446.010(39) states that when examining terms found in statutes, “shall” means “mandatory”; however, this is not always the case. “[T]he use of the word ‘shall’ with reference to some requirements . . . is usually indicative that it is -4- mandatory, but it will not be so regarded if the legislative intention appears otherwise.” Skaggs v. Fyffe, 266 Ky. 337 , 98 S.W.2d 884, 886 (1936).

2021KRS 446.010(39) states that when examining terms found in statutes, “shall” means “mandatory”; however, this is not always the case. “[T]he use of the word ‘shall’ with reference to some requirements . . . is usually indicative that it is -4- mandatory, but it will not be so regarded if the legislative intention appears otherwise.” Skaggs v. Fyffe, 266 Ky. 337 , 98 S.W.2d 884, 886 (1936).

2021The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 18 See Morton v. Tipton, 569 S.W.3d 388, 396 (Ky. 2019). 12 have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.”19 The applicable standard of proof is determined by reference to the “risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.”20 In the typical civil action, “proof by a preponderance of the evidence normally determines the rights of th

2021We disagree. 19Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754-55 (1982) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 20 Id. at 757 (quoting Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). 21 Woods v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 24, 43 (Ky. 2004). 22 Addington, 441 U.S. at 424 . 23 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758 . 24 See id.; see also Cabinet for Human Res. v. E.S., 730 S.W.2d 929 (Ky. 1987). 13 Unlike a parent’s right to the care and custody in their children, the question of who shall inherit what is firmly a legislative one.25 Though this legislative power is

2021We disagree. 19Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754-55 (1982) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 20 Id. at 757 (quoting Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). 21 Woods v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 24, 43 (Ky. 2004). 22 Addington, 441 U.S. at 424 . 23 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758 . 24 See id.; see also Cabinet for Human Res. v. E.S., 730 S.W.2d 929 (Ky. 1987). 13 Unlike a parent’s right to the care and custody in their children, the question of who shall inherit what is firmly a legislative one.25 Though this legislative power is

2021We disagree. 19Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754-55 (1982) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 20 Id. at 757 (quoting Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). 21 Woods v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 24, 43 (Ky. 2004). 22 Addington, 441 U.S. at 424 . 23 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758 . 24 See id.; see also Cabinet for Human Res. v. E.S., 730 S.W.2d 929 (Ky. 1987). 13 Unlike a parent’s right to the care and custody in their children, the question of who shall inherit what is firmly a legislative one.25 Though this legislative power is

2021We disagree. 19Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754-55 (1982) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 20 Id. at 757 (quoting Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). 21 Woods v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 24, 43 (Ky. 2004). 22 Addington, 441 U.S. at 424 . 23 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758 . 24 See id.; see also Cabinet for Human Res. v. E.S., 730 S.W.2d 929 (Ky. 1987). 13 Unlike a parent’s right to the care and custody in their children, the question of who shall inherit what is firmly a legislative one.25 Though this legislative power is

2020An error is not prejudicial and a judgment should not be set aside “if upon consideration of the whole case it does not appear that there is a substantial possibility that the result would have been any different[.]” Rankin v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.3d 227, 233 (Ky. App. 2007) (citation omitted); see also McFall v. Peace, Inc., 15 S.W.3d 724, 726 (Ky. 2000).

2020An error is not prejudicial and a judgment should not be set aside “if upon consideration of the whole case it does not appear that there is a substantial possibility that the result would have been any different[.]” Rankin v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.3d 227, 233 (Ky. App. 2007) (citation omitted); see also McFall v. Peace, Inc., 15 S.W.3d 724, 726 (Ky. 2000).