chief rule in Missouri

1976See Cato v. Smith, 9 Cir., 104 F.2d 885 ; Zerbst v. McPike, 5 Cir., 97 F.2d 253 .

1976See Cato v. Smith, 9 Cir., 104 F.2d 885 ; Zerbst v. McPike, 5 Cir., 97 F.2d 253 .

1976The following excerpts are taken therefrom: “The chief rule which preserves our two systems of courts from the actual conflict of jurisdiction is that the court which first takes the subject-matter of the litigation into its control, whether this be person or property, must be permitted to exhaust its remedy, to attain which it assumed control, before the other court shall attempt to take it for its purpose.” Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 , loc. cit. 260, 42 S.Ct. 309 , loc. cit. 310, 66 L.Ed. 607 , 22 A.L.R. 879 .

1976The following excerpts are taken therefrom: “The chief rule which preserves our two systems of courts from the actual conflict of jurisdiction is that the court which first takes the subject-matter of the litigation into its control, whether this be person or property, must be permitted to exhaust its remedy, to attain which it assumed control, before the other court shall attempt to take it for its purpose.” Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 , loc. cit. 260, 42 S.Ct. 309 , loc. cit. 310, 66 L.Ed. 607 , 22 A.L.R. 879 .

1976United States v. Croft, supra, is practically identical with the instant case as of the time the first sentence — federal in that case — was imposed.

1945In this test no distinction is made between machinery placed in a factory erected for a specific manufacturing purpose and like machinery placed in a building constructed for an entirely different purpose, but thereafter converted to a use for which the machinery is essential. ’ ’ We think this is the rule established by this court in such cases as Progress Press Brick & Machine Co. v. Gratiot Brick & Quarry Co., 151 Mo. 501 , 52 S. W. 401 ; and Thomas v. Davis, 76 Mo. 72 . [See also Havens v. Germania Fire Ins.

1945In this test no distinction is made between machinery placed in a factory erected for a specific manufacturing purpose and like machinery placed in a building constructed for an entirely different purpose, but thereafter converted to a use for which the machinery is essential. ’ ’ We think this is the rule established by this court in such cases as Progress Press Brick & Machine Co. v. Gratiot Brick & Quarry Co., 151 Mo. 501 , 52 S. W. 401 ; and Thomas v. Davis, 76 Mo. 72 . [See also Havens v. Germania Fire Ins.

1945In this test no distinction is made between machinery placed in a factory erected for a specific manufacturing purpose and like machinery placed in a building constructed for an entirely different purpose, but thereafter converted to a use for which the machinery is essential. ’ ’ We think this is the rule established by this court in such cases as Progress Press Brick & Machine Co. v. Gratiot Brick & Quarry Co., 151 Mo. 501 , 52 S. W. 401 ; and Thomas v. Davis, 76 Mo. 72 . [See also Havens v. Germania Fire Ins.

1942Louis Artificial Ice Rink Co., 242 Mo. 241 , l. c. 253, 146 S. W. 1142 ; Adams v. Gossom, 228 Mo. 566 , 129 S. W. 16 ; Perkinson v. Meredith, 158 Mo. 457 , 59 S. W. 1099 . *765 The chief defense- urged on this, appeal is that HimmelbergerHarrison Lumber Company was concluded by the judgment; and sale, foreclosing the lien of drainage taxes and that plaintiff (as its successor in interest) may not redeem from the said tax sale.

1942Louis Artificial Ice Rink Co., 242 Mo. 241 , l. c. 253, 146 S. W. 1142 ; Adams v. Gossom, 228 Mo. 566 , 129 S. W. 16 ; Perkinson v. Meredith, 158 Mo. 457 , 59 S. W. 1099 . *765 The chief defense- urged on this, appeal is that HimmelbergerHarrison Lumber Company was concluded by the judgment; and sale, foreclosing the lien of drainage taxes and that plaintiff (as its successor in interest) may not redeem from the said tax sale.

1942Louis Artificial Ice Rink Co., 242 Mo. 241 , l. c. 253, 146 S. W. 1142 ; Adams v. Gossom, 228 Mo. 566 , 129 S. W. 16 ; Perkinson v. Meredith, 158 Mo. 457 , 59 S. W. 1099 . *765 The chief defense- urged on this, appeal is that HimmelbergerHarrison Lumber Company was concluded by the judgment; and sale, foreclosing the lien of drainage taxes and that plaintiff (as its successor in interest) may not redeem from the said tax sale.

1942Louis Artificial Ice Rink Co., 242 Mo. 241 , l. c. 253, 146 S. W. 1142 ; Adams v. Gossom, 228 Mo. 566 , 129 S. W. 16 ; Perkinson v. Meredith, 158 Mo. 457 , 59 S. W. 1099 . *765 The chief defense- urged on this, appeal is that HimmelbergerHarrison Lumber Company was concluded by the judgment; and sale, foreclosing the lien of drainage taxes and that plaintiff (as its successor in interest) may not redeem from the said tax sale.

1942Louis Artificial Ice Rink Co., 242 Mo. 241 , l. c. 253, 146 S. W. 1142 ; Adams v. Gossom, 228 Mo. 566 , 129 S. W. 16 ; Perkinson v. Meredith, 158 Mo. 457 , 59 S. W. 1099 . *765 The chief defense- urged on this, appeal is that HimmelbergerHarrison Lumber Company was concluded by the judgment; and sale, foreclosing the lien of drainage taxes and that plaintiff (as its successor in interest) may not redeem from the said tax sale.

1942Louis Artificial Ice Rink Co., 242 Mo. 241 , l. c. 253, 146 S. W. 1142 ; Adams v. Gossom, 228 Mo. 566 , 129 S. W. 16 ; Perkinson v. Meredith, 158 Mo. 457 , 59 S. W. 1099 . *765 The chief defense- urged on this, appeal is that HimmelbergerHarrison Lumber Company was concluded by the judgment; and sale, foreclosing the lien of drainage taxes and that plaintiff (as its successor in interest) may not redeem from the said tax sale.

1912Co., 211 Mo. l. c. 83, 109 S. W. 682 .] Another principle is equally well established that although the chief instruction for the plaintiff was wrong, yet if the facts show plaintiff had a good case, the appellate court will not hold the error harmless and proceed to affirm the judgment.

1894The chief error in this 'argument lies in the major proposition which has for its authority Lowenstein v. Knopf, 2 Mo. App. 159, where the conclusion is expressed that bills of exchange and instruments containing the words “value received” are the only negotiable instruments which we have in this state, because the statute declares no other instruments negotiable.