claimed constitutional violation in Ohio

2026State v. Knott, 2024-Ohio-2289, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Frazier, 2023- Ohio-4222, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.). {¶ 34} In Barker 407 U.S. at 530 , the United States Supreme Court set out four factors for courts to consider when evaluating whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated: (1) the length of the pretrial delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and (4) whether the defendant was prejudiced by the delay.

2014And a claimed constitutional violation under either principle requires proof of “materiality.” See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434-436 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (holding that undisclosed evidence is “material” if, “considered collectively,” the evidence “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict”); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (holding that false testimony is “material” if “there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affect

2014And a claimed constitutional violation under either principle requires proof of “materiality.” See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434-436 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (holding that undisclosed evidence is “material” if, “considered collectively,” the evidence “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict”); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (holding that false testimony is “material” if “there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affect

2014And a claimed constitutional violation under either principle requires proof of “materiality.” See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434-436 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (holding that undisclosed evidence is “material” if, “considered collectively,” the evidence “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict”); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (holding that false testimony is “material” if “there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affect

2014And a claimed constitutional violation under either principle requires proof of “materiality.” See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434-436 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (holding that undisclosed evidence is “material” if, “considered collectively,” the evidence “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict”); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (holding that false testimony is “material” if “there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affect

2008In State v. Awan (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 120 , the Supreme Court of Ohio held: {¶ 21} "The general rule is that `an appellate court will not consider any error which counsel for a party complaining of the trial court's judgment could have called but did not call to the trial court's attention at a time when such error could have been avoided or corrected by the trial court.' State v. Childs (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 56 , paragraph three of the syllabus; State v. Glaros (1960), 170 Ohio St. 471 , paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Lancaster (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 83 , paragraph one of the syllabu

2008In State v. Awan (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 120 , the Supreme Court of Ohio held: {¶ 21} "The general rule is that `an appellate court will not consider any error which counsel for a party complaining of the trial court's judgment could have called but did not call to the trial court's attention at a time when such error could have been avoided or corrected by the trial court.' State v. Childs (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 56 , paragraph three of the syllabus; State v. Glaros (1960), 170 Ohio St. 471 , paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Lancaster (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 83 , paragraph one of the syllabu

2008In State v. Awan (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 120 , the Supreme Court of Ohio held: {¶ 21} "The general rule is that `an appellate court will not consider any error which counsel for a party complaining of the trial court's judgment could have called but did not call to the trial court's attention at a time when such error could have been avoided or corrected by the trial court.' State v. Childs (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 56 , paragraph three of the syllabus; State v. Glaros (1960), 170 Ohio St. 471 , paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Lancaster (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 83 , paragraph one of the syllabu

2008In State v. Awan (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 120 , the Supreme Court of Ohio held: {¶ 21} "The general rule is that `an appellate court will not consider any error which counsel for a party complaining of the trial court's judgment could have called but did not call to the trial court's attention at a time when such error could have been avoided or corrected by the trial court.' State v. Childs (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 56 , paragraph three of the syllabus; State v. Glaros (1960), 170 Ohio St. 471 , paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Lancaster (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 83 , paragraph one of the syllabu

2002Norwell v. Cincinnati (1999), 133 Ohio App.3d 790 , 806 .

1982State v. Jackson (1980), 64 Ohio St. 2d 107 [ 18 O.O.3d 348 ], Obviously, if the trial court’s sentencing was proper, then petitioner cannot prevail since his cause was not prejudiced by the failure of counsel to challenge the sentences.

1982State v. Jackson (1980), 64 Ohio St. 2d 107 [ 18 O.O.3d 348 ], Obviously, if the trial court’s sentencing was proper, then petitioner cannot prevail since his cause was not prejudiced by the failure of counsel to challenge the sentences.