claimed constitutional error in California

2017Due Process Requires a Detriment Finding Gladys L. , the foundational California case on presumed fathers' constitutional protections against termination of their parental rights, explains: "Parents have a fundamental interest in the care, companionship, and custody of their children. ( Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745 , 758, 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 ( Santosky ).) Santosky establishes minimal due process requirements in the context of state dependency proceedings. 'Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requir

2013(See In re S.B., at p. 1293 [“the appellate court’s discretion to excuse forfeiture should be-exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue”]; In re Frank R. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 532, 539 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 348 ] (Frank R.) [“we are reluctant to enforce the waiver rule when it conflicts with due process”]; In re RA. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1197 , 1210 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 783 ] (P.A.) [“an appellate court may review an error despite a party’s failure to raise it below if due process rights are involved”]; Gladys L., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 849 [same].) Because father

2017Due Process Requires a Detriment Finding Gladys L. , the foundational California case on presumed fathers' constitutional protections against termination of their parental rights, explains: "Parents have a fundamental interest in the care, companionship, and custody of their children. ( Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745 , 758, 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 ( Santosky ).) Santosky establishes minimal due process requirements in the context of state dependency proceedings. 'Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requir

2017Due Process Requires a Detriment Finding Gladys L. , the foundational California case on presumed fathers' constitutional protections against termination of their parental rights, explains: "Parents have a fundamental interest in the care, companionship, and custody of their children. ( Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745 , 758, 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 ( Santosky ).) Santosky establishes minimal due process requirements in the context of state dependency proceedings. 'Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requir

2012As we explained there, a petitioner can renew a legal issue, despite having raised the issue unsuccessfully on appeal, in four circumstances: (1) where the issue constitutes a fundamental constitutional error; that is, “where the claimed constitutional error is both clear and fundamental, and strikes at the heart of the trial process” (Harris, at p. 834); (2) where the judgment of conviction was rendered by a court lacking fundamental jurisdiction, described as “an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties” (Abelleira

2012As we explained there, a petitioner can renew a legal issue, despite having raised the issue unsuccessfully on appeal, in four circumstances: (1) where the issue constitutes a fundamental constitutional error; that is, “where the claimed constitutional error is both clear and fundamental, and strikes at the heart of the trial process” (Harris, at p. 834); (2) where the judgment of conviction was rendered by a court lacking fundamental jurisdiction, described as “an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties” (Abelleira

2021(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 .) Under Chapman, a reviewing court examines the claimed constitutional error and determines whether or not it is “‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” (People v. Aranada (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 367 .) Our Supreme Court has stated “the admission of evidence, even if erroneous under state law, results in a due process violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally unfair.” (People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 439 .) “Absent fundamental unfairness, state law error in admitting evi

2021(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 .) Under Chapman, a reviewing court examines the claimed constitutional error and determines whether or not it is “‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” (People v. Aranada (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 367 .) Our Supreme Court has stated “the admission of evidence, even if erroneous under state law, results in a due process violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally unfair.” (People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 439 .) “Absent fundamental unfairness, state law error in admitting evi

2021(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 .) Under Chapman, a reviewing court examines the claimed constitutional error and determines whether or not it is “‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” (People v. Aranada (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 367 .) Our Supreme Court has stated “the admission of evidence, even if erroneous under state law, results in a due process violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally unfair.” (People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 439 .) “Absent fundamental unfairness, state law error in admitting evi

2017In Mutch , supra , 4 Cal.3d 389 , 93 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 482 P.2d 633 , petitioner sought relief from a kidnapping conviction in connection with a robbery pursuant to section 209 after this court clarified in People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119 , 1139, 80 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225 , that such a conviction could not be based on "movements of the victim [that] are merely incidental to the commission of the robbery ...." ( Mutch , at p. 394, 93 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 482 P.2d 633 ; see ibid. [ Daniels overruled the **6 contrary rule on kidnapping set forth in People v. Chessman (1951) 38 Cal.2d 166 ,

2017In Mutch , supra , 4 Cal.3d 389 , 93 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 482 P.2d 633 , petitioner sought relief from a kidnapping conviction in connection with a robbery pursuant to section 209 after this court clarified in People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119 , 1139, 80 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225 , that such a conviction could not be based on "movements of the victim [that] are merely incidental to the commission of the robbery ...." ( Mutch , at p. 394, 93 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 482 P.2d 633 ; see ibid. [ Daniels overruled the **6 contrary rule on kidnapping set forth in People v. Chessman (1951) 38 Cal.2d 166 ,

2017First, "where the claimed constitutional error is both clear and fundamental, and strikes at the heart of the trial process ... an opportunity for a third chance at judicial review (trial, appeal, postappeal habeas corpus) [is] justified." ( Harris , supra , 5 Cal.4th at p. 834 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 855 P.2d 391 .) Second, review of a previously litigated claim is justified where the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction and " 'there [was] no material dispute as to the facts.' " ( Id. at p. 840, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 855 P.2d 391 , citing Zerbe , at p. 668, 36 Cal.Rptr. 286 , 388 P.2d 18

2017First, "where the claimed constitutional error is both clear and fundamental, and strikes at the heart of the trial process ... an opportunity for a third chance at judicial review (trial, appeal, postappeal habeas corpus) [is] justified." ( Harris , supra , 5 Cal.4th at p. 834 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 855 P.2d 391 .) Second, review of a previously litigated claim is justified where the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction and " 'there [was] no material dispute as to the facts.' " ( Id. at p. 840, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 855 P.2d 391 , citing Zerbe , at p. 668, 36 Cal.Rptr. 286 , 388 P.2d 18

2017In Mutch , supra , 4 Cal.3d 389 , 93 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 482 P.2d 633 , petitioner sought relief from a kidnapping conviction in connection with a robbery pursuant to section 209 after this court clarified in People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119 , 1139, 80 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225 , that such a conviction could not be based on "movements of the victim [that] are merely incidental to the commission of the robbery ...." ( Mutch , at p. 394, 93 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 482 P.2d 633 ; see ibid. [ Daniels overruled the **6 contrary rule on kidnapping set forth in People v. Chessman (1951) 38 Cal.2d 166 ,

2017In Mutch , supra , 4 Cal.3d 389 , 93 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 482 P.2d 633 , petitioner sought relief from a kidnapping conviction in connection with a robbery pursuant to section 209 after this court clarified in People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119 , 1139, 80 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225 , that such a conviction could not be based on "movements of the victim [that] are merely incidental to the commission of the robbery ...." ( Mutch , at p. 394, 93 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 482 P.2d 633 ; see ibid. [ Daniels overruled the **6 contrary rule on kidnapping set forth in People v. Chessman (1951) 38 Cal.2d 166 ,

2017In Mutch , supra , 4 Cal.3d 389 , 93 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 482 P.2d 633 , petitioner sought relief from a kidnapping conviction in connection with a robbery pursuant to section 209 after this court clarified in People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119 , 1139, 80 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225 , that such a conviction could not be based on "movements of the victim [that] are merely incidental to the commission of the robbery ...." ( Mutch , at p. 394, 93 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 482 P.2d 633 ; see ibid. [ Daniels overruled the **6 contrary rule on kidnapping set forth in People v. Chessman (1951) 38 Cal.2d 166 ,

2017In Mutch , supra , 4 Cal.3d 389 , 93 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 482 P.2d 633 , petitioner sought relief from a kidnapping conviction in connection with a robbery pursuant to section 209 after this court clarified in People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119 , 1139, 80 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225 , that such a conviction could not be based on "movements of the victim [that] are merely incidental to the commission of the robbery ...." ( Mutch , at p. 394, 93 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 482 P.2d 633 ; see ibid. [ Daniels overruled the **6 contrary rule on kidnapping set forth in People v. Chessman (1951) 38 Cal.2d 166 ,

2017"Because father has raised a question of law, we review the claimed constitutional violation de novo." ( In re T.G. , at p. 14, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 .) *729 B.

2013(See In re S.B., at p. 1293 [“the appellate court’s discretion to excuse forfeiture should be-exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue”]; In re Frank R. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 532, 539 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 348 ] (Frank R.) [“we are reluctant to enforce the waiver rule when it conflicts with due process”]; In re RA. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1197 , 1210 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 783 ] (P.A.) [“an appellate court may review an error despite a party’s failure to raise it below if due process rights are involved”]; Gladys L., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 849 [same].) Because father

2013(See In re S.B., at p. 1293 [“the appellate court’s discretion to excuse forfeiture should be-exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue”]; In re Frank R. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 532, 539 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 348 ] (Frank R.) [“we are reluctant to enforce the waiver rule when it conflicts with due process”]; In re RA. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1197 , 1210 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 783 ] (P.A.) [“an appellate court may review an error despite a party’s failure to raise it below if due process rights are involved”]; Gladys L., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 849 [same].) Because father

2012In the present petition, petitioner raises numerous claims subject to the Waltreus rule and for which no exception applies.23 Claim No. 8, in which he alleges 22 Abelleira gave these examples of situations in which a court fundamentally lacks jurisdiction: ―A state court has no jurisdiction to determine title to land located outside its territorial borders, for the subject matter is entirely beyond its authority or power. [Citation.] A court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the marital status of persons when neither is domiciled within the state. [Citations.] A court has no jurisdiction

2006(See Rancho Publications v. Superior Court (1999) 68 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1542 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 274 ] (Rancho Publications).) Accordingly, review by extraordinary writ is proper and warranted. *1440 II.

2006(See Rancho Publications v. Superior Court (1999) 68 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1542 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 274 ] (Rancho Publications).) Accordingly, review by extraordinary writ is proper and warranted. *1440 II.

2005B The Process That Is Due “It is axiomatic that due process guarantees apply to dependency proceedings.” (Ingrid E. v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 751, 756 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 ], citing Stanley v. Illinois (1972) 405 U.S. 645, 658 [ 31 L.Ed.2d 551 , 92 S.Ct. 1208 ]; Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 753-754 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 599 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 ].) The United States Supreme Court recognizes the concept of “due process” cannot be precisely defined.

2005B The Process That Is Due “It is axiomatic that due process guarantees apply to dependency proceedings.” (Ingrid E. v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 751, 756 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 ], citing Stanley v. Illinois (1972) 405 U.S. 645, 658 [ 31 L.Ed.2d 551 , 92 S.Ct. 1208 ]; Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 753-754 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 599 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 ].) The United States Supreme Court recognizes the concept of “due process” cannot be precisely defined.

2005B The Process That Is Due “It is axiomatic that due process guarantees apply to dependency proceedings.” (Ingrid E. v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 751, 756 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 ], citing Stanley v. Illinois (1972) 405 U.S. 645, 658 [ 31 L.Ed.2d 551 , 92 S.Ct. 1208 ]; Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 753-754 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 599 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 ].) The United States Supreme Court recognizes the concept of “due process” cannot be precisely defined.

2005B The Process That Is Due “It is axiomatic that due process guarantees apply to dependency proceedings.” (Ingrid E. v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 751, 756 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 ], citing Stanley v. Illinois (1972) 405 U.S. 645, 658 [ 31 L.Ed.2d 551 , 92 S.Ct. 1208 ]; Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 753-754 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 599 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 ].) The United States Supreme Court recognizes the concept of “due process” cannot be precisely defined.