speeding violation in Pennsylvania

2005The Vehicle Code at 75 Pa.C.S. § 3368(a) requires that for a speedometer clock to be valid the vehicle's speed must be measured "for a distance of not less than three-tenths of a mile." Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113 (1995) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court held clocking for two-tenths of a mile insufficient to constitute probable cause of a speeding violation).

2005The Vehicle Code at 75 Pa.C.S. § 3368(a) requires that for a speedometer clock to be valid the vehicle’s speed must be measured “for a distance of not less than three-tenths of a mile.” Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113 (1995) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court held clocking for two-tenths of a mile insufficient to constitute probable cause of a speeding violation).

2005The Vehicle Code at 75 Pa.C.S. § 3368(a) requires that for a speedometer clock to be valid the vehicle's speed must be measured "for a distance of not less than three-tenths of a mile." Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113 (1995) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court held clocking for two-tenths of a mile insufficient to constitute probable cause of a speeding violation).

2005The Vehicle Code at 75 Pa.C.S. § 3368(a) requires that for a speedometer clock to be valid the vehicle’s speed must be measured “for a distance of not less than three-tenths of a mile.” Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113 (1995) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court held clocking for two-tenths of a mile insufficient to constitute probable cause of a speeding violation).

2026Smith, supra. Judgment of sentence affirmed.11 Date: 2/9/2026 ____________________________________________ 11 Dong repeatedly classifies Trooper Stauffer’s questions, while he ran his documents thorough the police data base, as “off-mission.” However, Dong acknowledges that “the trooper was entitled to inquire about [his] travel plans.” Appellant’s Brief, at 15.

2025Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Green, 168 A.3d 180 (Pa. Super. 2017), a trooper stopped the defendant’s vehicle for a speeding violation.

2025Id. at 182 .

2025As the United States Supreme Court has observed, the risk of a violent encounter in a traffic-stop setting “stems not from the ordinary reaction of a motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop.” [Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414 ]. “[T]he motivation of a passenger to employ violence to prevent apprehension of such a crime … is every bit as great as that of the driver.” [Id.] Johnson, 555 U.S. at 331-32 .

2025Id.

2025In finding no merit to the defendant’s claim, our Supreme Court focused on whether “the second offense was known to the prosecuting officer at the time of the first trial.” Geyer, supra, 687 A.2d at 818 .

2025Id. at 656 .

2020In Killen, upon which Appellant relies, the complainant alleged she was intoxicated when a uniformed police officer stopped her vehicle “in front of her apartment for a speeding violation.” Killen, 680 A.2d at 851 .

2017Gutierrez, supra. In light of these facts, we are constrained to conclude that Trooper Kaczor did not possess the requisite probable cause to stop Johnson’s vehicle for a speeding violation under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3362(a)(2), or violation of driving on roadways laned for traffic under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3362(a)(2).

2009He averred that Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113 (1995), and Commonwealth v. Masters, 737 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. 1999), control the initial stop of vehicles and require suppression of evidence in the instant case where officer did not use the speed timing device in accordance with 75 Pa.C.S. §3368 (requiring distance for vehicle timed by police officer’s speedometer no less than three-tenths of a mile).

2007A concededly valid official policy may be deemed the "moving force” behind a constitutional tort when it is "unconstitutionally applied by a municipal employee.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 , 109 S.Ct. 1197 , 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (wherein police officers did not summon medical assistance for plaintiff, who fell down several times and became incoherent while being processed at the police station for a speeding violation).

2007A concededly valid official policy may be deemed the "moving force” behind a constitutional tort when it is "unconstitutionally applied by a municipal employee.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 , 109 S.Ct. 1197 , 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (wherein police officers did not summon medical assistance for plaintiff, who fell down several times and became incoherent while being processed at the police station for a speeding violation).

2006In the dissent’s view, Officer Sollenberger lacked statutory authority to arrest appellant because the conduct the officer witnessed in his own jurisdiction did not establish a speeding violation, since the officer did not clock appellant’s vehicle for the requisite statutory distance, and the “other driving and conduct of [appellant] ... took place outside his primary jurisdiction, where he lacked authority to make an arrest.” Therefore, the dissent concluded, appellant’s refusal to submit to chemical testing was a “legal nullity” and the Implied Consent Law “does not apply.” Martin, 870 A.2d

2006In the dissent’s view, Officer Sollenberger lacked statutory authority to arrest appellant because the conduct the officer witnessed in his own jurisdiction did not establish a speeding violation, since the officer did not clock appellant’s vehicle for the requisite statutory distance, and the “other driving and conduct of [appellant] ... took place outside his primary jurisdiction, where he lacked authority to make an arrest.” Therefore, the dissent concluded, appellant’s refusal to submit to chemical testing was a “legal nullity” and the Implied Consent Law “does not apply.” Martin, 870 A.2d

2003Id.

1999Shelly, 703 A.2d at 501 .

1997As this court made clear in Hoak, supra, a person who is free to leave the scene after being given a traffic citation is nothing more that a private citizen who is involved in a consensual encounter with a police officer.

1989In support of its position that a police officer’s estimation of speed, absent an exact measurement from a speed timing device, is legally sufficient to establish a speeding violation, the Commonwealth cites Commonwealth v. Monosky, 360 Pa.Super. 481 , 520 A.2d 1192 (1987).

1989In support of its position that a police officer’s estimation of speed, absent an exact measurement from a speed timing device, is legally sufficient to establish a speeding violation, the Commonwealth cites Commonwealth v. Monosky, 360 Pa.Super. 481 , 520 A.2d 1192 (1987).

1984However, the Pennsylvania Superior Court still found that the operator’s license should be suspended due to a speeding violation: “We are not in accord with the conclusion of the court below that an offense by the operator of a tractor-trailer may be excused on the ground that he was not responsible for the alleged improper functioning of the speedometers.” 213 Pa. Super, at 406, 249 A.2d at 787 .

1974This burden, however, arises after the Commonwealth has made out a prima facie case by producing the records of conviction received by the department from the magistrate and the secretary’s records compiled therefrom which justified the suspension: Virnelson, supra. From the testimony of appellant we find the following facts: (1) That on March 1, 1973, he was issued a citation by a member of the Pennsylvania State Police, alleging a speeding violation in Canimaugh Township, York County, Pa. (2) That pursuant to the “Instructions for Response by Mail” on the citation, he mailed the bottom porti

1973Commonwealth v. Woods, 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 359 , 295 A. 2d 612 (1972); Treadwell v. Commonwealth, 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 221 , 281 A. 2d 373 (1971).