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6 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Maryland v. Wilsongreen1 sentence2020See Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414 (extending Mimms to permit the roadside removal of a passenger because “the possibility of a violent encounter stems not from the ordinary reaction of a motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop.” (emphasis added)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hendricksgreen1 sentence2016Id. at 741. | 1 | 1 |
Arizona v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2016Indeed, “the risk of a violent encounter in a traffic-stop setting stems not from the ordinary reaction of a motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop.” Id. at 331 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 2016Indeed, “the risk of a violent encounter in a traffic-stop setting stems not from the ordinary reaction of a motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop.” Id. at 331 , 129 S.Ct. 781, 784 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Whren v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016See *16 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (acknowledging that an officer may have probable cause to stop and temporarily detain a vehicle after a traffic violation); Byndloss v. State, 391 Md. 462, 480 , 893 A.2d 1119, 1130 (2006) (“As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”). i. The interior of Petitioner’s vehicle was protected by the Fourth Amendment The Fourth Amendment guarantees individuals the right “to be secure in the 2016See *16 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (acknowledging that an officer may have probable cause to stop and temporarily detain a vehicle after a traffic violation); Byndloss v. State, 391 Md. 462, 480 , 893 A.2d 1119, 1130 (2006) (“As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”). i. The interior of Petitioner’s vehicle was protected by the Fourth Amendment The Fourth Amendment guarantees individuals the right “to be secure in the | 1 | 1 |
Byndloss v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See *16 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (acknowledging that an officer may have probable cause to stop and temporarily detain a vehicle after a traffic violation); Byndloss v. State, 391 Md. 462, 480 , 893 A.2d 1119, 1130 (2006) (“As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”). i. The interior of Petitioner’s vehicle was protected by the Fourth Amendment The Fourth Amendment guarantees individuals the right “to be secure in the 2016See *16 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (acknowledging that an officer may have probable cause to stop and temporarily detain a vehicle after a traffic violation); Byndloss v. State, 391 Md. 462, 480 , 893 A.2d 1119, 1130 (2006) (“As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”). i. The interior of Petitioner’s vehicle was protected by the Fourth Amendment The Fourth Amendment guarantees individuals the right “to be secure in the | 1 | 1 |
Stokes v. Stategreen2 sentences2016In considering potential risks to officer safety, I would agree with the circuit court that the area in which this stop occurred is a salient factor in assessing the “whole picture.” Stokes v. State, 362 Md. 407, 416 , 765 A.2d 612, 616 (2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 2016In considering potential risks to officer safety, I would agree with the circuit court that the area in which this stop occurred is a salient factor in assessing the “whole picture.” Stokes v. State, 362 Md. 407, 416 , 765 A.2d 612, 616 (2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Snow v. State
green
2 sentences2006In Snow v. State, 84 Md.App. 243 , 578 A.2d 816 (1990), the defendant’s automobile was stopped for a speeding violation. 2006In Snow v. State, 84 Md.App. 243 , 578 A.2d 816 (1990), the defendant’s automobile was stopped for a speeding violation. | 2 | 1999–2006 |
Ferris v. State
green
2 sentences1999As the Court of Appeals observed, “the pre-existing detention of Ferris, properly sustained by the probable cause for the speeding violation, combined with the other factors we have identified, leads to the conclusion that a reasonable person in Ferris’s position would believe that continued submission to Trooper Smith was required.” Ferris, 355 Md. at 379 , 735 A.2d 491 . 1999As the Court of Appeals observed, “the pre-existing detention of Ferris, properly sustained by the probable cause for the speeding violation, combined with the other factors we have identified, leads to the conclusion that a reasonable person in Ferris’s position would believe that continued submission to Trooper Smith was required.” Ferris, 355 Md. at 379 , 735 A.2d 491 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.