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5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2008 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Toland v. Sunland Housing Group, Inc.green2 sentences2008Imposing on the hiring person a liability greater than that incurred by the independent contractor (the party with the greatest and most direct fault) is equally unfair and illogical whether the hiring person’s liability is premised on the theory of section 413 ... or the theory of section 416 [of the Restatement] . . . .” (Toland v. Sunland Housing Group, Inc., supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 270 .) iv. 2003Imposing on the hiring person a liability greater than that incurred by the independent contractor (the party with the greatest and most direct fault) is equally unfair and illogical whether the hiring person's liability is premised on the theory of section 413 ... or the theory of section 416...." ( Toland, supra, at p. 270 , 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 878 , 955 P.2d 504 .) In Camargo v. Tjaarda Dairy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1235 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 617 , 25 P.3d 1096 (Camargo ), the high court extended the Privette rationale to the tort of negligent hiring. (§ 411 [subjecting hirer of contractor to liability fo | 1 | 4 |
Davidson v. City of Westminstergreen2 sentences1998By concocting a duty in a particular situation to prevent another from acting negligently, as an exception to the general rule that “one owes no duty to control the conduct of another” (Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 203 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 649 P.2d 894 ]), it is always possible to impose liability on one person for the negligence of another and to label that liability “direct.” The concurring and dissenting opinion does precisely this when it insists on characterizing Restatement Second of Torts section 413’s theory of liability (which, as explained in the text, is es 1998By concocting a duty in a particular situation to prevent another from acting negligently, as an exception to the general rule that “one owes no duty to control the conduct of another” (Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 203 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 649 P.2d 894 ]), it is always possible to impose liability on one person for the negligence of another and to label that liability “direct.” The concurring and dissenting opinion does precisely this when it insists on characterizing Restatement Second of Torts section 413’s theory of liability (which, as explained in the text, is es | 1 | 1 |
Privette v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1998Because of these conflicting views by the Courts of Appeal, we granted review to clarify the scope of our holding in Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689 . 2 Ill Plaintiff Toland asserts that Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689 , bars recovery by an employee of an independent contractor only in cases based on section 416 of the Restatement Second of Torts, which, Toland observes, holds the hiring person vicariously liable for the independent contractor’s failure to take the special precautions provided for “in the contract or otherwise.” Thus, Toland contends, Privette has no bearing on cases such as his 1998It may have provided a clue to its reasoning, however, in quoting Privette’s footnote 2 in its entirety but italicizing the word “normally” in the last sentence, as follows: “ ‘[P]eculiar risk liability is normally premised on the broader rule of vicarious liability for the contractor’s negligence.’ ” (Owens, supra, at p. 1667, fn. 4 ; see also Yanez v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1995) 63 F.3d 870, 873 [describing Owens as stating “a narrow exception- to Privette” for cases brought on the “direct liability” theory of Restatement Second of Torts section 413].) In this case, the Court of Appeal concluded th | 1 | 1 |
Hughes v. Atlantic Pacific Construction Co.green2 sentences1998Recovery in such a case would be for fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation, however, and would not involve the "comparative knowledge" analysis proposed by the concurring and dissenting opinion, nor would it depend on the peculiar risk doctrine. [5] To the extent that Owens v. Giannetta-Heinrich Construction Co., supra, 23 Cal.App.4th 1662 , 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 11 , concludes to the contrary, it is disapproved. [1] As noted in Grahn v. Tosco Corp. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1379 , footnote 1, 68 Cal. Rptr.2d 806 , the person employing the independent contractor may be referred to as the "emp 1998Recovery in such a case would be for fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation, however, and would not involve the "comparative knowledge" analysis proposed by the concurring and dissenting opinion, nor would it depend on the peculiar risk doctrine. [5] To the extent that Owens v. Giannetta-Heinrich Construction Co., supra, 23 Cal.App.4th 1662 , 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 11 , concludes to the contrary, it is disapproved. [1] As noted in Grahn v. Tosco Corp. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1379 , footnote 1, 68 Cal. Rptr.2d 806 , the person employing the independent contractor may be referred to as the "emp | 1 | 1 |
Owens v. Giannetta-Heinrich Construction Co.green2 sentences1998It may have provided a clue to its reasoning, however, in quoting Privette's footnote 2 in its entirety but italicizing the word "normally" in the last sentence, as follows: "'[P]eculiar risk liability is normally premised on the broader rule of vicarious liability for the contractor's negligence.'" ( Owens, supra, at p. 1667, fn. 4 , 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 11 ; see also Yanez v. United States (9th Cir.1995) 63 F.3d 870, 873 [describing Owens as stating "a narrow exception to Privette "for cases brought on the "direct ability" theory of Restatement Second of Torts section 413].) In this case, the Cour 1998It may have provided a clue to its reasoning, however, in quoting Privette’s footnote 2 in its entirety but italicizing the word “normally” in the last sentence, as follows: “ ‘[P]eculiar risk liability is normally premised on the broader rule of vicarious liability for the contractor’s negligence.’ ” (Owens, supra, at p. 1667, fn. 4 ; see also Yanez v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1995) 63 F.3d 870, 873 [describing Owens as stating “a narrow exception- to Privette” for cases brought on the “direct liability” theory of Restatement Second of Torts section 413].) In this case, the Court of Appeal concluded th | 1 | 1 |
Isabel YANEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appelleegreen2 sentences1998It may have provided a clue to its reasoning, however, in quoting Privette's footnote 2 in its entirety but italicizing the word "normally" in the last sentence, as follows: "'[P]eculiar risk liability is normally premised on the broader rule of vicarious liability for the contractor's negligence.'" ( Owens, supra, at p. 1667, fn. 4 , 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 11 ; see also Yanez v. United States (9th Cir.1995) 63 F.3d 870, 873 [describing Owens as stating "a narrow exception to Privette "for cases brought on the "direct ability" theory of Restatement Second of Torts section 413].) In this case, the Cour 1998It may have provided a clue to its reasoning, however, in quoting Privette’s footnote 2 in its entirety but italicizing the word “normally” in the last sentence, as follows: “ ‘[P]eculiar risk liability is normally premised on the broader rule of vicarious liability for the contractor’s negligence.’ ” (Owens, supra, at p. 1667, fn. 4 ; see also Yanez v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1995) 63 F.3d 870, 873 [describing Owens as stating “a narrow exception- to Privette” for cases brought on the “direct liability” theory of Restatement Second of Torts section 413].) In this case, the Court of Appeal concluded th | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Grahn v. Tosco Corp.
green
2 sentences2001The case characterized negligent hiring as a theory of "personal" or "independent" liability, rather than vicarious liability. ( Grahn, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1391 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 806 .) Grahn reasoned that the liability imposed upon a hirer of an independent contractor that it knew or should have known was incompetent was based entirely upon the hirers own negligence in entrusting the job to the independent contractor. ( Ibid. ) Thus, it concluded, the recovery by the employee from the hirer for its negligence did not constitute a windfall or double recovery, because the fault of the hi 2001The case characterized negligent hiring as a theory of "personal" or "independent" liability, rather than vicarious liability. ( Grahn, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1391 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 806 .) Grahn reasoned that the liability imposed upon a hirer of an independent contractor that it knew or should have known was incompetent was based entirely upon the hirers own negligence in entrusting the job to the independent contractor. ( Ibid. ) Thus, it concluded, the recovery by the employee from the hirer for its negligence did not constitute a windfall or double recovery, because the fault of the hi | 2 | 1998–2001 |
Camargo v. Tjaarda Dairy
green
2 sentences2003Imposing on the hiring person a liability greater than that incurred by the independent contractor (the party with the greatest and most direct fault) is equally unfair and illogical whether the hiring person's liability is premised on the theory of section 413 ... or the theory of section 416...." ( Toland, supra, at p. 270 , 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 878 , 955 P.2d 504 .) In Camargo v. Tjaarda Dairy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1235 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 617 , 25 P.3d 1096 (Camargo ), the high court extended the Privette rationale to the tort of negligent hiring. (§ 411 [subjecting hirer of contractor to liability fo 2003Imposing on the hiring person a liability greater than that incurred by the independent contractor (the party with the greatest and most direct fault) is equally unfair and illogical whether the hiring person's liability is premised on the theory of section 413 ... or the theory of section 416...." ( Toland, supra, at p. 270 , 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 878 , 955 P.2d 504 .) In Camargo v. Tjaarda Dairy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1235 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 617 , 25 P.3d 1096 (Camargo ), the high court extended the Privette rationale to the tort of negligent hiring. (§ 411 [subjecting hirer of contractor to liability fo | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Hooker v. Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2003(Ibid.) In the recent case Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198 , 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 853 , 38 P.3d 1081 (Hooker) , the Supreme Court considered whether an independent contractor's employee may sue the hirer for negligent exercise of retained control, as that tort is described in section 414 of the Restatement. 2003(Ibid.) In the recent case Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198 , 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 853 , 38 P.3d 1081 (Hooker) , the Supreme Court considered whether an independent contractor's employee may sue the hirer for negligent exercise of retained control, as that tort is described in section 414 of the Restatement. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Phyllis M. Nelson, Etc., and Cross-Appellant v. United States of America, and Cross-Appellee v. Duncanson-Harrelson Co., Third Party
green
2 sentences1998The court, applying and developing the federal common law of maritime injuries, analyzed the plaintiffs claim against the United States under the section 413 theory of liability. ( Nelson, supra, at p. 474 .) The appellate court, finding precedent divided on the application of section 413 to contractors' employees, returned to first principles. 1998(Nelson, supra, at p. 474 .) The appellate court, finding precedent divided on the application of section 413 to contractors’ employees, returned to first principles. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Woolen v. Aerojet General Corporation
red
2 sentences1998It may have provided a clue to its reasoning, however, in quoting Privette's footnote 2 in its entirety but italicizing the word "normally" in the last sentence, as follows: "'[P]eculiar risk liability is normally premised on the broader rule of vicarious liability for the contractor's negligence.'" ( Owens, supra, at p. 1667, fn. 4 , 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 11 ; see also Yanez v. United States (9th Cir.1995) 63 F.3d 870, 873 [describing Owens as stating "a narrow exception to Privette "for cases brought on the "direct ability" theory of Restatement Second of Torts section 413].) In this case, the Cour 1998It may have provided a clue to its reasoning, however, in quoting Privette’s footnote 2 in its entirety but italicizing the word “normally” in the last sentence, as follows: “ ‘[P]eculiar risk liability is normally premised on the broader rule of vicarious liability for the contractor’s negligence.’ ” (Owens, supra, at p. 1667, fn. 4 ; see also Yanez v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1995) 63 F.3d 870, 873 [describing Owens as stating “a narrow exception- to Privette” for cases brought on the “direct liability” theory of Restatement Second of Torts section 413].) In this case, the Court of Appeal concluded th | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.