Bell test in Alabama

2002Because of the confusion that has developed surrounding the Bell test, we today adopt the language recited above *835 from Larson, Workers' Compensation Law § 87.02, as the test for determining whether an injury to a scheduled member should be treated as unscheduled; [9] therefore, we overrule Bell insofar as it established a different test, and we further overrule those cases listed in notes 5 through 8 insofar as they expanded the Bell test. [10] This Court's 1969 decision in Leach Manufacturing Co. v. Puckett, 284 Ala. 209 , 224 So.2d 242 (Ala.1969), is consistent with the policy expressed

2002Because of the confusion that has developed surrounding the Bell test, we today adopt the language recited above *835 from Larson, Workers' Compensation Law § 87.02, as the test for determining whether an injury to a scheduled member should be treated as unscheduled; [9] therefore, we overrule Bell insofar as it established a different test, and we further overrule those cases listed in notes 5 through 8 insofar as they expanded the Bell test. [10] This Court's 1969 decision in Leach Manufacturing Co. v. Puckett, 284 Ala. 209 , 224 So.2d 242 (Ala.1969), is consistent with the policy expressed

2007Services, Gold Kist, Republic Steel Corp., Richardson Homes Corp., Checker's Drive-In Restaurant, American Cast Iron Pipe Co., U.S. Steel, Smith, and Dale Motels ] insofar as they expanded the Bell test." 837 So.2d at 835 . *1151 The Ex parte Drummond decision effectively upheld that portion of Bell that allowed injuries to be compensated outside the schedule "`if the effect of such injury extends to other parts of the body, and produces a greater or more prolonged incapacity than that which naturally results from the specific injury. . . .'" 282 Ala. at 646 , 213 So.2d at 811 .

2007Services, Gold Kist, Republic Steel Corp., Richardson Homes Corp., Checker's Drive-In Restaurant, American Cast Iron Pipe Co., U.S. Steel, Smith, and Dale Motels ] insofar as they expanded the Bell test." 837 So.2d at 835 . *1151 The Ex parte Drummond decision effectively upheld that portion of Bell that allowed injuries to be compensated outside the schedule "`if the effect of such injury extends to other parts of the body, and produces a greater or more prolonged incapacity than that which naturally results from the specific injury. . . .'" 282 Ala. at 646 , 213 So.2d at 811 .

2007Services, Gold Kist, Republic Steel Corp., Richardson Homes Corp., Checker's Drive-In Restaurant, American Cast Iron Pipe Co., U.S. Steel, Smith, and Dale Motels ] insofar as they expanded the Bell test." 837 So.2d at 835 . *1151 The Ex parte Drummond decision effectively upheld that portion of Bell that allowed injuries to be compensated outside the schedule "`if the effect of such injury extends to other parts of the body, and produces a greater or more prolonged incapacity than that which naturally results from the specific injury. . . .'" 282 Ala. at 646 , 213 So.2d at 811 .

2007Services, Gold Kist, Republic Steel Corp., Richardson Homes Corp., Checker's Drive-In Restaurant, American Cast Iron Pipe Co., U.S. Steel, Smith, and Dale Motels ] insofar as they expanded the Bell test." 837 So.2d at 835 . *1151 The Ex parte Drummond decision effectively upheld that portion of Bell that allowed injuries to be compensated outside the schedule "`if the effect of such injury extends to other parts of the body, and produces a greater or more prolonged incapacity than that which naturally results from the specific injury. . . .'" 282 Ala. at 646 , 213 So.2d at 811 .

2011The first of the two grounds given by the Court of Civil Appeals for reversing the judgment of the trial court is that “Hayes has not established that his right- *1217 foot injury caused an injury to any particular nonscheduled part of his body.” 70 So.3d at 1206 .

2011The first of the two grounds given by the Court of Civil Appeals for reversing the judgment of the trial court is that “Hayes has not established that his right- *1217 foot injury caused an injury to any particular nonscheduled part of his body.” 70 So.3d at 1206 .

2010In Boise Cascade Corp. v. Jackson, 997 So.2d 1026 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (“Jackson I”), this court interpreted Ex paHe Drum-mond as altering the Bell test to require that a worker prove that the effects of an injury to a scheduled member cause or contribute to a permanent physical injury to other parts of the worker’s body in order to receive unscheduled disability benefits.

2010In Boise Cascade Corp. v. Jackson, 997 So.2d 1026 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (“Jackson I”), this court interpreted Ex paHe Drum-mond as altering the Bell test to require that a worker prove that the effects of an injury to a scheduled member cause or contribute to a permanent physical injury to other parts of the worker’s body in order to receive unscheduled disability benefits.

2010See, e.g., Gold Kist, Inc. v. Casey, 495 So.2d 1129 (Ala.Civ.App.1986); and Republic Steel Corp. v. Kimbrell, 370 So.2d 294 (Ala.Civ.App.1979).

2010See, e.g., Gold Kist, Inc. v. Casey, 495 So.2d 1129 (Ala.Civ.App.1986); and Republic Steel Corp. v. Kimbrell, 370 So.2d 294 (Ala.Civ.App.1979).

2008As Advantage Sales points out, however, the scope of the second prong of Bell has been severely limited, if not abrogated completely, by Ex parte Drummond Co., 837 So.2d 831 (Ala.2002), and subsequent appellate opinions; at most, a vestigial exception may apply to situations “ ‘when an injury ... to a scheduled member[ ] entails ... a debilitating pain ... that impairs the body as a whole in a manner not contemplated by the schedule.’ ” Shoney’s, Inc. v. Rigsby, 971 So.2d 722 , 725-26 n. 2 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (quoting Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc. v. Johnson, 984 So.2d 1136, 1144 (Ala.Civ.App.2005

2008As Advantage Sales points out, however, the scope of the second prong of Bell has been severely limited, if not abrogated completely, by Ex parte Drummond Co., 837 So.2d 831 (Ala.2002), and subsequent appellate opinions; at most, a vestigial exception may apply to situations “ ‘when an injury ... to a scheduled member[ ] entails ... a debilitating pain ... that impairs the body as a whole in a manner not contemplated by the schedule.’ ” Shoney’s, Inc. v. Rigsby, 971 So.2d 722 , 725-26 n. 2 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (quoting Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc. v. Johnson, 984 So.2d 1136, 1144 (Ala.Civ.App.2005

2008As Advantage Sales points out, however, the scope of the second prong of Bell has been severely limited, if not abrogated completely, by Ex parte Drummond Co., 837 So.2d 831 (Ala.2002), and subsequent appellate opinions; at most, a vestigial exception may apply to situations “ ‘when an injury ... to a scheduled member[ ] entails ... a debilitating pain ... that impairs the body as a whole in a manner not contemplated by the schedule.’ ” Shoney’s, Inc. v. Rigsby, 971 So.2d 722 , 725-26 n. 2 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (quoting Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc. v. Johnson, 984 So.2d 1136, 1144 (Ala.Civ.App.2005

2008As Advantage Sales points out, however, the scope of the second prong of Bell has been severely limited, if not abrogated completely, by Ex parte Drummond Co., 837 So.2d 831 (Ala.2002), and subsequent appellate opinions; at most, a vestigial exception may apply to situations “ ‘when an injury ... to a scheduled member[ ] entails ... a debilitating pain ... that impairs the body as a whole in a manner not contemplated by the schedule.’ ” Shoney’s, Inc. v. Rigsby, 971 So.2d 722 , 725-26 n. 2 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (quoting Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc. v. Johnson, 984 So.2d 1136, 1144 (Ala.Civ.App.2005

2007Additionally, because a challenge to venue is waivable, see Ex parte Watts , 435 So.2d 135 , 137 (Ala. 1983), and Sciscoe v. State , 606 So.2d 202 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992), the Court of Criminal Appeals' application of the procedural bars that the claim "could have been but was not raised at trial," see Rule 32.2(3), Ala. R.Crim.

2007Additionally, because a challenge to venue is waivable, see Ex parte Watts, 435 So.2d 135, 137 (Ala.1983), and Sciscoe v. State, 606 So.2d 202 (Ala.Crim.App.1992), the Court of Criminal Appeals' application of the procedural bars that the claim "could have been but was not raised at trial," see Rule 32.2(3), Ala. R.Crim.

2007In affirming the trial court’s judgment, this court concluded that “there is some evidence that the effects of the injury have produced a greater interference with the ability to work than would be expected from a simple and uncomplicated loss of the use of a foot.” 50 Ala.App. at 256 , 278 So.2d at 373 (emphasis added) 1 In Ex parte Drummond Co., our supreme court overruled Dale Motels insofar as it expanded the Bell test to include vocational disabilities as an effect that will take the injury outside the schedule. 837 So.2d at 834 n. 8.

2007In affirming the trial court’s judgment, this court concluded that “there is some evidence that the effects of the injury have produced a greater interference with the ability to work than would be expected from a simple and uncomplicated loss of the use of a foot.” 50 Ala.App. at 256 , 278 So.2d at 373 (emphasis added) 1 In Ex parte Drummond Co., our supreme court overruled Dale Motels insofar as it expanded the Bell test to include vocational disabilities as an effect that will take the injury outside the schedule. 837 So.2d at 834 n. 8.

2007Although some of those decisions mentioned physical injury to other parts of the body, see Romine v. McDuffie , 341 So.2d 952 (Ala.Civ.App. 1977) (permanent shortening of leg that resulted in scoliosis of the back rendered injury nonscheduled), a majority of the cases allowed compensation outside the schedule based solely on symptoms in other parts of the body without referencing a particular injury to the affected body part.

2007Although some of those decisions mentioned physical injury to other parts of the body, see Romine v. McDuffie , 341 So.2d 952 (Ala.Civ.App. 1977) (permanent shortening of leg that resulted in scoliosis of the back rendered injury nonscheduled), a majority of the cases allowed compensation outside the schedule based solely on symptoms in other parts of the body without referencing a particular injury to the affected body part.

2002On appeal, Bell argues that the circuit court erroneously denied the amendment to his petition and that the circuit court's summary dismissal of his petition was erroneous. "[W]hen the facts are undisputed and an appellate court is presented with pure questions of law, that court's review in a Rule 32 proceeding is de novo ." Ex parte White , 792 So.2d 1097 , 1098 (Ala. 2001).

2002See Russell Corp. v. Wurtz, 625 So.2d 810 (Ala. Civ.App.1993); Whitehead Forest Prods., Inc. v. Huggins, 579 So.2d 657 (Ala.Civ.

2002See Russell Corp. v. Wurtz, 625 So.2d 810 (Ala. Civ.App.1993); Whitehead Forest Prods., Inc. v. Huggins, 579 So.2d 657 (Ala.Civ.

2001Corp. v. Kent, 618 So.2d 1357 (Ala.Civ.App.1992) (finding no legal evidence that the knee injury in that case met the Bell standard, and noting that "a knee injury which causes a partial [loss of] use of a leg comes within the provisions of a scheduled injury").

2001Corp. v. Kent, 618 So.2d 1357 (Ala.Civ.App.1992) (finding no legal evidence that the knee injury in that case met the Bell standard, and noting that "a knee injury which causes a partial [loss of] use of a leg comes within the provisions of a scheduled injury").

1999See Rowe v. Isbell, 599 So.2d 35 (Ala.1992); Smith v. Smith, 596 So.2d 1 (Ala.1992).

1999See Rowe v. Isbell, 599 So.2d 35 (Ala. 1992); Smith v. Smith, 596 So.2d 1 (Ala. 1992).

1999Cagle v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 681 So.2d 611 (Ala.Civ.App. 1996).

1999Cagle v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 681 So.2d 611 (Ala.Civ.App. 1996).

1997This court further noted that the conduct of the Bell defendants had been characterized as "an attempt to evade the provisions of a stat law." 579 So.2d at 649 .