Bell claim in California

2022Proc., § 906.) While we agree with much of Bell’s analysis regarding interim fee awards, we part company with it on its application of this statute.17 It is established law that a summary adjudication ruling is not appealable, while a fee award “is appealable as a final determination on a collateral matter, 17 No subsequent case has followed Bell on this point. 36 severable from the general subject of the litigation.” (Smith v. Krueger (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 752, 756 ; Tucker Ellis LLP v. Superior Court (Nelson), supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1240 .) If a reviewing court can be forced to review a

2022Proc., § 906.) While we agree with much of Bell’s analysis regarding interim fee awards, we part company with it on its application of this statute.17 It is established law that a summary adjudication ruling is not appealable, while a fee award “is appealable as a final determination on a collateral matter, 17 No subsequent case has followed Bell on this point. 36 severable from the general subject of the litigation.” (Smith v. Krueger (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 752, 756 ; Tucker Ellis LLP v. Superior Court (Nelson), supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1240 .) If a reviewing court can be forced to review a

2022Proc., § 906.) While we agree with much of Bell’s analysis regarding interim fee awards, we part company with it on its application of this statute.17 It is established law that a summary adjudication ruling is not appealable, while a fee award “is appealable as a final determination on a collateral matter, 17 No subsequent case has followed Bell on this point. 36 severable from the general subject of the litigation.” (Smith v. Krueger (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 752, 756 ; Tucker Ellis LLP v. Superior Court (Nelson), supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1240 .) If a reviewing court can be forced to review a

2022Proc., § 906.) While we agree with much of Bell’s analysis regarding interim fee awards, we part company with it on its application of this statute.17 It is established law that a summary adjudication ruling is not appealable, while a fee award “is appealable as a final determination on a collateral matter, 17 No subsequent case has followed Bell on this point. 36 severable from the general subject of the litigation.” (Smith v. Krueger (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 752, 756 ; Tucker Ellis LLP v. Superior Court (Nelson), supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1240 .) If a reviewing court can be forced to review a

2022However, “ ‘[t]he meaning of a statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the words must be construed in context, and provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible.’ ” (People v. Shabazz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 55, 67 .) Section 6601, subdivision (a)(3) begins by stating that a SVP petition may be filed if an individual was “in custody pursuant to a determinate prison term, parole revocation term, or a hold placed pursuant to Section 6601.3, at the time the petition [was] filed.” Construing the statute, section 6601, subdivision (a)(3)’s

2022Bell’s claim ignores that section 6601, subdivision (a)(1) requires referrals for an SVP evaluation only for those 11 Additionally, we also find no merit in Bell’s argument that his position is supported by the fact that the CDCR disclaimed jurisdiction over parolees in Armstrong v. Brown (2012) 857 F.Supp.2d 919 .

2022While Realignment generally vested trial courts with an enhanced role in the supervision of certain groups of parolees (see VonWahlde, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 1196 ), the text of Penal Code section 3000.09 and its legislative history make clear that Realignment did not divest the CDCR of custody and jurisdiction over parolees who were released on parole prior to October 1, 2011.

2022While Realignment generally vested trial courts with an enhanced role in the supervision of certain groups of parolees (see VonWahlde, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 1196 ), the text of Penal Code section 3000.09 and its legislative history make clear that Realignment did not divest the CDCR of custody and jurisdiction over parolees who were released on parole prior to October 1, 2011.

2022At the hearing on Bell’s motion, his counsel argued for the first time that the court had discretion to either strike a section 12022.53 enhancement in its entirety or impose a lesser section 12022.53 enhancement, citing as support People v. Morrison (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 217 (Morrison).

2020Second, a threat of great bodily harm is not inherent in this offense because section 273.5, subdivision (a) does not require such a showing, (see § 273.5, subd. (a)), and “ ‘serious bodily injury’ ” and “ ‘force likely to produce great bodily injury’ ” are not required thereunder; rather, injury of a “ ‘minor . . . nature’ ” is sufficient to give rise to liability under section 273.5, subdivision (a), so long as the harm was not “de minimis.” (See People v. Gutierrez (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 944 , 951–953 & fn. 6.) Bell’s claim that T.F.’s injuries did not require medical treatment is also unava

2018(Tool Research & Engineering Corp. v. Henigson (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 675, 678 , disapproved on other grounds in Sheldon Appel, at p. 883, fn. 9.) Here, the trial court granted Bell's motion for summary judgment because it determined that the judgment in the underlying action precluded the Lanes from establishing "favorable termination" of that action.

2018A. Favorable Termination "Favorable termination . . . is an essential element of the tort of malicious prosecution, and it is strictly enforced." (Ferreira v. Gray, Cary, Ware & Freidenrich (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 409, 413 .) Noting that " 'the theory underlying the requirement of favorable termination is that it tends to indicate the innocence of the accused,' " the Supreme Court in Casa Herrera expressly stated that "[t]o determine 'whether there was a favorable termination,' we 'look at the judgment as a whole in the prior action.' " (Casa Herrera, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 341 , italics added.

2018A. Favorable Termination "Favorable termination . . . is an essential element of the tort of malicious prosecution, and it is strictly enforced." (Ferreira v. Gray, Cary, Ware & Freidenrich (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 409, 413 .) Noting that " 'the theory underlying the requirement of favorable termination is that it tends to indicate the innocence of the accused,' " the Supreme Court in Casa Herrera expressly stated that "[t]o determine 'whether there was a favorable termination,' we 'look at the judgment as a whole in the prior action.' " (Casa Herrera, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 341 , italics added.

2015As noted, the superior court denied Bell’s motion for a preliminary injunction on the ground that the matter was moot.2 On appeal, appellant claims that the “essence” of his argument is that because CDCR rules, policies and procedures and practice “did not cease to be enforced” he is “everywhere and always subject to them” and there is no way that the “ ‘matter’ can be moot.” Bell claims that he “still seeks a hearing, a determination, and the giving of a remedy to protect his interests against the application of CDCR policies and practices in this regard.” The question before us is very narro

2013In Bell, the California Supreme Court identified three nonexclusive9 types of relevant evidence (which Alphonso refers to as "Bell factors") that a defendant may use to establish a prima facie case for purposes of Batson/Wheeler error analysis: (1) evidence that the prosecutor "has struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire, or has used a disproportionate number of his peremptories against the group"; (2) evidence that "the jurors in question share only this one characteristic— their membership in the group—and that in all other respects they are as heterogeneous

2013In Bell, the California Supreme Court identified three nonexclusive9 types of relevant evidence (which Alphonso refers to as "Bell factors") that a defendant may use to establish a prima facie case for purposes of Batson/Wheeler error analysis: (1) evidence that the prosecutor "has struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire, or has used a disproportionate number of his peremptories against the group"; (2) evidence that "the jurors in question share only this one characteristic— their membership in the group—and that in all other respects they are as heterogeneous

2013In Bell, the California Supreme Court identified three nonexclusive9 types of relevant evidence (which Alphonso refers to as "Bell factors") that a defendant may use to establish a prima facie case for purposes of Batson/Wheeler error analysis: (1) evidence that the prosecutor "has struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire, or has used a disproportionate number of his peremptories against the group"; (2) evidence that "the jurors in question share only this one characteristic— their membership in the group—and that in all other respects they are as heterogeneous

2013In Bell, the California Supreme Court identified three nonexclusive9 types of relevant evidence (which Alphonso refers to as "Bell factors") that a defendant may use to establish a prima facie case for purposes of Batson/Wheeler error analysis: (1) evidence that the prosecutor "has struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire, or has used a disproportionate number of his peremptories against the group"; (2) evidence that "the jurors in question share only this one characteristic— their membership in the group—and that in all other respects they are as heterogeneous

2004(Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 617 , 23 P.3d 1143 ].) In this appeal Bell raises no issue as to peculiar risk liability under the theories of retained control and affirmative contribution set out in Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th 198 . 3 Bell’s challenge is limited to a single question of law *460 on undisputed facts, namely, whether peculiar risk liability may be imposed on Agee notwithstanding Privette , because his employer Kincaid was without workers’ compensation coverage at the time he sustained his injuries.

1982In that case the court agreed with the Smith court that the Bell standard is applicable. ( 130 Cal.App. 3d at p. 101 .) The court held that under that standard the ban on contact visits was shown to be reasonable and justified.

1982In that case the court agreed with the Smith court that the Bell standard is applicable. ( 130 Cal.App. 3d at p. 101 .) The court held that under that standard the ban on contact visits was shown to be reasonable and justified.

1982Finally, in Ramos v. Lamm (10th Cir. 1980) 639 F.2d 559 , at page 580, footnote 26, the court stat *81 ed that the clear weight of present authority establishes that there is no constitutional right to contact visitation in a jail, and the court agreed with that view.

1982Finally, in Ramos v. Lamm (10th Cir. 1980) 639 F.2d 559 , at page 580, footnote 26, the court stat *81 ed that the clear weight of present authority establishes that there is no constitutional right to contact visitation in a jail, and the court agreed with that view.

1982The Court of Appeal applied the Bell standard to the publisher only rule and found that the rule was a reasonable and proper means of maintaining security at the jail. ( 112 Cal.App.3d at p. 966 .) The court further rejected the argument that the publisher only rule denied pretrial detainees equal protection in that the rule did not apply to state prisons, because there was no showing that the county jail and state prisons were similarly situated.

1982The Court of Appeal applied the Bell standard to the publisher only rule and found that the rule was a reasonable and proper means of maintaining security at the jail. ( 112 Cal.App.3d at p. 966 .) The court further rejected the argument that the publisher only rule denied pretrial detainees equal protection in that the rule did not apply to state prisons, because there was no showing that the county jail and state prisons were similarly situated.

1981Express waivers of the enumerated constitutional rights shall appear.” While there is no requirement the defendant be advised of these three rights “in optimum legalistic constitutional terminology,” (People v. English (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 361 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 122 ]), we must inquire, “[D]id [the language used] communicate to the defendant the essential character of the constitutional privilege in lay language, or did it require resort to inference?” (Id.) We are satisfied as to Bell’s plea on the burglary, the court properly informed him of his right to confront and cross-examine the witnesse

1981Express waivers of the enumerated constitutional rights shall appear.” While there is no requirement the defendant be advised of these three rights “in optimum legalistic constitutional terminology,” (People v. English (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 361 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 122 ]), we must inquire, “[D]id [the language used] communicate to the defendant the essential character of the constitutional privilege in lay language, or did it require resort to inference?” (Id.) We are satisfied as to Bell’s plea on the burglary, the court properly informed him of his right to confront and cross-examine the witnesse

1981However, we cannot conclude from the face of the record (see In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 132 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ], cert. den. 398 U.S. 911 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 72 , 90 S.Ct. 1708 ]), Bell was aware he had a right to a jury trial, as opposed to a trial by the court, and he freely waived that right. 1 We might be able to infer based on Bell’s past experience with *785 the criminal justice system, he was well aware he was waiving his right to trial by jury, however, such “‘inference, no matter how plausibly drawn from the evidence, does not suffice.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Johnson (19

1973He further stated that the evidence would create an “inference that the people who made this cut and created this street either knew that they were creating a hazard that might take many years to realize itself or if they didn’t know they should have known had they paid attention.” The trial court granted Bell’s motion for nonsuit, relying upon Sheffet v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 3 Cal.App.3d 720 , for the proposition that where the public entity approves and accepts as a public improvement private construction by a subdivider, “the public entity, not the subdivider, is liable in an inver