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23 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1840–2026 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
David Alan Jenkins v. Commonwealth of Kentuckygreen2 sentences2025Although this “does not mean, of course, that evidence of prior acts against the same victim is automatically admissible—relevance to a material issue and probativeness must be shown, and the possibility of undue prejudice must still be considered—but our experience with these cases has taught that in most of them the Bell inquiry leads to admission.” Jenkins, 496 S.W.3d at 458 . 2025Although this “does not mean, of course, that evidence of prior acts against the same victim is automatically admissible—relevance to a material issue and probativeness must be shown, and the possibility of undue prejudice must still be considered—but our experience with these cases has taught that in most of them the Bell inquiry leads to admission.” Jenkins, 496 S.W.3d at 458 . | 3 | 6 |
Bell v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2025The oft applied Bell test for “determining the admissibility of other crimes evidence” asks: (1) whether the other crimes evidence is relevant for some purpose other than to prove the defendant’s criminal disposition; (2) whether the evidence of the uncharged crime is sufficiently probative of its commission by the accused to warrant its admission into evidence; and (3) whether the other crimes evidence’s potential for prejudice substantially outweigh its probative value. 875 S.W.2d at 889-91 . 2024Probativeness under the Bell test “relates to whether there is sufficient evidence that the ‘other crime, wrong, or act’ actually occurred.” Davis v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 709, 724 (Ky. 2004) (quoting Bell, 875 S.W.2d at 890 ). | 2 | 13 |
Davis v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2024Probativeness under the Bell test “relates to whether there is sufficient evidence that the ‘other crime, wrong, or act’ actually occurred.” Davis v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 709, 724 (Ky. 2004) (quoting Bell, 875 S.W.2d at 890 ). 2024Probativeness under the Bell test “relates to whether there is sufficient evidence that the ‘other crime, wrong, or act’ actually occurred.” Davis v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 709, 724 (Ky. 2004) (quoting Bell, 875 S.W.2d at 890 ). | 2 | 3 |
Purcell v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2026Purcell v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 382, 399-400 (Ky. 2004). 2021See, e.g., Purcell v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 382 , 399–400 (Ky. 2004) (explaining testimony of alleged prior victims of sex offenses satisfies probative aspect of Bell test, that is “whether there is sufficient evidence that the ‘other crime, wrong, or act” actually occurred[];’”), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Prater, 324 S.W.3d 393 (Ky. 2010). | 2 | 2 |
Leach v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2025The second factor of the Bell inquiry is probativeness, which requires us to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that a jury “could reasonably infer that the prior bad acts occurred and that [Anderson] committed such acts.’” Leach, 571 S.W.3d at 554 (quoting Parker v. Commonwealth, 952 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Ky. 1997)). 2025The second factor of the Bell inquiry is probativeness, which requires us to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that a jury “could reasonably infer that the prior bad acts occurred and that [Anderson] committed such acts.’” Leach, 571 S.W.3d at 554 (quoting Parker v. Commonwealth, 952 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Ky. 1997)). | 1 | 2 |
Sexton v. Sextongreen2 sentences2025Additionally, the authorities that Bell’s brief cites to with correct information (i.e., the correct reporters, court names, years, etc.) often do not support the arguments she claims they do.5 “When counsel fail to narrow focus to specific parts of a record, or when they point to little or no persuasive legal authority, they unnecessarily tax 5 For example, Bell cites to Sexton v. Sexton, 125 S.W.3d 258 (Ky. 2004), and states that, there, “[t]he court emphasized the need for fair procedures and support to ensure that self-represented parties can adequately protect their rights.” However, Sext 2025Additionally, the authorities that Bell’s brief cites to with correct information (i.e., the correct reporters, court names, years, etc.) often do not support the arguments she claims they do.5 “When counsel fail to narrow focus to specific parts of a record, or when they point to little or no persuasive legal authority, they unnecessarily tax 5 For example, Bell cites to Sexton v. Sexton, 125 S.W.3d 258 (Ky. 2004), and states that, there, “[t]he court emphasized the need for fair procedures and support to ensure that self-represented parties can adequately protect their rights.” However, Sext | 1 | 1 |
Parker v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2025The second factor of the Bell inquiry is probativeness, which requires us to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that a jury “could reasonably infer that the prior bad acts occurred and that [Anderson] committed such acts.’” Leach, 571 S.W.3d at 554 (quoting Parker v. Commonwealth, 952 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Ky. 1997)). 2025The second factor of the Bell inquiry is probativeness, which requires us to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that a jury “could reasonably infer that the prior bad acts occurred and that [Anderson] committed such acts.’” Leach, 571 S.W.3d at 554 (quoting Parker v. Commonwealth, 952 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Ky. 1997)). | 1 | 1 |
Asa Pieratt Gullett IV v. Commonwealth of Kentuckygreen2 sentences2025Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 496 S.W.3d 435, 458 (Ky. 2016). “[P]rior acts committed against the same victim, similar to the conduct on trial, will often if not usually, have relevance other than merely establishing a propensity to commit the crime charged, thus falling within the KRE 404(b) exception.” Gullett v. Commonwealth, 514 S.W.3d 518, 530 (Ky. 2017) (citing Driver, 361 S.W.3d at 884 ). 2025Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 496 S.W.3d 435, 458 (Ky. 2016). “[P]rior acts committed against the same victim, similar to the conduct on trial, will often if not usually, have relevance other than merely establishing a propensity to commit the crime charged, thus falling within the KRE 404(b) exception.” Gullett v. Commonwealth, 514 S.W.3d 518, 530 (Ky. 2017) (citing Driver, 361 S.W.3d at 884 ). | 1 | 1 |
Koester v. Koestergreen1 sentence2025See Koester v. Koester, 569 S.W.3d 412, 414-15 (Ky. App. 2019) (citation omitted) (“It is not the function or responsibility of this court to scour the record on appeal to ensure that an issue has been preserved.”). | 1 | 1 |
Doneghy v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2021However, “[e]ven if evidence is relevant and probative, it should be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice and confusion of issues.” Purcell, 149 S.W.3d at 400 (citing KRE 403). “[T]he trial court has a substantial amount of discretion in its performance of this KRE 403 balancing test.” Doneghy v. Commonwealth, 410 S.W.3d 95, 109 (Ky. 2013). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Driver v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2025Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 496 S.W.3d 435, 458 (Ky. 2016). “[P]rior acts committed against the same victim, similar to the conduct on trial, will often if not usually, have relevance other than merely establishing a propensity to commit the crime charged, thus falling within the KRE 404(b) exception.” Gullett v. Commonwealth, 514 S.W.3d 518, 530 (Ky. 2017) (citing Driver, 361 S.W.3d at 884 ). 2025Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 496 S.W.3d 435, 458 (Ky. 2016). “[P]rior acts committed against the same victim, similar to the conduct on trial, will often if not usually, have relevance other than merely establishing a propensity to commit the crime charged, thus falling within the KRE 404(b) exception.” Gullett v. Commonwealth, 514 S.W.3d 518, 530 (Ky. 2017) (citing Driver, 361 S.W.3d at 884 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Padgett v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2023Of course, “the best practice would be for the judge to establish on the record whether the hearing has been waived, after the filing of the report.” Id. 3 KRS 510.155(6) provides that unlawful use of electronic means to induce a minor to engage in sexual or other prohibited activities is a Class D felony; the penalty range for Class D felonies is -3- Mahoney from Buffalo, New York to appear pro hac vice and to continue the sentencing to allow Mahoney to be present. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Commonwealth v. Prater
green
1 sentence2021See, e.g., Purcell v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 382 , 399–400 (Ky. 2004) (explaining testimony of alleged prior victims of sex offenses satisfies probative aspect of Bell test, that is “whether there is sufficient evidence that the ‘other crime, wrong, or act” actually occurred[];’”), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Prater, 324 S.W.3d 393 (Ky. 2010). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Newcomb v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2016As we noted in Newcomb v. Commonwealth, 410 S.W.3d at 77 , under Bell's third step, "a trial court should exclude evidence otherwise admissible under KRE 404(b) if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice." The Bell Court thought it axiomatic that a risk of undue prejudice (the forbidden character inference) is inherent in prior-bad-acts evidence and so urged trial courts to "apply the rule [KRE 404(b)] cautiously." Bell, 875 S.W.2d at 889 . 2016As we noted in Newcomb v. Commonwealth, 410 S.W.3d at 77 , under Bell's third step, "a trial court should exclude evidence otherwise admissible under KRE 404(b) if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice." The Bell Court thought it axiomatic that a risk of undue prejudice (the forbidden character inference) is inherent in prior-bad-acts evidence and so urged trial courts to "apply the rule [KRE 404(b)] cautiously." Bell, 875 S.W.2d at 889 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Chiles v. Jones
neutral
1 sentence1840And although Hannah’s was the best title, yet as Barnet, when he got possession of the dower interest, had no real claim to that title, and as the possession under Bell’s claim, though there was no patent, had been held for more than twenty years, without the slightest interruption, there is no ground for applying to the fact and manner of his taking or holding the possession, the presumptions which are claimed in analogy to what is said in regard to the Mayberry tenement, in the case of Chiles vs Jones, 7 Dana, 528 . | 1 | 1840–1840 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.