continuous conduct exception in California

1990The continuous conduct exception only really applies, if at all, to those types of offenses where the statute defining the crime may be interpreted as applying, on occasion, to an offense which may be continuous in nature such as failure to provide, child abuse, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving under the influence and the like (see People v. White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143 , 151 . . . (pandering); People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 714 , 717 . . . (child abuse); People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321 , 333 . . . (possession of a destructive device); People v. Feldman (

1982“The continuous conduct exception only really applies, if at all, to those types of offenses where the statute defining the crime may be interpreted as applying, on occasion, to an offense which may be continuous in nature such as failure to provide, child abuse, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving under the influence and the like [citations].” (People v. Madden, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d 212 , 218.) Respondent cites People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 714, 717 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 299 ], in support of his argument.

1990The continuous conduct exception only really applies, if at all, to those types of offenses where the statute defining the crime may be interpreted as applying, on occasion, to an offense which may be continuous in nature such as failure to provide, child abuse, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving under the influence and the like (see People v. White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143 , 151 . . . (pandering); People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 714 , 717 . . . (child abuse); People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321 , 333 . . . (possession of a destructive device); People v. Feldman (

1981The continuous conduct exception only really applies, if at all, to those types of offenses where the statute defining the crime may be interpreted as applying, on occasion, to an offense which may be continuous in nature such as failure to provide, child abuse, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving under the influence and the like (see People v. White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143, 151 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 312 ] (pandering); People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 714, 717 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 299 ] (child abuse); People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321, 333 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 349 ] (possession

2024For example, there “is no need for a unanimity instruction if the defendant offers the same defense or defenses to the various acts constituting the charged crime.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 679 .) Also, “no unanimity instruction is required if the case falls within the continuous-course-of-conduct exception, which arises ‘when the acts are so closely connected in time as to form part of one transaction’ [citation], or ‘when . . . the statute contemplates a continuous course of conduct of a series of acts over a period of time.’ ” (Ibid.) “Cases applying the continuous conduct

2017The second context occurs when the statute defines the offense to comprise a continuous course of conduct over a period of time. ( Ibid. ) "Cases applying the continuous conduct exception have generally relied on statutory interpretation to justify a conclusion that the nature of the crime is ongoing." ( Id. at p. 225, 206 Cal.Rptr. 516 .) *1179 Here, we have little difficulty concluding that section 278.5 contemplates a continuous course of conduct.

1990The continuous conduct exception only really applies, if at all, to those types of offenses where the statute defining the crime may be interpreted as applying, on occasion, to an offense which may be continuous in nature such as failure to provide, child abuse, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving under the influence and the like (see People v. White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143 , 151 . . . (pandering); People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 714 , 717 . . . (child abuse); People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321 , 333 . . . (possession of a destructive device); People v. Feldman (

1981The continuous conduct exception only really applies, if at all, to those types of offenses where the statute defining the crime may be interpreted as applying, on occasion, to an offense which may be continuous in nature such as failure to provide, child abuse, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving under the influence and the like (see People v. White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143, 151 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 312 ] (pandering); People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 714, 717 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 299 ] (child abuse); People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321, 333 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 349 ] (possession

1990The continuous conduct exception only really applies, if at all, to those types of offenses where the statute defining the crime may be interpreted as applying, on occasion, to an offense which may be continuous in nature such as failure to provide, child abuse, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving under the influence and the like (see People v. White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143 , 151 . . . (pandering); People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 714 , 717 . . . (child abuse); People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321 , 333 . . . (possession of a destructive device); People v. Feldman (

1981The continuous conduct exception only really applies, if at all, to those types of offenses where the statute defining the crime may be interpreted as applying, on occasion, to an offense which may be continuous in nature such as failure to provide, child abuse, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving under the influence and the like (see People v. White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143, 151 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 312 ] (pandering); People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 714, 717 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 299 ] (child abuse); People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321, 333 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 349 ] (possession

1990The continuous conduct exception only really applies, if at all, to those types of offenses where the statute defining the crime may be interpreted as applying, on occasion, to an offense which may be continuous in nature such as failure to provide, child abuse, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving under the influence and the like (see People v. White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143 , 151 . . . (pandering); People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 714 , 717 . . . (child abuse); People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321 , 333 . . . (possession of a destructive device); People v. Feldman (

1981The continuous conduct exception only really applies, if at all, to those types of offenses where the statute defining the crime may be interpreted as applying, on occasion, to an offense which may be continuous in nature such as failure to provide, child abuse, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving under the influence and the like (see People v. White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143, 151 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 312 ] (pandering); People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 714, 717 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 299 ] (child abuse); People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321, 333 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 349 ] (possession

1990The continuous conduct exception only really applies, if at all, to those types of offenses where the statute defining the crime may be interpreted as applying, on occasion, to an offense which may be continuous in nature such as failure to provide, child abuse, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving under the influence and the like (see People v. White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143 , 151 . . . (pandering); People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 714 , 717 . . . (child abuse); People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321 , 333 . . . (possession of a destructive device); People v. Feldman (

1981The continuous conduct exception only really applies, if at all, to those types of offenses where the statute defining the crime may be interpreted as applying, on occasion, to an offense which may be continuous in nature such as failure to provide, child abuse, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving under the influence and the like (see People v. White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143, 151 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 312 ] (pandering); People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 714, 717 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 299 ] (child abuse); People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321, 333 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 349 ] (possession

1990The continuous conduct exception only really applies, if at all, to those types of offenses where the statute defining the crime may be interpreted as applying, on occasion, to an offense which may be continuous in nature such as failure to provide, child abuse, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving under the influence and the like (see People v. White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143 , 151 . . . (pandering); People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 714 , 717 . . . (child abuse); People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321 , 333 . . . (possession of a destructive device); People v. Feldman (

1981The continuous conduct exception only really applies, if at all, to those types of offenses where the statute defining the crime may be interpreted as applying, on occasion, to an offense which may be continuous in nature such as failure to provide, child abuse, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving under the influence and the like (see People v. White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143, 151 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 312 ] (pandering); People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 714, 717 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 299 ] (child abuse); People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321, 333 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 349 ] (possession

1990The continuous conduct exception only really applies, if at all, to those types of offenses where the statute defining the crime may be interpreted as applying, on occasion, to an offense which may be continuous in nature such as failure to provide, child abuse, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving under the influence and the like (see People v. White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143 , 151 . . . (pandering); People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 714 , 717 . . . (child abuse); People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321 , 333 . . . (possession of a destructive device); People v. Feldman (

1981The continuous conduct exception only really applies, if at all, to those types of offenses where the statute defining the crime may be interpreted as applying, on occasion, to an offense which may be continuous in nature such as failure to provide, child abuse, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving under the influence and the like (see People v. White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143, 151 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 312 ] (pandering); People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 714, 717 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 299 ] (child abuse); People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321, 333 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 349 ] (possession

1990The continuous conduct exception only really applies, if at all, to those types of offenses where the statute defining the crime may be interpreted as applying, on occasion, to an offense which may be continuous in nature such as failure to provide, child abuse, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving under the influence and the like (see People v. White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143 , 151 . . . (pandering); People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 714 , 717 . . . (child abuse); People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321 , 333 . . . (possession of a destructive device); People v. Feldman (

1981The continuous conduct exception only really applies, if at all, to those types of offenses where the statute defining the crime may be interpreted as applying, on occasion, to an offense which may be continuous in nature such as failure to provide, child abuse, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving under the influence and the like (see People v. White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143, 151 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 312 ] (pandering); People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 714, 717 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 299 ] (child abuse); People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321, 333 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 349 ] (possession

1990The continuous conduct exception only really applies, if at all, to those types of offenses where the statute defining the crime may be interpreted as applying, on occasion, to an offense which may be continuous in nature such as failure to provide, child abuse, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving under the influence and the like (see People v. White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143 , 151 . . . (pandering); People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 714 , 717 . . . (child abuse); People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321 , 333 . . . (possession of a destructive device); People v. Feldman (

1981The continuous conduct exception only really applies, if at all, to those types of offenses where the statute defining the crime may be interpreted as applying, on occasion, to an offense which may be continuous in nature such as failure to provide, child abuse, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving under the influence and the like (see People v. White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143, 151 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 312 ] (pandering); People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 714, 717 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 299 ] (child abuse); People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321, 333 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 349 ] (possession

1987The continuous conduct exception only really applies, if at all, to those types of offenses where the statute defining the crime may be interpreted as applying, on occasion, to an offense which may be continuous in nature such as failure to provide, child abuse, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving under the influence and the like----” (People v. Madden (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 212, 218 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 897 ], citations omitted.) Unlike the problem posed here, the continuous conduct exception is not necessarily based upon the fact that uninterrupted acts occurred in the same time fr

1987The continuous conduct exception only really applies, if at all, to those types of offenses where the statute defining the crime may be interpreted as applying, on occasion, to an offense which may be continuous in nature such as failure to provide, child abuse, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving under the influence and the like----” (People v. Madden (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 212, 218 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 897 ], citations omitted.) Unlike the problem posed here, the continuous conduct exception is not necessarily based upon the fact that uninterrupted acts occurred in the same time fr

2025(People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 .) “A requirement of jury unanimity typically applies to acts that could have been charged as separate offenses. [Citations.] A unanimity instruction is required only if the jurors could otherwise disagree which act a defendant committed and yet convict him of the crime charged.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 423 , italics added.) Conversely, no such duty arises if the offense comprises a “continuous course of conduct,” where individual “acts were so closely connected in time as to form part of one transaction.” (Hernandez, supra, 217 Cal

1990(Such cases include, most pertinent to this case, child abuse, People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 714, 717 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 299 ], and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, People v. Lowell (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 341, 346-348 [ 175 P.2d 846 ]; as well as spousal battery (People v. Thompson (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 220, 224 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 516 ]); pimping (People v. Lewis (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 455, 460-462 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 587 , 3 A.L.R.4th 1185 ]); and harboring a felon (People v. Gunn (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 408 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 834 ]).

2016(See, e.g., Jenkins, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at pp. 294-295, 300 [course of 17 conduct exception applied even though defendant claimed some of the injuries were self- inflicted and others were inflicted in self-defense].) In any event, application of the continuous conduct rule is appropriate when “the defendant offers essentially the same defense to each of the acts” (People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 100 , italics added), which is precisely what defendant did here.

2013We have explained that a “ ‘unanimity instruction is not required when the acts alleged are so closely connected as to form part of one transaction.’ ” (People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 98 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 507 , 105 P.3d 1099 ].) Specifically, “[t]he ‘continuous conduct’ rule applies when the defendant offers essentially the same defense to each of the acts, and there is no reasonable basis for the jury to distinguish between them.” (People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 100 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 793 P.2d 23 ].) Here, as in Benavides , in which we applied the continuous conduct ru

2024For example, there “is no need for a unanimity instruction if the defendant offers the same defense or defenses to the various acts constituting the charged crime.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 679 .) Also, “no unanimity instruction is required if the case falls within the continuous-course-of-conduct exception, which arises ‘when the acts are so closely connected in time as to form part of one transaction’ [citation], or ‘when . . . the statute contemplates a continuous course of conduct of a series of acts over a period of time.’ ” (Ibid.) “Cases applying the continuous conduct

2022The second context occurs when the statute defines the offense to comprise a continuous course of conduct over a period of time.” (People v. Jo (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1178 ; accord, People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 679 ; People v. Napoles, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 115 .) Defendant’s contention that the continuous conduct exception is no longer valid is not supported by the case upon which he relies for that proposition.