result absent error in California

2025The Attorney General’s second argument is that any error in denying Seigler’s request for a continuance was harmless because there was no reasonable probability of a different result absent the error under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson). 17 But he offers no argument that Seigler failed to satisfy the statutory criteria for eligibility or suitability for mental health diversion. 18 Instead, he asserts that because the trial court 17 We will assume, without deciding, that Watson provides the applicable standard of prejudice. 18 Briefly, “mental health diversion requires trial cou

2025Kurtzman asked whether it was reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a better result absent the error under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).

2018DPSS relies on Adoption of A.B. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 912 , 926, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 531 [appellant seeking reversal for lack of proper ICWA notice must show reasonable probability of a different result absent the error] and In re Cheyanne F. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 571 , 576-577, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 189 ["Deficiencies in an ICWA notice are generally prejudicial, but may be deemed harmless under some circumstances."].

2018DPSS relies on Adoption of A.B. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 912 , 926, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 531 [appellant seeking reversal for lack of proper ICWA notice must show reasonable probability of a different result absent the error] and In re Cheyanne F. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 571 , 576-577, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 189 ["Deficiencies in an ICWA notice are generally prejudicial, but may be deemed harmless under some circumstances."].

2025(Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 335 ; see People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1077, fn. 7 [Kurtzman-related error “appears to implicate 13 California law only”], overruled on another ground in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1 ; Olivas, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 775 [applying Watson in reliance on Kurtzman and Berryman].) But more recently, in Hishmeh, the Fourth District Court of Appeal seemed to suggest that Kurtzman error is harmless only if it did not contribute to the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).

2015If an error implicates a defendant’s due process rights, then Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman) applies, i.e., the error is reversible unless it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2024(People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955 .) Under this standard, the failure to provide instruction on a lesser included offense “is harmless unless there is a reasonable probability of a different result absent the error.” (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 200, fn. 4 (Gonzalez).) The prejudice arising from the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is the risk that the jury ignored its instructions and convicted the defendant of an offense for which the prosecution did not carry its burden.

2021(People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955 .) “[T]he error is harmless unless there is a reasonable probability of a different result absent the error.” (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 200, fn. 4 .) “ ‘Such posttrial review focuses not on what a reasonable jury could do, but what such a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the error under consideration.

2014(See also People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 419 ; People v. Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 532-533; People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1214 [error in accepting oral waiver under §§ 977 and 1043 was harmless]; People v. Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 62 ; People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 923 [although capital defendant may not waive statutory right to be present at trial, error is reversible only if prejudicial; i.e., if there is a reasonable possibility the jury would have reached a different result absent the error].) A “defendant whose right of personal presence [is] de

2014(See also People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 419 ; People v. Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 532-533; People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1214 [error in accepting oral waiver under §§ 977 and 1043 was harmless]; People v. Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 62 ; People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 923 [although capital defendant may not waive statutory right to be present at trial, error is reversible only if prejudicial; i.e., if there is a reasonable possibility the jury would have reached a different result absent the error].) A “defendant whose right of personal presence [is] de

2025(Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1209.) Watson asks whether it is reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a better result absent the error.

2024(Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1209; Watson, at p. 836.) In his reply brief, Madriz appears to claim broadly that gang evidence always renders a trial fundamentally 11 unfair, but Tran forecloses that position, and he makes no attempt to demonstrate that his trial in particular was fundamentally unfair.

2014He argues only that he presented “unopposed” evidence to the trial court that he was prejudiced by the defective notice of hearing. (§ 65010, subd. (b) [legislative actions under the Planning and Zoning Law may not be invalidated or set aside absent findings of prejudice, substantial injury, and probability of a different result absent the error].) *1503 Respondents and real parties in interest 2 argue Roberson’s defective notice claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, because the same defective notice claim was finally litigated on its merits in Rialto Citizens for Responsible Growth

2014He argues only that he presented “unopposed” evidence to the trial court that he was prejudiced by the defective notice of hearing. (§ 65010, subd. (b) [legislative actions under the Planning and Zoning Law may not be invalidated or set aside absent findings of prejudice, substantial injury, and probability of a different result absent the error].) *1503 Respondents and real parties in interest 2 argue Roberson’s defective notice claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, because the same defective notice claim was finally litigated on its merits in Rialto Citizens for Responsible Growth

2014(See also People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 419 ; People v. Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 532-533; People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1214 [error in accepting oral waiver under §§ 977 and 1043 was harmless]; People v. Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 62 ; People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 923 [although capital defendant may not waive statutory right to be present at trial, error is reversible only if prejudicial; i.e., if there is a reasonable possibility the jury would have reached a different result absent the error].) A “defendant whose right of personal presence [is] de

2014(See also People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 419 ; People v. Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 532-533; People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1214 [error in accepting oral waiver under §§ 977 and 1043 was harmless]; People v. Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 62 ; People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 923 [although capital defendant may not waive statutory right to be present at trial, error is reversible only if prejudicial; i.e., if there is a reasonable possibility the jury would have reached a different result absent the error].) A “defendant whose right of personal presence [is] de

2018DPSS relies on Adoption of A.B. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 912, 926 [appellant seeking reversal for lack of proper ICWA notice must show reasonable probability of a different result absent the error] and In re Cheyanne F. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 571, 576-577 [”Deficiencies in an ICWA notice are generally prejudicial, but may be deemed harmless under some circumstances.”].

2018DPSS relies on Adoption of A.B. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 912 , 926, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 531 [appellant seeking reversal for lack of proper ICWA notice must show reasonable probability of a different result absent the error] and In re Cheyanne F. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 571 , 576-577, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 189 ["Deficiencies in an ICWA notice are generally prejudicial, but may be deemed harmless under some circumstances."].

2026This difficult question must be decided in the first instance by the juvenile court under the governing legal standards, which must be applied to the circumstances as they exist at the time of the hearing on remand.” (R.T., supra, at p. 1308.) An erroneous conclusion that the relative placement preference does not apply is prejudicial, necessitating reversal for further proceedings, only if “there is a reasonable probability of a different result absent that error.” (N.J., supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 127, citing In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45 , 59-60 & Isabella G., supra, 246 Cal.App.4t

2026This difficult question must be decided in the first instance by the juvenile court under the governing legal standards, which must be applied to the circumstances as they exist at the time of the hearing on remand.” (R.T., supra, at p. 1308.) An erroneous conclusion that the relative placement preference does not apply is prejudicial, necessitating reversal for further proceedings, only if “there is a reasonable probability of a different result absent that error.” (N.J., supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 127, citing In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45 , 59-60 & Isabella G., supra, 246 Cal.App.4t

2025(Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 335 ; see People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1077, fn. 7 [Kurtzman-related error “appears to implicate 13 California law only”], overruled on another ground in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1 ; Olivas, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 775 [applying Watson in reliance on Kurtzman and Berryman].) But more recently, in Hishmeh, the Fourth District Court of Appeal seemed to suggest that Kurtzman error is harmless only if it did not contribute to the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).

2025(Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 335 ; see People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1077, fn. 7 [Kurtzman-related error “appears to implicate 13 California law only”], overruled on another ground in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1 ; Olivas, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 775 [applying Watson in reliance on Kurtzman and Berryman].) But more recently, in Hishmeh, the Fourth District Court of Appeal seemed to suggest that Kurtzman error is harmless only if it did not contribute to the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).

2025(Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 335 ; see People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1077, fn. 7 [Kurtzman-related error “appears to implicate 13 California law only”], overruled on another ground in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1 ; Olivas, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 775 [applying Watson in reliance on Kurtzman and Berryman].) But more recently, in Hishmeh, the Fourth District Court of Appeal seemed to suggest that Kurtzman error is harmless only if it did not contribute to the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).

2025(Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 335 ; see People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1077, fn. 7 [Kurtzman-related error “appears to implicate 13 California law only”], overruled on another ground in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1 ; Olivas, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 775 [applying Watson in reliance on Kurtzman and Berryman].) But more recently, in Hishmeh, the Fourth District Court of Appeal seemed to suggest that Kurtzman error is harmless only if it did not contribute to the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).

2024(In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 59-60 ; see also Isabella G., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 723-724.) DCFS contends that any error in failing to apply the relative placement preference was harmless, as the court also found that it was in N.’s best interests to remain with the caregiver due to their strong bond.