defendant argued waiver in Illinois

2017Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 17 , 43 N.E.3d 984 . -4- ¶ 16 Our supreme court disagreed, finding judgments void only where jurisdiction is lacking or where the judgment is based on a facially unconstitutional statute, making it void ab initio.

2017Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 17 , 43 N.E.3d 984 . -4- ¶ 16 Our supreme court disagreed, finding judgments void only where jurisdiction is lacking or where the judgment is based on a facially unconstitutional statute, making it void ab initio.

2011The defendant argued that the claim was barred by the release, since the claim arose from the insurance provision of the employment agreement and the plaintiff had released “ ‘all claims *** arising from any employment agreement between [the parties here].’ ” Myers, 225 Ill.

2011The defendant argued that the claim was barred by the release, since the claim arose from the insurance provision of the employment agreement and the plaintiff had released “ ‘all claims *** arising from any employment agreement between [the parties here].’ ” Myers, 225 Ill.

2010Fautenberry, 515 F.3d at 625 .

2010Fautenberry, 515 F.3d at 625 .

2008Travis, 170 Ill.

2008Travis, 170 Ill.

2008The defendant argued that the instruction "erroneously assumed as a fact that [he] had initially provoked the encounter although there was conflicting evidence." Day, 2 Ill.

2008The defendant argued that the instruction “erroneously assumed as a fact that [he] had initially provoked the encounter although there was conflicting evidence.” Day, 2 Ill.

2006In People v. Bachman, 127 Ill.

2006In People v. Bachman, 127 Ill.

2024Id.

2022Id. ¶ 36 On appeal, the defendant argued that defense counsel was ineffective for “basing his defense on [hearsay] evidence which [counsel] could not and did not produce to the jury.” Id. at 467 .

2022Id. ¶ 36 On appeal, the defendant argued that defense counsel was ineffective for “basing his defense on [hearsay] evidence which [counsel] could not and did not produce to the jury.” Id. at 467 .

2022Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 196 .

2021Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d at 242 .

2012Fitzpatrick, 2011 IL App (2d) 100463, ¶ 13 , 960 N.E.2d at 715 .

2012Fitzpatrick, 2011 IL App (2d) 100463, ¶ 13 , 960 N.E.2d at 715 . ¶ 43 While the State asked that the case be remanded for a hearing, the defendant argued no hearing could be ordered because the 90-day period had expired.

2012Fitzpatrick, 2011 IL App (2d) 100463, ¶ 13 , 960 N.E.2d at 715 . ¶ 43 While the State asked that the case be remanded for a hearing, the defendant argued no hearing could be ordered because the 90-day period had expired.

2012Fitzpatrick, 2011 IL App (2d) 100463, ¶ 13 , 960 N.E.2d at 715 .

2012Cowan, 217 F.3d at 950 .

2012Id. at 422 .

2012Id. at 413 . ¶ 41 In Cowan, the defendant argued his waiver of a jury for sentencing was not “knowing” because the trial judge improperly instructed him that only a unanimous jury could prevent him from receiving a death sentence.

2003App. 3d at 733 , 713 N.E.2d at 246 , the defendant argued defense counsel’s Rule 604(d) certificate was deficient because it failed to include a statement showing counsel examined the transcript of the guilty plea hearing and failed to contain certification that counsel made any necessary amendments to the motion.

2002The defendant argued the instruction unduly emphasized the offense of first degree murder, “thereby giving the jury the impression it only had one option to consider to the exclusion of less serious alternatives including acquittal.” Walker, 227 Ill.

1995Pierre (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 494, 511 ; People v. Henderson (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 258, 334-35 ; People v. Ruiz (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 1, 20-21 ; People v. Guest (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 72, 107 ; People v. Buggs (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 284, 292 ; People v. Madej (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 201, 220-21 ; People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 534-36 .) In Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41 , the defendant argued that his waiver of a jury for the death sentencing hearing was not knowing and voluntary, because he had not been informed that the vote of one juror could preclude imposition of the death penalty.

1995Pierre (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 494, 511 ; People v. Henderson (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 258, 334-35 ; People v. Ruiz (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 1, 20-21 ; People v. Guest (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 72, 107 ; People v. Buggs (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 284, 292 ; People v. Madej (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 201, 220-21 ; People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 534-36 .) In Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41 , the defendant argued that his waiver of a jury for the death sentencing hearing was not knowing and voluntary, because he had not been informed that the vote of one juror could preclude imposition of the death penalty.

1995Pierre (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 494, 511 ; People v. Henderson (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 258, 334-35 ; People v. Ruiz (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 1, 20-21 ; People v. Guest (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 72, 107 ; People v. Buggs (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 284, 292 ; People v. Madej (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 201, 220-21 ; People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 534-36 .) In Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41 , the defendant argued that his waiver of a jury for the death sentencing hearing was not knowing and voluntary, because he had not been informed that the vote of one juror could preclude imposition of the death penalty.

1995In finding his argument unpersuasive, this court observed that under Illinois law, "it is sufficient, for a valid jury waiver, that *** the trial court explain to the defendant that he is waiving the right to have a jury consider the capital sentencing issues and that the sentencing decision would, therefore, be made by the judge alone.” (Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 59 , citing People v. Ruiz (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 1, 20-21 .) This court concluded that "[ijnasmuch as the defendant need not know of the nonunaminity rule before his jury waiver will be held to have been knowing, intelligent and voluntary,

1995Pierre (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 494, 511 ; People v. Henderson (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 258, 334-35 ; People v. Ruiz (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 1, 20-21 ; People v. Guest (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 72, 107 ; People v. Buggs (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 284, 292 ; People v. Madej (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 201, 220-21 ; People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 534-36 .) In Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41 , the defendant argued that his waiver of a jury for the death sentencing hearing was not knowing and voluntary, because he had not been informed that the vote of one juror could preclude imposition of the death penalty.

1995Pierre (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 494, 511 ; People v. Henderson (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 258, 334-35 ; People v. Ruiz (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 1, 20-21 ; People v. Guest (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 72, 107 ; People v. Buggs (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 284, 292 ; People v. Madej (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 201, 220-21 ; People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 534-36 .) In Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41 , the defendant argued that his waiver of a jury for the death sentencing hearing was not knowing and voluntary, because he had not been informed that the vote of one juror could preclude imposition of the death penalty.

1995Pierre (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 494, 511 ; People v. Henderson (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 258, 334-35 ; People v. Ruiz (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 1, 20-21 ; People v. Guest (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 72, 107 ; People v. Buggs (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 284, 292 ; People v. Madej (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 201, 220-21 ; People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 534-36 .) In Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41 , the defendant argued that his waiver of a jury for the death sentencing hearing was not knowing and voluntary, because he had not been informed that the vote of one juror could preclude imposition of the death penalty.

1995Pierre (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 494, 511 ; People v. Henderson (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 258, 334-35 ; People v. Ruiz (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 1, 20-21 ; People v. Guest (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 72, 107 ; People v. Buggs (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 284, 292 ; People v. Madej (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 201, 220-21 ; People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 534-36 .) In Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41 , the defendant argued that his waiver of a jury for the death sentencing hearing was not knowing and voluntary, because he had not been informed that the vote of one juror could preclude imposition of the death penalty.

1995Pierre (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 494, 511 ; People v. Henderson (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 258, 334-35 ; People v. Ruiz (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 1, 20-21 ; People v. Guest (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 72, 107 ; People v. Buggs (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 284, 292 ; People v. Madej (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 201, 220-21 ; People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 534-36 .) In Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41 , the defendant argued that his waiver of a jury for the death sentencing hearing was not knowing and voluntary, because he had not been informed that the vote of one juror could preclude imposition of the death penalty.

1995In finding his argument unpersuasive, this court observed that under Illinois law, "it is sufficient, for a valid jury waiver, that *** the trial court explain to the defendant that he is waiving the right to have a jury consider the capital sentencing issues and that the sentencing decision would, therefore, be made by the judge alone.” (Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 59 , citing People v. Ruiz (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 1, 20-21 .) This court concluded that "[ijnasmuch as the defendant need not know of the nonunaminity rule before his jury waiver will be held to have been knowing, intelligent and voluntary,

1993(Summers, 202 Ill.

1992App. 3d 471 , 469 N.E.2d 287 , the defendant argued that an instruction for battery or aggravated battery was warranted because the evidence indicated that none of the blunt trauma injuries were sufficient to induce the decedent’s death and that the decedent died as a result of ligature strangulation.

1992(Sanders, 127 Ill.