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5 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1852–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re Dinhofergreen1 sentence2007Operating Auth. ( 258 AD2d 326, 327 [1999]), this Court affirmed a defense verdict, stating: “ ‘Evidence, albeit logically and technically relevant, is not necessarily admissible [and] will be excluded “if it is too slight, remote, or conjectural to have any legitimate influence in determining the fact in issue.” ’ (Dermatossian v New York City Tr. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dermatossian v. New York City Transit Authority
green
1 sentence2007Auth., 67 NY2d 219, 223 .) Thus, the trial court properly excluded defendant’s initial internal investigatory report, which, although it labeled defendant’s driver ‘at fault’, was based on defendant’s internal rules and policies that exceeded the applicable common-law negligence standard of care, and was reduced on review to a finding of ‘questionable’.” In Karoon v New York City Tr. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Paolella v. Phillips
green
1 sentence1976Only when moral, mental and physical conditions are so bad as seriously to affect the health or morals of children should the courts be called upon to act.” In the Matter of Paolella v Phillips ( 27 Misc 2d 763 ) this court affirmed the principle of noninterference in the religious upbringing of children, there rejecting the petition of a Catholic father to direct the custodian mother, a converted Jewess, to raise the children of that marriage as Christians. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
New York Life Insurance & Trust Co. v. Viele
green
1 sentence1964The court further stated that it was sufficient if it appeared from the context of the will or trust, and the extraneous facts which might be properly considered, that the grantor intended to include adopted children (citing New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Viele, 161 N. Y. 11 and Matter of Upjohn, supra), and that adopted children were not required to establish that they specifically were contemplated as objects of affection and bounty by the testator (citing Matter of Charles, 304 N. Y. 776 and Matter of Ward, 9 A D 2d 950, affd. 9 N Y 2d 722). | 1 | 1964–1964 |
In re the Accounting of Bankers Trust Co.
green
1 sentence1964The court further stated that it was sufficient if it appeared from the context of the will or trust, and the extraneous facts which might be properly considered, that the grantor intended to include adopted children (citing New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Viele, 161 N. Y. 11 and Matter of Upjohn, supra), and that adopted children were not required to establish that they specifically were contemplated as objects of affection and bounty by the testator (citing Matter of Charles, 304 N. Y. 776 and Matter of Ward, 9 A D 2d 950, affd. 9 N Y 2d 722). | 1 | 1964–1964 |
In re the Construction of the Will of Upjohn
green
1 sentence1964The court further stated that it was sufficient if it appeared from the context of the will or trust, and the extraneous facts which might be properly considered, that the grantor intended to include adopted children (citing New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Viele, 161 N. Y. 11 and Matter of Upjohn, supra), and that adopted children were not required to establish that they specifically were contemplated as objects of affection and bounty by the testator (citing Matter of Charles, 304 N. Y. 776 and Matter of Ward, 9 A D 2d 950, affd. 9 N Y 2d 722). | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Friedlander v. Scheer
neutral
1 sentence1956Twice, very recently, this court affirmed that rule (Friedlander v. Scheer, 281 App. Div. 808 , affg. 1 Misc 2d 899 ; Matter of Kelekian, 281 App. Div. 877 ). | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Friedlander v. Scheer
green
1 sentence1956Twice, very recently, this court affirmed that rule (Friedlander v. Scheer, 281 App. Div. 808 , affg. 1 Misc 2d 899 ; Matter of Kelekian, 281 App. Div. 877 ). | 1 | 1956–1956 |
In re the Estate of Kelekian
neutral
1 sentence1956Twice, very recently, this court affirmed that rule (Friedlander v. Scheer, 281 App. Div. 808 , affg. 1 Misc 2d 899 ; Matter of Kelekian, 281 App. Div. 877 ). | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Munson v. Hungerford
neutral
1 sentence1852So also in Munson v. Hungerford, ( 6 Barb. 265 ,) the supreme court, held that the right to float logs on a stream, for three or four weeks in a year, during the freshets, in such a manner as to endanger and seriously injure the dams thereon, could not be made the subject of a dedication to the public; such a right not being in any sense a public right which can, from the nature of the case, be enjoyed by the public at large. | 1 | 1852–1852 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.