34 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Estate of Martha S. French v. Stratford Housegreen2 sentences2014If not, expert testimony is not required. {23} This functional inquiry gives content to the idea that “[n]ot all cases involving health or medical care automatically qualify as medical malpractice claims.” Estate of French v. Stratford House, 333 S.W.3d 546, 556 (Tenn. 2011). 2014If not, expert testimony is not required. {23} This functional inquiry gives content to the idea that “[n]ot all cases involving health or medical care automatically qualify as medical malpractice claims.” Estate of French v. Stratford House, 333 S.W.3d 546, 556 (Tenn. 2011). | 5 | 5 |
Collins on Behalf of Collins v. Tabetgreen2 sentences2013Furthermore, in adopting this functional approach, courts around the country have agreed that “a guardian ad litem would be absolutely immune in exercising functions such as testifying in court . . . and making reports and recommendations to the court in which the guardian acts as an actual functionary or arm of the court, not only in status or denomination but in reality.” Id. at 396 , 806 P.2d at 45 (citation omitted). {23} We note that the functional analysis of a guardian’s role is typically a factual inquiry. 2013Furthermore, in adopting this functional approach, courts around the country have agreed that “a guardian ad litem would be absolutely immune in exercising functions such as testifying in court . . . and making reports and recommendations to the court in which the guardian acts as an actual functionary or arm of the court, not only in status or denomination but in reality.” Id. at 396 , 806 P.2d at 45 (citation omitted). {23} We note that the functional analysis of a guardian’s role is typically a factual inquiry. | 3 | 5 |
State v. Garzagreen2 sentences2017See Barker, 407 U.S. at 522 (“[A]ny inquiry into a 9 speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular 10 context of the case.”); see also Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 13 (“Violation of the 11 speedy trial right is only determined through a review of the circumstances of a case, 12 which may not be divorced from a consideration of . . . the harm to the 13 defendant . . . . ”). 14 {36} Nor did we adopt a second approach under which a mistrial is not a “trial” for 15 speedy trial purposes, and defendants must be tried by a statutory deadline or 16 released. 2017See Barker, 407 U.S. at 522 (“[A]ny inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case.”); see also Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 13 (“Violation of the speedy trial right is only determined through a review of the circumstances of a case, which may not be divorced from a consideration of . . . the harm to the defendant . . . . ”). {36} Nor did we adopt a second approach under which a mistrial is not a “trial” for speedy trial purposes, and defendants must be tried by a statutory deadline or released. | 3 | 3 |
Barker v. Wingogreen2 sentences2017See Barker, 407 U.S. at 522 (“[A]ny inquiry into a 9 speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular 10 context of the case.”); see also Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 13 (“Violation of the 11 speedy trial right is only determined through a review of the circumstances of a case, 12 which may not be divorced from a consideration of . . . the harm to the 13 defendant . . . . ”). 14 {36} Nor did we adopt a second approach under which a mistrial is not a “trial” for 15 speedy trial purposes, and defendants must be tried by a statutory deadline or 16 released. 2017See Barker, 407 U.S. at 522 (“[A]ny inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case.”); see also Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 13 (“Violation of the speedy trial right is only determined through a review of the circumstances of a case, which may not be divorced from a consideration of . . . the harm to the defendant . . . . ”). {36} Nor did we adopt a second approach under which a mistrial is not a “trial” for speedy trial purposes, and defendants must be tried by a statutory deadline or released. | 2 | 5 |
Hunnicutt v. Sewellgreen2 sentences2024See Hunnicutt, 2009-NMCA-121 , 5 ¶¶ 9-13. 2024See Hunnicutt, 2009-NMCA-121, ¶¶ 9-13 . | 2 | 2 |
Rider v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., Rider v. State, 118 S.E.2d 749, 750 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961). 2017See, e.g., Rider v. State, 118 S.E.2d 749, 750 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961). | 2 | 2 |
Jack's Delicatessen, Inc. Liquor License Casegreen2 sentences1992See, e.g., In re Jack’s Delicatessen, Inc., 202 Pa.Super. 481 , 198 A.2d 604 (1964) (license denied where place to which transfer was sought was within 300 feet of farm land used by school for emotionally disturbed children); In re Di Rocco, 167 Pa.Super. 381 , 74 A.2d 501 (1950) (license denied where place to be licensed was within 300 feet of land where school building was in process of being erected). 1992See, e.g., In re Jack’s Delicatessen, Inc., 202 Pa.Super. 481 , 198 A.2d 604 (1964) (license denied where place to which transfer was sought was within 300 feet of farm land used by school for emotionally disturbed children); In re Di Rocco, 167 Pa.Super. 381 , 74 A.2d 501 (1950) (license denied where place to be licensed was within 300 feet of land where school building was in process of being erected). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Neatherlingreen2 sentences2021An object or instrument is a deadly weapon if the jury decides that it is a “weapon which is capable of producing death or great bodily harm” or a weapon “with which dangerous wounds can be inflicted[.]” NMSA 1978, § 30-1-12(B) (1963); see also State v. Neatherlin, 2007-NMCA- 035, ¶¶ 11, 15, 141 N.M. 328 , 154 P.3d 703 (concluding that “a determination regarding an object’s status as a deadly weapon requires a functional inquiry into the manner of use”). {11} Given the circumstances of this case, a jury could reasonably conclude that Defendant intended to injure Victim. 2021An object or instrument is a deadly weapon if the jury decides that it is a “weapon which is capable of producing death or great bodily harm” or a weapon “with which dangerous wounds can be inflicted[.]” NMSA 1978, § 30-1-12(B) (1963); see also State v. Neatherlin, 2007-NMCA- 035, ¶¶ 11, 15, 141 N.M. 328 , 154 P.3d 703 (concluding that “a determination regarding an object’s status as a deadly weapon requires a functional inquiry into the manner of use”). {11} Given the circumstances of this case, a jury could reasonably conclude that Defendant intended to injure Victim. | 1 | 1 |
Richter v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs.green1 sentence2019Richter, 2014-NMCA-056, ¶¶ 22, 25 . | 1 | 1 |
Kimbrell v. Kimbrellgreen1 sentence2014See Kimbrell, 2013-NMCA-070, ¶¶ 21, 28 . | 1 | 1 |
Grady v. Mullinsgreen2 sentences1998See Grady v. Mullins, 99 N.M. 614, 615 , 661 P.2d 1313, 1314 (1983). 1998See Grady v. Mullins, 99 N.M. 614, 615 , 661 P.2d 1313, 1314 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Edwardsgreen2 sentences1997New Mexico courts have consistently declined to formulate a general rule for what constitutes the practice of law, see State v. Edwards, 102 N.M. 413, 416 , 696 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Ct.App.1984), and have instead applied a functional analysis of the actions of the advocate in each particular case, see State Bar v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 91 N.M. 434, 439 , 575 P.2d 943, 948 (1978). 1997New Mexico courts have consistently declined to formulate a general rule for what constitutes the practice of law, see State v. Edwards, 102 N.M. 413, 416 , 696 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Ct.App.1984), and have instead applied a functional analysis of the actions of the advocate in each particular case, see State Bar v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 91 N.M. 434, 439 , 575 P.2d 943, 948 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
State Bar v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co.green2 sentences1997New Mexico courts have consistently declined to formulate a general rule for what constitutes the practice of law, see State v. Edwards, 102 N.M. 413, 416 , 696 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Ct.App.1984), and have instead applied a functional analysis of the actions of the advocate in each particular case, see State Bar v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 91 N.M. 434, 439 , 575 P.2d 943, 948 (1978). 1997New Mexico courts have consistently declined to formulate a general rule for what constitutes the practice of law, see State v. Edwards, 102 N.M. 413, 416 , 696 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Ct.App.1984), and have instead applied a functional analysis of the actions of the advocate in each particular case, see State Bar v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 91 N.M. 434, 439 , 575 P.2d 943, 948 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Boswell
green
2 sentences2023But as the Court of Appeals recognized, “the state of the 9 law of the impoundment and inventory doctrine has evolved from the distinctive 10 three-part test . . . and now focuses more generally on the reasonableness of the 11 officer’s asserted custody or control of the item seized and searched.” Byrom, 2018- 12 NMCA-016, ¶ 26; see Williams, 1982-NMSC-041 , ¶¶ 5-7; State v. Boswell, 1991- 13 NMSC-004, ¶¶ 8-14, 111 N.M. 240 , 804 P.2d 1059 . 2023But as the Court of Appeals recognized, “the state of the 9 law of the impoundment and inventory doctrine has evolved from the distinctive 10 three-part test . . . and now focuses more generally on the reasonableness of the 11 officer’s asserted custody or control of the item seized and searched.” Byrom, 2018- 12 NMCA-016, ¶ 26; see Williams, 1982-NMSC-041 , ¶¶ 5-7; State v. Boswell, 1991- 13 NMSC-004, ¶¶ 8-14, 111 N.M. 240 , 804 P.2d 1059 . | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Lopez v. State
green
2 sentences2019We have interpreted the notice provision of the Tort Claims Act as setting forth a functional standard, requiring consideration of the totality of the circumstances known to the governmental entity and "whether ... a reasonable person would have concluded that the victim may claim compensation." See, e.g. , Lopez v. State , 1996-NMSC-071 , ¶ 12, 122 N.M. 611 , 930 P.2d 146 (discussing NMSA 1978, § 41-4-16 (1977) ). 2019We have interpreted the notice provision of the Tort Claims Act as setting forth a functional standard, requiring consideration of the totality of the circumstances known to the governmental entity and "whether ... a reasonable person would have concluded that the victim may claim compensation." See, e.g. , Lopez v. State , 1996-NMSC-071 , ¶ 12, 122 N.M. 611 , 930 P.2d 146 (discussing NMSA 1978, § 41-4-16 (1977) ). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Gallegos v. Pueblo of Tesuque
green
2 sentences2011If he should 2 join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, 3 in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. 4 “The determination that a party is necessary involves a functional analysis of the 5 effects of the person’s absence upon the existing parties, the absent person, and the 6 judicial process itself.” Gallegos v. Pueblo of Tesuque, 2002-NMSC-012, ¶ 42 , 132 7 N.M. 207 , 46 P.3d 668 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2011If he should 2 join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, 3 in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. 4 “The determination that a party is necessary involves a functional analysis of the 5 effects of the person’s absence upon the existing parties, the absent person, and the 6 judicial process itself.” Gallegos v. Pueblo of Tesuque, 2002-NMSC-012, ¶ 42 , 132 7 N.M. 207 , 46 P.3d 668 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 2 | 2011–2011 |
DiRocco Liquor License Case
green
2 sentences1992See, e.g., In re Jack’s Delicatessen, Inc., 202 Pa.Super. 481 , 198 A.2d 604 (1964) (license denied where place to which transfer was sought was within 300 feet of farm land used by school for emotionally disturbed children); In re Di Rocco, 167 Pa.Super. 381 , 74 A.2d 501 (1950) (license denied where place to be licensed was within 300 feet of land where school building was in process of being erected). 1992See, e.g., In re Jack’s Delicatessen, Inc., 202 Pa.Super. 481 , 198 A.2d 604 (1964) (license denied where place to which transfer was sought was within 300 feet of farm land used by school for emotionally disturbed children); In re Di Rocco, 167 Pa.Super. 381 , 74 A.2d 501 (1950) (license denied where place to be licensed was within 300 feet of land where school building was in process of being erected). | 2 | 1992–1992 |
Vermont v. Brillon
green
2 sentences2014“The general rule attributing to the defendant delay 11 caused by assigned counsel is not absolute.” Brillon, 556 U.S. at 94 . “ ‘[A]ny inquiry 12 into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular 13 context of the case[.]’ ” Id. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 522 ). 14 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 15 {68} The constitutional right to counsel protects a defendant’s right to “reasonably 16 effective assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 . 2014“The general rule attributing to the defendant delay 11 caused by assigned counsel is not absolute.” Brillon, 556 U.S. at 94 . “ ‘[A]ny inquiry 12 into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular 13 context of the case[.]’ ” Id. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 522 ). 14 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 15 {68} The constitutional right to counsel protects a defendant’s right to “reasonably 16 effective assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence2014“The general rule attributing to the defendant delay 11 caused by assigned counsel is not absolute.” Brillon, 556 U.S. at 94 . “ ‘[A]ny inquiry 12 into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular 13 context of the case[.]’ ” Id. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 522 ). 14 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 15 {68} The constitutional right to counsel protects a defendant’s right to “reasonably 16 effective assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Boergadine
green
2 sentences2014“The standard of review for claims 17 of ineffective assistance of counsel is de novo.” State v. Boergadine, 2005-NMCA- 18 028, ¶ 33, 137 N.M. 92 , 107 P.3d 532 . 2014“The standard of review for claims 17 of ineffective assistance of counsel is de novo.” State v. Boergadine, 2005-NMCA- 18 028, ¶ 33, 137 N.M. 92 , 107 P.3d 532 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Srader v. Verant
green
2 sentences2002The determination that a party is necessary involves “a functional analysis of the effects of the person’s absence upon the existing parties, the absent person, and the judicial process itself.” Srader, 1998-NMSC-025, ¶22 , 125 N.M. 521 , 964 P.2d 82 . 2002The determination that a party is necessary involves “a functional analysis of the effects of the person’s absence upon the existing parties, the absent person, and the judicial process itself.” Srader, 1998-NMSC-025, ¶22 , 125 N.M. 521 , 964 P.2d 82 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Horton v. Taylor
green
1 sentence1999Id. at 478 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Schmitz v. Smentowski
green
2 sentences1992In light of recent supreme court opinions, e.g., Bober v. New Mexico State Fair, 111 N.M. 644 , 808 P.2d 614 (1991) (expanding premises liability to harm caused outside the premises); Collins v. Tabet, 111 N.M. 391 , 806 P.2d 40 (1991) (adopting a functional analysis in determination of scope of immunity for guardians ad litem); Lovelace Medical Ctr. v. Mendez, 111 N.M. 336 , 805 P.2d 603 (1991) (permitting parents to recover costs of raising a healthy child bom as consequence of failed tubal ligation); Schmitz v. Smentowski, 109 N.M. 386 , 785 P.2d 726 (1990) (adopting prima facie tort), I ha 1992In light of recent supreme court opinions, e.g., Bober v. New Mexico State Fair, 111 N.M. 644 , 808 P.2d 614 (1991) (expanding premises liability to harm caused outside the premises); Collins v. Tabet, 111 N.M. 391 , 806 P.2d 40 (1991) (adopting a functional analysis in determination of scope of immunity for guardians ad litem); Lovelace Medical Ctr. v. Mendez, 111 N.M. 336 , 805 P.2d 603 (1991) (permitting parents to recover costs of raising a healthy child bom as consequence of failed tubal ligation); Schmitz v. Smentowski, 109 N.M. 386 , 785 P.2d 726 (1990) (adopting prima facie tort), I ha | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
green
1 sentence1992Id. at 360 n. 4, 361. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Lovelace Medical Center v. Mendez Ex Rel. Mendez
green
2 sentences1992In light of recent supreme court opinions, e.g., Bober v. New Mexico State Fair, 111 N.M. 644 , 808 P.2d 614 (1991) (expanding premises liability to harm caused outside the premises); Collins v. Tabet, 111 N.M. 391 , 806 P.2d 40 (1991) (adopting a functional analysis in determination of scope of immunity for guardians ad litem); Lovelace Medical Ctr. v. Mendez, 111 N.M. 336 , 805 P.2d 603 (1991) (permitting parents to recover costs of raising a healthy child bom as consequence of failed tubal ligation); Schmitz v. Smentowski, 109 N.M. 386 , 785 P.2d 726 (1990) (adopting prima facie tort), I ha 1992In light of recent supreme court opinions, e.g., Bober v. New Mexico State Fair, 111 N.M. 644 , 808 P.2d 614 (1991) (expanding premises liability to harm caused outside the premises); Collins v. Tabet, 111 N.M. 391 , 806 P.2d 40 (1991) (adopting a functional analysis in determination of scope of immunity for guardians ad litem); Lovelace Medical Ctr. v. Mendez, 111 N.M. 336 , 805 P.2d 603 (1991) (permitting parents to recover costs of raising a healthy child bom as consequence of failed tubal ligation); Schmitz v. Smentowski, 109 N.M. 386 , 785 P.2d 726 (1990) (adopting prima facie tort), I ha | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Bober v. New Mexico State Fair
green
2 sentences1992In light of recent supreme court opinions, e.g., Bober v. New Mexico State Fair, 111 N.M. 644 , 808 P.2d 614 (1991) (expanding premises liability to harm caused outside the premises); Collins v. Tabet, 111 N.M. 391 , 806 P.2d 40 (1991) (adopting a functional analysis in determination of scope of immunity for guardians ad litem); Lovelace Medical Ctr. v. Mendez, 111 N.M. 336 , 805 P.2d 603 (1991) (permitting parents to recover costs of raising a healthy child bom as consequence of failed tubal ligation); Schmitz v. Smentowski, 109 N.M. 386 , 785 P.2d 726 (1990) (adopting prima facie tort), I ha 1992In light of recent supreme court opinions, e.g., Bober v. New Mexico State Fair, 111 N.M. 644 , 808 P.2d 614 (1991) (expanding premises liability to harm caused outside the premises); Collins v. Tabet, 111 N.M. 391 , 806 P.2d 40 (1991) (adopting a functional analysis in determination of scope of immunity for guardians ad litem); Lovelace Medical Ctr. v. Mendez, 111 N.M. 336 , 805 P.2d 603 (1991) (permitting parents to recover costs of raising a healthy child bom as consequence of failed tubal ligation); Schmitz v. Smentowski, 109 N.M. 386 , 785 P.2d 726 (1990) (adopting prima facie tort), I ha | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.