functional analysis in Iowa

2019The “immunity applies even when the [official] is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly because as a matter of policy it is in the public best interest that [officials] should exercise their function without fear of consequences and with independence.” Blanton, 258 N.W.2d at 308 ; accord Beck, 685 N.W.2d at 642 (“Because we apply a functional analysis, immunity attaches even when the prosecutor is alleged to have acted for improper reasons.”).

2019The "immunity applies even when the [official] is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly because as a matter of policy it is in the public best interest that [officials] should exercise their function without fear of consequences and with independence." Blanton , 258 N.W.2d at 308 ; accord Beck , 685 N.W.2d at 642 ("Because we apply a functional analysis, immunity attaches even when the prosecutor is alleged to have acted for improper reasons.").

2019Prosecutors neither “resolv[e] disputes between other parties” nor “authoritatively adjudicat[e] private rights.” Id. 50 By contrast, prosecutors do undertake “official acts involving policy discretion but not consisting of adjudication.” Burns, 500 U.S. at 500 , 111 S. Ct. at 1947 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

2019Prosecutors neither “resolv[e] disputes between other parties” nor “authoritatively adjudicat[e] private rights.” Id. 50 By contrast, prosecutors do undertake “official acts involving policy discretion but not consisting of adjudication.” Burns, 500 U.S. at 500 , 111 S. Ct. at 1947 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

2019Absolute judicial immunity at common law was a functional doctrine that "extended only to individuals who were charged with resolving disputes between other parties or authoritatively adjudicating private rights." Kalina , 522 U.S. at 132 , 118 S. Ct. at 510 (Scalia, J., concurring).

2019Absolute judicial immunity at common law was a functional doctrine that "extended only to individuals who were charged with resolving disputes between other parties or authoritatively adjudicating private rights." Kalina , 522 U.S. at 132 , 118 S. Ct. at 510 (Scalia, J., concurring).

2004See id. at 159 (criminal charges used as leverage in settlement negotiations for a client in an associated civil matter); Burr, 286 N.W.2d at 396 (maliciously filing a complaint without probable cause); Blanton , 258 N.W.2d at *643 311 (malicious institution of criminal proceedings against a .man whose wife the prosecutor was representing in their divorce).

2004See id. at 159 (criminal charges used as leverage in settlement negotiations for a client in an associated civil matter); Burr, 286 N.W.2d at 396 (maliciously filing a complaint without probable cause); Blanton , 258 N.W.2d at *643 311 (malicious institution of criminal proceedings against a .man whose wife the prosecutor was representing in their divorce).

2004Hike, 427 N.W.2d at 159 .

1994See General Care Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 705 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tenn.1986) (in looking to the function of an asset, the “acquisition, management and disposition” must be considered in making the determination, all must be integral parts of the taxpayer’s regular trade or business operations).

1989See Benson v. Fort Dodge Police Pension Bd., 312 N.W.2d 548, 550 (Iowa 1981). .

1979See e. g., Briggs v. Goodwin, 186 U.S.App.D.C. 179 , 569 F.2d 10 (1977) cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 , 98 S.Ct. 3089 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1133 (1978); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974); Dodd v. Spokane County, Washington, 393 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1968). 10 .The opinion also states that “[s]ince Imbler numerous jurisdictions have adhered to its ruling and hold a prosecutor is absolutely immune where his acts are within the scope of prosecu-torial duties, particularly ‘initiating a prosecution.’ ” Id. at 310.

1979See e. g., Briggs v. Goodwin, 186 U.S.App.D.C. 179 , 569 F.2d 10 (1977) cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 , 98 S.Ct. 3089 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1133 (1978); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974); Dodd v. Spokane County, Washington, 393 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1968). 10 .The opinion also states that “[s]ince Imbler numerous jurisdictions have adhered to its ruling and hold a prosecutor is absolutely immune where his acts are within the scope of prosecu-torial duties, particularly ‘initiating a prosecution.’ ” Id. at 310.

1979See e. g., Briggs v. Goodwin, 186 U.S.App.D.C. 179 , 569 F.2d 10 (1977) cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 , 98 S.Ct. 3089 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1133 (1978); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974); Dodd v. Spokane County, Washington, 393 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1968). 10 .The opinion also states that “[s]ince Imbler numerous jurisdictions have adhered to its ruling and hold a prosecutor is absolutely immune where his acts are within the scope of prosecu-torial duties, particularly ‘initiating a prosecution.’ ” Id. at 310.

1979See e. g., Briggs v. Goodwin, 186 U.S.App.D.C. 179 , 569 F.2d 10 (1977) cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 , 98 S.Ct. 3089 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1133 (1978); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974); Dodd v. Spokane County, Washington, 393 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1968). 10 .The opinion also states that “[s]ince Imbler numerous jurisdictions have adhered to its ruling and hold a prosecutor is absolutely immune where his acts are within the scope of prosecu-torial duties, particularly ‘initiating a prosecution.’ ” Id. at 310.