10 Nevada opinions name it 1 courts 1989–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nevada courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Zgombic v. Statered2 sentences2017In rejecting the functional definition, we reasoned, "NRS 193.165 is designed to deter injuries caused by weapons, not by people," so "interpreting the deadly weapon clause in NRS 193.165 by means of a functional test was not what our legislature intended." Zgombic, 106 Nev. at 574, 576, 798 P.2d at 550- 51. 2017In rejecting the functional definition, we reasoned, "NRS 193.165 is designed to deter injuries caused by weapons, not by people," so "interpreting the deadly weapon clause in NRS 193.165 by means of a functional test was not what our legislature intended." Zgombic, 106 Nev. at 574, 576, 798 P.2d at 550- 51. | 2 | 3 |
State v. McNeilgreen2 sentences2017State v. Napper, 6 Nev. 113, 115 (1870) (defining deadly weapon as "a weapon deadly either in its nature, or capable of being used in a deadly manner"); see also State v. McNeil, 53 Nev. 428, 436, 4 P.2d 889, 890 (1931) ("IW] e can easily conceive of many circumstances in which a given weapon could be equally deadly in many ways, regardless of the purpose for which it is mainly intended to be used."); State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 407, 413 (1879) ("It was peculiarly within the province of the jury, under the facts of this case, to determine, as a fact, whether the club in defendant's hand, as it was 2017State v. Napper, 6 Nev. 113, 115 (1870) (defining deadly weapon as "a weapon deadly either in its nature, or capable of being used in a deadly manner"); see also State v. McNeil, 53 Nev. 428, 436, 4 P.2d 889, 890 (1931) ("IW] e can easily conceive of many circumstances in which a given weapon could be equally deadly in many ways, regardless of the purpose for which it is mainly intended to be used."); State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 407, 413 (1879) ("It was peculiarly within the province of the jury, under the facts of this case, to determine, as a fact, whether the club in defendant's hand, as it was | 2 | 2 |
State v. Nappergreen2 sentences2017State v. Napper, 6 Nev. 113, 115 (1870) (defining deadly weapon as "a weapon deadly either in its nature, or capable of being used in a deadly manner"); see also State v. McNeil, 53 Nev. 428, 436, 4 P.2d 889, 890 (1931) ("IW] e can easily conceive of many circumstances in which a given weapon could be equally deadly in many ways, regardless of the purpose for which it is mainly intended to be used."); State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 407, 413 (1879) ("It was peculiarly within the province of the jury, under the facts of this case, to determine, as a fact, whether the club in defendant's hand, as it was 2017State v. Napper, 6 Nev. 113, 115 (1870) (defining deadly weapon as "a weapon deadly either in its nature, or capable of being used in a deadly manner"); see also State v. McNeil, 53 Nev. 428, 436 , 4 P.2d 889, 890 (1931) ("IW] e can easily conceive of many circumstances in which a given weapon could be equally deadly in many ways, regardless of the purpose for which it is mainly intended to be used."); State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 407, 413 (1879) ("It was peculiarly within the province of the jury, under the facts of this case, to determine, as a fact, whether the club in defendant's hand, as it wa | 2 | 2 |
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences2017State v. Napper, 6 Nev. 113, 115 (1870) (defining deadly weapon as "a weapon deadly either in its nature, or capable of being used in a deadly manner"); see also State v. McNeil, 53 Nev. 428, 436, 4 P.2d 889, 890 (1931) ("IW] e can easily conceive of many circumstances in which a given weapon could be equally deadly in many ways, regardless of the purpose for which it is mainly intended to be used."); State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 407, 413 (1879) ("It was peculiarly within the province of the jury, under the facts of this case, to determine, as a fact, whether the club in defendant's hand, as it was 2017State v. Napper, 6 Nev. 113, 115 (1870) (defining deadly weapon as "a weapon deadly either in its nature, or capable of being used in a deadly manner"); see also State v. McNeil, 53 Nev. 428, 436 , 4 P.2d 889, 890 (1931) ("IW] e can easily conceive of many circumstances in which a given weapon could be equally deadly in many ways, regardless of the purpose for which it is mainly intended to be used."); State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 407, 413 (1879) ("It was peculiarly within the province of the jury, under the facts of this case, to determine, as a fact, whether the club in defendant's hand, as it wa | 2 | 2 |
Hewitt v. Stategreen2 sentences1998Hewitt v. State, 113 Nev. 387, 392 , 936 P.2d 330, 333 (1997). 1998Hewitt v. State, 113 Nev. 387, 392 , 936 P.2d 330, 333 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nevada. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Clem v. State
green
2 sentences2009Under the functional test, this court would look to “how an instrument is used and the facts and circumstances of its use.” Id. at 357 , 760 P.2d at 106 . 2009Under the functional test, this court would look to “how an instrument is used and the facts and circumstances of its use.” Id. at 357 , 760 P.2d at 106 . | 4 | 1989–2009 |
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons
green
2 sentences2015Id. at 288-89 . 2 1n Ducharm, we ultimately held that the district court did not err by refusing to dismiss the claims based on a defense of absolute immunity because the alleged negligence occurred after the court order was entered. 118 Nev. at 620, 55 P.3d at 427 . 2015Id. at 288-89 . 2 1n Ducharm, we ultimately held that the district court did not err by refusing to dismiss the claims based on a defense of absolute immunity because the alleged negligence occurred after the court order was entered. 118 Nev. at 620, 55 P.3d at 427 . | 3 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada
green
2 sentences2015Id. at 288-89 . 2 1n Ducharm, we ultimately held that the district court did not err by refusing to dismiss the claims based on a defense of absolute immunity because the alleged negligence occurred after the court order was entered. 118 Nev. at 620, 55 P.3d at 427 . 2015Id. at 288-89 . 2 1n Ducharm, we ultimately held that the district court did not err by refusing to dismiss the claims based on a defense of absolute immunity because the alleged negligence occurred after the court order was entered. 118 Nev. at 620, 55 P.3d at 427 . | 3 | 2015–2015 |
Carr v. Sheriff, Clark County
green
2 sentences2009After this court determined that burglary sentences could not be enhanced under NRS 193.165, see Carr, 95 Nev. at 689-90 , 601 P.2d at 423-24 , and shortly after this court adopted the broad functional test, the Legislature amended NRS 205.060 to include an increased sentencing range when a person has possession or gains possession of a “deadly weapon” during a burglary. 1989 Nev. 2009After this court determined that burglary sentences could not be enhanced under NRS 193.165, see Carr, 95 Nev. at 689-90 , 601 P.2d at 423-24 , and shortly after this court adopted the broad functional test, the Legislature amended NRS 205.060 to include an increased sentencing range when a person has possession or gains possession of a “deadly weapon” during a burglary. 1989 Nev. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Church
green
2 sentences1990The Arizona Supreme Court has held that the inherently dangerous test used in the case cited by the majority, State v. Church, 109 Ariz. 39 , 504 P.2d 940 (1973), is inapplicable where use of a deadly weapon is not an element of the substantive offense. 1990The Arizona Supreme Court has held that the inherently dangerous test used in the case cited by the majority, State v. Church, 109 Ariz. 39 , 504 P.2d 940 (1973), is inapplicable where use of a deadly weapon is not an element of the substantive offense. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences1990In dealing with a statute that enumerated certain instruments as deadly weapons, the court in State v. Williams, 218 Neb. 57 , 352 N.W.2d 576 (1984), refused to recognize a steak knife found in appellant's car as a deadly weapon, reasoning that "an ordinary tool for personal dining" was not within the contemplation of the legislature. 1990In dealing with a statute that enumerated certain instruments as deadly weapons, the court in State v. Williams, 218 Neb. 57 , 352 N.W.2d 576 (1984), refused to recognize a steak knife found in appellant's car as a deadly weapon, reasoning that "an ordinary tool for personal dining" was not within the contemplation of the legislature. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.