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13 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1979–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mason v. Colemangreen1 sentence2018See Mason v. Coleman, 447 Mass. 177 (2006); Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Dr. Gladys Cok v. Louis Cosentinogreen2 sentences2012Cok v. Cosentino, supra, provides guidance as to the application of a functional analysis to partition commissioners. 2012See, e.g., Cok, 876 F.2d at 3 (guardian ad litem and conservator of assets); Bettencourt v. Bd. of Regist. in Med., 904 F.2d 772, 782-83 (1st Cir. 1990) (state medical board members and staff); Coggeshall v. Massachusetts Bd. of Registration of Psychologists, 604 F.3d 658, 663 (1st Cir. 2010) (members of state board of registration of psychologists). 8 See, generally, Lajoie v. Commonwealth, 2000 WL 1023723 (Mass.Super., 2000) (Toomey, J.) [1] Mass. L. | 1 | 1 |
Paul E. Bettencourt, M.D. v. Board of Registration in Medicine of the Commonwealth of Massachusettsgreen1 sentence2012See, e.g., Cok, 876 F.2d at 3 (guardian ad litem and conservator of assets); Bettencourt v. Bd. of Regist. in Med., 904 F.2d 772, 782-83 (1st Cir. 1990) (state medical board members and staff); Coggeshall v. Massachusetts Bd. of Registration of Psychologists, 604 F.3d 658, 663 (1st Cir. 2010) (members of state board of registration of psychologists). 8 See, generally, Lajoie v. Commonwealth, 2000 WL 1023723 (Mass.Super., 2000) (Toomey, J.) [1] Mass. L. | 1 | 1 |
Coggeshall v. Massachusetts Board of Registration of Psychologistsgreen1 sentence2012See, e.g., Cok, 876 F.2d at 3 (guardian ad litem and conservator of assets); Bettencourt v. Bd. of Regist. in Med., 904 F.2d 772, 782-83 (1st Cir. 1990) (state medical board members and staff); Coggeshall v. Massachusetts Bd. of Registration of Psychologists, 604 F.3d 658, 663 (1st Cir. 2010) (members of state board of registration of psychologists). 8 See, generally, Lajoie v. Commonwealth, 2000 WL 1023723 (Mass.Super., 2000) (Toomey, J.) [1] Mass. L. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Vasquezgreen1 sentence2008See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 397 Mass. 244, 253-254 (1986) (confinement preceding and enabling rape and robbery does not merge); Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 261, 267-268 (1981) (abduction to a room in an abandoned building for the commission of rape does not merge); Commonwealth v. Sumner, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 349, 352-353 (1984) (locking the victim in the perpetrator’s apartment as a prelude to rape does not merge); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 329, 334 (1999) (confinement at gunpoint before murder does not merge); Commonwealth v. Brown, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 237, 242-24 | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Sumnergreen1 sentence2008See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 397 Mass. 244, 253-254 (1986) (confinement preceding and enabling rape and robbery does not merge); Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 261, 267-268 (1981) (abduction to a room in an abandoned building for the commission of rape does not merge); Commonwealth v. Sumner, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 349, 352-353 (1984) (locking the victim in the perpetrator’s apartment as a prelude to rape does not merge); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 329, 334 (1999) (confinement at gunpoint before murder does not merge); Commonwealth v. Brown, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 237, 242-24 | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Riveragreen1 sentence2008See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 397 Mass. 244, 253-254 (1986) (confinement preceding and enabling rape and robbery does not merge); Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 261, 267-268 (1981) (abduction to a room in an abandoned building for the commission of rape does not merge); Commonwealth v. Sumner, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 349, 352-353 (1984) (locking the victim in the perpetrator’s apartment as a prelude to rape does not merge); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 329, 334 (1999) (confinement at gunpoint before murder does not merge); Commonwealth v. Brown, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 237, 242-24 | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Robinsongreen1 sentence2008See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 397 Mass. 244, 253-254 (1986) (confinement preceding and enabling rape and robbery does not merge); Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 261, 267-268 (1981) (abduction to a room in an abandoned building for the commission of rape does not merge); Commonwealth v. Sumner, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 349, 352-353 (1984) (locking the victim in the perpetrator’s apartment as a prelude to rape does not merge); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 329, 334 (1999) (confinement at gunpoint before murder does not merge); Commonwealth v. Brown, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 237, 242-24 | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Browngreen1 sentence2008See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 397 Mass. 244, 253-254 (1986) (confinement preceding and enabling rape and robbery does not merge); Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 261, 267-268 (1981) (abduction to a room in an abandoned building for the commission of rape does not merge); Commonwealth v. Sumner, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 349, 352-353 (1984) (locking the victim in the perpetrator’s apartment as a prelude to rape does not merge); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 329, 334 (1999) (confinement at gunpoint before murder does not merge); Commonwealth v. Brown, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 237, 242-24 | 1 | 1 |
Harvard Community Health Plan, Inc. v. Board of Assessors of Cambridgegreen1 sentence2004Factors in the functional test include an assessment whether the organization serves “a sufficiently large or indefinite class so that the community is benefited by its operations,” Western Mass. Lifecare, 434 Mass, at 103-104, quoting from Harvard Community Health Plan, Inc. v. Assessors of Cambridge, 384 Mass. 536, 543 (1981), and whether the purported charity lessens a burden that would otherwise be assumed by the government. | 1 | 1 |
Western Massachusetts Lifecare Corp. v. Board of Assessorsgreen1 sentence2004Western Mass. Lifecare, supra at 105-106, and cases cited. | 1 | 1 |
Harrison v. NetCentric Corp.green2 sentences2001The Court also clarified that “nothing in [the Demoulas] decision, however, suggested that we were overruling our long-standing policy of applying the law of the State of incorporation to internal corporate affairs.” Id. at 471. 2001The Court explained that its departure from the general rule in Demoulas , was warranted because ”[t]he Demoulas case was an exceptional one, as it concerned a company that had changed its State of incorporation as well as conduct that spanned both periods; thus, we conducted a functional analysis to determine which State had the more significant contacts.” Id. at 471. | 1 | 1 |
Boston Hides & Furs, Ltd. v. Sumitomo Bank, Ltd.green1 sentence1999See Boston Hides & Furs, Ltd. v. Sumitomo Bank, Ltd., 870 F. Supp. 1153, 1166-1167 (D. | 1 | 1 |
Forrester v. Whitered1 sentence1988See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988) (“Under [the functional] approach, we examine the nature of the functions with which a particular official or class of officials has been lawfully entrusted, and we seek to evaluate the effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those functions”). | 1 | 1 |
Dominick Mancini v. Sherwin Lester and David Lucasgreen1 sentence1985Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984); Mancini v. Lester, 630 F.2d 990, 992 (3d Cir. 1980); Note, Supplementing the Functional Test of Prosecutorial Immunity, 34 Stan. | 1 | 1 |
L. Patrick Gray, III v. Griffin Bellgreen1 sentence1985Courts which have faced the issue of prosecutorial immunity since Imbler have utilized a functional analysis to distinguish between quasi judicial and non quasi judicial activity. 4 See Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 499 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
LaLonde v. Eissner
green
1 sentence2025LaLonde, 405 Mass. at 212 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Preferred Mutual Insurance Co. v. Vermont Mutual Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2020"The first element of the test is 'continuity' -- that is, the activity in question must be one in which the insured regularly engages as a means of livelihood; the second element is 'profit motive' -- that is, the purpose of the activity must be to obtain monetary gain." Id. 2020In reaching this conclusion, we concluded that "determining when an activity arises out of or in connection with the insured's business" should be done in accordance with "a two-prong functional test." Id. at 514 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Philip Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, et a
green
2 sentences2020Therefore, after Hosanna-Tabor, the majority of courts that have considered the ministerial exception have continued to apply a functional analysis Page 36 of 54 when determining whether an employee qualifies as a ministerial employee, while still applying the four Hosanna-Tabor factors.[28] For example, in Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2012), the "first opportunity for the [Fifth Circuit] to address the ministerial exception in light of Hosanna-Tabor[,]" id. at 170 , the Fifth Circuit ruled that the exception applied to the music director at a Catholic Church, 2020Therefore, after Hosanna-Tabor, the majority of courts that have considered the ministerial exception have continued to apply a functional analysis Page 36 of 54 when determining whether an employee qualifies as a ministerial employee, while still applying the four Hosanna-Tabor factors.[28] For example, in Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2012), the "first opportunity for the [Fifth Circuit] to address the ministerial exception in light of Hosanna-Tabor[,]" id. at 170 , the Fifth Circuit ruled that the exception applied to the music director at a Catholic Church, | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas
green
1 sentence2018See Mason v. Coleman, 447 Mass. 177 (2006); Yannas v. Frondistou-Yannas, 395 Mass. 704 (1985). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Bushkin Associates, Inc. v. Raytheon Co.
green
1 sentence2001Nothing in our decision, however, suggested that we were overruling our long-standing policy of applying the law of the State of incorporation to internal corporate affairs. 9 See id. (explicitly stating that we need not address whether we should continue to follow the State of incorporation principle). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Whitten v. United States
green
1 sentence1985Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984); Mancini v. Lester, 630 F.2d 990, 992 (3d Cir. 1980); Note, Supplementing the Functional Test of Prosecutorial Immunity, 34 Stan. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Courier Citizen Co. v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation
green
1 sentence1979Nor is the validity of this mode of analysis undercut by the Legislature’s removal from exemption, by means of the amendments added by St. 1971, c. 555, § 45, certain items held to be included within the scope of § 6(s) in Courier Citizen Co. v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 358 Mass. 563 (1971). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.