Commissioner rule in New York

1925It was said by Mr: Justice Patterson in Matter of Randall ( 87 App. Div. 245 ), which was an appeal from an order directing the deposit of these books with the commissioner: ‘ If the person producing the books, in obedience to a subpoena, refuses to answer questions passed upon and allowed by the commissioner, and, under such circumstances, refuses to identify the books or the entries therein which are material to the case of the examining party, a remedy is afforded by law.’ The question, does not turn upon whether the decision of the commissioner is right or wrong, but upon the authority of

1904It was said by Mr. Justice Patterson in Matter of Randall ( 87 App. Div. 245 ), which was an appeal from an order directing the deposit of these hooks with the commissioner: “ If the person producing the books, in obedience to a subpoena, refuses to answer questions passed upon and allowed by the commissioner, and, under such circumstances, refuses to identify the books or the entries therein which are material to the case of the examining party, a remedy is afforded by law.” The question does not turn upon whether the decision of the commissioner is right or wrong, but upon the authority of t

2026Capital Corp. v New York State Div. of Tax Appeals, Tax Appeals Trib. , 2 NY3d at 254 ).

2026Pursuant to Labor Law § 620 (2), "[a]ny employer who claims to be aggrieved by the . . . determination of the amount of the employer's contributions . . . may apply to the commissioner for a hearing within [30] days after mailing or personal delivery of notice of such determination." Highgate offered nothing to suggest that Equifax did not receive the notice of determination sent to it in November 2022 and, as such, Highgate's September 2023 request for a hearing was untimely ( see 12 NYCRR 461.2; Matter of Sanon [Amazon Logistics, Inc.-Commissioner of Labor] , 213 AD3d 1040 , 1042 [3d Dept 20

2010We granted DOB leave to appeal ( 12 NY3d 713 [2009]). 1 New York City Administrative Code § 26-124 (c) provides, in relevant part: “In addition to any other penalty provided by law, the commissioner may refuse to accept any application or other document. . . that bears the signature of any person who has been found, after a hearing at the office of administrative trials and hearings pursuant to the department’s rules, ... to have knowingly or negligently falsified or allowed to be falsified any certificate, form, signed statement, application, [or] report.” 2 Adopted by the Legislature in 2007

2004Footnote 2: The Court credits the Commissioner's claim that the private monitor system will not be employed in every case, without regard to other factors, and , therefore the policy change need not be published as a rule and filed with the Secretary of State ( Matter of Guptill Holding Corp. v Williams , 140 AD2d 12 ).

2002The underlying facts of this adoption matter are set forth in a prior decision of this Court ( 289 AD2d 631 , lv dismissed 97 NY2d 725 ).

2000The appellant’s proof in opposition to the Commissioner’s motion consisted of speculation and unsubstantiated assertions and, therefore, was insufficient to defeat the motion (see, Zuckerman v City of New York, supra).

1995The Appellate Division reversed on the law, granted defendant’s motion and dismissed the complaint, concluding that because the Legislature enacted PESHA to create "a newly cognizable cause of action to protect employees who complained about unsafe working conditions” ( 200 AD2d 27 , *442 29), actions brought under PESHA are governed by CPLR 214 (2), which provides for a three-year limitations period in "an action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute.” This Court granted the Commissioner’s motion for leave to appeal.

1994Commencing with Justice Murphy’s dissent in Matter of Millar ( 40 AD2d 637 [1st Dept 1972], affd 35 NY2d 767 [1974]), in which he wrote that "[i]t is not sufficient to merely show the mother’s deficiencies without also establishing that the child is suffering or likely to suffer from neglect” (supra, at 638), a line of cases has evolved holding that "[t]he fact that the respondent had a previous history of mental and emotional illness and had been confined at one time in a State hospital is not conclusive as to whether the respondent * * * is now suffering from mental or emotional illness at t

1994However the Commissioner urges a contrary result, relying upon Matter of Samuelson ( 110 AD2d 187 ), where the Second Department engrafted certain barriers to application of the statute.

1994Commencing with Justice Murphy’s dissent in Matter of Millar ( 40 AD2d 637 [1st Dept 1972], affd 35 NY2d 767 [1974]), in which he wrote that "[i]t is not sufficient to merely show the mother’s deficiencies without also establishing that the child is suffering or likely to suffer from neglect” (supra, at 638), a line of cases has evolved holding that "[t]he fact that the respondent had a previous history of mental and emotional illness and had been confined at one time in a State hospital is not conclusive as to whether the respondent * * * is now suffering from mental or emotional illness at t

1992Whether educational policy served as an alternative basis for the Commissioner’s determination or was inextricably linked with the constitutional issue, the scope of judicial review of the determination is the same—if the determination is neither arbitrary and capricious nor lacking a rational basis, it must be confirmed (see, Matter of O’Connor v Sobol, 173 AD2d 74, 77 ).

1990Co., 91 AD2d 821 ).

1990In Bandas v Emperor the court extended Crabb and allowed DOSS to bring a proceeding during the recipient’s lifetime to prevent a fraudulent conveyance of assets, where possession of the assets didn’t render her ineligible for Medicaid ( 121 Misc 2d 192 , supra).

1988The Commissioner’s rule addressing this discrepancy gives rise to no "conflict” with any term of the Act, and given the guidelines in the Act itself, cannot be considered an improper delegation of legislative power (see, Matter of City of Utica v Water Pollution Control Bd., 5 NY2d 164 ; see also, Matter of Levine v Whalen, 39 NY2d 510 ).

1986The record is sufficiently complete so that we can assess the measure of punishment warranted (see, Matter of Pell v Board of Educ., 34 NY2d 222 , 234).

1984This is not a case where an overpayment was properly calculated but the actual costs were less than anticipated, but it is analogous to the cases where costs were improperly calculated (see Matter of Daleview Nursing Home v Axelrod, 91 AD2d 1161, 1162 , affd 62 NY2d 30 ).

1984As stated in Matter of Sigety v Ingraham ( 29 NY2d 110, 115-116 ), no taking of property is involved here: “The possible fact that the Commissioner’s rule adversely affects petitioner’s business is no ground for declaring such rule invalid or unreasonable.” I We determine, also, that the Commissioner properly applied the new reimbursement rate retroactively.

1984This is not a case where an overpayment was properly calculated but the actual costs were less than anticipated, but it is analogous to the cases where costs were improperly calculated (see Matter of Daleview Nursing Home v Axelrod, 91 AD2d 1161, 1162 , affd 62 NY2d 30 ).

1979Initially, we note that an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of an interest in real property has been successfully brought by a public welfare official in the past (Doukas v George, 12 Misc 2d 958 ).