Commissioner motion in Tennessee

2013Cumulus Broad., Inc. v. Shim, 226 S.W.3d 366, 373 (Tenn. 2007); Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 , 210–11 (Tenn. 1993).

2012In the order, the trial court first observed that the MTC would not be entitled to intervene in the case under Rule 24.01 or Rule 24.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, and added: “To the extent that the pending Motion includes a request for the MTC’s intervention in this case, it is DENIED.” The trial court next denied the Commissioner’s motion to admit Mr. Fort pro hac vice for the reasons stated its oral ruling, specifically citing State v. Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309 (Tenn. 2000).

2012In the order, the trial court first observed that the MTC would not be entitled to intervene in the case under Rule 24.01 or Rule 24.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, and added: “To the extent that the pending Motion includes a request for the MTC’s intervention in this case, it is DENIED.” The trial court next denied the Commissioner’s motion to admit Mr. Fort pro hac vice for the reasons stated its oral ruling, specifically citing State v. Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309 (Tenn. 2000).

1999In Griffin v. Prince, 632 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1982), our Supreme Court said: It is well settled in this state that the words of a conveyance or legal instrument which would make two other persons joint tenants under the common law, or tenants in common under T.C.A. § 64-107, will create tenancy by the entirety in a husband and wife. (citations omitted). * * * Under the authorities discussed above, the fact that the account cards did not use the words “tenants by the entirety” or that they used the word “joint” does not prevent ownership by the entirety if in fact the depositors were married when

1994Applying *198 the use tax statute to the foregoing facts, the Court of Appeals determined the spoils removal and dust piping system were exempt from tax because they were industrial machinery, but found the dry kiln was a building and not industrial machinery, citing as authority for its holding, this Court’s decision in Tibbals Flooring Co. v. Olsen, 698 S.W.2d 60 (Tenn.1985) (“Tibbals I”), in which we held, under the statute in effect at that time, that a pre-dryer is not exempt as industrial machinery. 1 INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY In this Court, both the taxpayer and the Commissioner challenge th

1986The relevant facts in determining successor liability under T.C.A. § 67-6-513 are indistinguishable from Bank of Commerce v. Woods, 585 S.W.2d 577 (Tenn.1979), which requires that we reverse the trial court. - A wholly owned subsidiary corporation of plaintiff was the owner and franchisor of franchises known as Popeye’s Famous Fried Chicken.

1982His principal reliance is on the case of Broadacre Dairies v. Evans, 193 Tenn. 441 , 246 S.W.2d 78 (1952).

1982His principal reliance is on the case of Broadacre Dairies v. Evans, 193 Tenn. 441 , 246 S.W.2d 78 (1952).

1963It should not be applied herein because this personal property was actually sold to' the purchasers and a profit made thereon by the appellee as hereinabove indicated and as is admitted in the Commissioner’s brief when he says: “Defendant of course recognizes that the customers were paying for the merchandise of a non-drug nature received by them from complainant.” In interpreting statutes and applying them in these revenue cases, we must keep in mind that doubtful language in taxing statute should be resolved in favor of the taxpayer, (Templeton v. Bartlett, 190 Tenn. 347, 229 , S.W.2d 509).