product violation in New York

2007It is axiomatic that “judicial review of a SEQRA determination is limited to determining whether the challenged determination was affected by an error of law, or was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or was the product of a violation of lawful procedure” (Matter of Village of Tarrytown v Planning Bd. of Vil. of Sleepy Hollow, 292 AD2d 617, 619 [2002]; see Akpan v Koch, 75 NY2d 561, 570 [1990]; Matter of UPROSE v Power Auth. of State of N.Y., 285 AD2d 603, 607 [2001]).

2007“The law is well settled that judicial review of a SEQRA determination is limited to determining whether the challenged determination was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or was the product of a violation of lawful procedure” (Matter of Village of Tarrytown v Planning Bd. of Vil. of Sleepy Hollow, 292 AD2d 617, 619 [2002]; see Akpan v Koch, 75 NY2d 561 [1990]; Matter of Jackson v New York State Urban Dev.

2010We affirm both orders and judgments. “ ‘[JJudicial review of a SEQRA determination is limited to determining whether the challenged determination was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or was the product of a violation of lawful procedure’ ” (Matter of County of Orange v Village of Kiryas Joel, 44 AD3d 765, 767 [2007], quoting Matter of Village of Tarrytown v Planning Bd. of Vil. of Sleepy Hollow, 292 AD2d 617, 619 [2002]).

2007“The law is well settled that judicial review of a SEQRA determination is limited to determining whether the challenged determination was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or was the product of a violation of lawful procedure” (Matter of Village of Tarrytown v Planning Bd. of Vil. of Sleepy Hollow, 292 AD2d 617, 619 [2002]; see Akpan v Koch, 75 NY2d 561 [1990]; Matter of Jackson v New York State Urban Dev.

2018Corp ., 67 NY2d 400, 416 ; Matter of St.

2015Corp., 67 NY2d 400, 416 [1986]; Matter of Save Open Space v Planning Bd. of the Town of Newburgh, 74 AD3d 1350, 1352 [2010]; Matter of East End Prop.

2007Furthermore, “[a] manufacturer or retailer may . . . incur liability for failing to warn concerning dangers in the use of a product which come to [its] attention after manufacture or sale, through advancements in the state of the art, with which [it] is expected to stay abreast, or through being made aware of later accidents involving dangers in the product of which warning should be given to users” (Cover v Cohen, 61 NY2d 261, 274-275 [1984]; see Liriano v Hobart Corp, 92 NY2d at 240 ). “[T]he existence and scope of such a duty [to warn] are generally fact-specific” (Liriano v Hobart Corp, 92

1984As recently noted in Cover v Cohen ( 61 NY2d 261 ), this duty to warn of defects is a continuing one, hence: “A manufacturer or retailer may * * * incur liability for failing to warn concerning dangers in the use of a product which come to his attention after manufacture or sale, through advancements in the state of the art, with which he is expected to stay abreast, or through being made aware of later accidents involving dangers in the product of which warning should be given to users * * * “Although a product be reasonably safe when manufactured and sold and involve no then known risks of w

2015Corp., 67 NY2d 400, 416 [1986]; Matter of Save Open Space v Planning Bd. of the Town of Newburgh, 74 AD3d 1350, 1352 [2010]; Matter of East End Prop.

2015Corp., 67 NY2d 400, 416 [1986]; Matter of Save Open Space v Planning Bd. of the Town of Newburgh, 74 AD3d 1350, 1352 [2010]; Matter of East End Prop.

2014LLC v City of New York, 32 AD3d 1, 6 [1st Dept 2006], quoting Matter of Village of Tarrytown v Planning Bd. of Vil. of Sleepy Hollow, 292 AD2d 617, 619 [2d Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 609 [2002]). “[T]he courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the agency for it is not their role to ‘weigh the desirability of any action or [to] choose among alternatives’ ” (Akpan v Koch, 75 NY2d 561, 570 [1990], quoting Matter of Jackson v New York State Urban Dev.

2014LLC v City of New York, 32 AD3d 1, 6 [1st Dept 2006], quoting Matter of Village of Tarrytown v Planning Bd. of Vil. of Sleepy Hollow, 292 AD2d 617, 619 [2d Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 609 [2002]). “[T]he courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the agency for it is not their role to ‘weigh the desirability of any action or [to] choose among alternatives’ ” (Akpan v Koch, 75 NY2d 561, 570 [1990], quoting Matter of Jackson v New York State Urban Dev.

2012Socy., 266 NY 71, 88 [1934])]).

2012Socy., 266 NY 71, 88 [1934])]).

2012Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that Justice Blumenfeld’s imposition of a sanction in the form of preclusion of the videotaped statement constituted an “unlawful procedure or error in the action or proceeding itself related to the proper purpose of the action or proceeding” (Matter of State of New York v King, 36 NY2d at 64 [emphasis added]).

2012Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that Justice Blumenfeld’s imposition of a sanction in the form of preclusion of the videotaped statement constituted an “unlawful procedure or error in the action or proceeding itself related to the proper purpose of the action or proceeding” (Matter of State of New York v King, 36 NY2d at 64 [emphasis added]).

2012Belatedly, the Second Circuit’s holding was made in the context of a case, unlike People v Perez, in which the challenged evidence was unquestionably a product of the violation of a disciplinary rule, and may properly be interpreted as limited to such a factual circumstance (People v Anderson, 66 NY2d 529, 535-536 [1985] [“it is well settled that ‘(t)he language of any opinion must be confined to the facts before the court’ ” (quoting Dougherty v Equitable Life Assur.

2012Belatedly, the Second Circuit’s holding was made in the context of a case, unlike People v Perez, in which the challenged evidence was unquestionably a product of the violation of a disciplinary rule, and may properly be interpreted as limited to such a factual circumstance (People v Anderson, 66 NY2d 529, 535-536 [1985] [“it is well settled that ‘(t)he language of any opinion must be confined to the facts before the court’ ” (quoting Dougherty v Equitable Life Assur.

2010We affirm both orders and judgments. “ ‘[JJudicial review of a SEQRA determination is limited to determining whether the challenged determination was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or was the product of a violation of lawful procedure’ ” (Matter of County of Orange v Village of Kiryas Joel, 44 AD3d 765, 767 [2007], quoting Matter of Village of Tarrytown v Planning Bd. of Vil. of Sleepy Hollow, 292 AD2d 617, 619 [2002]).

2010Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the Planning Board considered a reasonable range of feasible alternatives (see Matter of Town of Dryden v Tompkins County Bd. of Representatives, 78 NY2d 331 [1991]; Akpan v Koch, 75 NY2d 561, 570 [1990]; Matter of County of Orange v Village of Kiryas Joel, 44 AD3d at 769 ; ECL 8-0109 [2] [d]; [4]; 6 NYCRR 617.9 [b] [5] [v]).

2007“The nature of the warning to be given and to whom it should be given likewise turn upon a number of factors, including the harm that may result from use of the product without notice, the reliability and any possible adverse interest of the person, if other than the user, to whom notice is given, the burden on the manufacturer or vendor involved in locating the persons to whom notice is required to be given, the attention which it can be expected a notice in the form given will receive from the recipient, the kind of product involved and the number manufactured or sold, and the steps taken, o

2007It is axiomatic that “judicial review of a SEQRA determination is limited to determining whether the challenged determination was affected by an error of law, or was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or was the product of a violation of lawful procedure” (Matter of Village of Tarrytown v Planning Bd. of Vil. of Sleepy Hollow, 292 AD2d 617, 619 [2002]; see Akpan v Koch, 75 NY2d 561, 570 [1990]; Matter of UPROSE v Power Auth. of State of N.Y., 285 AD2d 603, 607 [2001]).

2007Furthermore, “[a] manufacturer or retailer may . . . incur liability for failing to warn concerning dangers in the use of a product which come to [its] attention after manufacture or sale, through advancements in the state of the art, with which [it] is expected to stay abreast, or through being made aware of later accidents involving dangers in the product of which warning should be given to users” (Cover v Cohen, 61 NY2d 261, 274-275 [1984]; see Liriano v Hobart Corp, 92 NY2d at 240 ). “[T]he existence and scope of such a duty [to warn] are generally fact-specific” (Liriano v Hobart Corp, 92

2007Furthermore, “[a] manufacturer or retailer may . . . incur liability for failing to warn concerning dangers in the use of a product which come to [its] attention after manufacture or sale, through advancements in the state of the art, with which [it] is expected to stay abreast, or through being made aware of later accidents involving dangers in the product of which warning should be given to users” (Cover v Cohen, 61 NY2d 261, 274-275 [1984]; see Liriano v Hobart Corp, 92 NY2d at 240 ). “[T]he existence and scope of such a duty [to warn] are generally fact-specific” (Liriano v Hobart Corp, 92

2005In the first place, we note that the challenged testimony was the product of defense counsel’s persistent cross-examination (see People v Montgomery, 293 AD2d 369, 371 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 712 [2002]).

2001In addition, the prosecutor must demonstrate that the witness’s silence was not the product of the defense counsel’s advice to keep silent (see, People v Dawson, supra, at 323).