11 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Vondehngreen2 sentences2018State v. Vondehn , 348 Or. 462 , 475-76, 236 P.3d 691 (2010) ; see id. at 487 , 236 P.3d 691 (Linder, J., concurring) (explaining that, when officers fail to provide the requisite Miranda warnings, "we properly ask whether any subsequently obtained evidence, physical or testimonial, is sufficiently a product of that violation to require *15 suppression along with any statements made in direct response to unwarned custodial interrogation"). 2018State v. Vondehn , 348 Or. 462 , 475-76, 236 P.3d 691 (2010) ; see id. at 487 , 236 P.3d 691 (Linder, J., concurring) (explaining that, when officers fail to provide the requisite Miranda warnings, "we properly ask whether any subsequently obtained evidence, physical or testimonial, is sufficiently a product of that violation to require *15 suppression along with any statements made in direct response to unwarned custodial interrogation"). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Jarnagingreen2 sentences2021The remedy for an Article I, section 12, violation extends not only to a defendant’s statements made in response to the violation “but also to the physical and testimonial evi- dence that is a product of that violation.” Jarnagin, 351 Or at 716 . 2020See State v. Jarnagin, 351 Or 703, 716 , 277 P3d 535 (2012). “[W]hether testimonial or physical evidence derives from a prior [Article I, section 12] violation cannot be reduced to a mechanical formula but will vary depending on the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Swan, 363 Or 121, 131 , 420 P3d 9 (2018). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Swangreen2 sentences2019See State v. Banks , 364 Or. 332 , 337-39, 434 P.3d 361 (2019) (rejecting the *424 state's argument that, under the implied consent statutes, the defendant did not have a constitutional right to refuse the officer's request that he take a breath test); Swan , 363 Or. at 137 -46 , 420 P.3d 9 (rejecting the state's argument that the implied consent statutes require the admission of breath test results when the decision to take a breath test is the product of a violation of the defendant's Article I, section 12, rights). 2019See State v. Banks , 364 Or. 332 , 337-39, 434 P.3d 361 (2019) (rejecting the *424 state's argument that, under the implied consent statutes, the defendant did not have a constitutional right to refuse the officer's request that he take a breath test); Swan , 363 Or. at 137 -46 , 420 P.3d 9 (rejecting the state's argument that the implied consent statutes require the admission of breath test results when the decision to take a breath test is the product of a violation of the defendant's Article I, section 12, rights). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Banksgreen2 sentences2019See State v. Banks , 364 Or. 332 , 337-39, 434 P.3d 361 (2019) (rejecting the *424 state's argument that, under the implied consent statutes, the defendant did not have a constitutional right to refuse the officer's request that he take a breath test); Swan , 363 Or. at 137 -46 , 420 P.3d 9 (rejecting the state's argument that the implied consent statutes require the admission of breath test results when the decision to take a breath test is the product of a violation of the defendant's Article I, section 12, rights). 2019See State v. Banks , 364 Or. 332 , 337-39, 434 P.3d 361 (2019) (rejecting the *424 state's argument that, under the implied consent statutes, the defendant did not have a constitutional right to refuse the officer's request that he take a breath test); Swan , 363 Or. at 137 -46 , 420 P.3d 9 (rejecting the state's argument that the implied consent statutes require the admission of breath test results when the decision to take a breath test is the product of a violation of the defendant's Article I, section 12, rights). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Durbingreen2 sentences2018Rather, we conclude that the state failed to prove that defendant's decision to take the breath test did not derive from the preceding repeated violation of defendant's Article I, section 12, right to counsel. **137 In Spencer , we suppressed the defendant's breath test results because his decision to submit to the test was the product of a violation of his Article I, section 11, right to counsel. 305 Or. at 75 -76 , 750 P.2d 147 ; see also Durbin , 335 Or. at 194 , 63 P.3d 576 (suppressing evidence of the defendant's breath test results when the defendant's decision to submit to a breath test 2018Rather, we conclude that the state failed to prove that defendant's decision to take the breath test did not derive from the preceding repeated violation of defendant's Article I, section 12, right to counsel. **137 In Spencer , we suppressed the defendant's breath test results because his decision to submit to the test was the product of a violation of his Article I, section 11, right to counsel. 305 Or. at 75 -76 , 750 P.2d 147 ; see also Durbin , 335 Or. at 194 , 63 P.3d 576 (suppressing evidence of the defendant's breath test results when the defendant's decision to submit to a breath test | 1 | 1 |
State v. Moore/Coengreen2 sentences2012See State v. Moore/Coen, 349 Or 371, 385 , 245 P3d 101 (2010) (testimonial evidence); Vondehn, 348 Or at 476 (physical evidence). 2012See State v. Moore/Coen, 349 Or 371, 385 , 245 P3d 101 (2010) (testimonial evidence); Vondehn, 348 Or at 476 (physical evidence). | 1 | 1 |
Bartlett v. MacRaegreen2 sentences1996Accord Bartlett v. MacRae, 54 Or App 516, 518-19 , 635 P2d 666 (1981) (concluding that “[t]here was no substantial evidence that any alleged labeling deficiencies were the proximate cause” of the decedent’s injuries, where the decedent mistook a plastic jug containing cattle dye for his water jug, despite the fact that the dark-colored dye was clearly visible and the container was clearly labeled). 5 Defendant urges us to “view the evidence based on the applicable, substantive evidentiary burden and ask if, based upon the evidence, a reasonable jury could have found for the nonmoving party by 1996Accord Bartlett v. MacRae, 54 Or App 516, 518-19 , 635 P2d 666 (1981) (concluding that “[t]here was no substantial evidence that any alleged labeling deficiencies were the proximate cause” of the decedent’s injuries, where the decedent mistook a plastic jug containing cattle dye for his water jug, despite the fact that the dark-colored dye was clearly visible and the container was clearly labeled). 5 Defendant urges us to “view the evidence based on the applicable, substantive evidentiary burden and ask if, based upon the evidence, a reasonable jury could have found for the nonmoving party by | 1 | 1 |
Muncy v. Magnolia Chemical Companygreen1 sentence1996Stores v. United Chemical, 329 NC 446, 406 SE2d 856 (1991) (plaintiffs failure to read instructions is a defense only if the instructions were adequate) and Muncy v. Magnolia Chemical Co, 437 SW2d 15,19 (Tex Civ App 1969) (“[A] manufacturer of a dangerous product could not avoid liability for injury caused by the product where the warning was insufficient, although the user admitted he had not read the label.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Joaquin
green
2 sentences2023Defendant argues, in pertinent part, that under the totality of the circumstances, law enforcement violated his rights under Article I, section 12, “when they made statements that were likely to elicit an 3 We note that, “[w]here a defendant’s Article I, section 12, right to counsel has been violated, the remedy for that violation extends not only to a defendant’s uncounseled responses to a detective’s questions but also to the physical and testimonial evidence that is the product of that violation.” State v. Joaquin, 307 Or App 314, 324 , 476 P3d 1263 (2020). 490 State v. Gold incriminating r 2023Defendant argues, in pertinent part, that under the totality of the circumstances, law enforcement violated his rights under Article I, section 12, “when they made statements that were likely to elicit an 3 We note that, “[w]here a defendant’s Article I, section 12, right to counsel has been violated, the remedy for that violation extends not only to a defendant’s uncounseled responses to a detective’s questions but also to the physical and testimonial evidence that is the product of that violation.” State v. Joaquin, 307 Or App 314, 324 , 476 P3d 1263 (2020). 490 State v. Gold incriminating r | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Barger v. Barger
green
1 sentence2019In Barger, we explained that, for a con- structive trust to arise, it is “the entire ownership, speaking in an equitable sense, that must be established” and that tracing is the process of following that equitable ownership interest as the property changes form. 30 Or at 276-77 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Spencer
green
2 sentences2018Rather, we conclude that the state failed to prove that defendant's decision to take the breath test did not derive from the preceding repeated violation of defendant's Article I, section 12, right to counsel. **137 In Spencer , we suppressed the defendant's breath test results because his decision to submit to the test was the product of a violation of his Article I, section 11, right to counsel. 305 Or. at 75 -76 , 750 P.2d 147 ; see also Durbin , 335 Or. at 194 , 63 P.3d 576 (suppressing evidence of the defendant's breath test results when the defendant's decision to submit to a breath test 2018Rather, we conclude that the state failed to prove that defendant's decision to take the breath test did not derive from the preceding repeated violation of defendant's Article I, section 12, right to counsel. **137 In Spencer , we suppressed the defendant's breath test results because his decision to submit to the test was the product of a violation of his Article I, section 11, right to counsel. 305 Or. at 75 -76 , 750 P.2d 147 ; see also Durbin , 335 Or. at 194 , 63 P.3d 576 (suppressing evidence of the defendant's breath test results when the defendant's decision to submit to a breath test | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Guerrero
green
2 sentences2012It appears that that language may he the product of our analysis and holding in State v. Guerrero, 214 Or App 14 , 162 P3d 1048 (2007), in which we addressed what appears to have been an antecedent “Marion County Sheriffs department’s inmate personal property policy,” id. at 16 , which did not “discuss! ] what to do with closed containers or expressly authorize[ ] a deputy to open a closed container for any purpose,” id. at 17 . 2012It appears that that language may he the product of our analysis and holding in State v. Guerrero, 214 Or App 14 , 162 P3d 1048 (2007), in which we addressed what appears to have been an antecedent “Marion County Sheriffs department’s inmate personal property policy,” id. at 16 , which did not “discuss! ] what to do with closed containers or expressly authorize[ ] a deputy to open a closed container for any purpose,” id. at 17 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2007The precedential effect of the majority's holding, in light of its reasoning, will be understood to apply to all prison discipline hearings. [2] Miranda warnings are the product of a rule made by the Court that it first announced in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 2007The precedential effect of the majority's holding, in light of its reasoning, will be understood to apply to all prison discipline hearings. [2] Miranda warnings are the product of a rule made by the Court that it first announced in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Champs Convenience Stores, Inc. v. United Chemical Co.
green
1 sentence1996Stores v. United Chemical, 329 NC 446, 406 SE2d 856 (1991) (plaintiffs failure to read instructions is a defense only if the instructions were adequate) and Muncy v. Magnolia Chemical Co, 437 SW2d 15,19 (Tex Civ App 1969) (“[A] manufacturer of a dangerous product could not avoid liability for injury caused by the product where the warning was insufficient, although the user admitted he had not read the label.”). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.