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13 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1908–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cardin v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See Cardin v. State, 540 N.E.2d 51, 54 (Ind.Ct.App.1989) (“Imperative declarations, such as orders or instructions, which by their nature can neither be true nor false, cannot be offered for their truth”), trans. denied. [10] As for the declarative statements on the labels that infants can suffocate on soft bedding and that failure to follow the product warnings could result in serious injury or death, the evidentiary purpose of these proffered statements was not to prove the facts asserted. | 1 | 1 |
Kansas v. Marshgreen2 sentences2007Kansas v. Marsh, -U.S.-,-, 126 S.Ct. 2516, 2525 , 165 L.Ed.2d 429 (2006) (“The use of mitigation evidence is a product of the requirement of individualized sentencing.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 , 96 S.Ct. 2909 , 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("We have long recognized that for the determination of sentences, justice generally requires that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender.”) (citations omitted); Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 , 79 S.Ct. 421 , 3 L.Ed.2d 516 (1959) (“In disch 2007Kansas v. Marsh, -U.S.-,-, 126 S.Ct. 2516, 2525 , 165 L.Ed.2d 429 (2006) (“The use of mitigation evidence is a product of the requirement of individualized sentencing.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 , 96 S.Ct. 2909 , 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("We have long recognized that for the determination of sentences, justice generally requires that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender.”) (citations omitted); Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 , 79 S.Ct. 421 , 3 L.Ed.2d 516 (1959) (“In disch | 1 | 1 |
Pennsylvania Ex Rel. Sullivan v. Ashegreen2 sentences2007Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 , 58 S.Ct. 59 , 82 L.Ed. 43 (1937) ("For the determination of sentences, justice generally requires ... that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender.”). . 2007Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 , 58 S.Ct. 59 , 82 L.Ed. 43 (1937) ("For the determination of sentences, justice generally requires ... that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender.”). . | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Oklahomagreen2 sentences2007Kansas v. Marsh, -U.S.-,-, 126 S.Ct. 2516, 2525 , 165 L.Ed.2d 429 (2006) (“The use of mitigation evidence is a product of the requirement of individualized sentencing.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 , 96 S.Ct. 2909 , 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("We have long recognized that for the determination of sentences, justice generally requires that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender.”) (citations omitted); Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 , 79 S.Ct. 421 , 3 L.Ed.2d 516 (1959) (“In disch 2007Kansas v. Marsh, -U.S.-,-, 126 S.Ct. 2516, 2525 , 165 L.Ed.2d 429 (2006) (“The use of mitigation evidence is a product of the requirement of individualized sentencing.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 , 96 S.Ct. 2909 , 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("We have long recognized that for the determination of sentences, justice generally requires that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender.”) (citations omitted); Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 , 79 S.Ct. 421 , 3 L.Ed.2d 516 (1959) (“In disch | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. New Yorkgreen2 sentences2007Kansas v. Marsh, -U.S.-,-, 126 S.Ct. 2516, 2525 , 165 L.Ed.2d 429 (2006) (“The use of mitigation evidence is a product of the requirement of individualized sentencing.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 , 96 S.Ct. 2909 , 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("We have long recognized that for the determination of sentences, justice generally requires that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender.”) (citations omitted); Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 , 79 S.Ct. 421 , 3 L.Ed.2d 516 (1959) (“In disch 2007Kansas v. Marsh, -U.S.-,-, 126 S.Ct. 2516, 2525 , 165 L.Ed.2d 429 (2006) (“The use of mitigation evidence is a product of the requirement of individualized sentencing.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 , 96 S.Ct. 2909 , 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("We have long recognized that for the determination of sentences, justice generally requires that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender.”) (citations omitted); Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 , 79 S.Ct. 421 , 3 L.Ed.2d 516 (1959) (“In disch | 1 | 1 |
City of Gary Ex Rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp.green1 sentence2007However, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the City alleged that "all dealer-defendants are alleged to have knowingly sold to illegal buyers through intermediaries in 'straw purchases,' ” that "the manufacturers know of these illegal retail sales of handguns, and know that a small percentage of dealers, including the dealer-defendants here, account for a large portion of illegally obtained handguns,” and “manufacturers, distributors, and dealers knowingly participate in a distribution system that unnecessarily and sometimes even intentionally provides guns to criminals, juveniles, and others | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See id. *411 Prewitt directs us to Wilson v. Maryland, 370 Md. 191 , 803 A.2d 1034 (2002), where the trial court committed reversible error in admitting expert probability testimony concerning the likelihood of two separate infant deaths being related to SIDS, as opposed to homicide. 2004See id. *411 Prewitt directs us to Wilson v. Maryland, 370 Md. 191 , 803 A.2d 1034 (2002), where the trial court committed reversible error in admitting expert probability testimony concerning the likelihood of two separate infant deaths being related to SIDS, as opposed to homicide. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Collinsgreen1 sentence2004See id. *411 Prewitt directs us to Wilson v. Maryland, 370 Md. 191 , 803 A.2d 1034 (2002), where the trial court committed reversible error in admitting expert probability testimony concerning the likelihood of two separate infant deaths being related to SIDS, as opposed to homicide. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See Smith v. State, 702 N.E.2d 668, 673-74 (Ind.1998) (stating that a defendant's claim that the product rule was improperly applied because the genes were in linkage disequilibrium, and thus not independent, went to the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence). 2004See Smith v. State, 702 N.E.2d 668, 673-74 (Ind.1998) (stating that a defendant's claim that the product rule was improperly applied because the genes were in linkage disequilibrium, and thus not independent, went to the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence). | 1 | 1 |
Indianapolis Athletic Club, Inc. v. Alco Standard Corp.green1 sentence2002Indianapolis Athletic Club, Inc. v. Alco Standard Corp., 709 N.E.2d 1070, 1072 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Marshall v. Clark Equipment Co.green1 sentence1999Marshall v. Clark Equipment Co., 680 N.E.2d 1102, 1108 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Koske v. Townsend Engineering Co.green1 sentence1998Koske v. Townsend Engineering Co., 551 N.E.2d 437, 441 (Ind.1990). 11 Further, no additional warning must be furnished where such warnings would not add to the user’s understanding of the characteristics of the product. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Scott Weigle v. SPX Corporation
green
1 sentence2017Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Woodson v. North Carolina
green
2 sentences2007Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 , 58 S.Ct. 59 , 82 L.Ed. 43 (1937) ("For the determination of sentences, justice generally requires . . . that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender."). [2] California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 , 107 S.Ct. 837 , 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987) (Eighth Amendment jurisprudence establishes that the capital defendant generally must be allowed to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence.); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193-95 , 96 S.Ct. 2909 (Mitigating and aggravating factors do provide guidance to 2007Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 , 58 S.Ct. 59 , 82 L.Ed. 43 (1937) ("For the determination of sentences, justice generally requires . . . that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender."). [2] California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 , 107 S.Ct. 837 , 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987) (Eighth Amendment jurisprudence establishes that the capital defendant generally must be allowed to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence.); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193-95 , 96 S.Ct. 2909 (Mitigating and aggravating factors do provide guidance to | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Gregg v. Georgia
green
2 sentences2007Kansas v. Marsh, -U.S.-,-, 126 S.Ct. 2516, 2525 , 165 L.Ed.2d 429 (2006) (“The use of mitigation evidence is a product of the requirement of individualized sentencing.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 , 96 S.Ct. 2909 , 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("We have long recognized that for the determination of sentences, justice generally requires that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender.”) (citations omitted); Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 , 79 S.Ct. 421 , 3 L.Ed.2d 516 (1959) (“In disch 2007Kansas v. Marsh, -U.S.-,-, 126 S.Ct. 2516, 2525 , 165 L.Ed.2d 429 (2006) (“The use of mitigation evidence is a product of the requirement of individualized sentencing.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 , 96 S.Ct. 2909 , 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("We have long recognized that for the determination of sentences, justice generally requires that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender.”) (citations omitted); Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 , 79 S.Ct. 421 , 3 L.Ed.2d 516 (1959) (“In disch | 1 | 2007–2007 |
California v. Brown
green
2 sentences2007Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 , 58 S.Ct. 59 , 82 L.Ed. 43 (1937) ("For the determination of sentences, justice generally requires . . . that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender."). [2] California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 , 107 S.Ct. 837 , 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987) (Eighth Amendment jurisprudence establishes that the capital defendant generally must be allowed to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence.); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193-95 , 96 S.Ct. 2909 (Mitigating and aggravating factors do provide guidance to 2007Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 , 58 S.Ct. 59 , 82 L.Ed. 43 (1937) ("For the determination of sentences, justice generally requires . . . that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender."). [2] California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 , 107 S.Ct. 837 , 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987) (Eighth Amendment jurisprudence establishes that the capital defendant generally must be allowed to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence.); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193-95 , 96 S.Ct. 2909 (Mitigating and aggravating factors do provide guidance to | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Pirtle v. State
green
2 sentences2002Although the Pirtle court noted that Pirtle's "consent was a product of a violation of [his] Miranda rights” and therefore could not "serve to legitimate the warrantless search of [his] apartment[,]” Pirtle, 263 Ind. at 25 , 323 N.E.2d at 638 , Pirtle’s holding contains no reference to Miranda rights. 2002Although the Pirtle court noted that Pirtle's "consent was a product of a violation of [his] Miranda rights” and therefore could not "serve to legitimate the warrantless search of [his] apartment[,]” Pirtle, 263 Ind. at 25 , 323 N.E.2d at 638 , Pirtle’s holding contains no reference to Miranda rights. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Brandon v. State
green
1 sentence1997Id. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
American Optical Co. v. Weidenhamer
green
1 sentence1994American Optical Co. v. Weidenhamer (1983), Ind., 457 N.E.2d 181, 186 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Lewis v. State
red
2 sentences1976The minimum standards for procuring a valid waiver from a juvenile were set forth in Lewis v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 431 , 288 N.E.2d 138 . 1976The minimum standards for procuring a valid waiver from a juvenile were set forth in Lewis v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 431 , 288 N.E.2d 138 . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Lake Erie & Western Railroad v. McFall
green
1 sentence1908Co. v. McFall (1905), 165 Ind. 574, 583 , this court said: “Where a material error has found its way into a cause, the presumption must be, in the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, that the judgment was in some degree a product of such error.” The rule has long been settled in this State that a judgment in favor of a plaintiff must be reversed where a demurrer has been overruled to an insufficient paragraph of complaint, unless it affirmatively appears from the record that the verdict or finding rests exclusively upon a good paragraph or paragraphs. | 1 | 1908–1908 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.