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9 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
De La Cruz v. Stategreen1 sentence2026See Palmer v. State, 310 Ga. 668 , 676–78 (2021) (where date and time of victim’s death was un- known, potential alibi witness offered only vague details of de- fendant’s whereabouts, and the other evidence of the defendant’s guilt was strong, any error in excluding the witness’s testimony was harmless); Graves v. State, 303 Ga. 305 , 308–09 (2018) (any error in exclusion of alibi evidence was harmless where the evi- dence of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming and “the alibi testimony was of limited probative value, because it specified no time at which [the defendant] was at his mother’s | 1 | 1 |
Dozier v. Stategreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., Dozier, 306 Ga. at 35-36; Luallen, 266 Ga. at 178. 3. 2021See, e.g., Dozier, 306 Ga. at 35-36 ; Luallen, 266 Ga. at 178 . 3. | 1 | 1 |
Luallen v. Stategreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., Dozier, 306 Ga. at 35-36; Luallen, 266 Ga. at 178. 3. 2021See, e.g., Dozier, 306 Ga. at 35-36 ; Luallen, 266 Ga. at 178 . 3. | 1 | 1 |
King v. Watersgreen2 sentences2008Compare King v. Waters, supra at 122 , 598 S.E.2d 476 (inconsistency not based on mistake or error, but on "an appellate or a habeas corpus court's ruling") Here, the error or mistake in the verdict form was waived by Appellant when he did not object and acquiesced in its submission to the jury. 2008Compare King v. Waters, supra at 122 (inconsistency not based on mistake or error, but on “an appellate or a habeas corpus court’s ruling”). | 1 | 1 |
Dillard v. North Carolinagreen1 sentence2003See, e.g., State v. Crowder, 285 N.C. 42 ( 203 SE2d 38 ) (1974), death penalty vacated, 428 U. S. 903 (96 SC 3205, 49 LE2d 1207) (1976); People v. Cole, 524 NE2d 926, 927 (Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Colegreen1 sentence2003See, e.g., State v. Crowder, 285 N.C. 42 ( 203 SE2d 38 ) (1974), death penalty vacated, 428 U. S. 903 (96 SC 3205, 49 LE2d 1207) (1976); People v. Cole, 524 NE2d 926, 927 (Ill. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Crowdergreen2 sentences2003See, e.g., State v. Crowder, 285 N.C. 42 ( 203 SE2d 38 ) (1974), death penalty vacated, 428 U. S. 903 (96 SC 3205, 49 LE2d 1207) (1976); People v. Cole, 524 NE2d 926, 927 (Ill. 2003See, e.g., State v. Crowder, 285 N.C. 42 ( 203 SE2d 38 ) (1974), death penalty vacated, 428 U. S. 903 (96 SC 3205, 49 LE2d 1207) (1976); People v. Cole, 524 NE2d 926, 927 (Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Deere & Co. v. Brooksgreen1 sentence1998Similarly, contributory negligence consisting of a careless act by the injured person with respect to the product is no defense, where the actual cause of the injury arises from an unanticipated defect in the product itself, and not from the careless act of the plaintiff.” Deere & Co. v. Brooks, 250 Ga. 517, 518 (1), supra. In the case sub judice, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on this inapplicable theory of defense to a strict product liability claim. 7. | 1 | 1 |
Ellis v. Rich's, Inc.green2 sentences1977See Ellis v. Rich’s, Inc., 233 Ga. 573, 575 ( 212 SE2d 373 ). 1977See Ellis v. Rich’s, Inc., 233 Ga. 573, 575 ( 212 SE2d 373 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Graves v. State
green
1 sentence2026See Palmer v. State, 310 Ga. 668 , 676–78 (2021) (where date and time of victim’s death was un- known, potential alibi witness offered only vague details of de- fendant’s whereabouts, and the other evidence of the defendant’s guilt was strong, any error in excluding the witness’s testimony was harmless); Graves v. State, 303 Ga. 305 , 308–09 (2018) (any error in exclusion of alibi evidence was harmless where the evi- dence of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming and “the alibi testimony was of limited probative value, because it specified no time at which [the defendant] was at his mother’s | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Tarver v. State
green
1 sentence2026See Mbungu, 322 Ga. at 567–68 (exclusion of evidence of victim’s threats against appellant was harmless where excluded evidence was similar to other evidence admitted at trial and appellant’s self-defense claim was weak); Tarver, 319 Ga. at 169– 73 (any error in exclusion of evidence about victim’s prior acts to show appellant’s state of mind was harmless because excluded evidence was largely cumulative of admitted evidence and appellant’s self-defense claim was weak). 3. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Certainteed Corp. v. Fletcher
green
2 sentences2018Certainteed Corp. , 300 Ga. at 330 , 794 S.E.2d 641 . 2018Certainteed Corp. , 300 Ga. at 330 , 794 S.E.2d 641 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Beam v. Omark Industries, Inc.
green
1 sentence1998The majority contends that Beam, supra, and Bishop, supra, “must be confined to those situations in which evidence shows a distributor or seller is aware of a danger either not communicated by the manufacturer’s warning or substantively different from the dangers the manufacturer has included in a warning label.” As the latter circumstance necessarily includes the former, the majority’s standard must be construed to mean that a distributor has a duty to warn only when it is aware of a danger that is substantively different from those dangers communicated on a product warning. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Bishop v. Farhat
green
1 sentence1998The majority contends that Beam, supra, and Bishop, supra, “must be confined to those situations in which evidence shows a distributor or seller is aware of a danger either not communicated by the manufacturer’s warning or substantively different from the dangers the manufacturer has included in a warning label.” As the latter circumstance necessarily includes the former, the majority’s standard must be construed to mean that a distributor has a duty to warn only when it is aware of a danger that is substantively different from those dangers communicated on a product warning. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.