section 9 rights in Ohio

2021As detailed in the Justice Stewart’s dissent in Hubbard, an ex post facto analysis requires the application of the “intent-effects” test pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92-93 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003): Under that test, a court is required to determine whether the legislature intended to enact a civil, remedial law or a criminal, punitive one. [Smith] at 92-93.

2021As detailed in the Justice Stewart’s dissent in Hubbard, an ex post facto analysis requires the application of the “intent-effects” test pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92-93 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003): Under that test, a court is required to determine whether the legislature intended to enact a civil, remedial law or a criminal, punitive one. [Smith] at 92-93.

2014Locke recognized that the right to bail under Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution was absolute, except for capital offenses (other exceptions now apply), and the court concluded that “[t]here is no discretion in the trial court in such matters.” Id. at 46 . {¶ 23} We also granted a writ of mandamus to compel a court of common pleas to change its bail-bond form, which required sureties to consent to forfeiture of deposited cash or securities to pay fines and costs assessed upon conviction and unsatisfied by the defendant.

2014Locke recognized that the right to bail under Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution was absolute, except for capital offenses (other exceptions now apply), and the court concluded that “[tjhere is no discretion in the trial court in such matters.” Id. at 46 . {¶ 23} We also granted a writ of mandamus to compel a court of common pleas to change its bail-bond form, which required sureties to consent to forfeiture of deposited cash or securities to pay fines and costs assessed upon conviction and unsatisfied by the defendant.

2002Id. at 470 , citing Colder, Beazell, and Weaver, supra. The court rejected the characterization of the change as “procedural,” noting that “[o]nly by closing one’s eyes to the actual effect of the transfer can one label this radical increase in the applicable punishment a procedural change.” Id. at 471.

1989Ill Appellant’s fourth assigned error is that: “Defendant-appellant’s conviction for attempted possession of criminal tools violated his Eighth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution against cruel and unusual punishment.” A criminal sentence does not violate constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishments “if it [is] not so greatly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the sense of justice of the community.” State v. Chaffin (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 13 , 59 O.O.2d 51 , 282 N.E.2d 46 , paragraph three of the s

1989Ill Appellant’s fourth assigned error is that: “Defendant-appellant’s conviction for attempted possession of criminal tools violated his Eighth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution against cruel and unusual punishment.” A criminal sentence does not violate constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishments “if it [is] not so greatly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the sense of justice of the community.” State v. Chaffin (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 13 , 59 O.O.2d 51 , 282 N.E.2d 46 , paragraph three of the s

1972Ed. 2d 346 , holding that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in the cases therein under consideration constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and followed by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Leigh (1972), 31 Ohio St. 2d 97 , compels us to hold that the petitioner has a constitutional right to bail under Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution.