34 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Helman v. Epl Prolong, Inc.green2 sentences2024Courts of appeals “cannot and will not search the record in order to make argument on appellant’s behalf.” Helman v. EPL Prolong, Inc., 139 Ohio App.3d 231, 240 , 2000-Ohio-2593 (7th Dist.). 2018Courts of appeals “cannot and will not search the record in order to make arguments on appellant[‘s] behalf.” Helman v. EPL Prolong, Inc., 139 Ohio App.3d 231, 240 (7th Dist.2000). {¶5} * * * App.R. 12(A)(2) recognizes this need for clarity and requires that assignments of error be argued separately. | 2 | 5 |
Chevron Oil Co. v. Husonred2 sentences2025Three considerations guide the determination whether to apply a decision only prospectively: “(1) whether the decision establishes a new principle 14 January Term, 2025 of law that was not foreshadowed in prior decisions; (2) whether retroactive application of the decision promotes or [hinders] the purpose behind the rule defined in the decision; and (3) whether retroactive application of the decision causes an inequitable result.” Id. at ¶ 25, citing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-107 (1971). {¶ 33} A prospective-only application of this decision is not warranted. 2023“However, an Ohio court has discretion to apply its decision only prospectively after weighing the following considerations: (1) whether the decision establishes a new principle of law that was not foreshadowed in prior decisions; (2) whether retroactive application of the decision promotes or retards the purpose behind the rule defined in the decision; and (3) whether retroactive application of the decision causes an inequitable result.” Id. at ¶ 25, citing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-107 , 92 S.Ct. 349 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). | 1 | 6 |
In Re RETAINING VORYS, SATER, SEYMOUR AND PEASE, L.L.P., AS SPECIAL COUNSELgreen2 sentences2012Bd. of Edn., 174 Ohio App.3d 317 , 2007-Ohio-6883 , 882 N.E.2d 14, ¶ 34 (6th Dist.) (discussing former DR5-102); In re Retaining Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., as Special Counsel, 192 Ohio App.3d 357 , 2011-Ohio-640 , 949 N.E.2d 84, ¶ 12 (7th Dist.). {¶5} If the court meant to say that Harvey could not appear as a witness under Prof.Cond.R. 3.7(a)(2), which states that a lawyer “shall not act as an advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness,” that conclusion was likewise erroneous because the purpose behind the rule was not implicated by Harvey’s desire 2012Bd. of Edn., 174 Ohio App.3d 317 , 2007-Ohio-6883 , 882 N.E.2d 14, ¶ 34 (6th Dist.) (discussing former DR5-102); In re Retaining Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., as Special Counsel, 192 Ohio App.3d 357 , 2011-Ohio-640 , 949 N.E.2d 84, ¶ 12 (7th Dist.). {¶5} If the court meant to say that Harvey could not appear as a witness under Prof.Cond.R. 3.7(a)(2), which states that a lawyer “shall not act as an advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness,” that conclusion was likewise erroneous because the purpose behind the rule was not implicated by Harvey’s desire | 1 | 1 |
Horen v. Board of Educationgreen2 sentences2012Bd. of Edn., 174 Ohio App.3d 317 , 2007-Ohio-6883 , 882 N.E.2d 14, ¶ 34 (6th Dist.) (discussing former DR5-102); In re Retaining Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., as Special Counsel, 192 Ohio App.3d 357 , 2011-Ohio-640 , 949 N.E.2d 84, ¶ 12 (7th Dist.). {¶5} If the court meant to say that Harvey could not appear as a witness under Prof.Cond.R. 3.7(a)(2), which states that a lawyer “shall not act as an advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness,” that conclusion was likewise erroneous because the purpose behind the rule was not implicated by Harvey’s desire 2012Bd. of Edn., 174 Ohio App.3d 317 , 2007-Ohio-6883 , 882 N.E.2d 14, ¶ 34 (6th Dist.) (discussing former DR5-102); In re Retaining Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., as Special Counsel, 192 Ohio App.3d 357 , 2011-Ohio-640 , 949 N.E.2d 84, ¶ 12 (7th Dist.). {¶5} If the court meant to say that Harvey could not appear as a witness under Prof.Cond.R. 3.7(a)(2), which states that a lawyer “shall not act as an advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness,” that conclusion was likewise erroneous because the purpose behind the rule was not implicated by Harvey’s desire | 1 | 1 |
Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trustgreen1 sentence2008See, also, Lyons v. Jefferson Bank Trust (C.A.10, 1993), 994 F.2d 716 , 721 (stating that that court has been "particularly insistent" on refusing to consider new issues on appeal "where the theory advanced on appeal was in direct contradiction to the theory pursued in the trial court"); Wakefield v. Church of Scientology (C.A.11, 1991), 938 F.2d 1226 , 1229 , fn. 1 (recognized that parties can assert "inconsistent claims" in the trial court, but an appellate court "reviews the case tried in the [trial] court; it does not try ever-changing theories parties fashion during the appellate process" | 1 | 1 |
Saeks v. Saeksgreen1 sentence1996Neither the trial testimony presented by the Association nor the stipulations agreed to by the parties even suggested that Roark, personally, used his influence to defraud or injure the Association or its members.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 289, 617 N.E.2d at 1086 . *245 Also, the Supreme Court noted, at 287, 617 N.E.2d at 1085 , that the purpose behind the exception to the general law of corporations is to prevent shareholders from hiding behind the fictional entity of the corporation “when it would be unjust.” (Emphasis added.) Moreover, we note that prior to its ruling in Belvedere, the Ohio | 1 | 1 |
Crosswhite v. Desaigreen2 sentences1994McCrory v. State (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 99, 103 , 21 O.O.3d 63, 65 , 423 N.E.2d 156, 159-160 ; Crosswhite v. Desai (1989), 64 Ohio App.3d 170, 176, 177 , 580 N.E.2d 1119, 1123-1124 . 1994McCrory v. State (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 99, 103 , 21 O.O.3d 63, 65 , 423 N.E.2d 156, 159-160 ; Crosswhite v. Desai (1989), 64 Ohio App.3d 170, 176, 177 , 580 N.E.2d 1119, 1123-1124 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
DiCenzo v. A-Best Products Co.
green
2 sentences2022The DiCenzo Factors {¶ 14} Although the “vested rights” exception, outlined in Peerless, 164 Ohio St. 209 , 210, 129 N.E.2d 467 , to the general rule that a decision applies retrospectively does not apply here, we nonetheless retain discretion to apply Klein prospectively only: [A]n Ohio court has discretion to apply its decision only prospectively after weighing the following considerations: (1) whether the decision establishes a new principle of law that was not foreshadowed in prior decisions; (2) whether retroactive application of the decision promotes or retards the purpose behind the rul 2022The DiCenzo Factors {¶ 14} Although the “vested rights” exception, outlined in Peerless, 164 Ohio St. 209 , 210, 129 N.E.2d 467 , to the general rule that a decision applies retrospectively does not apply here, we nonetheless retain discretion to apply Klein prospectively only: [A]n Ohio court has discretion to apply its decision only prospectively after weighing the following considerations: (1) whether the decision establishes a new principle of law that was not foreshadowed in prior decisions; (2) whether retroactive application of the decision promotes or retards the purpose behind the rul | 4 | 2013–2022 |
State v. Jamison
green
2 sentences2006Consequently, "evidence of other crimes, wrongs or bad acts independent of, and unrelated to, the offenses for which a defendant is on trial is generally inadmissible to show criminal propensity." Id. {¶ 38} "The purpose behind this rule is to prevent an accused from being placed in the unenviable position of having to defend him or herself for two distinct offenses at trial: those crimes which the accused is currently on trial for, and additional illegal activity that the accused allegedly committed in the past." State v. Kanetsky (June 11, 1999), Trumbull App. No. 97-T-0162. 2005Consequently, "evidence of other crimes, wrongs or bad acts independent of, and unrelated to, the offenses for which a defendant is on trial is generally inadmissible to show criminal propensity." Id. {¶ 58} "The purpose behind this rule is to prevent an accused from being placed in the unenviable position of having to defend him or herself for two distinct offenses at trial: those crimes which the accused is currently on trial for, and additional illegal activity that the accused allegedly committed in the past." State v. Kanetsky (June 11, 1999), Trumbull App. No. 97-T-0162. {¶ 59} Moreover, | 3 | 2005–2006 |
Cook v. Wilson
green
2 sentences2024In Cook v. Wilson, 2006-Ohio-234 (10th Dist.), the Tenth District stated: The purpose behind the rule is to require the appellant to specifically identify the error the appellant claims occurred and the portion of the record that supports the claim of error. 2006The purpose behind this rule is "to require the appellant to specifically identify the error the appellant claims occurred and the portion of the record that supports the claim of error." Cook v. Wilson , 165 Ohio App.3d 202 , 2006-Ohio-234 , ¶ 15 . | 2 | 2006–2024 |
Rettig Enterprises, Inc. v. Koehler
green
2 sentences2019The purpose behind the rule is to “‘avoid multiplicity of actions and to achieve a just resolution by requiring in one lawsuit the litigation of all claims arising from common matters.’” Id., quoting Rettig. 1996The purpose behind the test is “to avoid multiplicity of actions and to achieve a just resolution by requiring in one lawsuit the litigation of all claims arising from common matters.” Id. at 278 , 626 N.E.2d at 103 . | 2 | 1996–2019 |
State v. Yarbrough
green
1 sentence2026Historically, the purpose behind the rule against hearsay is “to exclude statements of dubious reliability that cannot be tested by cross- examination.” State v. Yarbrough, 2002-Ohio-2126, ¶ 70 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Slagle
green
1 sentence2024Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State ex rel. Walmart, Inc. v. Hixson
green
1 sentence2022We stated in Klein, “Our holding today forecloses any continued reliance on [the overruled statement in Pretty Prods., 77 Ohio St.3d 5 , 670 N.E.2d 466 ] in future temporary-total-disability cases.” (Emphasis added.) Klein, 155 Ohio St.3d 78 , 2018-Ohio-3890 , 119 N.E.3d 386, at ¶ 30 . {¶ 16} Walmart counters—and the Tenth District agreed—that when we have intended a decision to apply prospectively only, we have said so in more explicit terms that have included some form of the word “prospective.” 2021-Ohio- 3802, 180 N.E.3d 1197, at ¶ 19 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State ex rel. Klein v. Precision Excavating & Grading Co. (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2022Purpose behind the rule {¶ 23} The second DiCenzo factor asks “whether retroactive application of the decision promotes or retards the purpose behind the rule defined in the decision.” DiCenzo at ¶ 25. {¶ 24} In Klein, we stated, “The purpose of temporary-total-disability compensation is to compensate an injured employee for lost earnings during a period of disability while an injury heals.” Id., 155 Ohio St.3d 78 , 2018-Ohio-3890 , 119 N.E.3d 386, at ¶ 14 . 2022Purpose behind the rule {¶ 23} The second DiCenzo factor asks “whether retroactive application of the decision promotes or retards the purpose behind the rule defined in the decision.” DiCenzo at ¶ 25. {¶ 24} In Klein, we stated, “The purpose of temporary-total-disability compensation is to compensate an injured employee for lost earnings during a period of disability while an injury heals.” Id., 155 Ohio St.3d 78 , 2018-Ohio-3890 , 119 N.E.3d 386, at ¶ 14 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State ex rel. Pretty Products, Inc. v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences2022We stated in Klein, “Our holding today forecloses any continued reliance on [the overruled statement in Pretty Prods., 77 Ohio St.3d 5 , 670 N.E.2d 466 ] in future temporary-total-disability cases.” (Emphasis added.) Klein, 155 Ohio St.3d 78 , 2018-Ohio-3890 , 119 N.E.3d 386, at ¶ 30 . {¶ 16} Walmart counters—and the Tenth District agreed—that when we have intended a decision to apply prospectively only, we have said so in more explicit terms that have included some form of the word “prospective.” 2021-Ohio- 3802, 180 N.E.3d 1197, at ¶ 19 . 2022We stated in Klein, “Our holding today forecloses any continued reliance on [the overruled statement in Pretty Prods., 77 Ohio St.3d 5 , 670 N.E.2d 466 ] in future temporary-total-disability cases.” (Emphasis added.) Klein, 155 Ohio St.3d 78 , 2018-Ohio-3890 , 119 N.E.3d 386, at ¶ 30 . {¶ 16} Walmart counters—and the Tenth District agreed—that when we have intended a decision to apply prospectively only, we have said so in more explicit terms that have included some form of the word “prospective.” 2021-Ohio- 3802, 180 N.E.3d 1197, at ¶ 19 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Fletcher v. University Hospitals
green
1 sentence2019Hosps. of Cleveland, 120 Ohio St.3d 167 , 2008-Ohio-5379 , paragraph one of the syllabus. " 'The purpose behind the requirement in Civ.R. 10(D)(2) is to deter individuals from filing frivolous medical malpractice claims and to "establish the adequacy of the compliant." " '' Id., quoting Jackson v. Northeast Pre-Release Ctr., 10th Dist. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Sperle v. Michigan Department Of Corrections
green
2 sentences2011(C.A.6, 2002), 297 F.3d 483 , 494. {¶ 25} Appellate courts refuse to review contradictory arguments because they offend the purpose behind the waiver doctrine. 2011Id. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
McCoy v. Toledo Corr. Inst., Unpublished Decision (4-21-2005)
green
1 sentence2009Id. at ¶ 25. {¶ 13} In this case, these would be considerations only if McCoy, 2005-Ohio-1848 , 2005 WL 914664 , had actually announced a new principle of law when it found that theo two-year statute of limitations applies to discrimination claims brought against the state. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Margery Wakefield v. The Church of Scientology of California, Times Publishing Company and Tribune Company
green
1 sentence2008See, also, Lyons v. Jefferson Bank Trust (C.A.10, 1993), 994 F.2d 716 , 721 (stating that that court has been "particularly insistent" on refusing to consider new issues on appeal "where the theory advanced on appeal was in direct contradiction to the theory pursued in the trial court"); Wakefield v. Church of Scientology (C.A.11, 1991), 938 F.2d 1226 , 1229 , fn. 1 (recognized that parties can assert "inconsistent claims" in the trial court, but an appellate court "reviews the case tried in the [trial] court; it does not try ever-changing theories parties fashion during the appellate process" | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Deem
green
1 sentence2008The adoption of a test "which looks to both the statutory elements of the offenses involved and the evidence supporting such lesser offenses as presented at trial is grounded primarily in the need for clarity in meeting the constitutional requirement that an accused have notice of the offenses charged against him." State v. Deem , 40 Ohio St.3d at 210 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Valentine v. Valentine, Unpublished Decision (5-16-2005)
green
1 sentence2007Valentine v. Valentine , Butler App. No. CA2004-01-024, 2005-Ohio-2366 , ¶ 31 . {¶ 10} In issuing its findings and conclusions, the trial court referenced the fact that Barbara was adjudged mentally ill and ordered to undergo outpatient treatment. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Watson
green
1 sentence2001The purpose behind the rule and the statute is, "the assessment of the probability of rehabilitating the child within the juvenile justice system." State v. Watson, supra, at 95 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
In re Wieland
green
1 sentence2001Id. at 539 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Ramsey v. Neiman
green
2 sentences1998The purpose behind the requirement that a wrongful death action be brought in the name of the personal representative, and not individual beneficiaries of the action, is explained in Ramsey v. Neiman (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 508, 511 , 634 N.E.2d 211 , 213: “Such a requirement eliminates the possibility that the defendant will face more than one lawsuit. 1998The purpose behind the requirement that a wrongful death action be brought in the name of the personal representative, and not individual beneficiaries of the action, is explained in Ramsey v. Neiman (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 508, 511 , 634 N.E.2d 211 , 213: “Such a requirement eliminates the possibility that the defendant will face more than one lawsuit. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Leroux's Billyle Supper Club v. Ma
green
2 sentences1996LeRoux’s Billyle Supper Club v. Ma (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 417 , 602 N.E.2d 685 . 1996LeRoux’s Billyle Supper Club v. Ma (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 417 , 602 N.E.2d 685 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners' Ass'n v. R.E. Roark Companies, Inc.
green
2 sentences1996Neither the trial testimony presented by the Association nor the stipulations agreed to by the parties even suggested that Roark, personally, used his influence to defraud or injure the Association or its members.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 289, 617 N.E.2d at 1086 . *245 Also, the Supreme Court noted, at 287, 617 N.E.2d at 1085 , that the purpose behind the exception to the general law of corporations is to prevent shareholders from hiding behind the fictional entity of the corporation “when it would be unjust.” (Emphasis added.) Moreover, we note that prior to its ruling in Belvedere, the Ohio 1996Neither the trial testimony presented by the Association nor the stipulations agreed to by the parties even suggested that Roark, personally, used his influence to defraud or injure the Association or its members.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 289, 617 N.E.2d at 1086 . *245 Also, the Supreme Court noted, at 287, 617 N.E.2d at 1085 , that the purpose behind the exception to the general law of corporations is to prevent shareholders from hiding behind the fictional entity of the corporation “when it would be unjust.” (Emphasis added.) Moreover, we note that prior to its ruling in Belvedere, the Ohio | 1 | 1996–1996 |
McCrory v. State
green
2 sentences1994McCrory v. State (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 99, 103 , 21 O.O.3d 63, 65 , 423 N.E.2d 156, 159-160 ; Crosswhite v. Desai (1989), 64 Ohio App.3d 170, 176, 177 , 580 N.E.2d 1119, 1123-1124 . 1994McCrory v. State (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 99, 103 , 21 O.O.3d 63, 65 , 423 N.E.2d 156, 159-160 ; Crosswhite v. Desai (1989), 64 Ohio App.3d 170, 176, 177 , 580 N.E.2d 1119, 1123-1124 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Wolfe v. Wolfe
green
2 sentences1986Wolfe v. Wolfe (1976), 46 Ohio St. 2d 399 , 75 O.O. 2d 474, 350 N.E. 2d 413 . 1986Wolfe v. Wolfe (1976), 46 Ohio St. 2d 399 , 75 O.O. 2d 474, 350 N.E. 2d 413 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.