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9 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Moore v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Moore v. State, 882 N.E.2d 788, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2013See State v. Brunner, 947 N.E.2d at 415 (holding that the purpose behind the rule requiring statutory authorization for the State to appeal is "the idea that if the State brings a citizen before its own tribunal and loses, 'its avenging hand should be stayed except in unusual cases where the power to appeal was expressly conferred.’ ” (quoting State v. Sierp, 260 Ind. 57, 60 , 292 N.E.2d 245, 246 (1973))). [6] 6. "[T]he clause 'if the court rules so provide’ is intended to differentiate between the respective jurisdictions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, and thereby act as a gui | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sierpgreen2 sentences2013See State v. Brunner, 947 N.E.2d at 415 (holding that the purpose behind the rule requiring statutory authorization for the State to appeal is "the idea that if the State brings a citizen before its own tribunal and loses, 'its avenging hand should be stayed except in unusual cases where the power to appeal was expressly conferred.’ ” (quoting State v. Sierp, 260 Ind. 57, 60 , 292 N.E.2d 245, 246 (1973))). [6] 6. "[T]he clause 'if the court rules so provide’ is intended to differentiate between the respective jurisdictions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, and thereby act as a gui 2013See State v. Brunner, 947 N.E.2d at 415 (holding that the purpose behind the rule requiring statutory authorization for the State to appeal is "the idea that if the State brings a citizen before its own tribunal and loses, 'its avenging hand should be stayed except in unusual cases where the power to appeal was expressly conferred.’ ” (quoting State v. Sierp, 260 Ind. 57, 60 , 292 N.E.2d 245, 246 (1973))). [6] 6. "[T]he clause 'if the court rules so provide’ is intended to differentiate between the respective jurisdictions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, and thereby act as a gui | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brunnergreen1 sentence2013See State v. Brunner, 947 N.E.2d at 415 (holding that the purpose behind the rule requiring statutory authorization for the State to appeal is "the idea that if the State brings a citizen before its own tribunal and loses, 'its avenging hand should be stayed except in unusual cases where the power to appeal was expressly conferred.’ ” (quoting State v. Sierp, 260 Ind. 57, 60 , 292 N.E.2d 245, 246 (1973))). [6] 6. "[T]he clause 'if the court rules so provide’ is intended to differentiate between the respective jurisdictions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, and thereby act as a gui | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Aldon Builders, Inc. v. Kurland
green
2 sentences1981The basic text of fairness would indicate that a ‘party is entitled to some notice that an issue is before the court which has not been pleaded or has not been agreed to in a pre-trial order.’ Aldon Builders, Inc. v. Kurland, (1972), 152 Ind.App. 570, 580 , 284 N.E.2d 826, 832 . 1981The basic text of fairness would indicate that a ‘party is entitled to some notice that an issue is before the court which has not been pleaded or has not been agreed to in a pre-trial order.’ Aldon Builders, Inc. v. Kurland, (1972), 152 Ind.App. 570, 580 , 284 N.E.2d 826, 832 . | 2 | 1980–1981 |
Anglemyer v. State
green
2 sentences2008Id. at 489 . 2008Id. at 489 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
RIFE ETC. v. Karns
green
2 sentences2006The purpose behind this requirement is to ensure "good practice and to further the orderly administration of justice.” Rife, 133 Ind.App. at 228 , 181 N.E.2d at 240 . 6 . 2006The purpose behind this requirement is to ensure "good practice and to further the orderly administration of justice.” Rife, 133 Ind.App. at 228 , 181 N.E.2d at 240 . 6 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Walsman v. McCullough
green
1 sentence1994As noted above, the purpose behind the rule is to avoid "multiple lawsuits between the same parties arising from the same event or events." Estate of McCullough, 492 N.E.2d at 1096 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Bahre v. METROPOLITAN SCH. DIST., ETC.
green
1 sentence1986Dist. etc. (1980), Ind.App., 400 N.E.2d 197 , explained how the concept of fairness requires some notice of an unpleaded issue before a party is charged with impliedly consenting to it: "As previously discussed, the purpose behind the rule is to allow the parties some flexibility in litigating the case, and to further justice by allowing the evidence brought forth at trial [to] determine the parties' liability. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Technical Chemical Company v. Jacobs
green
1 sentence1975A more reasonable approach which represents a compromise within the framework of strict liability as suggested in Technical Chemical Co. v. Jacobs (Supreme Court of Texas 1972), 480 S.W.2d 602 , and discussed at 53 A.L.R.3d 239 and 50 Texas L.Rev. 577 (1972); is that the law should supply the presumption that an adequate warning would have been read and heeded, thereby minimizing the obvious problems of proof of causation. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.