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43 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1970–2025 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
DiLucido v. Terminix International, Inc.yellow2 sentences2003The purpose behind this requirement “is to determine whether the class representatives’ overall position on the common issues is sufficiently aligned with that of the absent class members, to ensure that the pursuit of their interests will advance those of the proposed class members.” DiLucido v. Terminix International Inc., 450 Pa. Super. 393, 404 , 676 A.2d 1237, 1242 (1996). 2003The purpose behind this requirement “is to determine whether the class representatives’ overall position on the common issues is sufficiently aligned with that of the absent class members, to ensure that the pursuit of their interests will advance those of the proposed class members.” DiLucido v. Terminix International Inc., 450 Pa. Super. 393, 404 , 676 A.2d 1237, 1242 (1996). | 10 | 11 |
Commonwealth v. Harth, K., Aplt.green2 sentences2024In establishing this exception to the general rule, the Harth majority expressed that Rule 600(C)(1) is “not a model of clarity,” hence its decision to turn to the Rule’s “commentary, the purpose behind the rule, and our prior jurisprudence interpreting Rule 600 and its predecessor.” Id. at 617. 2024In establishing this exception to the general rule, the Harth majority expressed that Rule 600(C)(1) is “not a model of clarity,” hence its decision to turn to the Rule’s “commentary, the purpose behind the rule, and our prior jurisprudence interpreting Rule 600 and its predecessor.” Id. at 617. | 5 | 7 |
Michigan v. Harveygreen2 sentences2025The purpose behind this rule is “to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.” Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 [] (1990). 2018The purpose behind this rule is “to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.” Michigan - 15 - J-S03045-18 v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 , 110 S.Ct. 1176 , 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990). | 2 | 4 |
Cribb v. United Health Clubs Inc.green2 sentences2003The existence of “factual differences with regard to each member of the class does not render the named parties’ claims atypical of the class as a whole.” Cribb v. United Health Clubs Inc., 336 Pa. Super. 479, 484 , 485 A.2d 1182, 1185 (1985) (citing Ablin Inc. v. Bell Telephone of Pennsylvania, 291 Pa. Super. 40 , 435 A.2d 208 (1981)). 2003The existence of “factual differences with regard to each member of the class does not render the named parties’ claims atypical of the class as a whole.” Cribb v. United Health Clubs Inc., 336 Pa. Super. 479, 484 , 485 A.2d 1182, 1185 (1985) (citing Ablin Inc. v. Bell Telephone of Pennsylvania, 291 Pa. Super. 40 , 435 A.2d 208 (1981)). | 2 | 2 |
Minnick v. Mississippired1 sentence2025Commonwealth v. Martin, 101 A.3d 706, 725 (Pa. 2014) (emphasis omitted). “[I]n Minnick [v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990), the United States Supreme] Court clarified the Edwards rule by holding that ‘when counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney.’” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 599 A.2d 200, 201 (Pa. 1991). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Santiagogreen1 sentence2025Commonwealth v. Martin, 101 A.3d 706, 725 (Pa. 2014) (emphasis omitted). “[I]n Minnick [v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990), the United States Supreme] Court clarified the Edwards rule by holding that ‘when counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney.’” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 599 A.2d 200, 201 (Pa. 1991). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Wamshergreen1 sentence2021Further, we presume “that our Supreme Court did not intend results which were absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable[.]” Commonwealth v. Wamsher, 577 A.2d 595, 600 (Pa.Super. 1990). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Fargreen1 sentence2021Furthermore, bearing in mind that we must, to the extent possible, construe our Rules of Criminal Procedure in accordance with the rules of statutory construction, Commonwealth v. Far, 46 A.3d 709, 912 (Pa. 2012), we agree with Justice Wecht that requiring the Commonwealth to demonstrate that it acted with due diligence before a trial court excludes time from its Rule 600 time computation on the basis of “judicial delay” comports with the language of Rule 600(C)(1) and its commentary, the purpose behind the rule, and our prior jurisprudence interpreting Rule 600 and its predecessor. | 1 | 1 |
In re Nomination Petition of Vodvarkared1 sentence2019It is well settled that the Election Code “be liberally construed to protect a candidate’s right to run for office and the voters’ right to elect the candidate of their choice.” In re Vodvarka, 140 A.3d 639, 641 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Grossman v. Barkegreen2 sentences2008See id. 2008See id. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Buckgreen2 sentences2000The purpose behind the rule is the principle that “a criminal conviction may not stand merely on the out[-]of[-]court confession of one accused, and thus a case may not go to the faet[-]finder where independent evidence does not suggest that a crime has occurred.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 521 Pa. 134, 144 , 555 A.2d 818, 823 (1989); Commonwealth v. Byrd, 490 Pa. 544, 556 , 417 A.2d 173, 179 (1980); Commonwealth v. Buck, 426 Pa.Super. 26, 28-29 , 626 A.2d 176, 177 (1993); Commonwealth v. Forman, 404 Pa.Super. 376, 379-81 , 590 A.2d 1282, 1284 (1991). 2000The purpose behind the rule is the principle that “a criminal conviction may not stand merely on the out[-]of[-]court confession of one accused, and thus a case may not go to the faet[-]finder where independent evidence does not suggest that a crime has occurred.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 521 Pa. 134, 144 , 555 A.2d 818, 823 (1989); Commonwealth v. Byrd, 490 Pa. 544, 556 , 417 A.2d 173, 179 (1980); Commonwealth v. Buck, 426 Pa.Super. 26, 28-29 , 626 A.2d 176, 177 (1993); Commonwealth v. Forman, 404 Pa.Super. 376, 379-81 , 590 A.2d 1282, 1284 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Formangreen2 sentences2000The purpose behind the rule is the principle that “a criminal conviction may not stand merely on the out[-]of[-]court confession of one accused, and thus a case may not go to the faet[-]finder where independent evidence does not suggest that a crime has occurred.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 521 Pa. 134, 144 , 555 A.2d 818, 823 (1989); Commonwealth v. Byrd, 490 Pa. 544, 556 , 417 A.2d 173, 179 (1980); Commonwealth v. Buck, 426 Pa.Super. 26, 28-29 , 626 A.2d 176, 177 (1993); Commonwealth v. Forman, 404 Pa.Super. 376, 379-81 , 590 A.2d 1282, 1284 (1991). 2000The purpose behind the rule is the principle that “a criminal conviction may not stand merely on the out[-]of[-]court confession of one accused, and thus a case may not go to the faet[-]finder where independent evidence does not suggest that a crime has occurred.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 521 Pa. 134, 144 , 555 A.2d 818, 823 (1989); Commonwealth v. Byrd, 490 Pa. 544, 556 , 417 A.2d 173, 179 (1980); Commonwealth v. Buck, 426 Pa.Super. 26, 28-29 , 626 A.2d 176, 177 (1993); Commonwealth v. Forman, 404 Pa.Super. 376, 379-81 , 590 A.2d 1282, 1284 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Byrdgreen2 sentences2000The purpose behind the rule is the principle that “a criminal conviction may not stand merely on the out[-]of[-]court confession of one accused, and thus a case may not go to the faet[-]finder where independent evidence does not suggest that a crime has occurred.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 521 Pa. 134, 144 , 555 A.2d 818, 823 (1989); Commonwealth v. Byrd, 490 Pa. 544, 556 , 417 A.2d 173, 179 (1980); Commonwealth v. Buck, 426 Pa.Super. 26, 28-29 , 626 A.2d 176, 177 (1993); Commonwealth v. Forman, 404 Pa.Super. 376, 379-81 , 590 A.2d 1282, 1284 (1991). 2000The purpose behind the rule is the principle that “a criminal conviction may not stand merely on the out[-]of[-]court confession of one accused, and thus a case may not go to the faet[-]finder where independent evidence does not suggest that a crime has occurred.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 521 Pa. 134, 144 , 555 A.2d 818, 823 (1989); Commonwealth v. Byrd, 490 Pa. 544, 556 , 417 A.2d 173, 179 (1980); Commonwealth v. Buck, 426 Pa.Super. 26, 28-29 , 626 A.2d 176, 177 (1993); Commonwealth v. Forman, 404 Pa.Super. 376, 379-81 , 590 A.2d 1282, 1284 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Edwardsgreen2 sentences2000The purpose behind the rule is the principle that “a criminal conviction may not stand merely on the out[-]of[-]court confession of one accused, and thus a case may not go to the faet[-]finder where independent evidence does not suggest that a crime has occurred.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 521 Pa. 134, 144 , 555 A.2d 818, 823 (1989); Commonwealth v. Byrd, 490 Pa. 544, 556 , 417 A.2d 173, 179 (1980); Commonwealth v. Buck, 426 Pa.Super. 26, 28-29 , 626 A.2d 176, 177 (1993); Commonwealth v. Forman, 404 Pa.Super. 376, 379-81 , 590 A.2d 1282, 1284 (1991). 2000The purpose behind the rule is the principle that “a criminal conviction may not stand merely on the out[-]of[-]court confession of one accused, and thus a case may not go to the faet[-]finder where independent evidence does not suggest that a crime has occurred.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 521 Pa. 134, 144 , 555 A.2d 818, 823 (1989); Commonwealth v. Byrd, 490 Pa. 544, 556 , 417 A.2d 173, 179 (1980); Commonwealth v. Buck, 426 Pa.Super. 26, 28-29 , 626 A.2d 176, 177 (1993); Commonwealth v. Forman, 404 Pa.Super. 376, 379-81 , 590 A.2d 1282, 1284 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Buck v. Coldway Food Express, Inc.green2 sentences1991See Buck v. Coldway Food Express, Inc., 383 Pa.Super. 580 , 557 A.2d 404, 407 (1989); Roseman v. Hospital of the Univ. of Pa., 377 Pa.Super. 409 , 547 A.2d 751 (1988). 1991See Buck v. Coldway Food Express, Inc., 383 Pa.Super. 580 , 557 A.2d 404, 407 (1989); Roseman v. Hospital of the Univ. of Pa., 377 Pa.Super. 409 , 547 A.2d 751 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
| American Enka Company, in No. 82-1080 v. Wicaco MacHine Corp. American Enka Company v. Wicaco MacHine Corp., in No. 82-1109green | 1 | 1 |
| Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Alleghenygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Garvingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Berger v. United Statesred | 1 | 1 |
| Sweitzer v. Whiteheadgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lobalzo v. Varoligreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. United States
green
2 sentences2018The U.S. Supreme Court has held that in order “[t]o avoid difficulties of proof and to provide guidance to officers conducting interrogations,” the determination of whether the right to counsel was invoked by the accused is an “objective inquiry.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 , 458–59, 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). 2018The U.S. Supreme Court has held that in order “[t]o avoid difficulties of proof and to provide guidance to officers conducting interrogations,” the determination of whether the right to counsel was invoked by the accused is an “objective inquiry.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 , 458–59, 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). | 3 | 2014–2018 |
Lamp v. Heyman
green
2 sentences2002The purpose behind this requirement is “to avoid the situation in which a plaintiff can bring an action, but by not making a good faith effort to notify a defendant, retain exclusive control over it for a period in excess of that permitted by the statute of limitations.” Lamp, 469 Pa. at 478 , 366 A.2d at 889 . 2002The purpose behind this requirement is “to avoid the situation in which a plaintiff can bring an action, but by not making a good faith effort to notify a defendant, retain exclusive control over it for a period in excess of that permitted by the statute of limitations.” Lamp, 469 Pa. at 478 , 366 A.2d at 889 . | 3 | 1993–2002 |
Ablin, Inc. v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa.
green
2 sentences2003The existence of “factual differences with regard to each member of the class does not render the named parties’ claims atypical of the class as a whole.” Cribb v. United Health Clubs Inc., 336 Pa. Super. 479, 484 , 485 A.2d 1182, 1185 (1985) (citing Ablin Inc. v. Bell Telephone of Pennsylvania, 291 Pa. Super. 40 , 435 A.2d 208 (1981)). 2003The existence of “factual differences with regard to each member of the class does not render the named parties’ claims atypical of the class as a whole.” Cribb v. United Health Clubs Inc., 336 Pa. Super. 479, 484 , 485 A.2d 1182, 1185 (1985) (citing Ablin Inc. v. Bell Telephone of Pennsylvania, 291 Pa. Super. 40 , 435 A.2d 208 (1981)). | 2 | 2001–2003 |
Steele v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Findlay Township)
green
1 sentence2025We also examined the purpose behind the requirement, as stated by the bill’s sponsor, which was “a built-in incentive for volunteer fire companies to fully utilize the PennFIRS system and [] push them to provide thorough information when filling out their PennFIRS reports” and that “the utilization of the PennFIRS system would serve to document that the volunteer firefighter was present at an incident where a known carcinogen was present.” Id. (quoting Pa. Legis. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Commonwealth v. Martin
green
1 sentence2025Commonwealth v. Martin, 101 A.3d 706, 725 (Pa. 2014) (emphasis omitted). “[I]n Minnick [v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990), the United States Supreme] Court clarified the Edwards rule by holding that ‘when counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney.’” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 599 A.2d 200, 201 (Pa. 1991). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Commonwealth v. Hill
green
1 sentence2024Id.; ____________________________________________ 4 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in Harth that “requiring the Commonwealth” to prove its due diligence “before a trial court excludes time from its Rule 600 time computation on the basis of ‘judicial delay’ comports with the language of Rule 600(C)(1) and its commentary, the purpose behind the rule, and our prior jurisprudence[.]” Id. at 617 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Com. v. Wiggins, M.
green
2 sentences2021See Commonwealth v. Harth, 252 A.3d 600 , 617 (Pa. 2021) (“requiring the Commonwealth to demonstrate that it acted with due diligence before a trial court excludes time from its Rule 600 time computation on the basis of “judicial delay” comports with the language of Rule 600(C)(1) and its commentary, the purpose behind the rule, and our prior jurisprudence interpreting Rule 600 and its predecessor.”) (emphasis added); Commonwealth v. Wiggins, 248 A.3d 1285 (Pa.Super. 2021) (observing general dictates of new Rule 600 remained the same as they were prior to adoption, but noting prior distinction 2021See Commonwealth v. Harth, 252 A.3d 600 , 617 (Pa. 2021) (“requiring the Commonwealth to demonstrate that it acted with due diligence before a trial court excludes time from its Rule 600 time computation on the basis of “judicial delay” comports with the language of Rule 600(C)(1) and its commentary, the purpose behind the rule, and our prior jurisprudence interpreting Rule 600 and its predecessor.”) (emphasis added); Commonwealth v. Wiggins, 248 A.3d 1285 (Pa.Super. 2021) (observing general dictates of new Rule 600 remained the same as they were prior to adoption, but noting prior distinction | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Commonwealth v. McCoy
green
1 sentence2020(Appellant’s brief at 20-27.) In Commonwealth v. McCoy, 975 A.2d 586 (Pa. 2009), our supreme court affirmed the legal principle that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Coral Gables, Inc. v. Kerl
green
2 sentences2012In support of establishing lien priority, Shipley argues that the information available in Chester County’s docketing system (CHESCOPIN) on the date the Johnsons’ deed was recorded was sufficient to apprise a searcher of Shipley’s judgment even though it had not been entered in the judgment index: Shipley argues that the information entered by [the Prothonotary’s clerk] in the COURTVIEW system on November 30, 2009 was available on the CHESCO-PIN system by December 1, 2009[,] was sufficient to satisfy both the purpose behind the requirement of indexing a judgment and the standard set forth in C 2012In support of establishing lien priority, Shipley argues that the information available in Chester County’s docketing system (CHESCOPIN) on the date the Johnsons’ deed was recorded was sufficient to apprise a searcher of Shipley’s judgment even though it had not been entered in the judgment index: Shipley argues that the information entered by [the Prothonotary’s clerk] in the COURTVIEW system on November 30, 2009 was available on the CHESCO-PIN system by December 1, 2009[,] was sufficient to satisfy both the purpose behind the requirement of indexing a judgment and the standard set forth in C | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Kinnally v. Bell of Pennsylvania
green
1 sentence2001Kinnally v. Bell of Pennsylvania, 748 F. Supp. 1136 (E.D. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Ohio v. Roberts
red
2 sentences1994Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). 1994Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Roseman v. Hospital of University of Pennsylvania
green
2 sentences1991See Buck v. Coldway Food Express, Inc., 383 Pa.Super. 580 , 557 A.2d 404, 407 (1989); Roseman v. Hospital of the Univ. of Pa., 377 Pa.Super. 409 , 547 A.2d 751 (1988). 1991See Buck v. Coldway Food Express, Inc., 383 Pa.Super. 580 , 557 A.2d 404, 407 (1989); Roseman v. Hospital of the Univ. of Pa., 377 Pa.Super. 409 , 547 A.2d 751 (1988). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Gerald G. v. Theresa G.
green
2 sentences1989Gerald G. v. Theresa G., 284 Pa.Super. 498 , 426 A.2d 157 (1981). 1989Gerald G. v. Theresa G., 284 Pa.Super. 498 , 426 A.2d 157 (1981). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Barton v. Thaw
green
2 sentences1989Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 352-354 , 92 A. 312 , 313-314 *429 (1914). “[I]f an unlimited time were allowed for the creation of these future and indestructible estates the alienation of lands might be henceforward forever prevented by the innumerable future estates which the caprice or vanity of some owners would prompt them to create.” Id., 246 Pa. at 355 , 92 A. at 314 . 4 . 1989Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 352-354 , 92 A. 312 , 313-314 *429 (1914). “[I]f an unlimited time were allowed for the creation of these future and indestructible estates the alienation of lands might be henceforward forever prevented by the innumerable future estates which the caprice or vanity of some owners would prompt them to create.” Id., 246 Pa. at 355 , 92 A. at 314 . 4 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Hunter v. Hunter
green
2 sentences1985Hunter v. Hunter, 169 Pa. Superior Ct. 498 , 83 A.2d 401 (1951). 1985Hunter v. Hunter, 169 Pa. Superior Ct. 498 , 83 A.2d 401 (1951). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Bucheit v. Laudenberger green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Roviaro v. United States green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Patterson v. Palley Manufacturing Co. green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Staszak v. Seibel neutral | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.