purpose behind rule in Louisiana

1994Williams v. Shell Oil Co., 677 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.1982) (Tate, J. writing for the panel), citing 13 W.

1992Williams v. Shell Oil Co., 677 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.1982) (Tate, J. writing for the panel), citing 13 W.

2019State v. Fletcher , [ 03-60 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/29/03) ,] 845 So.2d 1213 .

2019State v. Fletcher , [ 03-60 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/29/03) ,] 845 So.2d 1213 .

2020C.C.P. art. 1005 to specially plead an affirmative defense is “to give fair notice of the nature of the defense and thereby prevent a last minute surprise to the plaintiff.” Allvend, 2000-0661, p. 6, 804 So.2d at 29 .

2020C.C.P. art. 1005 to specially plead an affirmative defense is “to give fair notice of the nature of the defense and thereby prevent a last minute surprise to the plaintiff.” Allvend, 2000-0661, p. 6, 804 So.2d at 29 .

2003Id.

2002Id.

2024App. 5 Cir. 5/26/09), 15 So. 3d 1026 , as this would have a chilling effect on their ability to do so.

2023State v. Odom, 2003-1772, p. 11-12 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/2/04) , 878 So.2d 582, 591 , writ denied, 2004-1105 (La. 10/8/04), 883 So.2d 1026 ; see also State v. Campbell, 2006-0286, p. 84-85 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So.2d ’ The prior version of the statute prohibited a person indicted for a felony or convicted of a felony for which he has not been pardoned by the governor from serving on a jury, regardless of the date of the indictment or the date of the expiration of the incarceration, probation, or parole.

2023State v. Odom, 2003-1772, p. 11-12 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/2/04) , 878 So.2d 582, 591 , writ denied, 2004-1105 (La. 10/8/04), 883 So.2d 1026 ; see also State v. Campbell, 2006-0286, p. 84-85 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So.2d ’ The prior version of the statute prohibited a person indicted for a felony or convicted of a felony for which he has not been pardoned by the governor from serving on a jury, regardless of the date of the indictment or the date of the expiration of the incarceration, probation, or parole.

2010Id.

2008Id.

2004In the prosecutor's closing argument, there were multiple references to the defendant's failure to give a statement to police and to otherwise give testimony in his own defense: "... when did Lionel Bonner come forward?" "... why didn't [Bonner] go to the police the minute after he got out of the cab?" "... neither of these men reported the crime." Not surprisingly, when the first rhetorical question was asked concerning Bonner's failure to "come forward," that glaring reference to the Fifth Amendment required no argument from defense counsel, who simply said "objection" and received from the

2004In the prosecutor's closing argument, there were multiple references to the defendant's failure to give a statement to police and to otherwise give testimony in his own defense: "... when did Lionel Bonner come forward?" "... why didn't [Bonner] go to the police the minute after he got out of the cab?" "... neither of these men reported the crime." Not surprisingly, when the first rhetorical question was asked concerning Bonner's failure to "come forward," that glaring reference to the Fifth Amendment required no argument from defense counsel, who simply said "objection" and received from the

2004In the prosecutor's closing argument, there were multiple references to the defendant's failure to give a statement to police and to otherwise give testimony in his own defense: "... when did Lionel Bonner come forward?" "... why didn't [Bonner] go to the police the minute after he got out of the cab?" "... neither of these men reported the crime." Not surprisingly, when the first rhetorical question was asked concerning Bonner's failure to "come forward," that glaring reference to the Fifth Amendment required no argument from defense counsel, who simply said "objection" and received from the

2004State v. Eames, 97-0767 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/15/98), 714 So.2d 210, 216 , writ denied, 98-1640 (La.11/6/98), 726 So.2d 922 .

2004In the prosecutor's closing argument, there were multiple references to the defendant's failure to give a statement to police and to otherwise give testimony in his own defense: "... when did Lionel Bonner come forward?" "... why didn't [Bonner] go to the police the minute after he got out of the cab?" "... neither of these men reported the crime." Not surprisingly, when the first rhetorical question was asked concerning Bonner's failure to "come forward," that glaring reference to the Fifth Amendment required no argument from defense counsel, who simply said "objection" and received from the

2004State v. Eames, 97-0767 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/15/98), 714 So.2d 210, 216 , writ denied, 98-1640 (La.11/6/98), 726 So.2d 922 .

2003State v. Ware, 01-194, p. 14 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/28/01), 795 So.2d 495, 504 .

1994Bazley, 397 So.2d at 485 .

1990In State v. Jenkins, 338 So.2d 276 (La.1976) no reversible error was found where the state failed to answer a question regarding the venue of an alleged offense in a motion for bill of particulars as the defendant had already received the information at the preliminary examination.

1985As a practical matter, if the client knows that damaging information could more readily be obtained from the attorney following disclosure than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice...." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 , 96 S.Ct. 1569 , 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976).

1985As a practical matter, if the client knows that damaging information could more readily be obtained from the attorney following disclosure than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice...." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 , 96 S.Ct. 1569 , 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976).

1983When the remark directly points out that the defendant has not testified, it is irrelevant whether the prosecutor intended the jury to draw unfavorable inferences from the defendant's silence. [citation omitted] Historically, remarks characterizing the state's case as unrebutted have been deemed to be within the permissible scope of argument set forth by C.Cr.P. art. 774, which provides in part, "[t]he argument shall be confined to evidence admitted, to the lack of evidence, to conclusions of fact that the state or defendant may draw therefrom, and to the law applicable to the case." See State

1983When the remark directly points out that the defendant has not testified, it is irrelevant whether the prosecutor intended the jury to draw unfavorable inferences from the defendant's silence. [citation omitted] Historically, remarks characterizing the state's case as unrebutted have been deemed to be within the permissible scope of argument set forth by C.Cr.P. art. 774, which provides in part, "[t]he argument shall be confined to evidence admitted, to the lack of evidence, to conclusions of fact that the state or defendant may draw therefrom, and to the law applicable to the case." See State

1983When the remark directly points out that the defendant has not testified, it is irrelevant whether the prosecutor intended the jury to draw unfavorable inferences from the defendant's silence. [citation omitted] Historically, remarks characterizing the state's case as unrebutted have been deemed to be within the permissible scope of argument set forth by C.Cr.P. art. 774, which provides in part, "[t]he argument shall be confined to evidence admitted, to the lack of evidence, to conclusions of fact that the state or defendant may draw therefrom, and to the law applicable to the case." See State