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14 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Pickettgreen2 sentences2017See State v. Pickett, 671 N.W.2d 866, 869 (Iowa 2003). 2017State v. Pickett, 671 N.W.2d 866, 869 (Iowa 2003). | 5 | 5 |
State v. Fischergreen1 sentence2022See Fischer, 785 N.W.2d at 704 (“The written request requirement ensures an accurate and reliable record that a pretest request was made.”); see also State v. Meissner, 315 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Iowa 1982) (“This [requirement] promotes accuracy and furnishes a record for subsequent review.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Meissnergreen1 sentence2022See Fischer, 785 N.W.2d at 704 (“The written request requirement ensures an accurate and reliable record that a pretest request was made.”); see also State v. Meissner, 315 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Iowa 1982) (“This [requirement] promotes accuracy and furnishes a record for subsequent review.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2016See State v. Jones, 464 N.W.2d 241, 242 (Iowa 1990) (“Adding a corroboration requirement to our clear proof rules is not necessary to accomplish the purpose behind the rule when a victim’s testimony, standing alone, satisfies the requirement of clear proof.”); see also Richards, 2016 WL 2609526 , at *11 (noting the victim’s “testimony constituted clear proof of the other alleged acts under the circumstances presented”); State v. Caples, 857 N.W.2d 641, 647 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (“Testimony of a credible witness can satisfy th[e clear proof] requirement.”). | 1 | 1 |
State of Iowa v. Ricky Lee Putmangreen1 sentence2016“There simply needs to be sufficient proof to ‘prevent the jury from engaging in speculation or drawing inferences based on mere suspicion.’” Putman, 848 N.W.2d at 9 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State of Iowa v. Montez Tyrone Caplesgreen1 sentence2016See State v. Jones, 464 N.W.2d 241, 242 (Iowa 1990) (“Adding a corroboration requirement to our clear proof rules is not necessary to accomplish the purpose behind the rule when a victim’s testimony, standing alone, satisfies the requirement of clear proof.”); see also Richards, 2016 WL 2609526 , at *11 (noting the victim’s “testimony constituted clear proof of the other alleged acts under the circumstances presented”); State v. Caples, 857 N.W.2d 641, 647 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (“Testimony of a credible witness can satisfy th[e clear proof] requirement.”). | 1 | 1 |
In re Thompsongreen2 sentences2002The purpose behind the rule prohibiting ex parte communications is to prevent “the effect, or even the appearance, of granting undue advantage to one party to the litigation.” In re Conduct *578 of Thompson, 325 Or. 467 , 940 P.2d 512, 515 (1997); EC 7-35 (“[A] lawyer should not communicate with a judge relative to a matter pending ... in circumstances which might have the effect or give the appearance of granting undue advantage to one party.”). 2002The purpose behind the rule prohibiting ex parte communications is to prevent “the effect, or even the appearance, of granting undue advantage to one party to the litigation.” In re Conduct *578 of Thompson, 325 Or. 467 , 940 P.2d 512, 515 (1997); EC 7-35 (“[A] lawyer should not communicate with a judge relative to a matter pending ... in circumstances which might have the effect or give the appearance of granting undue advantage to one party.”). | 1 | 1 |
Ideal Mutual Insurance Co. v. Winkergreen1 sentence1987Co. v. Winker, 319 N.W.2d 289, 296 (Iowa 1982), the court stated that the purpose behind this requirement “can also be satisfied by a determination made without the full exploration that an issue receives during trial on the merits — by motion for summary judgment, a motion to dismiss, or their equivalents.” See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 68 comment d (1980). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mellor v. Chamberlin
green
2 sentences2010But in Mellor, the court noted a broader purpose behind the requirement; it commented that when the covenantee retains “the driver’s seat” in the litigation, he may “not assert all defenses or utilize all strategies to challenge [the third-party] claim.” 673 P.2d at 613 . 2010But in Mellor , the court noted a broader purpose behind the requirement; it commented that when the covenantee retains “the driver’s seat” in the litigation, he may “not assert all defenses or utilize all strategies to challenge [the third-party] claim.” 673 P.2d at 613 . | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Yokum v. Thomas
green
2 sentences2010This sentiment is consistent with this court’s comments in Yokum that notice was required in order to give the covenantor the opportunity to remove the cloud on title upon more favorable terms than those accomplished by the covenantee. 15 Iowa at 69 . 2010This sentiment is consistent with this court’s comments in Yokum that notice was required in order to give the covenantor the opportunity to remove the cloud on title upon more favorable terms than those accomplished by the covenantee. 15 Iowa at 69 , 1863 WL 95 . | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Van Sickle Construction Co. v. Wachovia Commercial Mortgage, Inc.
green
2 sentences2011The court reaffirmed the purpose behind the rule — “to prevent litigant with contract claims from litigating them inappropriately as tort claims.” Id. 2011The court reaffirmed the purpose behind the rule—“to prevent litigant with contract claims from litigating them inappropriately as tort claims.” Id. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
John Deery Motors, Inc. v. Steinbronn
green
1 sentence1987We recently reiterated the purpose behind the requirement of notice in John Deery Motors, Inc. v. Steinbronn, 383 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa 1986), where we wrote: The notice provision in Code section 554.9504(3) is obviously intended for the benefit and protection of the debtor. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Berger v. Amana Society
green
2 sentences1978As we noted in Berger v. Amana Society, 257 Iowa 956 , 120 N.W.2d 465 , 467: "One of the primary purposes of this section [179(b)] is to advise counsel and the appellate court of the basis of the trial court's decision in order that counsel may direct his attack upon specific adverse findings or rulings in the event of an appeal." The sustaining of a motion for summary judgment is nothing more nor less than a determination that there are no issues of material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, both of which elements must be specifically alleged by the m 1978As we noted in Berger v. Amana Society, 257 Iowa 956 , 120 N.W.2d 465 , 467: “One of the primary purposes of this section [179(b)] is to advise counsel and the appellate court of the basis of the trial court’s decision in order that counsel may direct his attack upon specific adverse findings or rulings in the event of an appeal.” The sustaining of a motion for summary judgment is nothing more nor less than a determination that there are no issues of material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, both of which elements must be specifically alleged by the m | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Berger v. Amana Society
green
2 sentences1978As we noted in Berger v. Amana Society, 257 Iowa 956 , 120 N.W.2d 465 , 467: "One of the primary purposes of this section [179(b)] is to advise counsel and the appellate court of the basis of the trial court's decision in order that counsel may direct his attack upon specific adverse findings or rulings in the event of an appeal." The sustaining of a motion for summary judgment is nothing more nor less than a determination that there are no issues of material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, both of which elements must be specifically alleged by the m 1978As we noted in Berger v. Amana Society, 257 Iowa 956 , 120 N.W.2d 465 , 467: “One of the primary purposes of this section [179(b)] is to advise counsel and the appellate court of the basis of the trial court’s decision in order that counsel may direct his attack upon specific adverse findings or rulings in the event of an appeal.” The sustaining of a motion for summary judgment is nothing more nor less than a determination that there are no issues of material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, both of which elements must be specifically alleged by the m | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.