Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
5 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 2020–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Reyes v. Stategreen1 sentence2025See infra Section II; see also Reyes v. State, 753 S.W.2d 382, 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc) (explaining that, because an unconstitutional statute is void from its inception, it “‘imposes no duties, confers no rights, creates no office, bestows no power, affords no protection, and justifies no acts performed under it’” (citation omitted)) MR143 3 Copy from re:SearchTX The Texas Supreme Court specifically called out this distinction in Pike, remarking that “Texas courts, having drawn upon the standing doctrine of our federal counterparts, sometimes apply the label ‘standing’ to statutory | 1 | 1 |
Engelman Irrigation District v. Shields Bros., Inc.green1 sentence2020Like jurisdiction, standing “is a word of many, too many, meanings.” 2 Texas courts, having drawn upon the standing doctrine of our federal counterparts, 3 sometimes apply the label “standing” to statutory or prudential considerations that “do[] not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction” but determine whether a plaintiff “falls within the class of [persons] . . . authorized to sue” or otherwise has “a valid . . . cause of action.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 , 128 & n.4 (2014) (explaining why this use of the standing label can be “misleading”). 4 Yet we | 1 | 1 |
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environmentred1 sentence2020Like jurisdiction, standing “is a word of many, too many, meanings.” 2 Texas courts, having drawn upon the standing doctrine of our federal counterparts, 3 sometimes apply the label “standing” to statutory or prudential considerations that “do[] not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction” but determine whether a plaintiff “falls within the class of [persons] . . . authorized to sue” or otherwise has “a valid . . . cause of action.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 , 128 & n.4 (2014) (explaining why this use of the standing label can be “misleading”). 4 Yet we | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.
green
2 sentences2025See infra Section II; see also Reyes v. State, 753 S.W.2d 382, 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc) (explaining that, because an unconstitutional statute is void from its inception, it “‘imposes no duties, confers no rights, creates no office, bestows no power, affords no protection, and justifies no acts performed under it’” (citation omitted)) MR143 3 Copy from re:SearchTX The Texas Supreme Court specifically called out this distinction in Pike, remarking that “Texas courts, having drawn upon the standing doctrine of our federal counterparts, sometimes apply the label ‘standing’ to statutory 2022Like jurisdiction, standing “is a word of many, too many, meanings.” Texas courts, having drawn upon the standing doctrine of our federal counterparts, sometimes apply the label “standing” to statutory or prudential considerations that “do[] not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction” but determine whether a plaintiff “falls within the class of [persons] . . . authorized to sue” or otherwise has “a valid . . . cause of action.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 , 128 & n.4 (2014) (explaining why this use of the standing label can be “misleading”). | 5 | 2020–2025 |
Kenneth L. Berry, Individually Kenneth L. Berry, as Trustee of the Berry Dynasty Trust Kenneth L. Berry, Trustee in a Derivative Capacity for Flying Bull Ranch, Ltd. And Chelsea Nichole Briers v. Dennis W. Berry Marvin G. Berry Allen L. Berry Fb Ranch, LLC Berry Gp, Inc. D/B/A Berry Contracting, Inc. Berry Contracting, Lp D/B/A Bay, Ltd. And Berry Ranches, Llc
green
1 sentence2025See Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763 , 773-74 & n.4 (Tex. 2020) (“Texas courts, having drawn upon the standing doctrine of our federal counterparts, sometimes apply the label ‘standing’ to statutory or prudential considerations that 16 MR199 ‘do not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction.’” (citation omitted)); Berry v. Berry, 646 S.W.3d 516 , 527 & n.3 (Tex. 2022); Tex. Med. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi
green
1 sentence2020Like jurisdiction, standing “is a word of many, too many, meanings.” 2 Texas courts, having drawn upon the standing doctrine of our federal counterparts, 3 sometimes apply the label “standing” to statutory or prudential considerations that “do[] not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction” but determine whether a plaintiff “falls within the class of [persons] . . . authorized to sue” or otherwise has “a valid . . . cause of action.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 , 128 & n.4 (2014) (explaining why this use of the standing label can be “misleading”). 4 Yet we | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Sneed v. Webre
green
1 sentence2020Like jurisdiction, standing “is a word of many, too many, meanings.” 2 Texas courts, having drawn upon the standing doctrine of our federal counterparts, 3 sometimes apply the label “standing” to statutory or prudential considerations that “do[] not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction” but determine whether a plaintiff “falls within the class of [persons] . . . authorized to sue” or otherwise has “a valid . . . cause of action.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 , 128 & n.4 (2014) (explaining why this use of the standing label can be “misleading”). 4 Yet we | 1 | 2020–2020 |