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5 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Shicklesgreen2 sentences2020There must be identified instances on which the jurors unanimously agree for each offense charged.” While the written 20160317-CA 17 2020 UT App 131 State v. Gollaher instructions did not adequately inform the jury of the constitutional unanimity requirement, this oral instruction cured that deficiency by ensuring that the jury understood that its verdict on each charge had to be truly unanimous, thus satisfying the constitutional unanimity requirement. 8 See State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 303 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (“[W]hen a prosecutor makes a remark misstating the law, wh 2009In this case, however, the clarifying instruction was discussing the original instruction and eteet-era is a reference to the remainder of the list of the specific noncharacter purposes contained in the "last (fourth])] sentence[ ]" of that prior instruction. 12 Considering the instructions as a whole, we conclude that the trial court properly instructed the jury on the limits to its consideration of the bad acts evidence. 151 The trial court carefully considered the probative value of the evidence under each of the Shickles factors, see State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Carrellgreen2 sentences2024We hold that (1) Paule’s counsel was not ineffective in failing to seek a more detailed unanimity instruction, and (2) because Paule did not raise in his petition for certiorari his claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to seek a clarifying instruction or a special verdict form, the claim is beyond the scope of our review. _____________________________________________________________ 74 See id. § 76-8-306(1). 75 Id. § 76-8-306(1)(c). 76 See Carrell, 2018 UT App 21, ¶ 57 (“[A] defendant’s intent can be inferred from conduct and attendant circumstances in the light of human behavior 2024We hold that (1) Paule’s counsel was not ineffective in failing to seek a more detailed unanimity instruction, and (2) because Paule did not raise in his petition for certiorari his claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to seek a clarifying instruction or a special verdict form, the claim is beyond the scope of our review. _____________________________________________________________ 74 See id. § 76-8-306(1). 75 Id. § 76-8-306(1)(c). 76 See Carrell, 2018 UT App 21, ¶ 57 (“[A] defendant’s intent can be inferred from conduct and attendant circumstances in the light of human behavior | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2024To prevail on this claim, Paule must demonstrate that (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient, falling “below an objective standard of reasonableness,” 77 and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced him. 78 Because we determine that Paule has not shown that his counsel’s performance was deficient, we decide the issue on the test’s first prong and do not address whether the alleged deficient performance prejudiced Paule. 79 ¶67 As Paule accurately observes—and the State does not dispute—although the jury instructions in Paule’s case mentioned general principles of jury unanimity, none spec 2024To prevail on this claim, Paule must demonstrate that (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient, falling “below an objective standard of reasonableness,” 77 and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced him. 78 Because we determine that Paule has not shown that his counsel’s performance was deficient, we decide the issue on the test’s first prong and do not address whether the alleged deficient performance prejudiced Paule. 79 ¶67 As Paule accurately observes—and the State does not dispute—although the jury instructions in Paule’s case mentioned general principles of jury unanimity, none spec | 1 | 1 |
Dipert v. Stategreen2 sentences1998The prosecutor’s statement that if Shickles were found not guilty by reason of insanity he would 'walk out the door' is a technical misstatement of the law and probably required a curative instruction.”); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987) ("In the face of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt, together with the fact that the comments were isolated as opposed to extensive and the fact that the trial judge specifically instructed the jury 'that no presumption adverse to [defendant Tillman] is to arise from the mere fact that he does not place himself upon the witness stand,’ w 1998The prosecutor’s statement that if Shickles were found not guilty by reason of insanity he would 'walk out the door' is a technical misstatement of the law and probably required a curative instruction.”); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987) ("In the face of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt, together with the fact that the comments were isolated as opposed to extensive and the fact that the trial judge specifically instructed the jury 'that no presumption adverse to [defendant Tillman] is to arise from the mere fact that he does not place himself upon the witness stand,’ w | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wetzelgreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 70 (Utah 1993) (stating that testimony, while not beneficial to defendant, was not so prejudicial as to impair substantial right, and trial court obviated any error when it struck testimony and ordered jury to disregard it); State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 303 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) ("[Wjhen a prosecutor makes a remark misstating the law, which may prejudice the jury, the proper procedure is for the trial court to give a clarifying instruction. 1998See, e.g., State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 70 (Utah 1993) (stating that testimony, while not beneficial to defendant, was not so prejudicial as to impair substantial right, and trial court obviated any error when it struck testimony and ordered jury to disregard it); State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 303 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) ("[W]hen a prosecutor makes a remark misstating the law, which may prejudice the jury, the proper procedure is for the trial court to give a clarifying instruction. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rimmaschgreen1 sentence1998The prosecutor's statement that if Shickles were found not guilty by reason of insanity he would `walk out the door' is a technical misstatement of the law and probably required a curative instruction."); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987) ("In the face of overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, together with the fact that the comments were isolated as opposed to extensive and the fact that the trial judge specifically instructed the jury `that no presumption adverse to [defendant Tillman] is to arise from the mere fact that he does not place himself upon the witness stand,' w | 1 | 1 |
State v. Petersongreen2 sentences1998The prosecutor’s statement that if Shickles were found not guilty by reason of insanity he would 'walk out the door' is a technical misstatement of the law and probably required a curative instruction.”); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987) ("In the face of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt, together with the fact that the comments were isolated as opposed to extensive and the fact that the trial judge specifically instructed the jury 'that no presumption adverse to [defendant Tillman] is to arise from the mere fact that he does not place himself upon the witness stand,’ w 1998The prosecutor's statement that if Shickles were found not guilty by reason of insanity he would `walk out the door' is a technical misstatement of the law and probably required a curative instruction."); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987) ("In the face of overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, together with the fact that the comments were isolated as opposed to extensive and the fact that the trial judge specifically instructed the jury `that no presumption adverse to [defendant Tillman] is to arise from the mere fact that he does not place himself upon the witness stand,' w | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tillmangreen2 sentences1998The prosecutor’s statement that if Shickles were found not guilty by reason of insanity he would 'walk out the door' is a technical misstatement of the law and probably required a curative instruction.”); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987) ("In the face of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt, together with the fact that the comments were isolated as opposed to extensive and the fact that the trial judge specifically instructed the jury 'that no presumption adverse to [defendant Tillman] is to arise from the mere fact that he does not place himself upon the witness stand,’ w 1998The prosecutor's statement that if Shickles were found not guilty by reason of insanity he would `walk out the door' is a technical misstatement of the law and probably required a curative instruction."); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987) ("In the face of overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, together with the fact that the comments were isolated as opposed to extensive and the fact that the trial judge specifically instructed the jury `that no presumption adverse to [defendant Tillman] is to arise from the mere fact that he does not place himself upon the witness stand,' w | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Wendell Cole, Howard Masters, B.K. Taylor, Larry Masters, Defendantsgreen2 sentences1998The prosecutor’s statement that if Shickles were found not guilty by reason of insanity he would 'walk out the door' is a technical misstatement of the law and probably required a curative instruction.”); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987) ("In the face of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt, together with the fact that the comments were isolated as opposed to extensive and the fact that the trial judge specifically instructed the jury 'that no presumption adverse to [defendant Tillman] is to arise from the mere fact that he does not place himself upon the witness stand,’ w 1998The prosecutor's statement that if Shickles were found not guilty by reason of insanity he would `walk out the door' is a technical misstatement of the law and probably required a curative instruction."); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987) ("In the face of overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, together with the fact that the comments were isolated as opposed to extensive and the fact that the trial judge specifically instructed the jury `that no presumption adverse to [defendant Tillman] is to arise from the mere fact that he does not place himself upon the witness stand,' w | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Crowley
green
2 sentences2026“Jury instruction issues that fall within the [trial] court’s discretion will, of course, be subject to an abuse of discretion standard.” Id. ¶ 45. ¶23 Lyman also asserts that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that any speed over 55 miles per hour “is prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent” and that this instruction “unconstitutionally shift[ed] the burden to the defense.” “The propriety of a jury instruction presents a question of law which we review for correctness.” State v. Crowley, 2014 UT App 33, ¶ 4 , 320 P.3d 677 (quotation simplified). ¶24 Finally 2026“Jury instruction issues that fall within the [trial] court’s discretion will, of course, be subject to an abuse of discretion standard.” Id. ¶ 45. ¶23 Lyman also asserts that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that any speed over 55 miles per hour “is prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent” and that this instruction “unconstitutionally shift[ed] the burden to the defense.” “The propriety of a jury instruction presents a question of law which we review for correctness.” State v. Crowley, 2014 UT App 33, ¶ 4 , 320 P.3d 677 (quotation simplified). ¶24 Finally | 1 | 2026–2026 |
McCloud v. State
green
1 sentence2024To prevail on this claim, Paule must demonstrate that (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient, falling “below an objective standard of reasonableness,” 77 and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced him. 78 Because we determine that Paule has not shown that his counsel’s performance was deficient, we decide the issue on the test’s first prong and do not address whether the alleged deficient performance prejudiced Paule. 79 ¶67 As Paule accurately observes—and the State does not dispute—although the jury instructions in Paule’s case mentioned general principles of jury unanimity, none spec | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Menzies v. State
red
2 sentences2024To prevail on this claim, Paule must demonstrate that (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient, falling “below an objective standard of reasonableness,” 77 and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced him. 78 Because we determine that Paule has not shown that his counsel’s performance was deficient, we decide the issue on the test’s first prong and do not address whether the alleged deficient performance prejudiced Paule. 79 ¶67 As Paule accurately observes—and the State does not dispute—although the jury instructions in Paule’s case mentioned general principles of jury unanimity, none spec 2024To prevail on this claim, Paule must demonstrate that (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient, falling “below an objective standard of reasonableness,” 77 and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced him. 78 Because we determine that Paule has not shown that his counsel’s performance was deficient, we decide the issue on the test’s first prong and do not address whether the alleged deficient performance prejudiced Paule. 79 ¶67 As Paule accurately observes—and the State does not dispute—although the jury instructions in Paule’s case mentioned general principles of jury unanimity, none spec | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Gollaher
green
1 sentence2020There must be identified instances on which the jurors unanimously agree for each offense charged.” While the written 20160317-CA 17 2020 UT App 131 State v. Gollaher instructions did not adequately inform the jury of the constitutional unanimity requirement, this oral instruction cured that deficiency by ensuring that the jury understood that its verdict on each charge had to be truly unanimous, thus satisfying the constitutional unanimity requirement. 8 See State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 303 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (“[W]hen a prosecutor makes a remark misstating the law, wh | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Span
green
1 sentence1998The prosecutor's statement that if Shickles were found not guilty by reason of insanity he would `walk out the door' is a technical misstatement of the law and probably required a curative instruction."); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987) ("In the face of overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, together with the fact that the comments were isolated as opposed to extensive and the fact that the trial judge specifically instructed the jury `that no presumption adverse to [defendant Tillman] is to arise from the mere fact that he does not place himself upon the witness stand,' w | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.