section 230 immunity in Washington

2015Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 984-85 (10th Cir. 2000); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (“By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.”); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D.

2015“Section 230 immunity applies even after notice of the potentially unlawful nature of the third-party content.” Id.; see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (“[i]f computer service providers were subject to distributor liability, they would face potential liability each time they receive notice of a potentially defamatory statement—from any party, concerning any message,” and such notice-based liability “would deter service providers from regulating the dissemination of offensive material over their own services” by confronting them with “ceaseless choices of suppressing controversial speech or sustai

2015Compare Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123 (law "provides broad immunity for publishing content provided primarily by third parties"), with Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F. 3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[l]ooking at the text, it appears clear that neither 7 J.

2015Compare Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123 (law “provides broad immunity for publishing content provided primarily by third parties”), with Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[hooking at the text, it appears clear that neither [subsection 230(c)] nor any other declares a general immunity from liability deriving from third-party content”). ¶25 The dissent also supports its argument for broad immunity through repeated references to other courts’ interpretations of the congressional intent in enacting section 230, “but such noise ultimately signifies nothing.

2015Compare Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123 (law "provides broad immunity for publishing content provided primarily by third parties"), with Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F. 3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[l]ooking at the text, it appears clear that neither 7 J.

2015Compare Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123 (law “provides broad immunity for publishing content provided primarily by third parties”), with Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[hooking at the text, it appears clear that neither [subsection 230(c)] nor any other declares a general immunity from liability deriving from third-party content”). ¶25 The dissent also supports its argument for broad immunity through repeated references to other courts’ interpretations of the congressional intent in enacting section 230, “but such noise ultimately signifies nothing.

2015Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 984-85 (lOth Cir. 2000); Zeran, 129 F .3d at 330 ("By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user ofthe service.") Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D.

2015Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 984-85 (10th Cir. 2000); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (“By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.”); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D.

2015In M.A., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1049 , the court stated, “[T]he creation by Backpage of an ‘adult’ category does not impose liability on Backpage for ads posted in that category.” The court in M.A. cited Dart in rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that Backpage lacked immunity because it created an “escort” category: “ ‘Craigslist created the categories, but its users create the content of the ads and select which categories their ads will appear in.’ ” Id. (quoting Dart, 665 F. Supp. at 962). 23 ¶88 Similarly, in Prickett v. InfoUSA, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 646, 651 (E.D.

2015In M.A., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1049 , the court stated, “[T]he creation by Backpage of an ‘adult’ category does not impose liability on Backpage for ads posted in that category.” The court in M.A. cited Dart in rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that Backpage lacked immunity because it created an “escort” category: “ ‘Craigslist created the categories, but its users create the content of the ads and select which categories their ads will appear in.’ ” Id. (quoting Dart, 665 F. Supp. at 962). 23 ¶88 Similarly, in Prickett v. InfoUSA, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 646, 651 (E.D.

2015In MA., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1049, the court stated, "[T]he creation by Backpage of an 'adult' category does not impose liability on Backpage for ads posted in that category." The court in MA. cited Dart in rejecting the 28 JS., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings eta!., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) plaintiffs claim that Backpage lacked immunity because it created an "escort" category: "'Craigslist created the categories, but its users create the contents of the ads and select which categories their ads will appear in."' !d. (quoting Dart, 665 F. Supp. at 962). 10 Similar

2015In M.A., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1049 , the court stated, “[T]he creation by Backpage of an ‘adult’ category does not impose liability on Backpage for ads posted in that category.” The court in M.A. cited Dart in rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that Backpage lacked immunity because it created an “escort” category: “ ‘Craigslist created the categories, but its users create the content of the ads and select which categories their ads will appear in.’ ” Id. (quoting Dart, 665 F. Supp. at 962). 23 ¶88 Similarly, in Prickett v. InfoUSA, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 646, 651 (E.D.

2015Wash. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Cosmetics Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp., 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010). 6 See, e.g., John Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (reading"§ 230(c)(l) as a definitional clause rather than as an immunity from liability"). 9 JS., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings et al., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) uniformly hold that its protection for publishers is "quite robust." They apply an expans1ve definition of '"interactive computer service provider"' and a rather restrictive definition of "information content provid

2015Wash. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Cosmetics Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp., 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010). 6 See, e.g., John Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (reading"§ 230(c)(l) as a definitional clause rather than as an immunity from liability"). 9 JS., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings et al., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) uniformly hold that its protection for publishers is "quite robust." They apply an expans1ve definition of '"interactive computer service provider"' and a rather restrictive definition of "information content provid

2001H1078-03, 1103 (1996). [25] See Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 87 Cal.App.4th 684 , 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772, 780-81 (2001) (rejecting argument that § 230 immunity was limited to tort claims, holding immunity extends to a taxpayer's action for declaratory and injunctive relief); see also Jane Doe One v. Oliver, 46 Conn.Supp. 406 , 755 A.2d 1000, 1003-04 (2000) (§ 230 immunity grounds for dismissal of breach of contract claim against AOL). [26] 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(1). [27] 47 U.S.C. § 230 (f)(3).

2001See Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 87 Cal. App. 4th 684 , 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772, 780-81 (2001) (rejecting argument that § 230 immunity was limited to tort claims, holding immunity extends to a taxpayer’s action for declaratory and injunctive relief); see also Jane Doe One v. Oliver, 46 Conn. Supp. 406 , 755 A.2d 1000, 1003-04 (2000) (§ 230 immunity grounds for dismissal of breach of contract claim against AOL). 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(1). 47 U.S.C. § 230 (f)(3).

2001H1078-03, 1103 (1996). [25] See Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 87 Cal.App.4th 684 , 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772, 780-81 (2001) (rejecting argument that § 230 immunity was limited to tort claims, holding immunity extends to a taxpayer's action for declaratory and injunctive relief); see also Jane Doe One v. Oliver, 46 Conn.Supp. 406 , 755 A.2d 1000, 1003-04 (2000) (§ 230 immunity grounds for dismissal of breach of contract claim against AOL). [26] 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(1). [27] 47 U.S.C. § 230 (f)(3).

2001See Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 87 Cal. App. 4th 684 , 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772, 780-81 (2001) (rejecting argument that § 230 immunity was limited to tort claims, holding immunity extends to a taxpayer’s action for declaratory and injunctive relief); see also Jane Doe One v. Oliver, 46 Conn. Supp. 406 , 755 A.2d 1000, 1003-04 (2000) (§ 230 immunity grounds for dismissal of breach of contract claim against AOL). 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(1). 47 U.S.C. § 230 (f)(3).

2001See Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 87 Cal. App. 4th 684 , 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772, 780-81 (2001) (rejecting argument that § 230 immunity was limited to tort claims, holding immunity extends to a taxpayer’s action for declaratory and injunctive relief); see also Jane Doe One v. Oliver, 46 Conn. Supp. 406 , 755 A.2d 1000, 1003-04 (2000) (§ 230 immunity grounds for dismissal of breach of contract claim against AOL). 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(1). 47 U.S.C. § 230 (f)(3).

2001See Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 87 Cal. App. 4th 684 , 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772, 780-81 (2001) (rejecting argument that § 230 immunity was limited to tort claims, holding immunity extends to a taxpayer’s action for declaratory and injunctive relief); see also Jane Doe One v. Oliver, 46 Conn. Supp. 406 , 755 A.2d 1000, 1003-04 (2000) (§ 230 immunity grounds for dismissal of breach of contract claim against AOL). 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(1). 47 U.S.C. § 230 (f)(3).