section 230 immunity in California

2026Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to 8 publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.” ’ ” ’ ”2 (Wozniak, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 908.) “Two California Supreme Court cases, Hassell, supra, 5 Cal.5th 522 (plur. opn.) and Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33 (Barrett), have addressed immunity under section 230, discussing at length statutory interpretation and judicial construction of the statute.

2024Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.’ ” ’ (Prager University v. Google, LLC (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1022 , 1032 (Prager), quoting Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 43 .) Notwithstanding this broad construction, certain claims against interactive computer services may fall outside the scope of section 230 immunity.

2026(Hassell, at p. 544 (plur. opn.) [‘broad scope of section 230 immunity’ is underscored by ‘inclusive language’ of § 230(e)(3), which, ‘read in connection with section 230(c)(1) and the rest of section 230, conveys an intent to shield Internet intermediaries from the burdens associated with defending against state law claims that treat them as the publisher or speaker of third party content, and from compelled compliance with demands for relief that, when viewed in the context of a plaintiff’s allegations, similarly assign them the legal role and responsibilities of a publisher qua publisher’];

2021(See Doe II v. MySpace Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 561, 572 [concluding a “general consensus to interpret section 230 immunity broadly” could be derived from California and federal court cases]; Delfino, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 804 ; accord, Doe v. MySpace Inc. (5th Cir. 2008) 528 F.3d 413, 418 ; Carafano v. Metrospalsh.com, Inc. (9th Cir. 2003) 339 F.3d 1119 , 1123 [“reviewing courts have treated § 230(c) immunity as quite robust”]; but see Barnes, supra, 570 F.3d at p. 1100 [text of § 230(c) “appears clear that neither this subsection nor any other declares a general immunity from liabi

2021(See Doe II v. MySpace Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 561, 572 [concluding a “general consensus to interpret section 230 immunity broadly” could be derived from California and federal court cases]; Delfino, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 804 ; accord, Doe v. MySpace Inc. (5th Cir. 2008) 528 F.3d 413, 418 ; Carafano v. Metrospalsh.com, Inc. (9th Cir. 2003) 339 F.3d 1119 , 1123 [“reviewing courts have treated § 230(c) immunity as quite robust”]; but see Barnes, supra, 570 F.3d at p. 1100 [text of § 230(c) “appears clear that neither this subsection nor any other declares a general immunity from liabi

2021(See Doe II v. MySpace Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 561, 572 [concluding a “general consensus to interpret section 230 immunity broadly” could be derived from California and federal court cases]; Delfino, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 804 ; accord, Doe v. MySpace Inc. (5th Cir. 2008) 528 F.3d 413, 418 ; Carafano v. Metrospalsh.com, Inc. (9th Cir. 2003) 339 F.3d 1119 , 1123 [“reviewing courts have treated § 230(c) immunity as quite robust”]; but see Barnes, supra, 570 F.3d at p. 1100 [text of § 230(c) “appears clear that neither this subsection nor any other declares a general immunity from liabi

2026(Hassell, at p. 544 (plur. opn.) [‘broad scope of section 230 immunity’ is underscored by ‘inclusive language’ of § 230(e)(3), which, ‘read in connection with section 230(c)(1) and the rest of section 230, conveys an intent to shield Internet intermediaries from the burdens associated with defending against state law claims that treat them as the publisher or speaker of third party content, and from compelled compliance with demands for relief that, when viewed in the context of a plaintiff’s allegations, similarly assign them the legal role and responsibilities of a publisher qua publisher’];

2021(See Doe II v. MySpace Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 561, 572 [concluding a “general consensus to interpret section 230 immunity broadly” could be derived from California and federal court cases]; Delfino, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 804 ; accord, Doe v. MySpace Inc. (5th Cir. 2008) 528 F.3d 413, 418 ; Carafano v. Metrospalsh.com, Inc. (9th Cir. 2003) 339 F.3d 1119 , 1123 [“reviewing courts have treated § 230(c) immunity as quite robust”]; but see Barnes, supra, 570 F.3d at p. 1100 [text of § 230(c) “appears clear that neither this subsection nor any other declares a general immunity from liabi

2021In assessing whether a claim treats a provider as a publisher or speaker of user-generated content, however, courts focus not on the name of the cause of action, but whether the plaintiff’s claim requires the court to treat the defendant as the publisher or speaker of information created by another. ( Barnes, supra, 570 F.3d at pp. 1101-1102; Cross, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 207 .) This test prevents plaintiffs from avoiding the broad immunity of section 230 through the “ ‘ “creative” pleading’ of barred claims” or using “litigation strategy . . . to accomplish indirectly what Congress has c

2018(See, e.g., Doe II v. MySpace Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 561 , 567-575, 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 148 [ section 230 immunity applies to tort claims against a social networking website, brought by minors who claimed that they had been assaulted by adults they met on that website]; Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2007) 145 Cal.App.4th 790 , 804-808, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 376 [ section 230 immunity applies to tort claims against an employer that operated an internal computer network used by an employee to allegedly communicate threats against the plaintiff]; Gentry v. eBay, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816 ,

2026The CDA states, “ ‘No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.’ ” (Hassell v. Bird (2018) 5 Cal.5th 522, 527 , citing 47 U.S.C., § 230 (e)(3).) Blackman quotes the dissenting opinion in Hassell, a case addressing whether Yelp Inc. (who had not been sued) had to comply with an order to take down defamatory consumer reviews, which stated, “None of the policies within section 230(b) state or suggest an express immunity from compliance with state court orders.” (Hassell, at p. 571 (dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).

2026Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to 8 publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.” ’ ” ’ ”2 (Wozniak, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 908.) “Two California Supreme Court cases, Hassell, supra, 5 Cal.5th 522 (plur. opn.) and Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33 (Barrett), have addressed immunity under section 230, discussing at length statutory interpretation and judicial construction of the statute.

2015The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held, “Providing neutral tools for navigating websites is fully protected by [the section 230(c)(1)] immunity, absent substantial affirmative conduct on the part of the website creator promoting the use of such tools for unlawful purposes.” (Roommates, supra, 521 F.3d at p. 1174, fn. 37 ; see also Doe II, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 563 [profile questions did not encourage discriminatory or otherwise illegal conduct]; Gentry v. eBay, Inc., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 831 [Web site granted § 230(c)(1) immunity when users created and

2015The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held, “Providing neutral tools for navigating websites is fully protected by [the section 230(c)(1)] immunity, absent substantial affirmative conduct on the part of the website creator promoting the use of such tools for unlawful purposes.” (Roommates, supra, 521 F.3d at p. 1174, fn. 37 ; see also Doe II, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 563 [profile questions did not encourage discriminatory or otherwise illegal conduct]; Gentry v. eBay, Inc., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 831 [Web site granted § 230(c)(1) immunity when users created and

2018In this defamation action, [plaintiffs] filed their complaint against Bird, not Yelp; obtained a default judgment against Bird, not Yelp; and [were] awarded damages and injunctive relief against Bird, not Yelp." ( Hassell v. Bird , supra , 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1363 , 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 203 .) The Court of Appeal recognized that other courts (e.g., Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 684 , 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772 ( Kathleen R. ); Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. (E.D.Va. 2003) 261 F.Supp.2d 532 ; Smith v. Intercosmos Media Group (E.D.La., Dec. 17, 2002, No. 02-1964), 2002 WL 31844907

2018In this defamation action, [plaintiffs] filed their complaint against Bird, not Yelp; obtained a default judgment against Bird, not Yelp; and [were] awarded damages and injunctive relief against Bird, not Yelp." ( Hassell v. Bird , supra , 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1363 , 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 203 .) The Court of Appeal recognized that other courts (e.g., Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 684 , 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 772 ( Kathleen R. ); Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. (E.D.Va. 2003) 261 F.Supp.2d 532 ; Smith v. Intercosmos Media Group (E.D.La., Dec. 17, 2002, No. 02-1964), 2002 WL 31844907

2021Plaintiffs’ Causes of Action Treat Salesforce as a Publisher or Speaker of Information Provided by Someone Other than Salesforce Having determined that the Second Amended Complaint alleges that Salesforce is the provider of an interactive computer service, we must now consider whether the alleged causes of action treat Salesforce as the publisher or speaker of information provided by another information content provider, as required for immunity under section 230(c)(1). ( Delfino, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at pp. 804-805.) Here, the plaintiffs allege they were injured by online advertising, place

2021(Doe v. MySpace, Inc. (5th Cir. 2008) 528 F.3d 413, 418 .) As our Supreme Court has explained in Hassell v. Bird (2018) 5 Cal.5th 522, 534-535 (Hassell), the immunity provisions implement the policy goals of section 230, which include “promot[ing] the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and 9 other interactive media” (§ 230(b)(1)) and “preserv[ing] the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” (§ 230(b)(2).) To claim immunity under sect

2026(Hassell, at p. 544 (plur. opn.) [‘broad scope of section 230 immunity’ is underscored by ‘inclusive language’ of § 230(e)(3), which, ‘read in connection with section 230(c)(1) and the rest of section 230, conveys an intent to shield Internet intermediaries from the burdens associated with defending against state law claims that treat them as the publisher or speaker of third party content, and from compelled compliance with demands for relief that, when viewed in the context of a plaintiff’s allegations, similarly assign them the legal role and responsibilities of a publisher qua publisher’];

2021(Doe v. MySpace, Inc. (5th Cir. 2008) 528 F.3d 413, 418 .) As our Supreme Court has explained in Hassell v. Bird (2018) 5 Cal.5th 522, 534-535 (Hassell), the immunity provisions implement the policy goals of section 230, which include “promot[ing] the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and 9 other interactive media” (§ 230(b)(1)) and “preserv[ing] the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” (§ 230(b)(2).) To claim immunity under sect

2024Applicable law and standard of review “When reviewing a ruling on a demurrer, we examine de novo whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action.” (Liapes v. Facebook (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 910 , 919 (Liapes), citing Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 549, 558 (Regents).) “ ‘We assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, [and] facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded.’ [Citation.] But we do not assume the truth of ‘contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.’ ” (Liapes, supra, at

2024Applicable law and standard of review “When reviewing a ruling on a demurrer, we examine de novo whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action.” (Liapes v. Facebook (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 910 , 919 (Liapes), citing Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 549, 558 (Regents).) “ ‘We assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, [and] facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded.’ [Citation.] But we do not assume the truth of ‘contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.’ ” (Liapes, supra, at

2024Applicable law and standard of review “When reviewing a ruling on a demurrer, we examine de novo whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action.” (Liapes v. Facebook (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 910 , 919 (Liapes), citing Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 549, 558 (Regents).) “ ‘We assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, [and] facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded.’ [Citation.] But we do not assume the truth of ‘contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.’ ” (Liapes, supra, at

2024Applicable law and standard of review “When reviewing a ruling on a demurrer, we examine de novo whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action.” (Liapes v. Facebook (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 910 , 919 (Liapes), citing Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 549, 558 (Regents).) “ ‘We assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, [and] facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded.’ [Citation.] But we do not assume the truth of ‘contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.’ ” (Liapes, supra, at

2024Applicable law and standard of review “When reviewing a ruling on a demurrer, we examine de novo whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action.” (Liapes v. Facebook (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 910 , 919 (Liapes), citing Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 549, 558 (Regents).) “ ‘We assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, [and] facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded.’ [Citation.] But we do not assume the truth of ‘contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.’ ” (Liapes, supra, at

2024Applicable law and standard of review “When reviewing a ruling on a demurrer, we examine de novo whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action.” (Liapes v. Facebook (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 910 , 919 (Liapes), citing Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 549, 558 (Regents).) “ ‘We assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, [and] facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded.’ [Citation.] But we do not assume the truth of ‘contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.’ ” (Liapes, supra, at

2024Applicable law and standard of review “When reviewing a ruling on a demurrer, we examine de novo whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action.” (Liapes v. Facebook (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 910 , 919 (Liapes), citing Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 549, 558 (Regents).) “ ‘We assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, [and] facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded.’ [Citation.] But we do not assume the truth of ‘contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.’ ” (Liapes, supra, at

2024Applicable law and standard of review “When reviewing a ruling on a demurrer, we examine de novo whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action.” (Liapes v. Facebook (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 910 , 919 (Liapes), citing Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 549, 558 (Regents).) “ ‘We assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, [and] facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded.’ [Citation.] But we do not assume the truth of ‘contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.’ ” (Liapes, supra, at

2023(See, e.g., Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 294, 298, 313 [section 230 did not bar lawsuit based on 9 Yelp’s own claims about the accuracy and efficacy of its “filter” for unreliable or biased customer reviews]; Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc. (9th Cir. 2016) 824 F.3d 846 , 848–849 [section 230 did not bar negligent failure to warn claim against company that owned Web site and allegedly knew identified rapists were using information posted on the site, not by the rapists but by the victim, to lure the victim to the rape site3]; Roommates.com, supra, 521 F.3d at p. 1165 [section 2

2022(See Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 294, 310, 313 [CDA does not 18 apply where “plaintiff seeks to hold Yelp liable for its own statements regarding the accuracy of its filter”].) Prager has not, however, alleged facts supporting its standing to raise this aspect of its UCL challenge.

2023There, a service provider was held liable for defamatory comments posted on one of its bulletin boards, based on a finding that the provider had adopted the role of ‘publisher’ by actively screening and editing postings. ‘Fearing that the specter of liability would . . . deter service providers from blocking and screening offensive material, Congress enacted § 230’s broad immunity,’ which ‘forbids the imposition of publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory functions.’ ” (Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 44 , fn. omitted, quoting Zeran v. Am

2021(Barrett, at pp. 48-49.) Noting that the “terms of section 230(c)(1) are broad and direct,” the court rejected an interpretation of the CDA that assumed Congress intended to immunize “ ‘publishers’ ” but leave “ ‘distributors’ ” vulnerable to liability.10 (Barrett, at pp. 47-48.) Importantly, Barrett also expressly agreed with the Zeran court’s analysis of section 230 immunity and its construction of the term “publisher.” ( Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 41-42, 48-49.) As discussed above, Murphy’s claims here fall squarely within Zeran’s holding that “lawsuits seeking to hold a service prov

2006While many of the cases addressing CDA immunity have involved claims for defamation (see, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, supra, 333 F.3d 1018 ; Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online Inc., supra, 206 F.3d 980 ; PatentWizard, Inc. v. Kinko’s, Inc., supra, 163 F.Supp.2d 1069 ; Blumenthal v. Drudge (D.D.C. 1998) 992 F.Supp. 44 ), it is clear that immunity under section 230 is not so limited.

2006While many of the cases addressing CDA immunity have involved claims for defamation (see, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, supra, 333 F.3d 1018 ; Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online Inc., supra, 206 F.3d 980 ; PatentWizard, Inc. v. Kinko’s, Inc., supra, 163 F.Supp.2d 1069 ; Blumenthal v. Drudge (D.D.C. 1998) 992 F.Supp. 44 ), it is clear that immunity under section 230 is not so limited.

2022(See, e.g., Barnes, supra, 570 F.3d at p. 1107 [regarding § 230 immunity as inapplicable to a claim of promissory estoppel alleging that an Internet intermediary promised to remove offensive content].)” ( Hassell, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 542-543.) Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has said “[i]t is not enough that third-party content is involved” and has “rejected use of a ‘but-for’ test that would provide immunity under the CDA solely because a cause of action would not otherwise have accrued but 72 for the third-party content. [Citation.] We look instead to what the duty at issue actually require

2022(See, e.g., Barnes, supra, 570 F.3d at p. 1107 [regarding § 230 immunity as inapplicable to a claim of promissory estoppel alleging that an Internet intermediary promised to remove offensive content].)” ( Hassell, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 542-543.) Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has said “[i]t is not enough that third-party content is involved” and has “rejected use of a ‘but-for’ test that would provide immunity under the CDA solely because a cause of action would not otherwise have accrued but 72 for the third-party content. [Citation.] We look instead to what the duty at issue actually require

2022It does not permit Internet service providers or users to be sued as ‘distributors,’ nor does it expose ‘active users’ to liability.” (Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 63 (Barrett).) “By declaring that no ‘user’ may be treated as a ‘publisher’ of third[-]party content, Congress has comprehensively immunized republication by individual Internet users.” (Id. at p. 62.) “Section 230(e)(3) underscores, rather than undermines, the broad scope of section 230 immunity by prohibiting not only the imposition of ‘liability’ under certain state[-]law theories, but also the pursuit of a proscrib

2018Section 230(e)(3) underscores, rather than undermines, the broad scope of section 230 immunity by prohibiting not only the imposition of "liability" under certain state-law theories, but also the pursuit of a proscribed "cause of action." (See Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc. (4th Cir. 2009) 591 F.3d 250 , 254 [ section 230 is not just a " 'defense to liability' "; it instead confers " 'immunity from suit' " (italics omitted) ]; Medytox Solutions, Inc. v. Investorshub.com, Inc. , supra , 152 So.3d at p. 731 .) This inclusive language, read in connection with section 230(c)(1)

2022(See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 .) 8 570 F.3d at pp. 1100, 1102, 1105; Murphy, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 30, 34; Lewis, supra, 461 F.Supp.3d at pp. 954-955.) Prager’s contention that defendants are themselves an information content provider—in that they developed algorithms used in determining whether to restrict access to Prager’s videos—does nothing to defeat section 230 immunity.

2010(See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ].) We need only add that, as the Ninth Circuit itself said in another case, section 230(c)(1) immunity was intended to prevent liability that otherwise would obtain under traditional common law as regards the publication of someone else’s material (see Batzel v. Smith, supra, 333 F.3d at p. 1026 [§ 230(c)(1) immunity was intended to “override[] the traditional treatment of publishers, distributors, and speakers under statutory and common law”]), a thought consistent with the Supreme Cour