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33 California opinions name it 1 courts 1988–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Shirk v. Vista Unified School Districtred2 sentences2017However, "the government claim presentation deadline is not a statute of limitations." Thus, section 340.1 did not revive those claims barred by failure to comply with the claim presentation requirement. ( Shirk , supra , at p. 213, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 210 , 164 P.3d 630 .) Moreover, as the appellate court in S.M. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist . (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 712 , 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 270 ( S.M . ) observed, although section 340.1 extended "the time during which a victim of childhood sexual abuse may sue, ... it [did] not alter the cause of action's accrual date, which is when the molesta 2017However, "the government claim presentation deadline is not a statute of limitations." Thus, section 340.1 did not revive those claims barred by failure to comply with the claim presentation requirement. ( Shirk , supra , at p. 213, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 210 , 164 P.3d 630 .) Moreover, as the appellate court in S.M. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist . (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 712 , 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 270 ( S.M . ) observed, although section 340.1 extended "the time during which a victim of childhood sexual abuse may sue, ... it [did] not alter the cause of action's accrual date, which is when the molesta | 2 | 4 |
Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc.green2 sentences2016It is well established that when a "new theory contemplates a factual situation the consequences of which are open to controversy and were not put in issue or *1264 presented at the trial the opposing party should not be required to defend against it on appeal. [Citations.]" ( Panopulos v. Maderis (1956) 47 Cal.2d 337 , 341, 303 P.2d 738 ; see Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 869 , 879, 242 Cal.Rptr. 184 .) We therefore decline to consider the issue for the first time on appeal. 2016It is well established that when a "new theory contemplates a factual situation the consequences of which are open to controversy and were not put in issue or *1264 presented at the trial the opposing party should not be required to defend against it on appeal. [Citations.]" ( Panopulos v. Maderis (1956) 47 Cal.2d 337 , 341, 303 P.2d 738 ; see Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 869 , 879, 242 Cal.Rptr. 184 .) We therefore decline to consider the issue for the first time on appeal. | 2 | 2 |
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2000Cedars-Sinai expressly disapproved Smith v. Superior Court to the extent that it is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in that case. ( Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 18, fn. 4 , 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248 , 954 P.2d 511 .) [8] Also inapposite are cases where the court assumed without deciding that a cause of action for negligent spoliation exists (see, e.g., Hernandez v. Garcetti (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 675 . 680, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 [held that a government tort claim for negligent spoliation was untimely]), cases where the issue of the existence of a tort remedy was not squarely at iss 2000(Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 18, fn. 4 .) Also inapposite are cases where the court assumed without deciding that a cause of action for negligent spoliation exists (see, e.g., Hernandez v. Garcetti (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 675, 680 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ] [held that a government tort claim for negligent spoliation was untimely]), cases where the issue of the existence of a tort remedy was not squarely at issue (see, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1289, 1293-1294, fn. 10 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 855 ] [held that the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule | 2 | 2 |
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2000(Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 18, fn. 4 .) Also inapposite are cases where the court assumed without deciding that a cause of action for negligent spoliation exists (see, e.g., Hernandez v. Garcetti (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 675, 680 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ] [held that a government tort claim for negligent spoliation was untimely]), cases where the issue of the existence of a tort remedy was not squarely at issue (see, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1289, 1293-1294, fn. 10 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 855 ] [held that the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule 2000(Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 18, fn. 4 .) Also inapposite are cases where the court assumed without deciding that a cause of action for negligent spoliation exists (see, e.g., Hernandez v. Garcetti (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 675, 680 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ] [held that a government tort claim for negligent spoliation was untimely]), cases where the issue of the existence of a tort remedy was not squarely at issue (see, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1289, 1293-1294, fn. 10 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 855 ] [held that the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule | 2 | 2 |
Gong v. City of Rosemeadgreen2 sentences2025(See Gong, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 377–378 [“The ‘substantial compliance’ exception . . . does not ‘save’ [plaintiff’s claim] because there is no reference whatsoever in [the claim] to [defendant’s] alleged tortious behavior”]; Dilts, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 37 [“The doctrine of substantial compliance cannot cure the total omission of an essential element from the claim or remedy a plaintiff’s failure to comply meaningfully with the statute”]; Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 769 [plaintiff’s claim “bears little or no resemblance to a government tort claim” wh 2016(Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1236-1237 (Perez); see Gong v. City of Rosemead (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 363, 374 .) In Perez, the complaint alleged the plaintiff “filed a timely claim complying with the required claims statute” and complied “with the requirements of the government tort claim statute.” (Perez, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1232 .) The Fifth District Court of Appeal held that the general allegations regarding compliance with the Government Claims Act were sufficient to withstand demurrer. | 1 | 2 |
Galanek v. Wismargreen2 sentences2000(Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 18, fn. 4 .) Also inapposite are cases where the court assumed without deciding that a cause of action for negligent spoliation exists (see, e.g., Hernandez v. Garcetti (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 675, 680 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ] [held that a government tort claim for negligent spoliation was untimely]), cases where the issue of the existence of a tort remedy was not squarely at issue (see, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1289, 1293-1294, fn. 10 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 855 ] [held that the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule 2000(Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 18, fn. 4 .) Also inapposite are cases where the court assumed without deciding that a cause of action for negligent spoliation exists (see, e.g., Hernandez v. Garcetti (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 675, 680 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ] [held that a government tort claim for negligent spoliation was untimely]), cases where the issue of the existence of a tort remedy was not squarely at issue (see, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1289, 1293-1294, fn. 10 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 855 ] [held that the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule | 1 | 2 |
Hernandez v. Garcettigreen2 sentences2000(Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 18, fn. 4 .) Also inapposite are cases where the court assumed without deciding that a cause of action for negligent spoliation exists (see, e.g., Hernandez v. Garcetti (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 675, 680 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ] [held that a government tort claim for negligent spoliation was untimely]), cases where the issue of the existence of a tort remedy was not squarely at issue (see, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1289, 1293-1294, fn. 10 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 855 ] [held that the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule 2000(Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 18, fn. 4 .) Also inapposite are cases where the court assumed without deciding that a cause of action for negligent spoliation exists (see, e.g., Hernandez v. Garcetti (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 675, 680 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ] [held that a government tort claim for negligent spoliation was untimely]), cases where the issue of the existence of a tort remedy was not squarely at issue (see, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1289, 1293-1294, fn. 10 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 855 ] [held that the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule | 1 | 2 |
Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Districtgreen2 sentences2025(See Gong, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 377–378 [“The ‘substantial compliance’ exception . . . does not ‘save’ [plaintiff’s claim] because there is no reference whatsoever in [the claim] to [defendant’s] alleged tortious behavior”]; Dilts, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 37 [“The doctrine of substantial compliance cannot cure the total omission of an essential element from the claim or remedy a plaintiff’s failure to comply meaningfully with the statute”]; Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 769 [plaintiff’s claim “bears little or no resemblance to a government tort claim” wh 2025(See Gong, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 377–378 [“The ‘substantial compliance’ exception . . . does not ‘save’ [plaintiff’s claim] because there is no reference whatsoever in [the claim] to [defendant’s] alleged tortious behavior”]; Dilts, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 37 [“The doctrine of substantial compliance cannot cure the total omission of an essential element from the claim or remedy a plaintiff’s failure to comply meaningfully with the statute”]; Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 769 [plaintiff’s claim “bears little or no resemblance to a government tort claim” wh | 1 | 1 |
Del Real v. City of Riversidegreen1 sentence2025(See Gong, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 377–378 [“The ‘substantial compliance’ exception . . . does not ‘save’ [plaintiff’s claim] because there is no reference whatsoever in [the claim] to [defendant’s] alleged tortious behavior”]; Dilts, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 37 [“The doctrine of substantial compliance cannot cure the total omission of an essential element from the claim or remedy a plaintiff’s failure to comply meaningfully with the statute”]; Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 769 [plaintiff’s claim “bears little or no resemblance to a government tort claim” wh | 1 | 1 |
Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafifgreen1 sentence2024(Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 295, fn. 21 .) 2 On April 26, 2022, attorney Kashou, using a general claim form, filed a government tort claim against the State of California, which was mailed to a Sacramento, California address. | 1 | 1 |
County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commissiongreen1 sentence2024(See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Com. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 905, 926-932 [providing detailed example of how to analyze invasion of privacy claims].) This would include the District’s arguments that publication of the claim was absolutely privileged pursuant to Civil Code section 47, and that Royer did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy once she filed a government tort claim as a precursor to litigation. | 1 | 1 |
Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Educationgreen1 sentence2024(See, e.g., Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702, 714 [in a lawsuit against county office of education, plaintiff’s late- claim application to the county board of supervisors did not constitute substantial compliance].) 15. | 1 | 1 |
| Moore v. Twomeygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rose v. Hudsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wells v. One2One Learning Foundationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bay Area Rapid Transit District v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Norgart v. Upjohn Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| CURTIS T. v. County of Los Angelesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| V.C. v. Los Angeles Unified School Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fowler v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| John B. Gunn Law Corp. v. Maynardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fall River Joint Unified School District v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lopez v. Southern California Permanente Medical Groupgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nelson v. State of Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nelson v. County of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences2026There, the court concluded a government tort claim filed by a decedent’s mother was insufficient to support an action by the decedent’s estate because the claim listed the mother as the only claimant and “the damages described in the claim were for ‘the loss of a son’ (with no mention of any damage incurred by [the decedent] before his death).” (Nelson, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 796 .) Specifically, the claim “did not identify any damages recoverable by the estate (e.g., predeath medical expenses or other expenses suffered by [the decedent] before his death).” (Id. at p. 797, fn. 10.) In co 2015(Castaneda, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1062 ; Nelson, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 796-797.) IV. | 2 | 2015–2026 |
Kobzoff v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center
green
2 sentences2017(See Kobzoff v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center (1998) 19 Cal.4th 851, 857 ; Gamble v. Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 253, 258-259 .) In a case alleging a government tort claim, we explained as follows: “To avoid paying defense costs under section 1038, plaintiff must show he or she filed and pursued the action with ‘reasonable cause and in the good faith belief that there was a justifiable controversy under the facts and law which warranted the filing of the complaint, . . . ’ [Citations.] The moving defendant must negate either good faith or reasonable 2017(See Kobzoff v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center (1998) 19 Cal.4th 851 , 857, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 803 , 968 P.2d 514 ; Gamble v. Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 253 , 258-259, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 271 .) In a case alleging a government tort claim, we explained as follows: "To avoid paying defense costs under section 1038, plaintiff must show he or she filed and pursued the action with 'reasonable cause and in the good faith belief that there was a justifiable controversy under the facts and law which warranted the filing of the complaint, ...' [Citations.] The movin | 2 | 2017–2017 |
S.M. v. Los Angeles Unified School District
green
2 sentences2017However, "the government claim presentation deadline is not a statute of limitations." Thus, section 340.1 did not revive those claims barred by failure to comply with the claim presentation requirement. ( Shirk , supra , at p. 213, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 210 , 164 P.3d 630 .) Moreover, as the appellate court in S.M. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist . (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 712 , 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 270 ( S.M . ) observed, although section 340.1 extended "the time during which a victim of childhood sexual abuse may sue, ... it [did] not alter the cause of action's accrual date, which is when the molesta 2017However, "the government claim presentation deadline is not a statute of limitations." Thus, section 340.1 did not revive those claims barred by failure to comply with the claim presentation requirement. ( Shirk , supra , at p. 213, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 210 , 164 P.3d 630 .) Moreover, as the appellate court in S.M. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist . (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 712 , 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 270 ( S.M . ) observed, although section 340.1 extended "the time during which a victim of childhood sexual abuse may sue, ... it [did] not alter the cause of action's accrual date, which is when the molesta | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Gamble v. Los Angeles Department of Water & Power
green
2 sentences2017(See Kobzoff v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center (1998) 19 Cal.4th 851, 857 ; Gamble v. Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 253, 258-259 .) In a case alleging a government tort claim, we explained as follows: “To avoid paying defense costs under section 1038, plaintiff must show he or she filed and pursued the action with ‘reasonable cause and in the good faith belief that there was a justifiable controversy under the facts and law which warranted the filing of the complaint, . . . ’ [Citations.] The moving defendant must negate either good faith or reasonable 2017(See Kobzoff v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center (1998) 19 Cal.4th 851 , 857, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 803 , 968 P.2d 514 ; Gamble v. Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 253 , 258-259, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 271 .) In a case alleging a government tort claim, we explained as follows: "To avoid paying defense costs under section 1038, plaintiff must show he or she filed and pursued the action with 'reasonable cause and in the good faith belief that there was a justifiable controversy under the facts and law which warranted the filing of the complaint, ...' [Citations.] The movin | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Panopulos v. Maderis
green
2 sentences2016It is well established that when a "new theory contemplates a factual situation the consequences of which are open to controversy and were not put in issue or *1264 presented at the trial the opposing party should not be required to defend against it on appeal. [Citations.]" ( Panopulos v. Maderis (1956) 47 Cal.2d 337 , 341, 303 P.2d 738 ; see Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 869 , 879, 242 Cal.Rptr. 184 .) We therefore decline to consider the issue for the first time on appeal. 2016It is well established that when a "new theory contemplates a factual situation the consequences of which are open to controversy and were not put in issue or *1264 presented at the trial the opposing party should not be required to defend against it on appeal. [Citations.]" ( Panopulos v. Maderis (1956) 47 Cal.2d 337 , 341, 303 P.2d 738 ; see Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 869 , 879, 242 Cal.Rptr. 184 .) We therefore decline to consider the issue for the first time on appeal. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Harris v. Hegmann
green
2 sentences2004The statute of limitations would not bar Wright's federal counts. (42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e; Brown v. Morgan (6th Cir.2000) 209 F.3d 595, 596 ; Harris v. Hegmann (1999) 198 F.3d 153, 158-159 .) Neither the statute of limitations for medical malpractice, nor the time limit for filing suit after rejection of a government tort claim, would bar Wright's state counts. 2004The statute of limitations would not bar Wright’s federal counts. (42 U.S.C. § 1997e; Brown v. Morgan (6th Cir. 2000) 209 F.3d 595, 596 ; Harris v. Hegmann (1999) 198 F.3d 153, 158-159 .) Neither the statute of limitations for medical malpractice, nor the time limit for filing suit after rejection of a government tort claim, would bar Wright’s state counts. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Roger Anthony Brown v. James Morgan, Warden James B. Mitchell Doug Sapp
green
2 sentences2004The statute of limitations would not bar Wright's federal counts. (42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e; Brown v. Morgan (6th Cir.2000) 209 F.3d 595, 596 ; Harris v. Hegmann (1999) 198 F.3d 153, 158-159 .) Neither the statute of limitations for medical malpractice, nor the time limit for filing suit after rejection of a government tort claim, would bar Wright's state counts. 2004The statute of limitations would not bar Wright’s federal counts. (42 U.S.C. § 1997e; Brown v. Morgan (6th Cir. 2000) 209 F.3d 595, 596 ; Harris v. Hegmann (1999) 198 F.3d 153, 158-159 .) Neither the statute of limitations for medical malpractice, nor the time limit for filing suit after rejection of a government tort claim, would bar Wright’s state counts. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Olson v. County of Sacramento
green
2 sentences2004(E.g., Baillargeon, supra, 69 Cal.App.3d at p. 683 , 138 Cal.Rptr. 338 ; Olson, supra, 38 Cal.App.3d at p. 965 , 113 Cal.Rptr. 664 ; Myers, supra, 6 Cal.App.3d at p. 634 , 86 Cal.Rptr. 198 .) Thus, we exclude the time during which a litigant reasonably pursues his administrative remedy from the six-month time limit for filing a court action after the Board of Control rejects a government tort claim. 2004(E.g., Baillargeon, supra, 69 Cal.App.3d at p. 683 ; Olson, supra, 38 Cal.App.3d at p. 965 ; Myers, supra, 6 Cal.App.3d at p. 634 .) Thus, we exclude the time during which a litigant reasonably pursues his administrative remedy from the six-month time limit for filing a court action after the Board of Control rejects a government tort claim. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Myers v. County of Orange
green
2 sentences2004(E.g., Baillargeon, supra, 69 Cal.App.3d at p. 683 , 138 Cal.Rptr. 338 ; Olson, supra, 38 Cal.App.3d at p. 965 , 113 Cal.Rptr. 664 ; Myers, supra, 6 Cal.App.3d at p. 634 , 86 Cal.Rptr. 198 .) Thus, we exclude the time during which a litigant reasonably pursues his administrative remedy from the six-month time limit for filing a court action after the Board of Control rejects a government tort claim. 2004(E.g., Baillargeon, supra, 69 Cal.App.3d at p. 683 ; Olson, supra, 38 Cal.App.3d at p. 965 ; Myers, supra, 6 Cal.App.3d at p. 634 .) Thus, we exclude the time during which a litigant reasonably pursues his administrative remedy from the six-month time limit for filing a court action after the Board of Control rejects a government tort claim. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Baillargeon v. Dep't of Water & Power of L.A.
green
2 sentences2004(E.g., Baillargeon, supra, 69 Cal.App.3d at p. 683 , 138 Cal.Rptr. 338 ; Olson, supra, 38 Cal.App.3d at p. 965 , 113 Cal.Rptr. 664 ; Myers, supra, 6 Cal.App.3d at p. 634 , 86 Cal.Rptr. 198 .) Thus, we exclude the time during which a litigant reasonably pursues his administrative remedy from the six-month time limit for filing a court action after the Board of Control rejects a government tort claim. 2004(E.g., Baillargeon, supra, 69 Cal.App.3d at p. 683 ; Olson, supra, 38 Cal.App.3d at p. 965 ; Myers, supra, 6 Cal.App.3d at p. 634 .) Thus, we exclude the time during which a litigant reasonably pursues his administrative remedy from the six-month time limit for filing a court action after the Board of Control rejects a government tort claim. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Connelly v. County of Fresno
green
1 sentence2025(See Gong, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 377–378 [“The ‘substantial compliance’ exception . . . does not ‘save’ [plaintiff’s claim] because there is no reference whatsoever in [the claim] to [defendant’s] alleged tortious behavior”]; Dilts, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 37 [“The doctrine of substantial compliance cannot cure the total omission of an essential element from the claim or remedy a plaintiff’s failure to comply meaningfully with the statute”]; Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 769 [plaintiff’s claim “bears little or no resemblance to a government tort claim” wh | 1 | 2025–2025 |
DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara
green
1 sentence2024First, “[t]he claimant bears the burden of ensuring that the claim is presented to the appropriate public entity.” (DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 991 .) “If an appropriate public employee or board never receives the claim, an undelivered or misdirected claim fails to comply with the statute.” (Id. at p. 992.) Government Code section 915 requires a government tort claim to be hand delivered or mailed to, or actually received by, the “clerk, secretary, auditor, or board of the local public entity.” (Id., subds. (a), (e).) Plaintiff’s e-mail to the Tulare County G | 1 | 2024–2024 |
CHIATELLO v. City and County of San Francisco
green
1 sentence2024VI Taxpayer Action (Code Civ. Proc., § 526a) Code of Civil Procedure section 526a “establishes the right of a taxpayer plaintiff to maintain an action against any officer of a local agency to obtain a judgment restraining or preventing illegal expenditure, waste, or injury of the estate, funds, or property of said agency.” (Schmid v. City and County of San Francisco (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 470 , 495.) However, “waste” in this context “does not encompass the great majority of governmental outlays of money or the time of salaried governmental employees, nor does it apply to the vast majority of di | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Coshow v. City of Escondido
green
1 sentence2024VI Taxpayer Action (Code Civ. Proc., § 526a) Code of Civil Procedure section 526a “establishes the right of a taxpayer plaintiff to maintain an action against any officer of a local agency to obtain a judgment restraining or preventing illegal expenditure, waste, or injury of the estate, funds, or property of said agency.” (Schmid v. City and County of San Francisco (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 470 , 495.) However, “waste” in this context “does not encompass the great majority of governmental outlays of money or the time of salaried governmental employees, nor does it apply to the vast majority of di | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Simms v. Bear Valley Community Heathcare Dist.
green
1 sentence2024A “ ‘careful practitioner’ would take the belt-and- suspenders approach.” (Simms v. Bear Valley Community Healthcare District (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 391 , 398). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Sagaser v. McCarthy
green
1 sentence2024VI Taxpayer Action (Code Civ. Proc., § 526a) Code of Civil Procedure section 526a “establishes the right of a taxpayer plaintiff to maintain an action against any officer of a local agency to obtain a judgment restraining or preventing illegal expenditure, waste, or injury of the estate, funds, or property of said agency.” (Schmid v. City and County of San Francisco (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 470 , 495.) However, “waste” in this context “does not encompass the great majority of governmental outlays of money or the time of salaried governmental employees, nor does it apply to the vast majority of di | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Blair v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2024In Blair v. Superior Court (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 221 (Blair), the court found the plaintiff’s government tort claim asserting negligence in the construction and general maintenance of a highway was sufficient to allow him to proceed on a factual theory in his subsequent complaint that the road was defective due to the lack of guard rails, the slope of the road, and a failure to warn. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Mills v. Forestex Co.
green
1 sentence2022(Mills, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 641 .) The trial court, properly relying on the record before it, concluded Coyle’s government tort claim did not equitably toll the time to file a DFEH administrative complaint.1 Because Coyle’s FEHA claims were time-barred and equitable tolling does not apply, we need not consider the parties’ additional arguments concerning whether the facts supported her FEHA claims. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Cold Creek Compost, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Tackett v. City of Huntington Beach green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Castaneda v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilation green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Yanowitz v. L'OREAL USA, INC. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Kelley v. The Conco Cos. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| K.J. v. Arcadia Unified School District green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Nelson v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Lewis v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Shank v. County of Los Angeles green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Salinero v. Pon green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Nelson v. Flintkote Co. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Hocharian v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Adams v. Roses green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.