wrongful termination in violation of public policy in California

2026Her statutory claims served as the basis for her contention that she had been terminated in violation of public policy within the meaning of Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 , giving rise to a common law claim for wrongful termination.

2026In December 2016, respondent filed an amendment to complaint naming Los Bagres as a Doe defendant.4 Respondent’s complaint attached the Department of Fair Employment and Housing’s (DFEH) notice of filing of 2 Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 , 177– 178 (Tameny) (holding at-will employees may recover tort damages from their employers for being discharged in contravention of fundamental public policy). 3 Cabrera, Mariela Garcia, and Jesus Erasmo Garcia are not parties to this appeal. 4 Respondent also filed an “amended cross/cross-complaint” in October 2017 and a “second ame

2026In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 , the Supreme Court determined that “when an employer’s discharge of an employee violates fundamental principles of public policy, the discharged employee may maintain a tort action and recover damages traditionally available in such actions.” (Id. at p. 170, italics added.) Later, the court concluded “employees who assert Tameny claims must show that the important public interests they seek to protect are ‘tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions.’ (Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1

2026So Trevino’s reliance on authority concerning wrongful termination in violation of public policy does not help him.7 (See Green v. Ralee 7 Similarly, Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1378 , 1385-1386, disapproved on another ground by Lawson v. PPG Architectural 6 Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 71 ; City of Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1143 , 1158-1161; Gantt v. Sentry Ins. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1085 ; Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 178 .) We are not asked to decide whether and when termination for reporting a s

2025(See Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 889 [policy must be “ ‘well established’ at the time of the discharge”]; accord, Diego v. Pilgrim United Church of Christ (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 913, 926 [“The public policy violated by an alleged wrongful discharge must be ‘one about which reasonable persons can have little disagreement, and which was “firmly established” at the time of discharge.’ ”], quoting Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 668 .) Fourth, the policy in section 432.2 of prohibiting involuntary polygraph examinations is “substantial“ and “fundamental.” The Legislature in 1981 amended secti

2025(See Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 889 [policy must be “ ‘well established’ at the time of the discharge”]; accord, Diego v. Pilgrim United Church of Christ (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 913, 926 [“The public policy violated by an alleged wrongful discharge must be ‘one about which reasonable persons can have little disagreement, and which was “firmly established” at the time of discharge.’ ”], quoting Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 668 .) Fourth, the policy in section 432.2 of prohibiting involuntary polygraph examinations is “substantial“ and “fundamental.” The Legislature in 1981 amended secti

2025(See Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880 , 889-890 [stating that the public policy at issue must be established by constitutional or statutory provision].) The trial court found the wrongful termination claim failed with the summary adjudication of the predicate retaliation claim.

2025Code, § 63103); (7) Discrimination and retaliation (§§ 98.6 & 1102.5); (8) Defamation (see Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720 ); (9) Intentional infliction of emotional distress4 (see Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001 ); (10) Wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (see Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 887 ); and (11) Unlawful and unfair business practices (Bus. & Prof.

2026In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 , the Supreme Court determined that “when an employer’s discharge of an employee violates fundamental principles of public policy, the discharged employee may maintain a tort action and recover damages traditionally available in such actions.” (Id. at p. 170, italics added.) Later, the court concluded “employees who assert Tameny claims must show that the important public interests they seek to protect are ‘tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions.’ (Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1

2026So Trevino’s reliance on authority concerning wrongful termination in violation of public policy does not help him.7 (See Green v. Ralee 7 Similarly, Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1378 , 1385-1386, disapproved on another ground by Lawson v. PPG Architectural 6 Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 71 ; City of Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1143 , 1158-1161; Gantt v. Sentry Ins. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1085 ; Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 178 .) We are not asked to decide whether and when termination for reporting a s

2023(See, e.g., Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 88 (Rojo) [employee was not required to exhaust FEHA administrative process before bringing action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy]; Stevenson, at p. 903 [exhaustion of administrative remedies not required to bring claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy against age discrimination].) 11 The “common law of this state provides any number of remedial theories to compensate for injuries ‘relating to discrimination’ (§ 12993, subd. (a)).” (Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 74 .) Employment discrimination cases “ ‘inv

2023(See, e.g., Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 88 (Rojo) [employee was not required to exhaust FEHA administrative process before bringing action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy]; Stevenson, at p. 903 [exhaustion of administrative remedies not required to bring claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy against age discrimination].) 11 The “common law of this state provides any number of remedial theories to compensate for injuries ‘relating to discrimination’ (§ 12993, subd. (a)).” (Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 74 .) Employment discrimination cases “ ‘inv

2024All of Escamilla-Vera’s causes of action arose under FEHA and required evidence of discrimination by an “employer.” (See § 12940, subds. (a), (k) [precluding an “employer” from discriminating on the basis of age or national origin and from failing to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination from occurring]; Jennings, supra, 8 Cal.4th a p. 130 [action for wrongful termination in violation of FEHA public policy may only be maintained against a defendant that qualifies as an employer]; CACI No. 2502 (“Disparate Impact – Essential Factual Elements (Gov.

2021(Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 130 .) Even if, as a general matter, a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy arises from common law and need not depend on the violation of an express statutory provision, there is no dispute that in this action, respondent’s wrongful termination claim is predicated entirely on a violation of the FEHA.

2026(Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 229 [“[B]ecause 35 [Mata’s] FEHA claim fails, his claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy fails”].) Similarly, Mata’s ninth derivative cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation fails because he has not established the underlying FEHA claims.

2026(See Wilkin v. Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 806 , 820 (Wilkin) [FEHA claims subject to McDonnell Douglas rubric]; Bareno v. San Diego Community College Dist. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 546, 560 [CFRA claims analyzed under same rubric]; see also Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 229 [wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim is derivative of underlying claim].) Under this rubric, established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 , the employer has “ ‘ “the initial burden to present admissible evidence showing

2026In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 , the Supreme Court determined that “when an employer’s discharge of an employee violates fundamental principles of public policy, the discharged employee may maintain a tort action and recover damages traditionally available in such actions.” (Id. at p. 170, italics added.) Later, the court concluded “employees who assert Tameny claims must show that the important public interests they seek to protect are ‘tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions.’ (Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1

2026In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 , the Supreme Court determined that “when an employer’s discharge of an employee violates fundamental principles of public policy, the discharged employee may maintain a tort action and recover damages traditionally available in such actions.” (Id. at p. 170, italics added.) Later, the court concluded “employees who assert Tameny claims must show that the important public interests they seek to protect are ‘tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions.’ (Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1

2016(Green, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 71 [employee discharged for complaining to management that defendant was shipping airline parts that failed inspections in violation of the Federal Aviation Act]; Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1097 [employee discharged for refusing to give false testimony]; Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 169 [employer forced an employee to participate in an illegal price fixing scheme]; Gould v. Maryland Sound Industries, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1149 [employee fired for reporting violations of overtime laws to management]; Collier v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d

2014Former section 1102.5(b) expressly protected the disclosure to a government agency of “a violation or noncompliance with a state . . . regulation.” (Italics added.) 10 In a pie-Tameny opinion, the Court of Appeal relied on this same language from Safeway Stores in concluding an employer’s right to discharge an employee could be limited by considerations of “public policy.” (Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 184, 188 [ 344 P.2d 25 ].) 11 Any other interpretation would lead to an inequitable result.

2026On a final note, the court explained that because the County could not be held liable for a common law tort, the sixth cause of action for wrongful termination in 4 She does not assert that this attorney was the head of the County Counsel office involved with the County Counsel Claims Office or in any other way the appropriate person to be served with such a claim. 5 violation of public policy was independently meritless under Miklosy v. Regents of the University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899 .

2026An injured employee obtains “relatively swift and certain compensation in return for the surrender of the right to bring tort actions for his employer’s failure to provide a safe place of employment.” (Ibid.) “Workers’ compensation is the sole remedy for an employee injured by the employer’s failure to provide a safe workplace.” (Spratley v. Winchell Donut House, Inc. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1408, 1412 (Spratley).) “The exclusivity rule applies even where the employer’s misconduct is serious, 3 “The exception for conduct that ‘contravenes fundamental public policy’ is aimed at permitting a Tamen

2017Code, § 132a ]; but cf. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1143 , 1161, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 445 , 959 P.2d 752 [holding that "disability discrimination [in violation of Lab.

2017Code, § 132a ]; but cf. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1143 , 1161, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 445 , 959 P.2d 752 [holding that "disability discrimination [in violation of Lab.

2016(Green, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 71 [employee discharged for complaining to management that defendant was shipping airline parts that failed inspections in violation of the Federal Aviation Act]; Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1097 [employee discharged for refusing to give false testimony]; Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 169 [employer forced an employee to participate in an illegal price fixing scheme]; Gould v. Maryland Sound Industries, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1149 [employee fired for reporting violations of overtime laws to management]; Collier v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d

2009Code, § 6310.) “Where a statute creates a right that did not exist at common law, and provides a comprehensive system of administrative enforcement, a requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted may be implied. [Citation.] But, generally, ‘where a statutory remedy is provided for the enforcement of a preexisting common-law right, the newer statutory remedy will be considered only cumulative.’ ” (Hentzel v. Singer Co., supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at p. 303 ; see also 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Actions, §9, p. 71.) Though Cal-OSHA created a statutory right of action for workplac

2017Code, § 3600), and the employer's conduct neither contravenes fundamental public policy (Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. [(1980)] 27 Cal.3d 167 [(Tameny)]) nor exceeds the risks inherent in the employment relationship (Cole [v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987)] 43 Cal.3d 148 [(Cole)]), an employee's emotional distress injuries are subsumed under the exclusive remedy provisions of workers' compensation." (Livitsanos, at p. 754; accord Miklosy v. Regents of the University of Cal. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 902 (Miklosy).) The latter exception, under Cole, has been described as follows: "[T]he

2017In Miklosy , the plaintiffs alleged causes of action for retaliation in violation of the California Whistleblower *688 Protection Act (§ 8547 et seq.), wrongful termination and constructive wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. ( Id. at p. 884, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 690 , 188 P.3d 629 .) As to the last claim, "Plaintiffs allege[d] defendants engaged in 'outrageous conduct' that was intended to, and did, cause plaintiffs 'severe emotional distress,' giving rise to common law causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distres

2016(See, e.g., Silo v. CHW Medical Foundation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1097, 1108-1109 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 698 , 45 P.3d 1162 ] [where employee of religious hospital terminated for discussing another religion in the workplace was barred from pursuing FEHA claim due to statutory exemption for religious corporations, hospital could not be held liable under theory of wrongful termination in violation of public policy]; Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 134-135 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 275 , 876 P.2d 1074 ] [FEHA exemption for employers who employ fewer than five persons precluded tortious wrongful discharge

2016(See, e.g., Silo v. CHW Medical Foundation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1097, 1108-1109 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 698 , 45 P.3d 1162 ] [where employee of religious hospital terminated for discussing another religion in the workplace was barred from pursuing FEHA claim due to statutory exemption for religious corporations, hospital could not be held liable under theory of wrongful termination in violation of public policy]; Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 134-135 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 275 , 876 P.2d 1074 ] [FEHA exemption for employers who employ fewer than five persons precluded tortious wrongful discharge

1994The tort is independent of the term of employment.’ ” (Italics added, quoting Koehrer v. Superior Court (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1155, 116 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 820 ]; see also Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d 167, 176 [“an employer’s obligation to refrain from discharging an employee who refuses to commit a criminal act does not depend upon any express or implied ‘ “promise[] . . .” ’ but rather reflects a duty imposed by law upon all employers in order to implement the fundamental public policies embodied in tiie state’s penal statutes”].) According to a recent count, 43 jurisdictions have adopted the so-cal

1994The tort is independent of the term of employment.’ ” (Italics added, quoting Koehrer v. Superior Court (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1155, 116 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 820 ]; see also Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d 167, 176 [“an employer’s obligation to refrain from discharging an employee who refuses to commit a criminal act does not depend upon any express or implied ‘ “promise[] . . .” ’ but rather reflects a duty imposed by law upon all employers in order to implement the fundamental public policies embodied in tiie state’s penal statutes”].) According to a recent count, 43 jurisdictions have adopted the so-cal

2023Leyva Raised a Triable Issue of Fact as to His Wrongful Termination Claim “The elements of a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy are (1) an employer-employee relationship, (2) the employer terminated the plaintiff’s employment, (3) the termination was substantially motivated by a violation of public policy, and (4) the discharge caused the plaintiff harm.” (Yau v. Allen (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 144, 154 ; accord, Haney v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 623, 641 .) “The 14 Defendants are correct, however, that Leyva has forfeited any argument the tria

2021“The elements of a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy are (1) an employer-employee relationship, (2) the employer terminated the plaintiff’s employment, (3) the termination was substantially motivated by a violation of public policy, and (4) the discharge caused the plaintiff harm.” (Yau v. Allen (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 144, 154 ; accord, Haney v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 623, 641 .) “The central assertion of a claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy is that the employer’s motives for terminating the employee are so contra

2026Three years later, in Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064, 1077 (Little), the court employed similar reasoning to conclude that an employee’s right to bring a Tameny claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy was similarly unwaivable.

2022In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 (Tameny), the California Supreme Court “recognized that although employers have the power to terminate employees at will, they may not terminate an employee for a reason that is contrary to public policy.” (Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064, 1076 .) “[E]mployees who assert Tameny claims must show that the important public interests they seek to protect are ‘tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions.’ ” (Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 71 .) Here,

1990The first amended complaint set forth causes of action for (1) “wrongful termination,” (2) wrongful termination in violation of former Government Code section 19683 (hereafter referred to as section 19683; see fn. 11, post), (3) wrongful termination in violation of fundamental public policy (citing Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 , 9 A.L.R.4th 314 ]), (4) breach of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (citing Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 443 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 722 ]), (5) wrongful inte

1990The first amended complaint set forth causes of action for (1) “wrongful termination,” (2) wrongful termination in violation of former Government Code section 19683 (hereafter referred to as section 19683; see fn. 11, post), (3) wrongful termination in violation of fundamental public policy (citing Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 , 9 A.L.R.4th 314 ]), (4) breach of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (citing Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 443 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 722 ]), (5) wrongful inte

2020(Shapiro, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at p. 475 ; Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 172 .) An employer’s right as to whom to hire (Fisher) cannot preclude an employee’s right to be 12 free from termination for a purpose inconsistent with substantial public policies underlying statutory provisions (Tameny).2 Lastly, we note that respondents’ theory misses the mark for another reason.

2020(Shapiro, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at p. 477 .) The court also rejected Shapiro’s argument that the termination of his employment without cause under Labor Code section 2922 was an unconstitutional denial of his property interest in continuing employment, noting that the plaintiff had not “identified any California statute or rule to support his claim that he is entitled to continued employment.” (Id. at p. 483, italics added.) 10 Shapiro did not consider whether a threat to fire an employee unless he paid $1,000 could constitute a threat to injure property under Penal Code section 519, or whethe

2024(Collier v. Superior Court, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1122– 1123 [a petitioner who reported his suspicions of current illegal conduct—including conduct that may have violated, among other things, laws against embezzlement— “served not only the interests of his employer, but also the public interest in deterring crime” and supported a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy].)4 To recover on a wrongful termination claim under section 1102.5(b), a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing he engaged in protected activity, he was subject to a

2021(Collier v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1121 ; see Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 920, 931-932 (Ross) [cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is based on exception to at-will employment that “an employer may not discharge an employee for a reason that violates a fundamental public policy of the state”].) Construing the SAC liberally to plead a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, at most, only Basler could assert such a claim.

2015“In order to sustain a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of fundamental public policy” a plaintiff “must prove that his dismissal violated a policy that is (1) fundamental, (2) beneficial for the public, and (3) embodied in a statute or constitutional provision.” (Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1256 , fns. omitted.) Since Manuel’s FEHA claim fails for the reasons we have discussed above, so too does “his claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.” (Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 229 ; see also Reno, 18 Cal.4th at p. 663

2013Because plaintiff may not sue [defendant] as an individual supervisor under the FEHA, she may not sue her 14 individually for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.” ( Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th 640, 664 .) More recently, Division Seven of this Court found that because a defendant supervisor could not be personally liable for discrimination-based employment claims under Reno, “it follows he cannot be held liable for the emotional distress claims either.” (Smith v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1637, 1658 .) These authorities apply equally well t

2025FEHA discrimination, harassment, and retaliation; wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and unfair business practices (third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth causes of action) To establish unlawful discrimination or retaliation, a plaintiff must provide evidence that “(1) he [or she] was a member of a protected class, (2) he [or she] was qualified for the position he [or she] sought or was performing competently in the position he [or she] held, (3) he [or she] suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other

2016(Compare, e.g., Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 355 [elements of a FEHA discrimination claim] with Rope v. Auto-Chlor System of Washington, Inc., supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 660 [elements of a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy].) A plaintiff asserting a FEHA claim must exhaust the administrative remedies under that statute before seeking judicial relief.

2025“The central assertion of a claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy is that the employer’s motives for terminating the employee are so contrary to fundamental norms that the termination inflicted an injury sounding in tort.” (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 702 .) Mallon’s claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy in this case is premised on her section 1102.5 retaliation claim as the underlying source of statutory authority.

2024Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452 , 457 (Woodcock).) If a verdict is not hopelessly ambiguous, we may “ ‘interpret the verdict from its language considered in connection with the pleadings, evidence and instructions.’ ” (Id. at pp. 456-457.) C Defendants argue that the jury’s awards of damages to Maya for past lost earnings and emotional distress on her causes of action for sexual harassment, failure to prevent sexual harassment, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and sexual assault/battery were duplicative and, in so arguing, implicitly argue those damages were awarded by the jury for

2026(See Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 503 [a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy accrues at the time of termination of employment].) Mata’s cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy fails because he has not established the underlying FEHA claims.

2023If the employer’s object in offering such a package is, as [the employer] suggests, to purchase exoneration from any claim of wrongful termination, such an object may be secured directly through an express agreement in which the employee waives any potential claims.” (Romano, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 500 .) In so ruling, the court implicitly recognized the public policy benefits of allowing an employer to offer severance benefits in exchange for a release of a wrongful termination claim when the decision to terminate is made before the actual termination date.