therapist duty to warn in California

2026Appellants argue, for the first time on appeal, there are triable issues under title 42 United States Code section 1983 , the Bane Act under Civil Code section 52.1, Government Code section 815.6, and the failure to warn others under Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425 .

2021(Id. at p. 751.) The court distinguished Tarasoff, supra, 17 Cal.3d 18 425 on the basis that the decedent was not a foreseeable or readily identifiable target of the juvenile’s threats.

2024Second, if so, the court must consult the factors described in Rowland [v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 (Rowland)] to determine whether relevant policy considerations counsel limiting that duty.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 209.) “A duty to control, warn, or protect may be based on the defendant’s relationship with ‘either the person whose conduct needs to be controlled or [with] . . . the foreseeable victim of that conduct.’” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 619 , quoting Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 43

2024Second, if so, the court must consult the factors described in Rowland [v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 (Rowland)] to 15 determine whether relevant policy considerations counsel limiting that duty.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 209.) “A duty to control, warn, or protect may be based on the defendant’s relationship with ‘either the person whose conduct needs to be controlled or [with] . . . the foreseeable victim of that conduct.’” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 619 , quoting Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 435 .) The defendant’s duty to control a th

2007(Thompson v. County of Alameda (1980) 27 Cal.3d 741, 752-753 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 70 , 614 P.2d 728 ], citing Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 439 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 ] [“Although the intended victim as a precondition to liability need not be specifically named, he must be ‘readily identifiable’ ”].) Contrary to plaintiffs’ suggestion, the proximity of the park in which they were attacked to the HRC facility does not render plaintiffs identifiable or otherwise separate them from other members of the general public.

2007(Thompson v. County of Alameda (1980) 27 Cal.3d 741, 752-753 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 70 , 614 P.2d 728 ], citing Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 439 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 ] [“Although the intended victim as a precondition to liability need not be specifically named, he must be ‘readily identifiable’ ”].) Contrary to plaintiffs’ suggestion, the proximity of the park in which they were attacked to the HRC facility does not render plaintiffs identifiable or otherwise separate them from other members of the general public.

2018Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 49 , 56, 192 Cal.Rptr. 857 , 665 P.2d 947 ( Bigbee ); see also Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40 , 46, 123 Cal.Rptr. 468 , 539 P.2d 36 ["While duty is a question of law, foreseeability is a question of fact for the jury"].) Section 43.92, subdivision (b) clarifies that a therapist may "discharge[ ] his or her duty to protect by making reasonable efforts to communicate the threat to the victim or victims and to a law enforcement agency." Although described as a "duty to protect," Tarasoff's analysis makes clear that a therapist can normally discharge his or he

2018Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 49 , 56, 192 Cal.Rptr. 857 , 665 P.2d 947 ( Bigbee ); see also Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40 , 46, 123 Cal.Rptr. 468 , 539 P.2d 36 ["While duty is a question of law, foreseeability is a question of fact for the jury"].) Section 43.92, subdivision (b) clarifies that a therapist may "discharge[ ] his or her duty to protect by making reasonable efforts to communicate the threat to the victim or victims and to a law enforcement agency." Although described as a "duty to protect," Tarasoff's analysis makes clear that a therapist can normally discharge his or he

2024(Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1129 ; Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 203 ; Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 435 , foreclosed as a matter of law in any event because the undisputed facts establish that Hargis Home was fully informed of J.C.’s violent propensities.

2024(Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1129 ; Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 203 ; Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 435 , foreclosed as a matter of law in any event because the undisputed facts establish that Hargis Home was fully informed of J.C.’s violent propensities.

2015(Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 456, 472 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 936 P.2d 70 ].) “As a general rule, each person *245 has a duty to use ordinary care and ‘is liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances ....’” (Ibid.; see § 1714, subd. (a) [“Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person . . . .”].) However, “legal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but m

2015(Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 456, 472 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 936 P.2d 70 ].) “As a general rule, each person *245 has a duty to use ordinary care and ‘is liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances ....’” (Ibid.; see § 1714, subd. (a) [“Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person . . . .”].) However, “legal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but m

2014Duty to Warn Plaintiffs contend that the “duty to warn” required the City to advise them that the properties they sought to purchase were subject to AHP restrictions, in reliance on Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 240 , 447 P.2d 352 ] and Tarasoff" v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 ].

2014Duty to Warn Plaintiffs contend that the “duty to warn” required the City to advise them that the properties they sought to purchase were subject to AHP restrictions, in reliance on Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 240 , 447 P.2d 352 ] and Tarasoff" v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 ].

2024(Id. at 1104-1106.) It instead “defines the scope of a manufacturer’s duty to warn in context of prescription drugs” or medical devices (id. at p. 1104) by providing that the manufacturer’s “duty to warn runs to the physician, not to the patient” (Carlin, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1116 ).

2024In a typical products liability case, a manufacturer owes a duty to warn the end user “about the hazards inherent in their products.” (Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 64 .) For manufacturers of prescription drugs and many medical devices, however, the “duty to warn runs to the physician, not to the patient.” (Carlin v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1104, 1116 , italics omitted (Carlin); accord, T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 164 (T.H.).) Thus, these manufacturers have a duty to warn physicians of the risks associated with their products

2020As a general principle, a “defendant owes a duty of care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct, with respect to all risks which make the conduct unreasonably dangerous.” ’ (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425 , 434-435, quoting Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 382, 399 .)” (Giraldo v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 231, 245 (Giraldo).) As will be further discussed, while there is generally no duty to come to the aid of another, such certain relationships do give rise to a duty of care.

2010(See Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 450 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 ]; Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 450 , 460^62 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 416 ].) Rodriguez, supra, 12 Cal.3d 382 , involved a spouse who had nonfatal injuries, and our opinion did not discuss the possibility that the injured spouse’s life expectancy might have been curtailed in any way by his injuries.

1999As set forth in the Restatement Second of Torts, “The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 314.) “As a general rule one has no duty to control the conduct of another, and no duty to warn those who may be endangered by such conduct.” (Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 799, 806 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 842 , 685 P.2d 1193 ], citing Rest.2d Torts, § 315; Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 203 [ 1

1999As set forth in the Restatement Second of Torts, “The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 314.) “As a general rule one has no duty to control the conduct of another, and no duty to warn those who may be endangered by such conduct.” (Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 799, 806 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 842 , 685 P.2d 1193 ], citing Rest.2d Torts, § 315; Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 203 [ 1

2024Second, if so, the court must consult the factors described in Rowland [v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 (Rowland)] to determine whether relevant policy considerations counsel limiting that duty.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 209.) “A duty to control, warn, or protect may be based on the defendant’s relationship with ‘either the person whose conduct needs to be controlled or [with] . . . the foreseeable victim of that conduct.’” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 619 , quoting Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 43

2024Second, if so, the court must consult the factors described in Rowland [v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 (Rowland)] to 15 determine whether relevant policy considerations counsel limiting that duty.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 209.) “A duty to control, warn, or protect may be based on the defendant’s relationship with ‘either the person whose conduct needs to be controlled or [with] . . . the foreseeable victim of that conduct.’” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 619 , quoting Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 435 .) The defendant’s duty to control a th

2024(Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204 , 213 (Brown).) As a general rule, a defendant owes a duty of care to “ ‘all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct, with respect to all risks which make the conduct unreasonably dangerous.’ ” (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425 , 434-435.) To determine whether a duty exists in an ordinary negligence case, courts evaluate “whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed on the negligent par

2021The same rule applies to a person who stumbles upon a mugging, for “as a general matter, there is no duty to act to protect others from the conduct of third parties.” (Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 235 (Delgado); see also Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 619 [Generally, “ ‘one owes no duty to control the conduct of another, nor to warn those endangered by such conduct.’ ”].)5 This general rule, we have explained, “derives from the common law’s distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, and its reluctance to impose liability for the latter.” (Tarasoff v. Regents of Uni

2013For support, Bert’s cites Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 65 [ 271 P.2d 23 ]; Southland Corp. v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 656, 665-668 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 57 ]; Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 435 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 ], superseded by statute, Civ.

2013For support, Bert’s cites Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 65 [ 271 P.2d 23 ]; Southland Corp. v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 656, 665-668 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 57 ]; Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 435 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 ], superseded by statute, Civ.

2008As a general principle, a ‘defendant owes a duty of care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct, with respect to all risks which make the conduct unreasonably dangerous.’ ” (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 434-435 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 ] (Tarasoff), quoting Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 382, 399 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 765 , 525 P.2d 669 ].) Another general principle is “that, as a general matter, there is no duty to act to protect others from the conduct of third parties. [Citations.]” (Delgado v. Trax Bar &

2007Code, § 1714.) On the other hand, “[a] person who has not created a peril is not liable in tort merely for failure to take affirmative action to assist or protect another . . . .” (Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 23 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 233 , 664 P.2d 137 ] (Williams).) “This rule derives from the common law’s distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, and its reluctance to impose liability for the latter.” (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 435, fn. 5 .) Although the general rule of nonliability is that “no one is required to save an

2026(See, e.g., Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 936 [student’s “tendency to drive recklessly”]; Doe 1 v. City of Murrieta (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 899, 919 (Murrieta) [risk posed by police officer who abused minors during ride-alongs], disapproved on another ground in Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th 204 ; Federico v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1214 [risk of harm presented by employee]; Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 395 (Juarez) [negligent “selection, supervision and retention” claim based on scoutmaster’s sexual misconduct], d

2026(See, e.g., Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 936 [student’s “tendency to drive recklessly”]; Doe 1 v. City of Murrieta (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 899, 919 (Murrieta) [risk posed by police officer who abused minors during ride-alongs], disapproved on another ground in Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th 204 ; Federico v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1214 [risk of harm presented by employee]; Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 395 (Juarez) [negligent “selection, supervision and retention” claim based on scoutmaster’s sexual misconduct], d

2024(Carlin, at p. 1116; Gall v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 117 , 122 (Gall); Plenger v. Alza Corp. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 349, 362 (Plenger).) But the manufacturer is required to warn physicians of any non-negligible risks that are generally unknown to the medical 5 HIMES v. SOMATICS, LLC Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. community, as this will “allow the health-care provider, and thereby the patient, to make an informed choice whether to utilize the drug or medical device.” (Rest.3d Torts, Products Liability, § 6, com. d, p. 148.) Once the manufacturer has fulfilled its duty to

2017Thus, the duty to warn in these cases runs to the physician, not the patient.” (Ibid., italics added; see Plenger v. Alza Corp. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 349, 361, fn. 6 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 811 ].) Breg has not cited any authority extending the learned intermediary doctrine to medical devices such as the Polar Care 500, which are not implantable, and we are aware of none.

2009Co. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 406, 415-416 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 402 , 556 P.2d 764 ]), university therapists’ failure to warn a patient’s homicide victim of the patient’s prior threats to kill her (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 444-447 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 ]), and a police officer’s negligent conduct of a traffic investigation once undertaken (McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 70 Cal.2d 252, 261-262 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 389 , 449 P.2d 453 ]).

2009Co. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 406, 415-416 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 402 , 556 P.2d 764 ]), university therapists’ failure to warn a patient’s homicide victim of the patient’s prior threats to kill her (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 444-447 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 ]), and a police officer’s negligent conduct of a traffic investigation once undertaken (McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 70 Cal.2d 252, 261-262 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 389 , 449 P.2d 453 ]).

2025California courts have determined “[a] ‘special relationship’ exists between a doctor and a patient.” (Myers v. Quesenberry (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 888, 892 (Myers), citing Tarasoff, supra, 17 Cal.3d 425, 436 ; see also Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 310 (conc. opn., Kaufman, J.); Elsheref v. Applied Materials, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 451, 461 [quoting Tarasoff].) “ ‘Such a relationship may support affirmative duties for the benefit of third persons.’ ” ( Myers, supra, at p. 892 , quoting Tarasoff, supra, at p. 436 , fns. omitted.) Here, Dr. Dhawan concedes doctors and

2004(Cf. Nolly v. Grace Community Church, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 296, fn. 6 [court has “never imposed ‘an affirmative duty on a psychiatrist to see that his patient does no harm to himself’ ”].) Thus, appellants cannot show that respondents owed Mrs. Hernandez a duty to protect as alleged.

2023Furthermore, concluding that a petitioner seeking to terminate registration waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege could also have the unintended effect of causing tier one registrants to avoid seeking psychological treatment and/or causing them to be reluctant to “make the full disclosure upon which diagnosis and treatment … depends.” (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 555 [“We have previously recognized ‘the public interest in supporting effective treatment of mental illness and ... the consequent public importance of safeguarding the confidential character of psychotherapeutic c

2019(Dis. opn., post, at pp. 24-25, citing Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 632 [discussing 2000 article on deterrence effects of reporting potentially violent patients], People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 558 [discussing deterrence effects of reporting patients whom psychotherapists believe to be dangerous], Tarasoff, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 440, fn. 12 [discussing 1974 article that found “little if any empirical data” on deterrence effects of reporting potentially violent patients], and Lifschutz, at pp. 426-427 [discussing deterrence effects in con

1983(Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 435 ; Buford v. State of California, supra, 104 Cal.App.3d at p. 819 ; Rest.2d Torts, supra, §§ 315-320.) Bearing in mind the foregoing controlling principles, we look to the Supreme Court precedents to determine whether Respondents were in such a special relationship to either Decedent or Appellants and therefore had a duty to warn Appellants of the impending release of Decedent.

1983Such a duty may arise, however, if `(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the *987 other which gives the other a right to protection.'" ( Davidson v. City of Westminster, supra, 32 Cal.3d 197, 203 ; see Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 435 [ 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 , 83 A.L.R.3d 1166 ].) (2) Relying on Buford v. State of California (1980) 104 Cal. App.3d 811 [ 164 Cal. Rptr. 264 ] and Harla

1992Indeed, in Wharton we made plain that the exception was “not keyed to . . . disclosure” or warning, but to the “existence of the specified factual predicate,” viz., reasonable cause for belief in the dangerousness of the patient and the necessity of disclosure. (53 Cal.3d at pp. 560-561; see People v. Gomez (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 874, 881 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 ] [to similar effect]; Mavroudis v. Superior Court (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 594, 604 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 724 ] [same]; Lemelle v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 148, 159 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 450 ] [same].) If ever there was any question about the

1992Indeed, in Wharton we made plain that the exception was “not keyed to . . . disclosure” or warning, but to the “existence of the specified factual predicate,” viz., reasonable cause for belief in the dangerousness of the patient and the necessity of disclosure. (53 Cal.3d at pp. 560-561; see People v. Gomez (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 874, 881 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 ] [to similar effect]; Mavroudis v. Superior Court (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 594, 604 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 724 ] [same]; Lemelle v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 148, 159 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 450 ] [same].) If ever there was any question about the

1999The Prosser (Green) approach often appears in American decision law via the policybased, multi-factor balancing tests made popular largely through several critical California Supreme Court decisions, particularly, Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California [(1976) 17 Cal.3d 425 , 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 ], Rowland v. Christian [ (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 , 70 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 443 P.2d 561 ], Dillon v. Legg [(1968) 68 Cal.2d 728 , 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 ], and Biakanja v. Irving [(1958) 49 Cal.2d 647 , 320 P.2d 16 ], American courts have had little use for the relevant sections of

1999The Prosser (Green) approach often appears in American decision law via the policybased, multi-factor balancing tests made popular largely through several critical California Supreme Court decisions, particularly, Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California [(1976) 17 Cal.3d 425 , 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 ], Rowland v. Christian [ (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 , 70 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 443 P.2d 561 ], Dillon v. Legg [(1968) 68 Cal.2d 728 , 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 ], and Biakanja v. Irving [(1958) 49 Cal.2d 647 , 320 P.2d 16 ], American courts have had little use for the relevant sections of

2025For instance, in Hedlund, the plaintiffs’ cause of action for failure to warn came within MICRA because the proper diagnosis of the patient was an element of the plaintiffs’ cause of action. ( Hedlund, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 703-704.) We explained: “Tarasoff [v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425 held] that diagnoses and predictions about the danger of violence presented by a patient must be rendered under accepted rules of professional responsibility, and that in so doing therapists must exercise the ‘ “reasonable degree of skill, knowledge and care ordinarily possessed

2015At a follow-up meeting the next day, Thompson stated he did not have any intent to harm others and denied experiencing any homicidal ideation.9 During subsequent meetings with Green on March 18th, 26th and 8 The Legislature passed Civil Code section 43.92 in response to Hedlund v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 695 and Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425 , which contained broad language suggesting that a therapist owed a duty of care “‘to predict and warn of potential violence by his patient’” (Ewing v. Goldstein (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 807, 816 (Ewing).) “‘“Se

2022As plaintiffs put it, “because manufacturers do not adequately warn doctors, they must warn patients.” 13 In support of their position, plaintiffs point to language in Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 51 (Stevens), a case in which our Supreme Court discussed the operation of the learned intermediary doctrine, saying this: “[i]n the case of medical prescriptions, ‘if adequate warning of potential dangers of a drug has been given to doctors, there is no duty by the drug manufacturer to insure that the warning reaches the doctor’s patient for whom the drug is prescribed.’ ” (Id. at p

2020(See Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 179 [“A product can be defective in its manufacture or design, or because it fails to include a warning about known risks.”].) “‘Generally speaking, manufacturers have a duty to warn consumers about the hazards inherent in their products.’” (Id. at p. 181.) In the case of prescription drugs, however, California has adopted the “learned intermediary doctrine,” according to which “‘the duty to warn runs to the physician, not to the patient.’ [Citation.] ‘“[I]f adequate warning of potential dangers of a drug has been given to doctors,

2025California courts have determined “[a] ‘special relationship’ exists between a doctor and a patient.” (Myers v. Quesenberry (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 888, 892 (Myers), citing Tarasoff, supra, 17 Cal.3d 425, 436 ; see also Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 310 (conc. opn., Kaufman, J.); Elsheref v. Applied Materials, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 451, 461 [quoting Tarasoff].) “ ‘Such a relationship may support affirmative duties for the benefit of third persons.’ ” ( Myers, supra, at p. 892 , quoting Tarasoff, supra, at p. 436 , fns. omitted.) Here, Dr. Dhawan concedes doctors and

2025California courts have determined “[a] ‘special relationship’ exists between a doctor and a patient.” (Myers v. Quesenberry (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 888, 892 (Myers), citing Tarasoff, supra, 17 Cal.3d 425, 436 ; see also Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 310 (conc. opn., Kaufman, J.); Elsheref v. Applied Materials, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 451, 461 [quoting Tarasoff].) “ ‘Such a relationship may support affirmative duties for the benefit of third persons.’ ” ( Myers, supra, at p. 892 , quoting Tarasoff, supra, at p. 436 , fns. omitted.) Here, Dr. Dhawan concedes doctors and

2002Group v. County of Santa Clara, supra, 11 Cal.4th at page 1019 . 28 City of Morgan Hill v. Brown (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1121 [ 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 361 ]. 29 Barner v. Leeds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 676, 684-685 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 97 , 13 P.3d 704 ]. 30 Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782, 788 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 240 , 447 P.2d 352 ], quoting Ham v. County of Los Angeles (1920) 46 Cal.App. 148, 162 [ 189 P. 462 ]. 31 Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 981 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 842 , 897 P.2d 1320 ]. 32 Caldwell v. Montoya, supra, 10 Cal.4th at page 981 , quoting Johnson v. State of Califo

2002Group v. County of Santa Clara, supra, 11 Cal.4th at page 1019 . 28 City of Morgan Hill v. Brown (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1121 [ 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 361 ]. 29 Barner v. Leeds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 676, 684-685 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 97 , 13 P.3d 704 ]. 30 Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782, 788 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 240 , 447 P.2d 352 ], quoting Ham v. County of Los Angeles (1920) 46 Cal.App. 148, 162 [ 189 P. 462 ]. 31 Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 981 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 842 , 897 P.2d 1320 ]. 32 Caldwell v. Montoya, supra, 10 Cal.4th at page 981 , quoting Johnson v. State of Califo

2001In such cases the question of duty is governed by the standards of ordinary care. [Citations.]” (Pa mela L., supra, 112 Cal.App.3d at p. 209 , italics added, citing Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 49 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 468 , 539 P.2d 36 ] (Weirum) and Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 435, fn. 5 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 , 83 A.L.R.3d 1166 ].) Stated more simply, as a general rule, California tort law does not require people to be Good Samaritans, and ordinarily does not impose liability for mere nonfeasance.

1985Appellant cites Pamela L. v. Farmer (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 206 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 282 ]; Mann v. State of California (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 773 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 82 ]; Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 , 83 A.L.R.3d 1166 ]; O’Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp. (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 798 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 487 ]; and Musgrove v. Ambrose Properties (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 44 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 722 ] as involving duties imposed by a “special relationship.” However, none of those involve driving while intoxicated or the effects of the 1978 legislati