33 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Field v. Mansgreen2 sentences2026Justifiable reliance, as compared to reasonable reliance, “‘is a matter of the qualities and characteristics of the particular plaintiff, and the circumstances of the particular case, rather than of the application of a community standard of conduct to all cases.’” Id. at 496 , quoting Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 70-71 (1995). 2025Justification is a matter of the qualities and characteristics of the particular plaintiff, and the circumstances of the particular case, rather than of the application of a community standard of conduct to all cases.” ’ ” Id. at 88 , quoting Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 71 (1995), quoting Restatement of the Law, Torts, § 545A, Comment b (1976). {¶ 119} The trial court did not consider this issue because it rejected the fraud claim on another basis. | 3 | 8 |
State v. Fultongreen2 sentences2025Burke evidently is black, and her lawyer suggests that Burke’s constitutional rights may have been violated because every member of the jury at her trial was white. {¶20} “In order to establish a violation of the fair representative cross-section of the community requirement for a petit jury array under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, a defendant must prove: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in r 2018Crim.R. 24(F) permits a challenge to the array of petit jurors on the basis that it "was not selected, drawn or summoned in accordance with law." Crim.R. 24(F) requires that such challenges be made "before the examination of the jurors * * *." "In order to establish a violation of the fair representative cross-section of the community requirement for a petit jury array under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, a defendant must prove: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group | 1 | 18 |
Duren v. Missourigreen2 sentences2013The holding that “petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community * * * impose[s] no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population”; “[d]efendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition.” Taylor at 538 . {¶33} “In order to establish a violation of the fair representative cross-section of the community requirement for a petit jury array under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, a defendant must prove: (1) that the group alleg 2013The holding that “petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community * * * impose[s] no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population”; “[d]efendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition.” Taylor at 538 . {¶33} “In order to establish a violation of the fair representative cross-section of the community requirement for a petit jury array under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, a defendant must prove: (1) that the group alleg | 1 | 9 |
Amerifirst Savings Bank of Xenia v. Kruggreen2 sentences2026Justifiable reliance, as compared to reasonable reliance, “‘is a matter of the qualities and characteristics of the particular plaintiff, and the circumstances of the particular case, rather than of the application of a community standard of conduct to all cases.’” Id. at 496 , quoting Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 70-71 (1995). 2020Justifiable reliance, as contrasted with reasonable reliance, "'is a matter of the qualities and characteristics of the particular plaintiff, and the circumstances of the particular case, rather than of the application of a community standard of conduct to all cases.'" Id. at 496 , quoting Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 70-71 , 116 S.Ct. 437 (1995). {¶21} In determining whether there was justifiable reliance, "the court must inquire into the relationship between the parties. * * * The court must consider the nature of the transaction, the form and materiality of the representation, the relationsh | 1 | 4 |
Mishler v. Halegreen2 sentences2026In determining whether one party justifiably relied on the other’s statements, “the court must inquire into the relationship between the parties. . . [and] must consider the nature of the transaction, the form and materiality of the representation, the relationship of the parties and their respective means and knowledge, as well as other circumstances.” Mishler v. Hale, 2014-Ohio-5805, ¶ 33 (2d Dist.). {¶ 51} In this case, as the magistrate found and the trial court adopted, the facts do not support a finding that Town’s reliance on the representation in the MLS listing was justified. 2020Montgomery No. 25962, 2014-Ohio-5805, ¶ 33 . {¶22} Even the existence of an "as is" clause does not overcome the ability of buyers to justifiably rely on representations made by the sellers regarding defects in the home. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Crosbygreen1 sentence2025See State v. Crosby, 2016-Ohio-571, ¶ 11 (5th Dist.) (“appellant is an African American and meets the first prong of the test as a “distinctive” group within the community”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. St. Martingreen1 sentence2014Cuyahoga No. 96834, 2012-Ohio-1633, ¶ 13 (citing State v. Chaffin, 30 Ohio St.2d 13, 17 , 282 N.E.2d 46 (1972), an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment case, in reviewing a felony sentence for consistency). {¶9} The concept of proportionality, referring to the shocking to the sense of justice in the community standard, under the cruel and unusual punishment analysis, or disproportionate to the offender’s conduct standard, under consecutive sentencing review, focuses on the offender’s conduct as it relates to his crimes, and not to the sentences of other similarly situated offenders.2 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lepera v. Fuson
green
1 sentence2025Justification is a matter of the qualities and characteristics of the particular plaintiff, and the circumstances of the particular case, rather than of the application of a community standard of conduct to all cases.” ’ ” Id. at 88 , quoting Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 71 (1995), quoting Restatement of the Law, Torts, § 545A, Comment b (1976). {¶ 119} The trial court did not consider this issue because it rejected the fraud claim on another basis. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Sieng, Unpublished Decision (3-30-2007)
green
1 sentence2017Id. at ¶ 12- 16. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Chaffin
green
2 sentences2014Cuyahoga No. 96834, 2012-Ohio-1633, ¶ 13 (citing State v. Chaffin, 30 Ohio St.2d 13, 17 , 282 N.E.2d 46 (1972), an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment case, in reviewing a felony sentence for consistency). {¶9} The concept of proportionality, referring to the shocking to the sense of justice in the community standard, under the cruel and unusual punishment analysis, or disproportionate to the offender’s conduct standard, under consecutive sentencing review, focuses on the offender’s conduct as it relates to his crimes, and not to the sentences of other similarly situated offenders.2 2014Cuyahoga No. 96834, 2012-Ohio-1633, ¶ 13 (citing State v. Chaffin, 30 Ohio St.2d 13, 17 , 282 N.E.2d 46 (1972), an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment case, in reviewing a felony sentence for consistency). {¶9} The concept of proportionality, referring to the shocking to the sense of justice in the community standard, under the cruel and unusual punishment analysis, or disproportionate to the offender’s conduct standard, under consecutive sentencing review, focuses on the offender’s conduct as it relates to his crimes, and not to the sentences of other similarly situated offenders.2 | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2006In paragraph two of the syllabus of Fulton , the court stated, as follows: In order to establish a violation of the fair representative cross-section of the community requirement for a petit jury array under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, a defendant must prove: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that the representation is due to | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Wilson
green
1 sentence2006However it is not necessary that every jury contain representatives of all economic, social, religious, racial, political, and geographical groups in the community. {¶ 16} In State v. Wilson (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 199 , 202 , the Supreme Court of Ohio stated that a proportionate number of an accused's race is not constitutionally required if the jury selection standards apply to all persons. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Moore
green
1 sentence1999Accordingly, we apply the following test to the scenario at hand: "In order to establish a violation of the fair representative cross-section the community requirement for a petit jury array * * *", a defendant must prove: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that the representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process." State v. Moor | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Sedelbauer v. State
green
2 sentences1991On appeal, the defendant charged that the trial court should have instructed the jury that the proper community standard is what the community will “tolerate” rather than what the community will “accept.” In overruling this assignment of error, the court relied upon Sedelbauer v. State (Ind.1981), 428 N.E.2d 206 , certiorari denied (1982), 455 U.S. 1035 , 102 S.Ct. 1739 , 72 L.Ed.2d 153 , in which the Indiana Supreme Court found the two words to be “virtually interchangeable.” The Indiana court *332 determined that any perceived distinction in meaning between the two words was superficial, ste 1991Sedelbauer, supra. Any distinction between the two words is so insignificant as to fail to provide a sufficient basis for a finding of reversible error which must be predicated upon an incomplete or erroneous instruction resulting in substantial prejudice to the accused. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Holland v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1991(Duren v. Missouri [1979], 439 U.S. 357, 364 [ 99 S.Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579, 587 ], applied and followed.)” In Holland v. Illinois (1990), 493 U.S. 474 , 110 S.Ct. 803 , 107 L.Ed.2d 905 , the Supreme Court discussed the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement: “The Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross section on the venire is a means of assuring, not a representative jury (which the Constitution does not demand), but an impartial one (which it does). 1991(Duren v. Missouri [1979], 439 U.S. 357, 364 [ 99 S.Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579, 587 ], applied and followed.)” In Holland v. Illinois (1990), 493 U.S. 474 , 110 S.Ct. 803 , 107 L.Ed.2d 905 , the Supreme Court discussed the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement: “The Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross section on the venire is a means of assuring, not a representative jury (which the Constitution does not demand), but an impartial one (which it does). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Zeigler v. Florida
green
1 sentence1991On appeal, the defendant charged that the trial court should have instructed the jury that the proper community standard is what the community will “tolerate” rather than what the community will “accept.” In overruling this assignment of error, the court relied upon Sedelbauer v. State (Ind.1981), 428 N.E.2d 206 , certiorari denied (1982), 455 U.S. 1035 , 102 S.Ct. 1739 , 72 L.Ed.2d 153 , in which the Indiana Supreme Court found the two words to be “virtually interchangeable.” The Indiana court *332 determined that any perceived distinction in meaning between the two words was superficial, ste | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Sedelbauer v. Indiana
green
1 sentence1991On appeal, the defendant charged that the trial court should have instructed the jury that the proper community standard is what the community will “tolerate” rather than what the community will “accept.” In overruling this assignment of error, the court relied upon Sedelbauer v. State (Ind.1981), 428 N.E.2d 206 , certiorari denied (1982), 455 U.S. 1035 , 102 S.Ct. 1739 , 72 L.Ed.2d 153 , in which the Indiana Supreme Court found the two words to be “virtually interchangeable.” The Indiana court *332 determined that any perceived distinction in meaning between the two words was superficial, ste | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Hoopa Valley Tribe of Indians v. Short
green
1 sentence1991On appeal, the defendant charged that the trial court should have instructed the jury that the proper community standard is what the community will “tolerate” rather than what the community will “accept.” In overruling this assignment of error, the court relied upon Sedelbauer v. State (Ind.1981), 428 N.E.2d 206 , certiorari denied (1982), 455 U.S. 1035 , 102 S.Ct. 1739 , 72 L.Ed.2d 153 , in which the Indiana Supreme Court found the two words to be “virtually interchangeable.” The Indiana court *332 determined that any perceived distinction in meaning between the two words was superficial, ste | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Bruni v. Tatsumi
green
1 sentence1990Bruni v. Tatsumi (1976), 46 Ohio St. 2d 127 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.