community standard in Oregon

2022See Coffey v. Board of Geologist Examiners, 348 Or 494, 509 , 235 P3d 678 (2010) (“[W]e cannot attribute to the legislature an intent to require the board to specify by rule, in advance of adjudica- tion, how it will determine the community standard of care in every case.”); McKay v. Board of Medical Examiners, 100 Or App 685, 691 , 788 P2d 476 (1990) (concluding that the board did not need to define “recognized standards of eth- ics” by rulemaking).

2022See Coffey v. Board of Geologist Examiners, 348 Or 494, 509 , 235 P3d 678 (2010) (“[W]e cannot attribute to the legislature an intent to require the board to specify by rule, in advance of adjudica- tion, how it will determine the community standard of care in every case.”); McKay v. Board of Medical Examiners, 100 Or App 685, 691 , 788 P2d 476 (1990) (concluding that the board did not need to define “recognized standards of eth- ics” by rulemaking).

2013The excerpts of the record set out in the majority opinion reveal that the prosecutor in Wilson objected to defendant’s request to waive a jury, arguing that the mental state at issue—extreme indifference to the value of human life—was a community standard better resolved by a jury than a judge. 353 Or at 251 .

2012We reasoned that, through the enactment of the 1989 version of former ORS 161.565(2), the legislature had “determined that misdemeanors no longer represent anti-social behavior serious enough to warrant criminal prosecution in the absence of a district attorney’s affirmative decision otherwise.” 118 Or App at 670 .

2010In the professional negligence context, this court has recognized that “the standard of care is that of a reasonably prudent, careful and skillful practitioner of that discipline in *510 the community or a similar community under the same or similar circumstances.” Creasey v. Hogan, 292 Or 154, 163 , 637 P2d 114 (1981) (footnote omitted) (malpractice claim against podiatrist); see also Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Or 174, 179 , 489 P2d 953 (1971) (recognizing that a professional acts negligently by failing to follow “the reasonable practice * * * in the community”).

2010In the professional negligence context, this court has recognized that “the standard of care is that of a reasonably prudent, careful and skillful practitioner of that discipline in *510 the community or a similar community under the same or similar circumstances.” Creasey v. Hogan, 292 Or 154, 163 , 637 P2d 114 (1981) (footnote omitted) (malpractice claim against podiatrist); see also Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Or 174, 179 , 489 P2d 953 (1971) (recognizing that a professional acts negligently by failing to follow “the reasonable practice * * * in the community”).

1999Because no expert testified that the standard in the professional community required a pharmacist to warn of the hazards of this prescription drug, defendant argues that no breach of due care could be found, even if the warning were lacking.” Id. at 255 .

1999Considering the complex relationship between a physician, the patient and a pharmacist, we hold that an expert must testify as to the standard of care in the community for warning of dangers of a prescription drug before a jury may determine that such a standard was breached.” Id. at 256 . 11 See also Tiedemann v. Radiation Therapy Consultants, 299 Or 238, 242-45 , 701 P2d 440 (1985); Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Or 174, 179 , 489 P2d 953 (1971) (both addressing requirements of expert testimony in professional malpractice actions).

1999Considering the complex relationship between a physician, the patient and a pharmacist, we hold that an expert must testify as to the standard of care in the community for warning of dangers of a prescription drug before a jury may determine that such a standard was breached.” Id. at 256 . 11 See also Tiedemann v. Radiation Therapy Consultants, 299 Or 238, 242-45 , 701 P2d 440 (1985); Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Or 174, 179 , 489 P2d 953 (1971) (both addressing requirements of expert testimony in professional malpractice actions).

1999Considering the complex relationship between a physician, the patient and a pharmacist, we hold that an expert must testify as to the standard of care in the community for warning of dangers of a prescription drug before a jury may determine that such a standard was breached.” Id. at 256 . 11 See also Tiedemann v. Radiation Therapy Consultants, 299 Or 238, 242-45 , 701 P2d 440 (1985); Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Or 174, 179 , 489 P2d 953 (1971) (both addressing requirements of expert testimony in professional malpractice actions).

1990This is plainly presumptuous and contrary to our often pronounced pledge of judicial self-restraint.” 269 Or at 260 .

1982Uihlein v. Albertsons, Inc., 282 Or 631 , 580 P2d 1014 (1978); Hamilton v. State, 42 Or App 821, 829 , 601 P2d 882 (1979).

1982Uihlein v. Albertsons, Inc., 282 Or 631 , 580 P2d 1014 (1978); Hamilton v. State, 42 Or App 821, 829 , 601 P2d 882 (1979).

1982Uihlein v. Albertsons, Inc., 282 Or 631 , 580 P2d 1014 (1978); Hamilton v. State, 42 Or App 821, 829 , 601 P2d 882 (1979).

1982Uihlein v. Albertsons, Inc., 282 Or 631 , 580 P2d 1014 (1978); Hamilton v. State, 42 Or App 821, 829 , 601 P2d 882 (1979).

1979See also, Hoefer v. Cope, 40 Or App 275 , 594 P2d 1300 , rev den 287 Or 215 (1979); Jefferis v. Arden-Mayfair Inc., 39 Or App 377 , 592 P2d 271 (1979).

1979See also, Hoefer v. Cope, 40 Or App 275 , 594 P2d 1300 , rev den 287 Or 215 (1979); Jefferis v. Arden-Mayfair Inc., 39 Or App 377 , 592 P2d 271 (1979).

1977It is further strengthened by the United States Supreme Court’s continuing references to the Roth criteria as "basic guidelines for the trier of fact,” Ward v. Illinois, 431 US 767 , 97 S Ct 2085 , 52 L Ed 2d 738 (1977), rather than as objective forensic standards.

1977It is further strengthened by the United States Supreme Court’s continuing references to the Roth criteria as "basic guidelines for the trier of fact,” Ward v. Illinois, 431 US 767 , 97 S Ct 2085 , 52 L Ed 2d 738 (1977), rather than as objective forensic standards.

1960The verdict of two eminent scholars on this point is as follows: "`Although the whole structure of obscenity censorship hinges upon the unproved assumption that "obscene" literature is a significant factor in causing sexual deviation from the community standard, no report can be found of a single effort at genuine research to test this assumption by singling out as factor for study the effect of sex literature upon sex conduct.' [Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 Minn L Rev 295, 385.] "Indeed, for an undetermined number of individuals, the writing or

1960The verdict of two eminent scholars on this point is as follows: "`Although the whole structure of obscenity censorship hinges upon the unproved assumption that "obscene" literature is a significant factor in causing sexual deviation from the community standard, no report can be found of a single effort at genuine research to test this assumption by singling out as factor for study the effect of sex literature upon sex conduct.' [Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 Minn L Rev 295, 385.] "Indeed, for an undetermined number of individuals, the writing or

1960The verdict of two eminent scholars on this point is as follows: "`Although the whole structure of obscenity censorship hinges upon the unproved assumption that "obscene" literature is a significant factor in causing sexual deviation from the community standard, no report can be found of a single effort at genuine research to test this assumption by singling out as factor for study the effect of sex literature upon sex conduct.' [Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 Minn L Rev 295, 385.] "Indeed, for an undetermined number of individuals, the writing or

1960The verdict of two eminent scholars on this point is as follows: "`Although the whole structure of obscenity censorship hinges upon the unproved assumption that "obscene" literature is a significant factor in causing sexual deviation from the community standard, no report can be found of a single effort at genuine research to test this assumption by singling out as factor for study the effect of sex literature upon sex conduct.' [Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 Minn L Rev 295, 385.] "Indeed, for an undetermined number of individuals, the writing or

1960Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 US 495 , 72 SC 777, 96 L Ed 1098 (1952), (New York statute proscribing showing of “sacriligeous” films held unconstitutionally vague and broad); Thomas v. Collins, 323 US 516, 534-38 , 65 SC 315, 89 L Ed 430 (1945), (Texas statute requiring labor organizers to obtain organizer’s card before "soliciting,” held unconstitutional as blanketing with uncertainty whatever might be said); Staub v. Baxley, 355 US 313, 321-25 , 78 SC 277, 2 L Ed2d 302 (1958), (city ordinance requiring a solicitor’s permit which could be granted or denied by reason of “effects upon gen

1960The verdict of two eminent scholars on this point is as follows: "`Although the whole structure of obscenity censorship hinges upon the unproved assumption that "obscene" literature is a significant factor in causing sexual deviation from the community standard, no report can be found of a single effort at genuine research to test this assumption by singling out as factor for study the effect of sex literature upon sex conduct.' [Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 Minn L Rev 295, 385.] "Indeed, for an undetermined number of individuals, the writing or

1960The verdict of two eminent scholars on this point is as follows: "`Although the whole structure of obscenity censorship hinges upon the unproved assumption that "obscene" literature is a significant factor in causing sexual deviation from the community standard, no report can be found of a single effort at genuine research to test this assumption by singling out as factor for study the effect of sex literature upon sex conduct.' [Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 Minn L Rev 295, 385.] "Indeed, for an undetermined number of individuals, the writing or

1960The verdict of two eminent scholars on this point is as follows: "`Although the whole structure of obscenity censorship hinges upon the unproved assumption that "obscene" literature is a significant factor in causing sexual deviation from the community standard, no report can be found of a single effort at genuine research to test this assumption by singling out as factor for study the effect of sex literature upon sex conduct.' [Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 Minn L Rev 295, 385.] "Indeed, for an undetermined number of individuals, the writing or

1960The verdict of two eminent scholars on this point is as follows: "`Although the whole structure of obscenity censorship hinges upon the unproved assumption that "obscene" literature is a significant factor in causing sexual deviation from the community standard, no report can be found of a single effort at genuine research to test this assumption by singling out as factor for study the effect of sex literature upon sex conduct.' [Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 Minn L Rev 295, 385.] "Indeed, for an undetermined number of individuals, the writing or

1960The verdict of two eminent scholars on this point is as follows: "`Although the whole structure of obscenity censorship hinges upon the unproved assumption that "obscene" literature is a significant factor in causing sexual deviation from the community standard, no report can be found of a single effort at genuine research to test this assumption by singling out as factor for study the effect of sex literature upon sex conduct.' [Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 Minn L Rev 295, 385.] "Indeed, for an undetermined number of individuals, the writing or

1960Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 US 495 , 72 SC 777, 96 L Ed 1098 (1952), (New York statute proscribing showing of “sacriligeous” films held unconstitutionally vague and broad); Thomas v. Collins, 323 US 516, 534-38 , 65 SC 315, 89 L Ed 430 (1945), (Texas statute requiring labor organizers to obtain organizer’s card before "soliciting,” held unconstitutional as blanketing with uncertainty whatever might be said); Staub v. Baxley, 355 US 313, 321-25 , 78 SC 277, 2 L Ed2d 302 (1958), (city ordinance requiring a solicitor’s permit which could be granted or denied by reason of “effects upon gen

1960The verdict of two eminent scholars on this point is as follows: "`Although the whole structure of obscenity censorship hinges upon the unproved assumption that "obscene" literature is a significant factor in causing sexual deviation from the community standard, no report can be found of a single effort at genuine research to test this assumption by singling out as factor for study the effect of sex literature upon sex conduct.' [Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 Minn L Rev 295, 385.] "Indeed, for an undetermined number of individuals, the writing or