community standard in Arizona

1991Vigil v. Herman, 102 Ariz. 31, 34 , 424 P.2d 159, 162 (1967) (in a medical malpractice case, the community standard of care may be established by defendant doctor’s own testimony); Stallcup v. Coscarart, 79 Ariz. 42, 46 , 282 P.2d 791 (1955), quoting Bickford v. Lawson, 27 Cal.App.2d 416, 421 , 81 P.2d 216, 219 (1938) (expert testimony establishing plaintiff’s prima facie case in a malpractice action may be that of the defendant); Evans v. Bernhard, 23 Ariz.App. 413, 416 , 533 P.2d 721, 724 (1975) (“The medical standard of care must be established by expert medical testimony____ However, third

1991Vigil v. Herman, 102 Ariz. 31, 34 , 424 P.2d 159, 162 (1967) (in a medical malpractice case, the community standard of care may be established by defendant doctor’s own testimony); Stallcup v. Coscarart, 79 Ariz. 42, 46 , 282 P.2d 791 (1955), quoting Bickford v. Lawson, 27 Cal.App.2d 416, 421 , 81 P.2d 216, 219 (1938) (expert testimony establishing plaintiff’s prima facie case in a malpractice action may be that of the defendant); Evans v. Bernhard, 23 Ariz.App. 413, 416 , 533 P.2d 721, 724 (1975) (“The medical standard of care must be established by expert medical testimony____ However, third

2023GREENE Opinion of the Court ¶34 As reiterated in Atkins, the “clearest and most reliable” objective indication of a national consensus concerning imposition of the death penalty is “the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.” 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).

2023The superior court likewise concluded a community standard existed, in conjunction with the actions of the legislature, to render Greene’s sentence unconstitutional. ¶38 When considering evolving standards of decency and the constitutionality of imposing a death sentence, “the response of juries reflected in their sentencing decisions are to be consulted.” Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 . ¶39 The jury information Greene presents consists of the fact that out of 142 capital cases reviewed by this Court on direct appeal since 2002, 9 Notably, the former version of (F)(5) remains an aggravating factor fo

2023The superior court likewise concluded a community standard existed, in conjunction with the actions of the legislature, to render Greene’s sentence unconstitutional. ¶38 When considering evolving standards of decency and the constitutionality of imposing a death sentence, “the response of juries reflected in their sentencing decisions are to be consulted.” Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 . ¶39 The jury information Greene presents consists of the fact that out of 142 capital cases reviewed by this Court on direct appeal since 2002, 9 Notably, the former version of (F)(5) remains an aggravating factor fo

2017After holding evidentiary hearings, the juvenile court in January 2016 denied the Community’s motion to transfer A.D.’s case to tribal court, finding the foster parents had met their burden of showing that good cause existed under § 1911(b) to deny the motion. ¶7 The Community appealed, and the court of appeals addressed whether “26 U.S.C. § 1911(b) of ICWA allow[s] transfer to tribal court of state preadoptive and adoptive placement proceedings occurring after parental rights have terminated!)]” Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 385 , 389 ¶ 11, 379 P.3d 1016 (App. 20

2017After holding evidentiary hearings, the juvenile court in January 2016 denied the Community’s motion to transfer A.D.’s case to tribal court, finding the foster parents had met their burden of showing that good cause existed under § 1911(b) to deny the motion. ¶7 The Community appealed, and the court of appeals addressed whether “26 U.S.C. § 1911(b) of ICWA allow[s] transfer to tribal court of state preadoptive and adoptive placement proceedings occurring after parental rights have terminated!)]” Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 385 , 389 ¶ 11, 379 P.3d 1016 (App. 20

2000See State v. Corley, 108 Ariz. 240, 242 , 495 P.2d 470, 472 (1972) (“a person’s knowledge that his act is ‘wrong,’ as such term is used ... for criminal insanity,” may not be based on the defendant’s “personal beliefs” but on “‘wrong’ as defined by a community standard of morality”); 4 see generally People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 137 (Colo.1992) (the concepts of right and wrong “are essentially ethical in character and have their primary source in the existing societal standards of morality”); State v. Wilson, 242 Conn. 605 , 700 A.2d 633 (1997) (finding personal belief test improper method

2000See State v. Corley, 108 Ariz. 240, 242 , 495 P.2d 470, 472 (1972) (“a person’s knowledge that his act is ‘wrong,’ as such term is used ... for criminal insanity,” may not be based on the defendant’s “personal beliefs” but on “‘wrong’ as defined by a community standard of morality”); 4 see generally People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 137 (Colo.1992) (the concepts of right and wrong “are essentially ethical in character and have their primary source in the existing societal standards of morality”); State v. Wilson, 242 Conn. 605 , 700 A.2d 633 (1997) (finding personal belief test improper method

2000See State v. Corley, 108 Ariz. 240, 242 , 495 P.2d 470, 472 (1972) (“a person’s knowledge that his act is ‘wrong,’ as such term is used ... for criminal insanity,” may not be based on the defendant’s “personal beliefs” but on “‘wrong’ as defined by a community standard of morality”); 4 see generally People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 137 (Colo.1992) (the concepts of right and wrong “are essentially ethical in character and have their primary source in the existing societal standards of morality”); State v. Wilson, 242 Conn. 605 , 700 A.2d 633 (1997) (finding personal belief test improper method

2000See State v. Corley, 108 Ariz. 240, 242 , 495 P.2d 470, 472 (1972) (“a person’s knowledge that his act is ‘wrong,’ as such term is used ... for criminal insanity,” may not be based on the defendant’s “personal beliefs” but on “‘wrong’ as defined by a community standard of morality”); 4 see generally People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 137 (Colo.1992) (the concepts of right and wrong “are essentially ethical in character and have their primary source in the existing societal standards of morality”); State v. Wilson, 242 Conn. 605 , 700 A.2d 633 (1997) (finding personal belief test improper method

1999State v. Jensen, 193 Ariz. 105 , 970 P.2d 937 (App.1998). ¶7 In Corley , our supreme court addressed the question of “whether a person’s knowledge that his act is ‘wrong,’ as such term is used ... for criminal insanity, should be defined as “wrong’ by defendant’s personal beliefs or ‘wrong’ as defined by a community standard of morality.” Id. at 242 , 495 P.2d at 472 (citation omitted).

1999State v. Jensen, 193 Ariz. 105 , 970 P.2d 937 (App.1998). ¶7 In Corley , our supreme court addressed the question of “whether a person’s knowledge that his act is ‘wrong,’ as such term is used ... for criminal insanity, should be defined as “wrong’ by defendant’s personal beliefs or ‘wrong’ as defined by a community standard of morality.” Id. at 242 , 495 P.2d at 472 (citation omitted).

1999See State v. Berndt, 138 Ariz. 41 , 672 P.2d 1311 (1983); State v. Skaggs, 120 Ariz. 467 , 586 P.2d 1279 (1978); State v. Sanchez, 117 Ariz. 369 , 573 P.2d 60 (1977).

1999See State v. Berndt, 138 Ariz. 41 , 672 P.2d 1311 (1983); State v. Skaggs, 120 Ariz. 467 , 586 P.2d 1279 (1978); State v. Sanchez, 117 Ariz. 369 , 573 P.2d 60 (1977).

1999See State v. Berndt, 138 Ariz. 41 , 672 P.2d 1311 (1983); State v. Skaggs, 120 Ariz. 467 , 586 P.2d 1279 (1978); State v. Sanchez, 117 Ariz. 369 , 573 P.2d 60 (1977).

1999See State v. Berndt, 138 Ariz. 41 , 672 P.2d 1311 (1983); State v. Skaggs, 120 Ariz. 467 , 586 P.2d 1279 (1978); State v. Sanchez, 117 Ariz. 369 , 573 P.2d 60 (1977).

1991Vigil v. Herman, 102 Ariz. 31, 34 , 424 P.2d 159, 162 (1967) (in a medical malpractice case, the community standard of care may be established by defendant doctor’s own testimony); Stallcup v. Coscarart, 79 Ariz. 42, 46 , 282 P.2d 791 (1955), quoting Bickford v. Lawson, 27 Cal.App.2d 416, 421 , 81 P.2d 216, 219 (1938) (expert testimony establishing plaintiff’s prima facie case in a malpractice action may be that of the defendant); Evans v. Bernhard, 23 Ariz.App. 413, 416 , 533 P.2d 721, 724 (1975) (“The medical standard of care must be established by expert medical testimony____ However, third

1991Vigil v. Herman, 102 Ariz. 31, 34 , 424 P.2d 159, 162 (1967) (in a medical malpractice case, the community standard of care may be established by defendant doctor’s own testimony); Stallcup v. Coscarart, 79 Ariz. 42, 46 , 282 P.2d 791 (1955), quoting Bickford v. Lawson, 27 Cal.App.2d 416, 421 , 81 P.2d 216, 219 (1938) (expert testimony establishing plaintiff’s prima facie case in a malpractice action may be that of the defendant); Evans v. Bernhard, 23 Ariz.App. 413, 416 , 533 P.2d 721, 724 (1975) (“The medical standard of care must be established by expert medical testimony____ However, third

1991Vigil v. Herman, 102 Ariz. 31, 34 , 424 P.2d 159, 162 (1967) (in a medical malpractice case, the community standard of care may be established by defendant doctor’s own testimony); Stallcup v. Coscarart, 79 Ariz. 42, 46 , 282 P.2d 791 (1955), quoting Bickford v. Lawson, 27 Cal.App.2d 416, 421 , 81 P.2d 216, 219 (1938) (expert testimony establishing plaintiff’s prima facie case in a malpractice action may be that of the defendant); Evans v. Bernhard, 23 Ariz.App. 413, 416 , 533 P.2d 721, 724 (1975) (“The medical standard of care must be established by expert medical testimony____ However, third

1991Vigil v. Herman, 102 Ariz. 31, 34 , 424 P.2d 159, 162 (1967) (in a medical malpractice case, the community standard of care may be established by defendant doctor’s own testimony); Stallcup v. Coscarart, 79 Ariz. 42, 46 , 282 P.2d 791 (1955), quoting Bickford v. Lawson, 27 Cal.App.2d 416, 421 , 81 P.2d 216, 219 (1938) (expert testimony establishing plaintiff’s prima facie case in a malpractice action may be that of the defendant); Evans v. Bernhard, 23 Ariz.App. 413, 416 , 533 P.2d 721, 724 (1975) (“The medical standard of care must be established by expert medical testimony____ However, third

1988While the cases cited by the majority can be distinguished on their facts (cases in which there were clear suicidal attempts prior to admission which were known to the hospital authorities) in my opinion the facts in this case are more akin to those in Dimi-trijevic v. Chicago Wesley Memorial Hospital, 92 Ill.App.2d 251 , 236 N.E.2d 309 (1968).

1988While the cases cited by the majority can be distinguished on their facts (cases in which there were clear suicidal attempts prior to admission which were known to the hospital authorities) in my opinion the facts in this case are more akin to those in Dimi-trijevic v. Chicago Wesley Memorial Hospital, 92 Ill.App.2d 251 , 236 N.E.2d 309 (1968).

1979Lawson v. Ridgeway, 72 Ariz. 253 , 233 P.2d 459 (1951).

1979Lawson v. Ridgeway, 72 Ariz. 253 , 233 P.2d 459 (1951).

1977McFadden v. Watson, 51 Ariz. 110 , 74 P.2d 1181 (1938); Hays v. Richardson, 95 Ariz. 64 , 386 P.2d 791 (1963), modified on other grounds, 95 Ariz. 263 , 389 P.2d 260 (1964). 1 Therefore, a judgment for punitive damages could be had against her interest in the community and it was error to direct the verdict for either Ronald or Roberta.

1977McFadden v. Watson, 51 Ariz. 110 , 74 P.2d 1181 (1938); Hays v. Richardson, 95 Ariz. 64 , 386 P.2d 791 (1963), modified on other grounds, 95 Ariz. 263 , 389 P.2d 260 (1964). 1 Therefore, a judgment for punitive damages could be had against her interest in the community and it was error to direct the verdict for either Ronald or Roberta.

1977McFadden v. Watson, 51 Ariz. 110 , 74 P.2d 1181 (1938); Hays v. Richardson, 95 Ariz. 64 , 386 P.2d 791 (1963), modified on other grounds, 95 Ariz. 263 , 389 P.2d 260 (1964). 1 Therefore, a judgment for punitive damages could be had against her interest in the community and it was error to direct the verdict for either Ronald or Roberta.

1977McFadden v. Watson, 51 Ariz. 110 , 74 P.2d 1181 (1938); Hays v. Richardson, 95 Ariz. 64 , 386 P.2d 791 (1963), modified on other grounds, 95 Ariz. 263 , 389 P.2d 260 (1964). 1 Therefore, a judgment for punitive damages could be had against her interest in the community and it was error to direct the verdict for either Ronald or Roberta.